France builds forts along its border with Belgium in the pre-WWI era

Cutting their navy might seem plausible, no? After all, if Britain can be relied upon to protect France's interests, France might not need a large navy of its own.
France actually does need a fairly large navy to maintain that huge empire of theirs, not as big as the UK's but large enough, of course this mostly requires smaller cruisers and gunboats for colonial duties, they can get away skimping on Battleships and larger cruisers. But the UK also relied on France holding the Med so they could concentrate sufficient force to keep the HSF bottled up. Until Italy enters the war the French Navy is what is keeping Austria-Hungary bottled up, too much cuts and Entente shipping in the Med suffers. Also if the French navy is much smaller, it might make Italy more likely to stay CP, if Italy thinks they can easily establish Naval superiority over France
 

Deleted member 94680

Do you mean encircle the French after the French penetrate Alsace-Lorraine?

Partially I suppose but I mainly meant localised counterattacks against the French attacks from their fortresses. The German plans allowed for a lot of latitude whether on the offensive or the defensive.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The post-WW1 Maginot Line was not very expensive, so it would not be hugely difficult to pull off a comparably expensive fortification along the Belgian border. It might need to be more of a "water line" than anything, but those are also very hard to penetrate - the only reason OTL Netherlands fell in WW2 was paratroops capturing a line of bridges into Fortress Holland.
 

Deleted member 94680

The post-WW1 Maginot Line was not very expensive, so it would not be hugely difficult to pull off a comparably expensive fortification along the Belgian border.

"The main construction was largely completed by 1939, at a cost of around 3 billion French francs." Wiki page on Maginot Line
 

Redbeard

Banned
Fortifications are not necessarily a bad idea from a strict military point of view. They will at a relatively low cost force the enemy to focus more resources to move across than if the fortifications had not been there. The important point is however, that you don't put all your eggs in the fortifications basket - you still need the ability to move and (counter)strike. Even the strongest fortifications will eventually be overwhelmed if you just sit in your fortifications. In this context I think the biggest problem would be the political one - it would be seen as a signal of France not planning to actively intervene in any conflict but just sit behind her borders. If you are Belgian that would not be a good basis for allying with France.

BTW the Maginot Line worked fine in WWII - it was the field army from the Line to the Channel that failed.
 

Redbeard

Banned
"The main construction was largely completed by 1939, at a cost of around 3 billion French francs." Wiki page on Maginot Line

Or about 0,83% of a yearly GDP (360 Billion Francs). A French Franc was worth about 0,05 US $ then.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
"The main construction was largely completed by 1939, at a cost of around 3 billion French francs." Wiki page on Maginot Line
Yes? French military budget of the period:


Year Millions of Francs
1932 19595
1933 19897
1934 18126
1935 21507
1936 22708
1937 24523
1938 29153
1939 88584


It cost 2% of the French military budget over the period of construction.
 

Deleted member 94680

Or about 0,83% of a yearly GDP (360 Billion Francs). A French Franc was worth about 0,05 US $ then.

In modern terms anywhere between a quarter and a third of NATO requirement defence spending. Not relevant I know, but an illuminating comparison.

In an era where battleships cost 2.5 million francs, I can't help but think that it wasn't 'cheap' and the money could have been spent better elsewhere.
 

Deleted member 94680

Yes? French military budget of the period:


Year Millions of Francs
1932 19595
1933 19897
1934 18126
1935 21507
1936 22708
1937 24523
1938 29153
1939 88584


It cost 2% of the French military budget over the period of construction.

That's impressive spending to be fair. Do you have a source for those figures?
 

Saphroneth

Banned
In an era where battleships cost 2.5 million francs, I can't help but think that it wasn't 'cheap' and the money could have been spent better elsewhere.
Citation for any French battleship in the 1930s costing 2.5 million francs? That's roughly equivalent to £33,000.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
That's impressive spending to be fair. Do you have a source for those figures?
This is the thing - I don't think you really get how little a Franc was worth in the 1930s.

http://www.paper-dragon.com/1939/exchange.html

This shows that, in 1934, a Franc was 1/15 of a dollar and a pound was five dollars; that is, one Franc was 1/75 of a GBP.

So a cost of 3 billion French Francs roughly equates to £40 million.


That's impressive spending to be fair. Do you have a source for those figures?
It's copied from a post by Von Adler, I'm afraid.
A Blunted Sickle
 

Deleted member 94680

Citation for any French battleship in the 1930s costing 2.5 million francs? That's roughly equivalent to £33,000.

Yeah seems I've got my figures mixed up. Can't find it anywhere and as you've pointed out, that does seem ridiculously cheap.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Yeah seems I've got my figures mixed up. Can't find it anywhere and as you've pointed out, that does seem ridiculously cheap.
Yeah, by comparison the British defence budget was the equivalent of 9 billion francs in 1935 alone (£121.9 million). With the OTL Maginot Line spread out over eight to nine years, it was quite affordable despite being built during the Great Depression and may actually have been a net economic benefit for keeping people in work!
 

Deleted member 94680

This is the thing - I don't think you really get how little a Franc was worth in the 1930s.

Oh I understand that exchange rates fluctuate and the franc was a "high denomination" currency - the New Franc was set at 100 old Francs, after all.


It's copied from a post by Von Adler, I'm afraid.
A Blunted Sickle

Ah, right. Because when searching myself I found this:
You_Doodle_2017-04-06_T10_30_31_Z.jpg

Which is apparently from an old magazine (?) and references the League of Nations Armaments Year Book. Quite the difference, although listed in Dollars. Going by the website "Measuring Worth" https://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/ I've got for the range 1930-39 there were 25.5 Old Francs (rounding up) to the Dollar. So the 1934 figure listed by Von Adler (18126) divided by the 25.5 would give 710 million Dollars. The magazine lists 438 million, although that is a projection. The 1933 figures are 780 versus 448.

I'm getting confused now.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Which is apparently from an old magazine (?) and references the League of Nations Armaments Year Book. Quite the difference, although listed in Dollars. Going by the website "Measuring Worth" https://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/ I've got for the range 1930-39 there were 25.5 Old Francs (rounding up) to the Dollar. So the 1934 figure listed by Von Adler (18126) divided by the 25.5 would give 710 million Dollars. The magazine lists 438 million, although that is a projection. The 1933 figures are 780 versus 448.
I'd suggest asking V-A where his source is. Either way it shows the point.
 

Deleted member 94680

I'd suggest asking V-A where his source is. Either way it shows the point.

Agreed. I just think the money spent (whatever percentage it represents) would have been better spent somewhere else. For a military imbued with the "Spirit of the Offensive", it seems so strange they put so much into something designed to relinquish the offensive to the enemy.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Agreed. I just think the money spent (whatever percentage it represents) would have been better spent somewhere else. For a military imbued with the "Spirit of the Offensive", it seems so strange they put so much into something designed to relinquish the offensive to the enemy.
But that's not what it was designed to do - not quite.

The original Maginot Line had three purposes:

1) Ensure the Zone Rouge was in Belgium, not in France.
2) Free up troops from the (smaller, due to demographics) French army, to allow them to concentrate offensive manpower.
3) Make sure Belgium got invaded, thus ensuring British support.

WW2 French doctrine wasn't wedded to the Spirit of the Offensive, anyway, they planned to basically do 1918 again. That includes the Hundred Days Offensive, but it's not the 1914-style French tactic of "charge!"
 

Deleted member 94680

But that's not what it was designed to do - not quite.

The original Maginot Line had three purposes:

1) Ensure the Zone Rouge was in Belgium, not in France.
2) Free up troops from the (smaller, due to demographics) French army, to allow them to concentrate offensive manpower.
3) Make sure Belgium got invaded, thus ensuring British support.

WW2 French doctrine wasn't wedded to the Spirit of the Offensive, anyway, they planned to basically do 1918 again. That includes the Hundred Days Offensive, but it's not the 1914-style French tactic of "charge!"

Fair points, all. It just the system outside of the Maginot failed to meet pretty much all regards of their end of the bargain.

When the zone rouge was shifted it didn't become Belgium but the Ardennes and they were unable to effectively counter and the Germans got into France practically unopposed.
For all the manpower it freed up, the French army was still too small for the Battle of France ("Where are your reserves?" "There are none"*)
British support was secured, by Poland as opposed to Belgium, but it didn't render effective forces until after France had fallen. All well and good getting support from Britain, but if the war plans weren't sufficiently coordinated to the point that the British built their forces up to an adequate degree it fails in its requirements.

*paraphrasing, obviously.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
When the zone rouge was shifted it didn't become Belgium but the Ardennes and they were unable to effectively counter and the Germans got into France practically unopposed.
That's not what the zone rouge is. The zone rouge is the area so full of unexploded bombs it's uninhabitable today.

For all the manpower it freed up, the French army was still too small for the Battle of France ("Where are your reserves?" "There are none"*)
No, the army wasn't too small - it was just poorly deployed. Their manpower was all at the front, and it's pretty easy to get a fairly hefty reserve strength for the French by adjusting deployments without weakening the line much.

British support was secured, by Poland as opposed to Belgium, but it didn't render effective forces until after France had fallen. All well and good getting support from Britain, but if the war plans weren't sufficiently coordinated to the point that the British built their forces up to an adequate degree it fails in its requirements.
Actually, the British deployed 13 divisions at their peak - thirteen mechanized divisions, which were some of the best equipped units in the world - and were well on the way to delivering more.

You have to judge the Maginot Line in the context of what it was intended to do and permit, not in the context of one of the stupidest operational deployments of the 20th century. (See: Blunted Sickle.)
 

Deleted member 94680

That's not what the zone rouge is. The zone rouge is the area so full of unexploded bombs it's uninhabitable today.

Fair enough, my mistake. So the French plan was to make Belgium uninhabitable?

No, the army wasn't too small - it was just poorly deployed. Their manpower was all at the front, and it's pretty easy to get a fairly hefty reserve strength for the French by adjusting deployments without weakening the line much.

It was too small for the deployment plan the French developed. They needed all their troops at the front, which still failed to halt the German advance. The fact they deployed them as they did points to poor deployment plans, but the lack of reserve points to a manpower pool that was too small. If the French had put less men on the frontline, it would have been even less effective at stopping the Germans.

Actually, the British deployed 13 divisions at their peak - thirteen mechanized divisions, which were some of the best equipped units in the world - and were well on the way to delivering more.

Which only accounted for 10% of the allied troops IIRC. Coupled with the French army being undersized for their own deployment plan, I would posit the British needed more troops as well.

You have to judge the Maginot Line in the context of what it was intended to do and permit, not in the context of one of the stupidest operational deployments of the 20th century. (See: Blunted Sickle.)

I judge the Maginot Line in the context of what it was designed for: the defence of France. France fell and the Maginot Line saw barely any fighting whilst it fell. Therefore, I conclude the Maginot Line was a failure.
 
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