France sues for peace very early in Franco-Prussian War

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
If the war, albeit as a Prussian victory, ended early, is there any way it could have been *too early* and left the formal creation of the 2nd Reich undone.

How many weeks of war were needed to bind the German states together sufficiently to get OTL's outcome of Prussian King as German Emperor?

Looking at things from the other end, is it possible that the war could have resulted in creation of the Second Reich under the Hohenzollerns *even if* the war was a modest French victory or stalemate rather than Prussian victory?
 
If the war, albeit as a Prussian victory, ended early, is there any way it could have been *too early* and left the formal creation of the 2nd Reich undone.

How many weeks of war were needed to bind the German states together sufficiently to get OTL's outcome of Prussian King as German Emperor?

Looking at things from the other end, is it possible that the war could have resulted in creation of the Second Reich under the Hohenzollerns *even if* the war was a modest French victory or stalemate rather than Prussian victory?
In the eyes of the people, the French started it. Just because they sue for peace doesn't mean the Germans will accept it. Maybe the Southern states would finally form their South German Confederation like they were planning on doing after the Peace of Prague, and then start negotiating to form one large German State.
 
The war could very well end after the Prussian victories at Mars-le-Tour and Gravelotte: Bismarck did not want to crush the 2nd Empire, nor was a German Empire in the cards at all the last thing that Bismarck wanted was the collapse of the Bonapartist regime and its replacement with a republic, and as far as the German empire neither him nor the king of Prussia wanted it). The continuation of the war (and in particular the mad idea to relieve Metz which ended up in the disaster of Sedan) was decided by Nappy himself, against the advice of both Prince Bonaparte (Plon-Plon) and gen. Trochou. The war was already lost, in particular once Bazaine failed to extricate himself and his army from Metz, and what Nappy achieved was to throw away the last standing army of the French empire.

Gravelotte was fought on 18 August 1870: if the French are rational enough to recognize that the war is lost, it would be possible to agree to a cease fire in a week or so, and start discussing peace terms. IMHO the peace terms would not be too punitive, and I doubt it would include the annexation of Alsace: most likely a neutralization of the left bank of the Upper Rhine and the demolition of the fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Gravelotte was fought on 18 August 1870: if the French are rational enough to recognize that the war is lost, it would be possible to agree to a cease fire in a week or so, and start discussing peace terms. IMHO the peace terms would not be too punitive, and I doubt it would include the annexation of Alsace: most likely a neutralization of the left bank of the Upper Rhine and the demolition of the fortresses of Strasbourg and Metz.

---so Nappy sues for peace after Gravelotte, and France loses *no* territory, it just loses the right to fortify the border (somewhat like the Dunkirk clauses of the 7 Years War)

--Is France charged an indemnity? If so, how much? I'm not sure where the front-lines were or what the Prussians would hold on to until any indemnity was paid.

--So because the war and war fever is shortened, Bismarck and the Prussian King are able to keep the structure of the North German Confederation going, and in cooperation with rulers wanting the south to be separate, are able to resist for at least a time demands from some political quarters for a merger of the North German Confederation and individual south German states or a South German Confederation?
 
The nationalistic fervor that sweep Southern Germany in 1870 pretty much guaranteed the unification sooner.
 
The problem for Bismarck (and the Prussian army) is the need of keeping troops positioned on the right bank of the Upper Rhine to protect southern Germany from a possible French invasion: quite a costly commitment.
An annexation of Alsace would have certainly increased the security (and Moltke was planning for this), but there was the political problem of what to do with the annexed province, which would have no contiguity with Prussian territory. The empire was not a real consideration in June 1870, since the elections of 1869 had returned anti-Prussian majorities in the southern states.
IMHO the chance of wrapping up the war in 4-5 weeks would have been very attractive for Bismarck.

The neutralization of the French side of the border and the demolition of Metz and Strasbourg fortresses is very similar to the neutralization of Luxembourg in 1867.

The Prussians are besieging Metz and Strasbourg, and occupying Alsace.

Bazaine is holed up in Metz, MacMahon is at the army camp of Chalons with the emperor. Paris is strongly garrisoned and protected by a ring of forts.

Reparations should not be too punitive: less than 2 billion Francs for sure, maybe just one. Bismarck does not want to destroy the Bonapartist regime to see it replaced by a republic.
 
The nationalistic fervor that sweep Southern Germany in 1870 pretty much guaranteed the unification sooner.
That came after Sedan. In August it was not yet so widespread in the south. In December Bismarck had to fan it up because he started to have problems in the Prussian parliament
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
That came after Sedan. In August it was not yet so widespread in the south. In December Bismarck had to fan it up because he started to have problems in the Prussian parliament

How did Southern German nationalistic fervor solve Bismarck's problems with the Prussian parliament? Simply by distracting them with "good news"?
 
In the eyes of the people, the French started it. Just because they sue for peace doesn't mean the Germans will accept it. Maybe the Southern states would finally form their South German Confederation like they were planning on doing after the Peace of Prague, and then start negotiating to form one large German State.

Problem is that a South German Bund would be dominated by Bavaria - and Protestant Badeners and Wurttembergers would dislike domination by Catholic Bavaria even more than by Protestant Prussia.
 
If the war, albeit as a Prussian victory, ended early, is there any way it could have been *too early* and left the formal creation of the 2nd Reich undone.

How many weeks of war were needed to bind the German states together sufficiently to get OTL's outcome of Prussian King as German Emperor?

It was about seven weeks from the French DoW to the surrender at Sedan. That aroused enough enthusiasm to ensure that unification would go through.
 
Would an earlier cease fire have saved the Bonaparte dynasty? I confess I'm not completely sure it would have.
Before Sedan, the dynasty could be saved, at least in the short term: just have Louis Napoleon moving back to Paris would be a strong help to stabilize the political situation. What happens later on is more doubtful: it will depend on the terms of the peace treaty (which should be lenient), the health of the emperor (which could not be completely restored, but avoiding the trauma of Sedan, the abdication and the exile might slow down a bit his decline) and most of all the introduction of real reforms to bring on board the liberals and improve the conditions of the poorest sections of the cities. I'm quite willing to grant the first two conditions, but the third one will be much harder: Parisian mobs are ready to go up in flames, and the unrest will spread to the other major cities. It can be repressed, and probably would be, but it would not solve the underlying problem. To borrow a set phrase from financial reports: negative outlook for the dynasty.
 
Before Sedan, the dynasty could be saved, at least in the short term: just have Louis Napoleon moving back to Paris would be a strong help to stabilize the political situation. What happens later on is more doubtful: it will depend on the terms of the peace treaty (which should be lenient), the health of the emperor (which could not be completely restored, but avoiding the trauma of Sedan, the abdication and the exile might slow down a bit his decline) and most of all the introduction of real reforms to bring on board the liberals and improve the conditions of the poorest sections of the cities. I'm quite willing to grant the first two conditions, but the third one will be much harder: Parisian mobs are ready to go up in flames, and the unrest will spread to the other major cities. It can be repressed, and probably would be, but it would not solve the underlying problem. To borrow a set phrase from financial reports: negative outlook for the dynasty.

So more or less the underlying problems of the dynasty would probably cause it to collapse in the long term? Was there any way to bring on reforms?
 
How did Southern German nationalistic fervor solve Bismarck's problems with the Prussian parliament? Simply by distracting them with "good news"?

Problem is that a South German Bund would be dominated by Bavaria - and Protestant Badeners and Wurttembergers would dislike domination by Catholic Bavaria even more than by Protestant Prussia.

It was about seven weeks from the French DoW to the surrender at Sedan. That aroused enough enthusiasm to ensure that unification would go through.

First of all, it would not just mean a South German nationalistic fervor. The nationalists were actually stronger in western and northern Germany, while in southern Germany they were certainly present and quite vociferous but the conservative and localistic interests were a majority. Then there is the problem of Prussia (which accounted for 80% of the population of the NCG): while the nationalists were also present in Prussia, they were more concentrated in the west: Brandenburg and Prussia proper were more tepid about a full merger of Prussia into a pan-German state (which as a matter of fact did not happen IOTL when the Reich was proclaimed). This was mirrored by the actual distaste of traditional German states who feared to become mere Prussian appendices.

Bismarck had two main worries: the cost of a prolonged war (which would have to be borne mainly by Prussia alone and would create significant issues in the Prussian parliament) and the danger of involvement by the other European powers which became more and more real with an extended duration of the war: Prussia had substantially enlarged its territory after the war of 1866 (straight annexations, as well as the Prussian-dominated NCG) and had tied up the South German states with the defense treaty provisions and their participation in the Zollverein (the Zollverein as reformed after 1866 gave Prussia the right to dissolve the Zollverein with a 6-month notice and Bismarck was not shy in using this threat against Bavaria in particular). The disastrous French position after Sedan, in the view of the European Powers, raised the danger of a Prussian annexation of Northern France (not a realistic fear, but perception is master) or the risk of a revolution in France: neither of these outcomes would have been acceptable. The failure of diplomatic talks in St. Petersburg in late 1870 (mostly due to British reluctance in taking firm commitments) lessened the risk of international intervention (at least for the time being) but did nothing to ease Bismarck's budgetary worries.
There are reasons for Bismarck to curse the French emperor, not just for his mad idea of relieving Metz but even more for allowing himself to be captured after Sedan: the chance of an early close to the war disappeared at a stroke.

Starting in November, Bismarck had to accept to play the nationalistic card once more, to use the nationalistic votes in the Prussian and NCG parliaments to curb the resistance of Prussian conservatives to new taxes. The path he chose was to woo Bavaria (with promises, threats and a golden handshake) and by end of December the Bavarians were on board: the imperial crown was offered to the king of Prussia by the king of Bavaria, on behalf of the other German states. It was a long and costly negotiation, and Bismarck would have preferred not to need going through it.

Bismarck's preferred strategy would have to wrap up the war as soon as possible, and his plan with regards to the South German states was to induce them to form the South German Confederation: Bismarck thought that this junior confederation would have anyway be firmly tied in the Zollverein and the supra-national organization would have reduced over time the independent inclination of the southern states, make them more homogeneous and prepare them for the next step of being absorbed in the new German Confederation he planned. A German Reich was not really attractive to him, although I'm pretty sure that it figured as plan B of his strategy.
 
So more or less the underlying problems of the dynasty would probably cause it to collapse in the long term? Was there any way to bring on reforms?
The "long term" would be pretty short: when Louis Napoleon dies (could be anytime between 1873 and 1875) there will be trouble. If he dies (or is incapacitated) before the Prince Imperial comes of age, regency troubles are also quite likely.
LN tries to implement liberal reforms in the early 1860s, and it did not work. He tried again in late 1868, since there were a lot of signs that trouble was coming: the results of the elections of November 1869 were not very favorable for the regime, and even the plebiscite of May 1870 (which was intended to legitimize the constitutional changes) did not return really impressive results even if the "yes" were a large majority. The problem is that the regime's strength was in the countryside and among the Catholics (but based on a strong defense of the papal interests in Rome). The cities' results were not encouraging. By late August the emperor has a lost a war (or is at least well on the way of losing it) and the French regiments which were stationed in Rome had been recalled. The empress Eugenie is both very catholic and reactionary, and after the plebiscite of May the reactionaries (the so-called Mamelukes) where on the raise. Can a Bonaparte who has just lost an aggression war and had quickly to sue for peace credibly propose liberal reforms?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
A modification on the question from the original post:

AHC- French Provisional Government (Post-Napoleon III & post-Sedan of course), gets a settlement in which they do not have to yield any European territory

Additional condition: The PoD cannot be a strictly unilateral German decision, it needs to start with the French side doing something different
 
Top