"France first, dear OKW"

Reading back through Mays 'Strange Victory' there are a couple remarks that describe the plan in place as a attack through Belgium, with the main effort on the Belgian plain - north of the Meuse River. Also the armored Corps were distributed to seperate armies and not concentrated.

Now these remarks dont indicate the Germans were locked into such a plan for September, or whenever they attacked. When Halder was able to turn his attention to the west after the Polish campaign he was even then disatisfied with the plan & directed the development of alternatives to be tested in early November wargames. Since the Germans exhaustively tested their plans in map and field exercises we must assume Halders doubts derived from the plan failing these tests. Were the priority France vs Poland we have to consider that the campaign concept of Plan Yellow might be better developed. But, OTL it took 6-7 months to develop the sophisticated Sickle Cut plan as we know it. Contrary to Mainsteins fans it did not spring whole from his genius in Nov 39, but was evolved through a series of staff studies. field tests and wargames spanning October 39 through March 1940.

So, what we might see from the Germans in a September 1939 campaign is the main effort concentrated north of the Meuse River, the armored corps may or may not be concentrated, and the Netherlands may be left alone. Making the main effort south of the Meuse River was complex & required a lot of extra staff planning & field testing to work out. Even after all that in May 1940 many German leaders thought it would fail. So its unlikely it would be attempted in 1939.
 
Germany would rush through Belgium to the channel ports in record speed, just like Minsk IOTL.

The OTL rush of 1940 through the Netherlands very largely depended on using two regiments of paratroopers and an airlanding division.
In 1939 the drop-ready paratroopers amounted to two battalions and a few specialist companies. The airlanding division was not wholly trained for that.
 
The OTL rush of 1940 through the Netherlands very largely depended on using two regiments of paratroopers and an airlanding division.
In 1939 the drop-ready paratroopers amounted to two battalions and a few specialist companies. The airlanding division was not wholly trained for that.

The Dutch were a lot less prepared as well, as OTL they took a good look at the Norwegian campaign. Speaking of which, a surprise attack opens up the possibility of the Kriegsmarine replicating their OTL performance form Norway of ferrying troops at their unsuspecting enemies doorstep before the Anglo-French have a chance to react.
 
In my older thread, I proposed the following disposition of Axis forces:

Germany

Low Countries
  • 33 inf. div. (A)
  • 4 motorized
  • 12 inf. div. (B)
  • 7 panzer divisons
  • 1 mot. inf brigade
  • 4 mot. inf. regiments
TOTAL: 60+

Well, yeah, it's 61... provided that you count regiments and brigades as if they were divisions. Which they are not.

Siegfired Line
  • 1 inf. div (A)
  • 1 mountain div.
  • 1 inf. div. (B)
  • 2 inf. div. (C)
  • 14 inf. div (D)
TOTAL: 19

Your numbers don't add up, as another poster has mentioned. Germany did not field 7 Panzerdivisions; it fielded

5 Panzerdivisions;
2 "Panzerdivisions" which were actually tank brigades, one of which an ad-hoc formation including Eastern Prussian SS units, which you cannot really deploy to the French border;
and 4 Light divisions which mostly included no more than one tank battalion.

I also think you double-counted some 4 infantry divisions.

On the other hand, you don't count the Landwehr division, and all the border regiments which would be not irrelevant along the long border with Poland, considering that Poland would attack.

Meanwhile, for France:

For France, you go to great lengths to explain how bad the situation of the reserves was. What about the German 4. Welle divisions (those you call "D")? No analysis?

Poland
  • 1 inf div. (A)
  • 2 mountain div.
  • 4 inf. div. (B)
  • 3 Slovak inf. div (B?)
  • 19 inf. div. (C)
  • 1 cav brigade
TOTAL: 29

And this is where the other shoe really falls.
Even if you add 36 border and Landwehr independent regiments which will only have defensive purposes.

The Poles can attack where they want, achieving local superiority. They have

20 fully mobilized infantry divisions
2 mountain divisions
15 partially mobilized infantry divisions
3 mountain brigades
9 mobilized cavalry brigades
2 later mobilized cavalry brigades
1 motorized brigade

Note the partial mobilization was a problem because the Germans attacked here. In an ATL in which the Germans are on the defensive, the mobilization is only disrupted by air attacks.

Now, even if they leave no less than the 15 partially mobilized divisions facing the Soviets, just in case, the Poles can also leave
10 infantry divisions,
2 mountain divisions,
3 mountain brigades and
7 cavalry brigades facing the Germans along the main border.

That still leaves 10 infantry divisions, 4 cavalry brigades and the motorized brigade to attack East Prussia.

Now, in OTL in East Prussia the Germans had the 3. Armee, with

4 infantry divisions (1. Welle)
1 infantry division (2. Welle)
2 infantry division (3. Welle)
1 reserve infantry division (3. Welle, that was still receiving its stuff)
1 cavalry brigade
1 ad-hoc Panzerdivision which was actually a tank brigade
7 border/Landwehr regiments that were in the fortress areas of Königsberg and Lötzen.

If you subtract these forces from the list you propose for "Poland", you get what the Germans would have on the main border:

2 mountain divisions
16 infantry divisions (3. Welle)
3 Slovakian infantry divisions (calling them "B" is probably generous, were only used for LOC duties in OTL)
numerous border regiments that are only useful on the defense.

As you can see, the Poles can achieve local superiority in attacking East Prussia, especially considered that the 3. Welle divisions of the East Prussian sort had reduced mobility and the Koenigsberg defense regiments won't be immediately attacked. The Poles will be making inroads in Eastern Prussia.

The Germans will be in the same situation as their predecessors at the beginning of WWI. Can they ignore the loss of German territory in Eastern Prussia? If not, they will have to attack with the forces they have along the main Polish border, in order to try to relieve the pressure on Eastern Prussia.
But those forces, once you leave behind the border regiments, and once you rule out having the Slovakians going gung-ho on the attack, amount to
16 infantry divisions (3. Welle)
2 mountain divisions.

- no tanks, no motorized infantry, no cavalry.
And they will be faced by
10 infantry divisions,
2 mountain divisions,
3 mountain brigades and
7 cavalry brigades.

Meaning that even if the Germans should achieve local superiority somewhere, the Poles have the greater mobility with their large number of cavalry brigades, and they will be able to contain such an attack.

So, regardless of what happens in France, the Germans are losing ground in Eastern Prussia and they are also stalemated in the Corridor, the Tatras, or the central area of the Polish border.

With this situation, our wary friend Stalin won't risk getting involved.
 
Making a separate post to point out a general principle, which holds true at least since the times of Napoleon. The theory of the central position.

The combatant in the central position is disadvantaged in that he will be fighting on two fronts. That was, BTW, Hitler's bane, since he remembered WWI all too well.
However, if the combatant in the central position enjoys an advantage in mobility, he can exploit that. He will contain the more dangerous enemy with a smaller force in a defensive posture; meanwhile he will defeat the less dangerous enemy with his remaining forces (the majority). Then, those victorious forces will shift to reinforce the containment asset, and to finally defeat the second, more dangerous enemy.

This works even if taken together, the two enemies are stronger than the combatant in the central position.


To stylize, if you have each letter representing an army corps:

FFFFF (five French army corps)
are contained by
GG (two German army corps)

meanwhile

GGGG (four German army corps)
attack and defeat
PPP (three Polish army corps)

Since the Germans are in the central position, they can then quickly juggle troops from here to there as needed. The Germans can win even if they have 6 army corps, while their enemies combined have 8 army corps.

Now, the proposal at hand is to do this, with the same numbers:

FFFFF
are attacked by
GGGGG

while

G
defends against
PPP.

Can we see it's unwise?
 
Added to which all but the Wave 1, mobile and mountain units are only mobilised in August so have no time to undertake higher formation, this makes a lot of difference to the comparative performance of german and other units.

The underlying proposition is that 14 mobile divisions can force a decision in the west cross at least 1 major fortified zone before the Dutch Belgian, French, British, Polish and others can mobilise themselves and counterattack.

Its not beyond the bounds of possibility that the OKs would do this but the likelihood is they run into enough resistance early enough that the thing gets derailed, the air force is permanently crippled supporting it and Germany is left feeding part trained troops into an attritional battle without securing its coastal flanks.

then runs out of ammo
 
Making a separate post to point out a general principle, which holds true at least since the times of Napoleon. The theory of the central position.

...

This works even if taken together, the two enemies are stronger than the combatant in the central position.

Now, for those who did not fall asleep during lesson #1, here's lesson #2.

Remember what was the main disadvantage for the two peripheral combatants in lesson #1, even though taken together they were stronger than their centrally positioned enemy? That they couldn't move troops from one front to the other, while the centrally positioned combatant can.

Germany is in the position of the centrally-positioned combatant - if we look at it as two fronts, the French border and the Polish border.

But actually, there are three fronts: the French border, the main Polish border, and the Easatern Prussian border.

Now, in OTL, the Germans immediately advanced through the Corridor and linked up with Eastern Prussian units moving into Danzig and beyond. Thus, in OTL, there were two fronts onlya fter a couple of days.

But that happened because the Germans took an offensive stance in Poland.

In the outlandish proposal of this thread, they take a defensive stance there; meaning that they don't link up; meaning that in the East, it is Poland that is centrally positioned. The Germans can move troops to Eastern Prussia only by sea. The Poles can juggle troops around, squeezing Eastern Prussia if the Germans do nothing on the main border. Or removing them from the Eastern Prussian front if they are needed to stop a belated German change of mind on the main front.

So, in the actual situation, the German situation would be even worse than just giving up the obvious advantage of the central position (i.e., attacking with greater force the weaker enemy first).
 
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