Franco join the axis in early June 1940

With Italy in the war merchant shipping was already going around the cape - while losing Gibraltar would be blow to British basing in the area - this might mean that the British are less adventurous ie no Greek adventure - IMO that weakened Wavells forces too much - Including the subsequent reversals suffered during Sonnenbaum I have heard something in the region of 5+ Divisions worth of heavy equipment and 1.5 Divisions worth of troops.

So Wavell has a cast iron excuse to not send his best troops to Greece and Crete and instead concentrates on Kicking in the Italians in East Africa and defending the canal (which IMO is what should have happened - perhaps with the exception of retaining Crete).
OTOH if the British don't send any help to the Greeks that might mean that the pro-Axis government in Yugoslavia is less likely to be overthrown, which I think is much less likely in the first place if Spain joins the Axis in June 1940.

That doesn't help Franco, but it does help Hitler because he doesn't have to invade and occupy the country. It would release people which could either be sent to other fronts or kept working in the German economy. It would make it easier for him go get raw materials out of Yugoslavia. IOTL the Germans helped the Hungarians expand their aircraft industry on the understanding that some of the production went to the Luftwaffe. IIRC the Yugoslav aircraft factories were building Blenheims and Hurricanes when the Germans invaded. TTL the Germans might help them expand their factories and re-tool them to make German types. Not necessarily Bf109s and Ju88s, it could be transport and training aircraft so that the German industry could concentrate on combat types.
 
As for Argentina - wasn't it pro British? After all it was selling beef to them and not the Germans. There were Argentines flying and dying in the RAF after all - they even had their own RAF fighter squadron - 164 from 1942.
Another country which AFAIK was pro-British at the time was Turkey.

However, in a situation where the British were: even more preoccupied with the Battle of the Atlantic due to Spain being in the war; not in a position to intervene in the Balkans; and suppressing a Pan-Arab revolt in the Middle East, might the Turkish government decide to take advantage of the situation by moving its border with Iraq and Syria further to the south?
 
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Erhmm ... this is June 1940 ... post-Poland-Campaign ... post Norway/Denmarck-Campaign ... post "Case Yellow" and Sichle-cut ... which alarm bells regarding the european situation are not ringing already almost ear-deafening ???
The fact that Portugal is likely to fall to the Axis one way or another after that, and IIRC that was actually one of the US' redlines (as the Azores were seen as being a potential stepping stone to the Americas).

Oh, and ... ofc it would help the western allies a lot if british almighty RN is sinking neutral non-belligerent US merchantmen on their way to Spain or even stopping other nations merchantmen considerably lowering US-american profits
... US is still neutral and non-belliogerent ... and pls don't forget IOTL the US even acknowledged the Vichy-Regime as legitimate.
How much trade did the US conduct with Germany durring WWII? How much US-German trade was there in WWI for that matter? Yeah, the US wasn't willing to stick its neck out for private businesses stupid enough to pick a fight with the RN, and most private businesses recognized that. Also US neutrality laws of the 1930s prohibited trade with belligerent nations, and I doubt FDR was going to make an exception for Spain (especially given that he'd made exceptions for the British and French).

And what do you need the puny spanish navy for in protecting neutral, maybe US-flagged merchantmen ? ... "protected" by the thrieve for profit of US-american companies ?
I don't recall saying anything of the sort. My reference to the Spanish Republican Navy was specifically its failure to interdict supply shipments to the Nationalists durring the civil war. And again, if the RN sinks an American flagged ship breaking American neutrality laws then they're just doing the US Coast Guard's job for them pro bono.
 
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OTOH if the British don't send any help to the Greeks that might mean that the pro-Axis government in Yugoslavia is less likely to be overthrown, which I think is much less likely in the first place if Spain joins the Axis in June 1940.

That doesn't help Franco, but it does help Hitler because he doesn't have to invade and occupy the country. It would release people which could either be sent to other fronts or kept working in the German economy. It would make it easier for him go get raw materials out of Yugoslavia. IOTL the Germans helped the Hungarians expand their aircraft industry on the understanding that some of the production went to the Luftwaffe. IIRC the Yugoslav aircraft factories were building Blenheims and Hurricanes when the Germans invaded. TTL the Germans might help them expand their factories and re-tool them to make German types. Not necessarily Bf109s and Ju88s, it could be transport and training aircraft so that the German industry could concentrate on combat types.
Only problem is Yugoslavs didn’t manufactured Rolls Royce engine.
However Yougoslavians did updated one Hurri with DB 601 engine from their stock of reserve engines for theirs Bf 109s for experimental purposes. Question is if Germans can supply DBs. Also production rate was very small.
 
bernardz said:
...
When Franco presented Hitler with what he required oil, food and arms were on the list.
1) Where is Spain going to get food? Germany had barely enough for itself.
2) Oil you have covered
3) Where is Spain going to get the arms to fight this war? Her industry is not big enough? Germany has not got enough for her own army.

+++++++++

Ad 1)
... from the same sources as number 2) ? ... maybe also from some other latin-american countries also ?
Ad 3)
Well, could be bought also worldwide and the med at this point of time is full of still non-belligerent neutrals which could 'lodge' or act as strawmen to trade for arms.
... well, ofc you now start crying "... but with what to pay with !"
-with whatever 'money' Franco had IOTL to pay for i.e. US oil
-with whatever 'funny money tricks' the germans might tells them
-with whatever money of whatever questionable sources the germans might/were actually able/prepared to give Franco IOTL through i.e. swiss financial 'channels'
(just some ideas possible part of whatever PoD might cause such an ATL)​

No
The RN has a blockade even if Franco has the money, he cannot get any of this from the Americas.
 
Because they were short of engines themselves.
Did the Yugoslavs make engines as well as airframes? I'm not being sarcastic, I simply don't know.

If they are making transport and training aircraft for the Germans they won't need to be able to make big high powered engines line the DB601, Jumo 211 and their successors.
 
Did the Yugoslavs make engines as well as airframes? I'm not being sarcastic, I simply don't know.

If they are making transport and training aircraft for the Germans they won't need to be able to make big high powered engines line the DB601, Jumo 211 and their successors.
Not sure but seems not. They were using HS 12. I believe Czechoslovak made. In 1940 they were considering improved version of HS12 with power above 1100 HP for their IK-3 fighters but with fall of France this was gone. Their experiment with DB 601 in Hurricanes was direct results of luck of engines but even here they had to use spare engine supplied with Bf 109.

As far as I know Romanians had similar problems with more powerful engines for their planes.
Czechoslovakia was developing HS 12 with 1000 HP but it was tested only at fall 1939, after occupation. Afterwards further research and devely was basically stopped by Germans.

Not sure how production of more developed of HS12 went in France after its fall and during the war.
 

hipper

Banned
Erhmm ... this is June 1940 ... post-Poland-Campaign ... post Norway/Denmarck-Campaign ... post "Case Yellow" and Sichle-cut ... which alarm bells regarding the european situation are not ringing already almost ear-deafening ???

Oh, and ... ofc it would help the western allies a lot if british almighty RN is sinking neutral non-belligerent US merchantmen on their way to Spain or even stopping other nations merchantmen considerably lowering US-american profits
... US is still neutral and non-belliogerent ... and pls don't forget IOTL the US even acknowledged the Vichy-Regime as legitimate.

And what do you need the puny spanish navy for in protecting neutral, maybe US-flagged merchantmen ? ... "protected" by the thrieve for profit of US-american companies ?

Well, sure, esp. as such population centres as Madrid, Murcia, Sevilla, Saragossa, Bilbao, Granada, Cordoba, Merida, Toledo, Valladolid, Leon, etc. are all served by ocean-harbors. ...

And possibly you mean the 'northern coastline' ? ... as there isn't much of a western coastline of Spain.

Another thought maybe worth thinking of :
might become an interesting early experience for the RN being fought by land-based aircrafts during a long(er) lasting operation as a blockade is ...​

Ad 1)
... from the same sources as number 2) ? ... maybe also from some other latin-american countries also ?
Ad 3)
Well, could be bought also worldwide and the med at this point of time is full of still non-belligerent neutrals which could 'lodge' or act as strawmen to trade for arms.
... well, ofc you now start crying "... but with what to pay with !"
-with whatever 'money' Franco had IOTL to pay for i.e. US oil
-with whatever 'funny money tricks' the germans might tells them
-with whatever money of whatever questionable sources the germans might/were actually able/prepared to give Franco IOTL through i.e. swiss financial 'channels'
(just some ideas possible part of whatever PoD might cause such an ATL)​



edit :
Question of mine regarding in other similar threads mentioned 'possibility' of a british amphibious action against Spain ... esp. in the time setting of this OP (mid summer 1940) :
1) Where to get the troops for from during/after Dunkirk ?
2) Really wanna invade and occupy another neutral ? ... Portugal ?​


The RN don’t need to sink merchantmen they would just reduce a Navicert for ships going to spain. the ship would than be subject to such delays that it’s voyage would be unprofitable for the owners. no close blockade required.

they used the 3rd Division as the potential assault division for a variety of schemes after Dunkirk.
 
Good PoD would be to have him be too near an explosion late in said Civil War, suffer a traumatic brain injury (one of the theories behind Henry the VIIIth's changes of behavior) and not make as smart choices afterwards.
It is pretty amusing, in a macabre way, that the challenge is so out there that we need to hand Franco a literal idiot ball!

And it would not work. If any sort of injury rendered Franco so bloody dumb he would dare risk the nigh inevitable British blockade, never mind whether they could invade or not, he'd be so damaged that his unfitness to rule would be plain, and his addled wits would make him vulnerable to a coup. in fact his own most staunch supporters would connive in the coup for his own good. Maybe they'd pull a soft coup, leaving him as a puppet ruler to save face and maintain his image as leader, but the person making this decision in the wake of the fall of France would not be brain damaged.

I can't credit the whole "let's be the straw breaking the camel's back" gamble.

I also think Franco was not only thinking of the pain a British blockade would bring. He also had his doubts about the wisdom of becoming dependent on Hitler.

Gibraltar would be nice to have,but Spain is never going to take it all by themselves; Franco would have to call on German troops to do the heavy lifting and I would think Hitler would just hang on to it himself rather than hand it over to Spain. Pretty soon any Nationalist leader would become a German puppet and would be liable to be replaced if they did not toe the German line. I think Franco temporized with Hitler as much to keep the Germanx at arms length as because he feared the RN.
 
I also think Franco was not only thinking of the pain a British blockade would bring. He also had his doubts about the wisdom of becoming dependent on Hitler.

Gibraltar would be nice to have,but Spain is never going to take it all by themselves; Franco would have to call on German troops to do the heavy lifting and I would think Hitler would just hang on to it himself rather than hand it over to Spain. Pretty soon any Nationalist leader would become a German puppet and would be liable to be replaced if they did not toe the German line. I think Franco temporized with Hitler as much to keep the Germanx at arms length as because he feared the RN.

There are two views on Franco on this question, the first is the charitable view that he never wanted to go into the war so he made demands so outrageous that he would have an out, the other view is that Franco felt that he was worth these demands. I tend to view the second as more correct. Please have a read here and let me know what you think.


http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26101/1/Franco and Hitler(lsero).pdf
 
There are two views on Franco on this question, the first is the charitable view that he never wanted to go into the war so he made demands so outrageous that he would have an out, the other view is that Franco felt that he was worth these demands. I tend to view the second as more correct. Please have a read here and let me know what you think.


http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/26101/1/Franco and Hitler(lsero).pdf
Not promising to read it, I might. Certainly won't right now.

The salient point is, would Franco be alert to the risk that who pays the piper calls the tune, and Spain can only expect to benefit from association with Hitler to the degree that Spaniards pay in treasure and blood--and even that is at risk of being appropriated for the superior racial good of the German people, as determined by their Leader? That letting German force onto Spanish soil in numbers that can overwhelm weak Spanish powers of resistance is asking for a fate comparable to a conquered province, that the fate of the Vichy leadership is the best he can hope for and even that is not certain?

I despise Franco and the horse he rode in on. Nor do I think he was any kind of intellectual giant. The point is, it didn't take a genius to recognize the risks of dealing with a viper-like mind like Hitler's or with the arrogance of a German nation rolling on the top of the world and drunk with six years of propaganda feeding on perhaps not atypical national chauvinism reinforced by high tech and great numbers and the appropriated plunder of all Europe. Nor to recognize that Spain could only do for herself on terms that required access to the global markets the British, not the Germans, controlled. Against that I do think Franco was a fascist snake himself, that his desire to massacre Communists and generally terrorize whole vast categories of people he did not like were quite salient motives for him, and teaming up with the Axis was the royal road to gratifying these desires...not to mention also, one thug crime lord to another, he owed Hitler and Mussolini big time.

We don't have to canonize him as a saint or award him a Nobel for either genius or moral integrity to recognize he was in a hell of a jam. Indeed if Hitler could have offset the price of British blockade I suppose Franco might have caved and hoped for honor among thieves. But it was in the nature of things that Hitler could not substitute for what Spain would lose, and that was not entirely a matter of accident either.

Temporizing was the right thing for him to do, on the most basic animal survival level. Had he been a crazed fanatic who set the welfare of his people at naught...well in a selective sense that is exactly what he was of course, he cared only for some Spanish people, the rest he tried to send on the road to hell by the quickest route he could engineer. Definitely a fascist. But he cared for his power base, and pulling the plug on Spain's economy had to come at a very high price indeed, in the nature of things. And for what gains anyway? For the glory of Spaniards to be in on the kill of the Soviet Union, that was something Hitler could offer--and as I understand it, Franco did send a "Blue Legion" IIRC to participate in the invasion of the USSR. But what else? Gibraltar? Can't take it without German arms, and why should the Germans give it back--why trade one bunch of unchristian Nordics in occupation of key bits of Spanish soil for another? Particularly why trade the devil you know for one who could turn into a completely new kind of monstrous thing, even if it is a monster after your own nature? What else was Hitler offering, concretely, that he wouldn't sooner just keep for himself and his favored Germans? Vaster holdings of Saharan desert with no oil and legions of hostile natives to kill? Cuba maybe? The lost Empire of the Indies in full?

Spain would get what Spain could take, which was damn little by the early '40s. If Franco temporized too long and Hitler won without him, Hitler would take everything probably. But give in too easy and all Spain, and thus Franco, gets is more misery and a brutal death--either at the hands of victorious Allies seeking to make an example, or at the hands of thankless Nazis smelling the sick sense of Spain in extremis and swooping in for an unclean feast.

It was not a comfortable place for him to be. Couldn't happen to a better person.

But he played it smart and then it paid off and he skated the rest of his weaselly life, a comfortable NATO ally washed clean by anti-Communist crusaders and buoyed up with loads of American aid, much of it in the form of economic injections via American bases and their overpaid personnel on leave. Whom I imagine some at least inflicted misery in various forms on some sectors of the Spanish people I suppose that more than covered their free-spending largesse, but not the classes of Spanish people the Nationalists cared about; they did all right at no cost at all. Americans, unlike perhaps Labourite Britons, wouldn't even sneer at the Nationalists; relatively few Abraham Lincoln Brigaders would be in the regular Army ranks and McCarthyite indoctrinated Yanks would, among their many sins, at least not be Loyalist sympathizers. They'd be lucky to know the Civil War even happened, that kind of knowledge was for coffee house beatniks who knew to stay away. His European allies might have longer memories but it would be clueless Yanks supplying the base forces as well as the procurement budgets. Anyway for every Labour Tommy or socialist poulou who might wander near the borders or off some base there would be Tories and other conservatives aplenty more appreciative of Nationalist virtues as they saw them.

Certainly I would not visit Spain during Franco's lifetime if I had these leftist chips on my shoulders!
 
Certainly I would not visit Spain during Franco's lifetime if I had these leftist chips on my shoulders!

The debate on Franco lives on. Politics is the art of the possible, the choice Spain faced was either a left-wing which quite probably would be a communist government and Franco?

One point I should say is that Franco was not a NAZI, he was a conservative and he turned out to be a capable ruler who took his country out of a devastating war into a reasonable state. Nor is it like his enemies were saints, the stories of the red terror in Spain are true.

If so my questions would be
1) Would the democratic Spanish government have survived if not for Franco and his party?
2) Would if such a left-wing government have kept Spain out of the war probably not? Hitler probably would have come into the conflict in support of his former allies. If so it would have costed the Spanish people and the Allies much in blood.
3) Which government would treat the Spanish people better, maybe if democracy survived or the allies after coming through a devastated land conquered Spain and restored democracy? Otherwise, I would say a communist government would have treated the Spanish people worse.
4) Would the Spanish people have been poorer almost certainly?
5) Would many more Spanish people have died, almost certainly?

There are good reasons why about a third of Spanish people today still support Franco.

PS I would not have voted for him

Overall it would have costed the US taxpayer much more however it went.
 
Not sure but seems not. They were using HS 12. I believe Czechoslovak made. In 1940 they were considering improved version of HS12 with power above 1100 HP for their IK-3 fighters but with fall of France this was gone. Their experiment with DB 601 in Hurricanes was direct results of luck of engines but even here they had to use spare engine supplied with Bf 109.

As far as I know Romanians had similar problems with more powerful engines for their planes.
Czechoslovakia was developing HS 12 with 1000 HP but it was tested only at fall 1939, after occupation. Afterwards further research and devely was basically stopped by Germans.

Not sure how production of more developed of HS12 went in France after its fall and during the war.
According to the Aeroflight website there was a firm called INDUSTRIJA AEROPLANSKIH MOTORA AD (factory of aircraft engines) which was formed in 1927 and built Gnôme-Rhône engines under licence.

I have found a book online about the Do17 in Yugoslav service which says that IAM built Gnôme-Rhône 157 K-14NO engines for them.
 
These extracts from the official history are what the British Government thought about Spain between the middle of 1940 and the middle of 1941.

They more or less say that Franco would like to join the war, but the economic state of his country was making him think twice about it.

However, the way I read it is that they also though Spain remaining non-belligerent was much better for the UK than Spain declaring war on the UK. E.g. gaining the Canary Islands and Spanish Guinea was no substitute for loosing Gibraltar and the Germans being able to base aircraft and warships in Iberia.

Pages 124 and 125 of The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume I, part of the British official history of World War II. (The Hyperwar transcript.)
More specifically it's the fourth paragraph of Chapter VII - The French collapse.
At sea the whole balance of strength had been upset at a stroke: the British would now be obliged to retain sufficient naval forces in European waters to match both the German and Italian fleets. Hitherto, the Western Mediterranean had been the French zone of responsibility, and the British had intended to abandon the Eastern Mediterranean if they felt it necessary to send a fleet to the Far East, in which event the French would have assumed the task of containing the Italian fleet.1 The Australian and New Zealand Governments had now to be told that in the new situation no fleet could be sent to the Far East. Within the Mediterranean the British had lost the co-operation of three French battleships, two battlecruisers and fourteen cruisers, besides numerous destroyers, submarines and small craft; the only coasts remaining open to them were those of Egypt and Palestine, the islands of Cyprus and Malta, and the Rock of Gibraltar. Italian naval and air forces would be able to move freely in the central and western basins. This led to some anxiety about Gibraltar, where the existing British forces were inadequate even for giving due warning of enemy approach. All this was bad enough, but a recent move by Spain suggested worse to come. On 14th June she had exchanged her neutrality for non-belligerency and occupied the international zone of Tangier on the pretext of guaranteeing its neutrality. It seemed possible that, following the example of Italy, she was preparing to come to the help of the winning side.
Pages 238 and 239 of Grand Strategy Volume II - Middlesbrough Reference Library copy
The conduct of the British blockade under the Conditions described in this chapter was a matter of close concern to Spain and Portugal, and in other ways too the French collapse greatly increased the strategic importance of these countries. Spain no longer marched, along her Pyrenean and African frontiers, with a Power that was our ally; no longer could our forces at Gibraltar look for a support to Cassablanca or Oran. Moreover, belligerency of Italy might perhaps encourage General Franco to follow Mussolini's example. Franco had joined the anti-Comintern group in March 1939, he had expressed himself as sympathetic to the Axis, and he had struck a pact of friendship with Germany in November. If Spain welcomed in the German divisions now close to her frontier or opened her Atlantic ports to German submarines, the result for the British would be grave. But it was far from certain or even probable that Franco would throw in his lot with the Axis. He might well covet Gibraltar and a larger slice of North Africa; but the crucial fact since the end of the civil war had been the exhaustion and poverty of his country, and the western Powers were in a position to supply its needs as the Axis Powers were not.

On 3 September 1939 Franco had declared Spain's neutrality. In March 1940 the British Government had concluded a war trade agreement assuring her a credit of £2 million for purchases in the sterling area. On June 12, the day after Italy entered the war, Franco announced Spain was no longer neutral but "non-belligerent", but the changed of phrase meant no real change of attitude. Spain's occupation of June 15 of the neutral Tangier zone was, if anything, to our advantage. Nevertheless the task of the new British Ambassador at Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, lately a member of the Chamberlain War Cabinet, was an exceedingly delicate one: he was to counteract the all-pervading German influence and keep Spain neutral in fact.

From the military point of view the contingency of Spain helping the Axis had of course been discussed during the period of French alliance and counter measures had been considered; these had included the possible occupation of the Grand Canary. The discussions had also embraced the possibility that Portugal, with whose attitude of benevolent neutrality we were well content, might fall under Axis domination. The Azores and Cape Verde Islands were of too great strategic importance to be allowed to fall into enemy hands: they lay athwart our trade route from the South Atlantic and contained British cable stations, as did Maderia. The Chiefs of Staff pointed out, however, that unless there were clear indications that Spain intended to enter the war against us it would not be to our advantage to precipitate Spanish and Portuguese hostility by occupying the Atlantic Islands simply because Gibraltar had become untenable to us. More convenience for the purpose of the blockade would not be sufficient reason. In any case the actual decision to send the expeditions, for which preparations had already begun, would be undertaken by the Cabinet. The forces earmarked for these operations were two composite brigades consisting mainly of Royal Marines.
Pages 430 to 434 of Grand Strategy Volume II - Middlesbrough Reference Library copy
There was also the Spanish question: the continued non-belligerency of Spain became more likely with every Axis disappointment, but it could not be taken for Granted. General Franco replaced Señor Beighbeder as Foreign Minister by the Falangist Serrano Suñer on October 17, and at his meeting with Hitler at Hendaye on the 23rd gave a vague assurance of Span's eventual entry into the war. On November 4 the Spaniards, in disregard of British rights, assumed administrative control of the international zone of Tangier; on December 1 they incorporated Tangier into the Spanish Zone of Morocco and dismissed British officials. However, they went no further. Our possession of Gibraltar was a thorn in Franco's side, but Spanish war-weariness and economic weaknesses were decisive.

Hitler, however, as we have seen, was determined at the beginning of November to occupy Gibraltar at the first opportunity, and in his directive of the 12th he outlined a scheme for driving the British from the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose it was necessary to take Gibraltar and close the Straits, and to prevent the British from obtaining a foothold anywhere else in the Iberian peninsular and the islands in the Atlantic.

Operation "Felix" in its original form envisaged action by all three Services. The Army units must be strong enough to capture the Rock from the land side even without Spanish assistance; one corps was the force assigned. A smaller force would stand ready to help the Spaniards repel a British landing elsewhere, and a third, motorised, force would follow in order to occupy Portugal if necessary. The Air Force would begin by attacking British warships at Gibraltar and would consist largely of dive-bombers, while the Navy would supply submarines. Since the operation would increase the importance of the Canary and Cape Verde Islands, the German naval and air chiefs were to examine the problem of helping the Spaniards to defend the former and of occupying the latter, a Portuguese possession. The possible occupation of other Portuguese islands, Madeira and the Azores, was also to be studied and an early report demanded.

Hitler told Suñer, now Foreign Minister, shortly after this that the best time for the German soldiers to fight in Spain would be December and that two following months; in March and April they might be required for other tasks. But "Felix" was never put to the proof. Hitler countermanded the operation on December 11 on the ground that the required political condition did not obtain, and confirmed his decision on January 10. Any desire Franco may have cherished to join his fellow-dictators in arms was quenched by the German refusal to grant his terms and by the economic aid of Britain and the United States; the failure of the Axis in September over England and in North Africa many well have convinced him that the war would be prolonged and that he could bide his time. Nevertheless the possibility of a German thrust against Gibraltar or the Atlantic islands long caused anxiety to the British high command and valuable troops and ships were held ready to parry it.

The Chiefs of Staff considered in October and November the requirements of the fortress for sustaining a long siege and approved the estimate of the Governor (Lieutenant-General Sir Clive Liddell) that supplies for six months should be held. Discussions took place with him in London in January; it was clearly understood that in the event of a land attack the use of the naval base would have to be given up. The Governor also pointed out the inadequacy of Gibraltar as a base for contraband control.

The need for an alternative to Gibraltar was always in the British Government's mind, and forces were kept in being for the occupation of some of the Atlantic islands should the Germans invade the Iberian peninsula with or without the consent of their Governments. The forces had been re-constituted after the Dakar expedition, and various projects, with a bewildering series of ode names, were discussed at all levels right through the winter and spring. There was of course the danger of the Germans again forestalling us as in Norway, and at the end of November it seemed that this danger might be imminent. The Defence Committee, however, stood by the Government's earlier decision (of 22 July) that we should not take the first step.

Staff papers of this period illustrate the extreme complexity of the practical implications of such amphibious projects; apart from that of finding troops suitably trained and equipped, they involved difficult problems of logistics, such as the time required to load and unload ships of different kinds in different ports and the interference so caused with other military movements and with hardly less important commercial sailings. It is perhaps as well the General Weygand did not accept our offer to despatch six divisions to North Africa at this time.

Addressing the Chiefs of Staff early in January 1941 on the subject of future strategy, the Prime Minister said that he regarded a German invasion of Spain in order to force a way through Gibraltar unlikely. Attempted against the will of the Spanish Government, especially in winter, it would be a most dangerous and questionable enterprise. With the permission of the Spanish Government it would of course be a short and easy matter for the Germans to gain control of Lisbon and of the Algeciras and Cetua batteries, together with the airfields desired. But it was becoming increasingly unlikely that the Spanish Government would give the passage, and it was most improbable that they would try to force their way through before April. If matters hung fire in Spain until the spring, it was possible that Vichy might by then have been provoked by the Germans to undertake or allow the resumption of war in North Africa, in which case our whole situation in the Mediterranean would be transformed in our favour. From every point of view the delay was helpful to us, and we must be careful not to precipitate matters in Spain. Since the expeditions against the Atlantic islands could not be contemplated unless or until Spain offered passage to the Germans or Germany began to force one, it would seem that they need no longer be kept ready at 48 hours' notice.

This settled the matter for the present, but the reversal of fortune in the Near East in the spring revived our apprehensions. Towards the end of April the Chiefs of Staff presented a report expressing the opinion that German's position was now so strong that within a few weeks she could bring irresistible pressure on Spain and deprive us of the use of Gibraltar. It had always been recognised, they said, that the only substitute for Gibraltar as a base for big ships was the Canary Islands, but not until recently had we available of the assault craft for capturing them and the fighters for defending them. They recommended that a force should be assembled at once for this operation (code name "Puma") in addition to those prepared for the Cape Verde and Azores groups. The proposal was approved at a meeting at which the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were present, but the decision to launch the expeditions was to remain with the Government. Discussions about "Puma" were in fact still continuing in July.

Some embarrassment was caused in London by the fact that early in March a Portuguese staff mission had visited England to discuss how Portugal could best resist a German invasion through Spain and what help her ancient ally could provide. The Portuguese believed that the Spaniards would offer but slight opposition, and they were disappointed to find how little we could do for the defence of the Portuguese mainland. Indeed, when the matter was under consideration at the end of May the Defence Committee took the view that their Government's best policy, in the event of invasion, would be to abandon Portugal for the Azores. For this we could offer naval co-operation and a certain amount of anti-aircraft and other equipment. Dr. Salazar had been unwilling to allow the presence of British technicians in the Azores. In the year 1807, in not dissimilar circumstances, a Portuguese Government had sailed from Lisbon with the assistance of the Royal Navy for a refuge overseas; but Dr. Salazar had no wish, one may suppose, to provoke another Peninsular War. And indeed it was no part of our policy to give the Germans an excuse for a descent on the Atlantic islands.

Possession of the Azores brings a European Power a thousand miles nearer to America, and the United States could not fail to be interested in their future. The Prime Minister kept the President informed of what we had in mind and assured him that co-operation of any sort would be welcome. Mr. Roosevelt had at the end of March, in response to a British suggestion, proposed the visit of an American squadron to Portuguese waters, and in May he did in fact order plans to be drawn up for the occupation of the Azores by United States forces. But the Portuguese Government objected even to the former proposal, and nothing come of either project, so that in this matter American help was of no immediate advantage to us.

Hitler had earlier, in November, ordered his staff to study the possibilities of occupying the Atlantic islands; but Admiral Raeder reported that the occupation and defence of the Cape Verdes and Canaries would hardly be possible while the British had command of the sea, and no serious plans were made. We have seen too that preparations for Operation "Felix" for the capture of Gibraltar were called off on January 10: Hitler told his staff that there was, for the time being, no prospect of Spain becoming Germany's ally. But the idea of an attack on Gibraltar with Spanish help was never given up; even after the invasion of Russia had become the main concern the German staff contemplated launching one in the course of the summer, possibly before operations against Russia had ended. Early in May Hitler thought it possible that the British might forestall him in Spain, and plan ("Isabella") was produced for the expulsion of the British force and the occupation of the chief Spanish ports.

Sir Samuel Hoare, our Ambassador in Madrid, laid great stress on the way in which American moral support could help us in Spain. He appreciated the visit of Colonel Donvoan, the President's emissary in Madrid and Lisbon in February 1941, at a time when German propaganda was particularly active. Our Ambassador expected soon after this that the crisis over the German demands would occur in two or three months; but on May 8 the Foreign Office were informed on good authority that as long as we held the Suez Canal Franco would be able to resist German requests for the through passage to Gibraltar.
 
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The RN don’t need to sink merchantmen they would just reduce a Navicert for ships going to Spain. The ship would than be subject to such delays that it’s voyage would be unprofitable for the owners. No close blockade required.
Plus the British controlled most of the World's merchant fleet from the middle of 1940, that is not just the British Empires, but also those of the Belgians, Dutch, Free French, Greeks, Norwegians and Poles that escaped plus IIRC two-thirds of the Italian merchant fleet because Mussolini didn't recall his merchant shipping before declaring war.

So the Spanish would have to import what they could with their own merchant shipping.

According to the British official history on Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War Spain in in 1939 had 214 merchant vessels of 1,600 tons of older totalling 838,000 tons, gross and 1,166 deadweight tons, which was only 1.48% of the world fleet.

The above included 16 tankers of 86,000 tons, gross and 119,000 deadweight tons.

However, as the Franco like Mussolini declares war after making a spur of the moment decision he probably hasn't recalled his merchant shipping either so in the second half of 1940 Spain probably had only one third of the 214 ships they had a year earlier.
 
However, as the Franco like Mussolini declares war after making a spur of the moment decision he probably hasn't recalled his merchant shipping either so in the second half of 1940 Spain probably had only one third of the 214 ships they had a year earlier.

Also, Italy with a slightly larger population had over three times the tonnage of Spain.

The other problem is what ports are going to be used? Gibraltar is blocking most of them. There are some on Spain's Atlantic coast but I presume the RN would be active there.
 
The notion seems to be if Franco joins the Axis outright, Gibraltar will fall.

However...this hardly seems like a slam dunk to me. Sure, Hitler has a mighty army, particularly before he commits it to Barbarossa. But Gibraltar is a fortress! Defending it from land attack has always been a preoccupation of its commandants. Since it was "only Spain" and probably British war planners had given very little thought to what might happen if France collapsed completely, the defenses might not be everything they could be. But the other thing is that as long as the British hold Gibraltar, they can bring in supplies by ship.

To be sure, if Hitler can move in force pretty fast, then Luftwaffe forces can be based practically point blank at Gibraltar and interdict it by air.

But perhaps two can play at that game? It will take some time for Hitler to move the troops to the southwest corner of Spain, it has been noted Spain's railroads were a mess after all. Can the British not only reinforce The Rock but bring in troops to break out past Spanish defenses and seize a deeper perimeter, one in which they can defend some RAF bases, and batter the Luftwaffe back? (Note that if the British can do this, which I am prepared to be told they can't, the terrain they seize could reasonably be annexed to Gibraltar forever as yet another price of war with Britain.

If the British can hang on, the Allies already have a foothold on the Continent! They had it OTL but it was not useful for attacking Hitler, but now they have only two choices--hold in SW Spain and someday perhaps push out from there to take all Spain and thence on into France, or give up The Rock and suffer the consequences of Hitler holding there.

Meanwhile there is another front, Portugal. I gather Salazar was closer to the Allies than Franco was, but he too was an authoritarian dictator who could perhaps be persuaded of the superiority of the Axis side. But joining the Axis would cost Portugal even more dearly than Spain! Portugal too was dependent on seaborne trade, and I would guess fishing too, and its overseas empire in Africa and south Asia was far more to lose than Spain's paltry colonies. And lose them they would if Salazar went Axis. If he appeared to be doing so with a gun to his head, that might be forgiven...maybe. Ask the Dutch how their colonial possessions fared despite the obvious fact the Dutch were in no way guilty--I suppose some collaborated but the Netherlands are rather famous for their lack of sympathy for the Nazis. Their exiled forces in the Dutch East Indies fought Japan very stubbornly even after being driven out of their Indonesian bases and onto Allied charity--they paid their way in blood. Interestingly while the Dutch lost control of their colony, Portugal had control of East Timor and Macao restored despite remaining neutral! (Being neutral the Japanese shouldn't have taken possession of them in the first place of course, but they did).

If Britain can muster the force, assisting Portugal in holding the Axis forces out would be a priority, though I suppose keeping Gibraltar would be equally high priority. The demands conflict but also assist one another; any forces pinned down trying to dislodge the British from Gibraltar would not be available to secure Portugal for the Axis, and any terrain in southern Portugal the British could hold with local help would be places to attack nearby Luftwaffe and other German sites by air from. I think it is a stretch but the British aircraft they'd want can ferry in directly from Britain, particularly if attacking Spain from north Portugal can cost them control in the northwest.

Note that hot fighting in Iberia must divert forces Hitler used in the Blitz OTL.

If Franco waits until after Hitler is committed to Barbarossa, then German hands are even more tied and the British will have better capabilities. Obviously the thread is devoted to the idea Franco does not wait but acts as impulsively as Mussolini did in the wake of the fall of France, which is certainly the worst case for Britain.

Again, even aside from the danger that Hitler will use his power in Spain to depose Franco or force him to do his bidding slavishly, if Britain turns out to have the ability to hang on tenaciously, and encourage Portugal to throw in with the Allies, then Franco's ATL decision turns Spain into a war zone again.

I don't like Franco but I do credit him with more wit than that.
 
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