France-based Holy Roman Empire, and pagans.

The OP says that East and Middle Francia coalesce; since Provence and Burgundy were part of Middle Francia, they'd presumably be part of the French HRE as well.
Late IXth and Xth Provence was chaotic.I mean, really chaotic. Aquitaine on steroids-chaotic.

Middle Francia itself was very short-lived, and soon split among smaller entities within the late Carolingian ensemble : by the time you had an imperial revival in Europe, Provence and Burgundy had a particularily important nobiliar (and ecclesiastical) independence. Interestingly, Boson wasn't that interested on creating a kingdom there, but hoped to possibly recover a certain influence in Aquitaine. Burgundy/Provence, on this regard, are what I usually called "border kingdoms" on this board, as in opportunistic and vaguely-definied entities due to weak or distracted neighbours.

Hugues d'Arles didn't made anything less, trusted man of Louis up to being a quasi-viceroy, then betraying him as an accelerated redux of Robertian/Carolingian relationship. Admittedly, the Guilhemid ambitions in Provence could be maintained with the survival of Boson, son of Guilhem I of Aquitaine. Of course, that would possibly mean as well the maintain of a relatively (very relatively) coherent Aquitain ensemble.

Depending on how things unfold, you might see the continuation of the oppsotion between "Provencals" and "Bourguignons" (which are less about regionalities, and more between who favours Guilhemids and who favours Bosonids), with the suite of disorders, coups and troubles you had in the late 910's, complicated by the independence of Gothic* nobles. Would this be enough to prevent Hugues to have a strong Italian policy? It's possible, altough the situation is chaotic enough to not be certain there.
In fact, you'd probably need Provence to be far too englued in conflicts with Aquitain and Bosonid factions to intervene in Italy : it could allow Late Carolingians to make a come back in the peninsula (with Germany unable to do so) beneficing from a possible Aquitain benevolence (if they manage to advance,at least temporarily, along the Rhone) and the failure of Berengar of Friul' and the likely chaotic Italian situation.

I'd wait for @Carp to say how the Italian situation without Hugues of Arles's presence would look like, tough.

If the situation unfolds as IOTL, with Guilhemid disapperence and a succession war in Aquitaine, tough, it would be more complicated for Late Carolingians to really make a bid for Italy without humbling Bosonids and Anscarids; which wouldn't be that difficult militarily speaking after the undless series of schemes, conflicts and coups, but hard to maintain without a stable enough situation in Burgundy which is, must it be stressed, the only real way to Italy for F-HRE.
We probably need to get rid of Raoul or any Bosonid as king of Western Francia, even in this configuration, and possibly allow Charles-Constantin as a king in Provence (rather than king of Provence) and get rid of Elder Welfs' ambitions (at least for most of Provence-Burgundy), in order to get a similar situation than IOTL Provence (as in with kings barely able to rule over their kingdom).

*As in, nobles from Gothia, roughly Languedoc. Not in the sense of non-Frankish Gothic nobles of the VIIIth, even if there's a continuity. It's complicated.
 
In 1519, the electors considered Charles Hapsburg, Frederick of Saxony, and Fracas I of France. They did pick Charles, relative of Maximillian, but it didn't have to do that way
We're rather talking of a different HRE, evolving from Western Francia in the Xth century. While interesting, an election PoD in the XVIth century is a really different discussion, as it would rather be about an HRE that would be still German-based since centuries, whom a non-German dynast would be at its head.
 
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Who would be the electorates ITTL?
Giving that electorates were a result of the Golden Bull of 1356, which acknowledged a situation where imperial power had to compose with a powerful aristocratic ensemble with a legal institution; I'd say not as such.
That said, with such a PoD, it's hard to determine what would be the long-term evolution of this HRE : as hypothetised above, the relative lack of regional potentes (safe maybe in Aquitaine for exemple, with the right changes),and the mosaicized political situation in France/Burgundy/Italy would be as much an issue to enforce imperial power (making this HRE significantly weaker than its historical counterpart), than preventing the rise of strong potentes able to pull their weight during successions (it doesn't mean you won't have French potentes doing the same, just it would be more chaotic and tending to compromise IMO) in a quasi-institutional way.

But, really, that could change one way or another depending on how this HRE survives the late Xth and XIth centuries : after all, the Golden Bull was certainly not a direct legacy of the formation of Ottonian HRE, but a result of its evolution trough nearly 4 centuries.
 
Thinking about it, an important change would be how the Pontifical reforms unfolds ITTL.

The Clunisian changes would likely be still a thing, as Guilhèm I* already supported their build-up, part out of genuine piety before the sorry state of the late Carolingian clergy, part out of remorse of his actions in P, part because it served his geopolitical interests (especially for holding on Mâconnais). But with an imperial support, it could know an even quicker and larger expension in Latin Christiendom.

It's worth noting that in IOTL France, the moral decline of the clergy and its "nobiliarisation" went in par with the decline of the Carolingian dynasty, Robertians hardly behaving differently from other nobles until Robert II.
ITTL, Carolingians could be credited with a stronger clergy, patrially due to a concious and maintained policy as the episcopalian support was a strong feature of their own legitimization in France. On the other hand, this clergy isn't as dependent on royal (or there imperial) power that it tended to be in Germany : the regalian role of the clergy is more present in the east of the kingdom (and probably Lotharingia as part of F-HRE ITTL), and tends to disappear quickly more you go west and south.

It's hard to say if the regional councils would be maintained as IOTL, altough I do think that strong potentes as Aquitaine would. But the Peace of God movements would be likely changed due to a possible (but really relative) imperial appeasement : it wouldn't be butterflied away, tough, as a F-HRE would be still particularily troubled in several regions, with an emperor barely able to hold out conflicts in peripherical regions if at all.

But the pontifical reforms ITTL would be a significant support of F-HRemperors, less because they would support it constantly (the Clunisian reform is more a matter of nobiliar support IOTL) but because the clergy would try to find a secular support to their ideas of generalized peace into a relatively accepted imperial suzerainty which in turn would be a bit more validated onto potentes.
Of course, the strong papacy that would appear ITTL wouldn't be nearly as half-challenged as it was with Ottonians and Salians : Italy is far from France on this regard.

I could see some interesting changes there :
- While it didn't created it, the Clunisian movement really structurated the northern French involvement of miles in Spain. Notably Normans, but as well Angevin, Bourguignon and Champenois would it be in Castille (Robert Crespin being the most known), but as well in Aragon. The aformentioned slightly stronger imperial influence in Castille might come as well from this.

- A stronger, or rather a less rivaled, papacy in Italy might have some pretty interesting consequences. But, again, I'm not too sure to see what, so I'd beam again the @Carp signal.
A more autonomous papacy doesn't mean that Rome would have the upper hand on imperial clergy, tough : contrary to historical HRE, French clergy tended to be much more under the influence of potentes, which would lead to the following point.

- Instead of a Investiture-based conflict, which was more or less two-sided; I could see F-HREmperors switching sides between supporting Rome and supporting its own potentes, depending what would serve more its interests : again, let's remember that the imperial power wouldn't be nearly as strong and enforcable that it was IOTL under Ottonians.

*Aquitain influences pops a bit everywhere in this period, and especially ITTL : but it's not just a product of my own focus, believe me.
 
The OTL original 6 episcopal pairs de France and 6 secular pairs de France, originally had a role not too dissimilar to the original role of what would become the Prince-Electors. And IIRC France formally remained an elective monarchy until at least Philip II Augustus. Now ITTL the French HRE will have to deal with a Papacy, who will want try to take a too dominant Emperor down a notch. TTL French HRE is likely to develop a stronger tradition of an elective monarchy.
 
Due have more midteration land, this lead many city-states thus lot more civic-republicanism... this have many interesting butterfly effects...
 
The OTL original 6 episcopal pairs de France and 6 secular pairs de France, originally had a role not too dissimilar to the original role of what would become the Prince-Electors.
It only appeared in the XIIth century, tough, and they had an essentially symbolical role. It's extremely likely that this get butterflied ITTL. As it happened historically both in France and Germany, I would rather see an unformal set of nobles, probably not including bishops as such, due to the aformentioned changes.

And IIRC France formally remained an elective monarchy until at least Philip II Augustus.
It's...complicated : the kingship election in Western Francia is essentially due to the political unstability of the Xth century, largely unformal and often disputed (again, Aquitaine potentes generally didn't acknowledged non-Carolingian kings). By the time Capetians really ensured their throne, tough (in the early XIth) the elections as essentially ritual, and concerned less a set council of nobles than popular acclamation after the sacre (which, while not making the king itself, represented a litteral sacralisation of him and his family).

ITTL, we'd rather see the dynastic principle being ensured for Carolingians, altough a formal acclamation and "choice" would be probable, than the strict continuation of an elective succession that was more contextual than traditional : of course, giving the weaker structures of F-HRE, I don't expect a smooth succession as well. But I think it would be resolved differently from what happened for Xth century France and Germany, something in between IMO.

Now ITTL the French HRE will have to deal with a Papacy, who will want try to take a too dominant Emperor down a notch.
I rather disagree, or more to the point, I would rather nuance it : if the lack of regalian bishopries in Western France (mostly gathered in the east) and the relative farness of Rome compared to Germany, wouldn't make the Pope as much an ally than a rival in the empire, rather than a clear-cut opposition as for historical HRE.
Given the nobiliarisation of imperial clergy ITTL, the struggle for a more autonomous Church could be supported at times by the emperor, less to make the clergy part of the feudalty of service Ottonians built up, but to deprive their potentes to the ability to buy/sell/monopolize seats and monasteries in their own territories.

The relationship between F-HRE and Rome would be as important than it was for HRE, but probably (IMO) on different lines and interests.

That said, I entierly agree that at some point, the imperial interest would be to side with potentes, would it be only to still be able to have their own episcopalian/monastic policies, and to prevent Rome to grow far too much powerful in Italy. There, I honestly think that they would have no better chances than historical HRE, and at best make the conflict turn out to be a compromise (would it be only to switch side again).

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Thinking about an aformentioned Guilhemid survival in Aquitaine, allowing Late Carolingians to benefit from a passage trough Burgundy to Italy, I realized that the PoD couldn't be only about Boson Guilhelmid surviving.
I'd probably have to introduce a bit the region in the early Xth with a crude map, so feel free to pass eventually.

Pvge07O.png

Aquitaine in 918
-For clarity, I didn't represented French suzerainty, it's an orgy of pixels already enough-

- Guilhem I (1) hold directly mostly Auvergne, with Mâcon, Lyons and what would become La Marche IOTL, with some authority over various viscounties (1a) south of Limousin.
- Raimondins (1b) hold the majority of the Gothia, whom Guilhèm I is marchio. They tend to be treated as auxiliaries in management of the region, which is a fair mess, as while some northern counties acknowledge Aquitain suzerainty and interact with Guilhelmids and Raimondins (1c), many simply not really care about either ducal or royal suzerainty while exchanging with their northern equivalent (1d, Barcelona is highlighted mostly for historiographical purposes), and some completly ignore it (1e)
- Ramnulfids, led by Elbes Manzar (2) were former dukes of Aquitaine, but went trough bad strokes due to Robertian and Guilhelmid meddling. Elbes Manzar managed to chase the Guilhelmid Aymar (2a) out of the county thanks to Carolingian support of his claims, and even to take some of Limousin (2b)
- Gascony (3) is technically part of Aquitaine, with Sanche II participating to some act, but is actually the most distinctive and remote part of the region since decades. We don't know much apart that it might have been under duress from Normans until late, and with some counties (3a) distaching themselves while Pampelunian/Navarese influence is definitely more a thing than Aquitain or French.


I proposed above that Guilhèm might be succeeded by his son Boson, maintaining Guilhelmid claims on the kingdom of Burgundy and trying to enforce them. It could to provide Late Carolingians with a passage trough the kingdom to Italy, and eventually allow a Late Carolingian to claim the imperial title, but it might not be enough : we might need Ramnulfids to be beaten early on, maybe with an earlier death for Elbes Manzar and Aimar remaining count of Peitau. A Guilhelmid ensemble in North Aquitaine (altough less favourable to Carolingians than a Ramnulfid Aquitaine) might be relatively stable enough to allow a takeover of at least part of Provence.

It's a fairly important digression from the general OP, but without clear way to Italy, I simply don't see Carolingians claiming back the imperial kingship.
It also highlight, IMO, the aformentioned issues about an imperial-driven strike at al-Andalus, giving the complex situation in Aquitaine.
 
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I'd wait for @Carp to say how the Italian situation without Hugues of Arles's presence would look like, tough.

I don't think of Hugh of Arles as being particularly important in a personal sense; that is, anyone who occupied his position in Provence, either as king or as regent, was almost inevitably going to be pulled into the politics of Italy. Before Hugh, it was his "master" Louis whom the Lombard nobles had invited in to depose Berengar; he tried twice, failed twice, and lost his eyes for the trouble. Hugh merely stepped into Louis' role as the adjacent king in Provence, a role which could be equally well filled by the King of (Upper) Burgundy or even a great local magnate in the absence of a good local Carolingian descendant. If Hugh isn't in Provence, then whoever is in Provence is likely to play a similar role in Italian politics.

Nor was Hugh very unique once he was in power in Italy; his strategy, such as it was, was to import a cadre of his Provencal supporters and push his various familial relations into ducal/margravial and ecclesiastical posts in an attempt to replace disloyal magnates with personally loyal ones. It was sort of a version in miniature of what the Franks had done when they conquered Lombard Italy. Evidently it wasn't thorough enough, however, as it was ultimately the Anscarids (originally Burgundian, but settled in Ivrea since the rule of Guy of Spoleto) who did away with Bosonid rule in Italy.

If Hugh simply dies or otherwise vanishes from the scene before claiming Italy, it's possible Rudolph II of Burgundy might actually be able to rule; but then Rudolph had ambitions on Provence, and if Hugh is absent then Provence might be his preferred target. He doesn't seem to have been much loved by the nobility of Italy, so perhaps you'd end up with an earlier Anscarid rise (they're one of the few powerful territorial families left in Italy at this point), although a counterweight in the south under the Hucpoldings of Spoleto, the Bonifacii of Tuscany, or even Alberic in Spoleto/Rome is quite possible; the former two were basically extinguished around this time but could well do better in an alt-TL without Hugh. Lambert of Tuscany had a particular familial rivalry with Hugh (being his uterine half-brother) which you presumably would not have under a different ruler.

In respect to the thread more generally, I agree entirely that the "FHRE" is difficult to evoke into being because of the significant territory it requires; a king would, at the very least, have to maintain some sort of supremacy in Burgundy/Provence to hold the route to Italy, and between Laon and Rome there are plenty of magnates and petty kings who the Pope could exalt into a rival for power just as the popes did IOTL against various pre-Ottonian kings of Italy. It's a much greater challenge than it was for the Kings of Germany, particularly the Ottonians who could generally count on either personal reign or that of a loyal servant in Swabia.

As to the pagans to the east of Germany, I think there is a potentially interesting outcome in Sorbia/"Wendland" if Germany never becomes imperial. IOTL, Germany dominated both Denmark and Poland in the Ottonian era and was generally accepted as their nominal suzerain, but in a situation in which Germany is less powerful and lacks the imperial prestige and ecclesiastical influence of the OTL HRE the situation on the Baltic might be more balanced. Germany could and did use the arch-episcopal organization in the east to serve its own political ends, and that presumably becomes harder without the imperium and control over the Papacy. You might see a closer competition between Germany, Poland, and Denmark for Polabia and Pomerania, or maybe even a Sorbian/Wendish/Pomeranian "native" state arise, at least for a while, in the breach between these powers.
 
For clarity sake, I'll call the son of Guilhèlm I of Aquitaine Boson Guilhelmid, and the son of Teobald of Arles and brother of Hugues as Boson Hubertid.

I don't think of Hugh of Arles as being particularly important in a personal sense; that is, anyone who occupied his position in Provence, either as king or as regent, was almost inevitably going to be pulled into the politics of Italy.
I would tend to agree for what matter what matter potentes of Burgundy (inside or outside the kingdom) and Provence, but while they remained the main contenders in the region IOTL, it was partially thanks to the timely end of Guilhelmid power in Aquitaine which had serious ambitions, using the nobiliar opposition to Hugues at their benefit, to claim at least part of the kingdom for themselves.

What I find hard to determine (but there's admittedly a shortage of sources) is if Louis III would have accepted possible royal claims from Boson Guilhelmid, or if he would have yet trusted another relative as he did with Hugues by making Boson Guilhelmid his trusted man in Provence, chasing off Boson Hubertid. I would tend to agree on the latter, as Guilhèm already had control on the lands between Lyons and Autun in the early 910's that while entrused by the french kings, probably required Louis III's at least passive agreement.

Guilhelmids may have gained some support from Louis III or at least around him trough the nobiliar network partially set by Guilhem's father, altough not an overwelming one if the murder of Arnuste of Narbonne which seems to have been caused by the opposition between two sides, one gathering the viscount Alberic, support of Guilhèm and allied trough marriage to Folquièr de Valensole (opponent of Hugues), the other Rainald (possible parent of Guilhelm but probably dependent of the March of Vienna) : I'll spare the details, but the murder highlighted the presence of Guilhelmids in Provence (which kinda made the conflict going back to Gothia).

It's admittedly hard to state what would happen in a Guilhelmid Provence : royal takeover, vice-royalty (followed or not by a royal takeover), but I'm not sure would be translated into imperial ambitions : contrary to the relatively shaky territory and honores Hugues and Louis had, Aquitaine became at this point one of the first real territorial principalties outside Germany. I tend to agree with you that burgondian-provencal kingship tended to be tied to Italy, but we'll be in the case of a strong potens of Aquitaine and Gothia which was more tied to his original bases from one hand, and more tied to royal dynasties in France from another.

But, at least, the survival of Boson Guilhelmid and its succession in Aquitaine after his father death might hold the same role that Raoul of France (Bosonid himself) held against Hugues and prevent him to really reinforce himself in this side of the Alps, with several Bosonid claimants (Aquitaine, France, ducal Burgundy)? After all, after the tragi-comic events of 933, Hugues had to abandon his pretentions to provencal kingship : maybe that with an earlier outer pressure, ITTL from Aquitaine, would he be forced to do so?

It's rather a mess, I agree, and I may have looked in the wrong direction about Hugues : rather than forcing him to stay in Provence, we may rather need to make him stuck in Italy, which should proove chaotic enough to allow (in the eventuality of a German false-start ITTL) Late Carolingians to have a go at Italy, trough a more or less neutralized Burgundy thanks to Guilhelmid presence (which doesn't have to be royal or dominant, just strong enough), altough I wonder how much an Anscarid presence in Burgundy would be a problem for wannabee-emperors. Eventually a lot of this possible plan depends from the capacity of Guilhelmids to monopolize the nobiliar clientele of Louis III from one hand, and what would happen in Italy in regard to Provence as Guilhelmid overall ambitions weren't dependent on holding Provence.

He doesn't seem to have been much loved by the nobility of Italy, so perhaps you'd end up with an earlier Anscarid rise (they're one of the few powerful territorial families left in Italy at this point), although a counterweight in the south under the Hucpoldings of Spoleto, the Bonifacii of Tuscany, or even Alberic in Spoleto/Rome is quite possible; the former two were basically extinguished around this time but could well do better in an alt-TL without Hugh. Lambert of Tuscany had a particular familial rivalry with Hugh (being his uterine half-brother) which you presumably would not have under a different ruler.
So, sort of stabilization in Italy, around various Franco-Italian potentes?
What about the pontifical power ITTL, being assumed that Clunisiac reforms is at least as powerful as IOTL?

and between Laon and Rome there are plenty of magnates and petty kings who the Pope could exalt into a rival for power just as the popes did IOTL against various pre-Ottonian kings of Italy.
Not that much, actually : you had a few potentes and kings able to be technically exalted (I really appreciate this expression in this context, by the way) but many were either both territorially established and the other relatively dependent on royal favour (Bosonids of Burgundy) to really go for Italy. Rodolf is one of the serious claimant I could see, but as you said he wasn't exactly welcomed in Italy. In the case of a Carolingian victory at Soissons*, and Robertians out of the picture for a while, I don't see much candidates : Guilhelmids, in the case of a provencal takeover maybe? I kinda doubt it for the aformentioned reasons, tough. Who else? Burgundy Bosonids? Maybe, but they would be in the same situation than Hubertides IMO.
Now, maybe you had other names in mind?

*This potential TL have more PoDs than an espresso-machine owning household.


As to the pagans to the east of Germany, I think there is a potentially interesting outcome in Sorbia/"Wendland" if Germany never becomes imperial. IOTL, Germany dominated both Denmark and Poland in the Ottonian era and was generally accepted as their nominal suzerain, but in a situation in which Germany is less powerful and lacks the imperial prestige and ecclesiastical influence of the OTL HRE the situation on the Baltic might be more balanced. Germany could and did use the arch-episcopal organization in the east to serve its own political ends, and that presumably becomes harder without the imperium and control over the Papacy. You might see a closer competition between Germany, Poland, and Denmark for Polabia and Pomerania, or maybe even a Sorbian/Wendish/Pomeranian "native" state arise, at least for a while, in the breach between these powers.
That's especially interesting.
 
It's admittedly hard to state what would happen in a Guilhelmid Provence : royal takeover, vice-royalty (followed or not by a royal takeover), but I'm not sure would be translated into imperial ambitions : contrary to the relatively shaky territory and honores Hugues and Louis had, Aquitaine became at this point one of the first real territorial principalties outside Germany. I tend to agree with you that burgondian-provencal kingship tended to be tied to Italy, but we'll be in the case of a strong potens of Aquitaine and Gothia which was more tied to his original bases from one hand, and more tied to royal dynasties in France from another.

But, at least, the survival of Boson Guilhelmid and its succession in Aquitaine after his father death might hold the same role that Raoul of France (Bosonid himself) held against Hugues and prevent him to really reinforce himself in this side of the Alps, with several Bosonid claimants (Aquitaine, France, ducal Burgundy)? After all, after the tragi-comic events of 933, Hugues had to abandon his pretentions to provencal kingship : maybe that with an earlier outer pressure, ITTL from Aquitaine, would he be forced to do so?

It's rather a mess, I agree, and I may have looked in the wrong direction about Hugues : rather than forcing him to stay in Provence, we may rather need to make him stuck in Italy, which should proove chaotic enough to allow (in the eventuality of a German false-start ITTL) Late Carolingians to have a go at Italy, trough a more or less neutralized Burgundy thanks to Guilhelmid presence (which doesn't have to be royal or dominant, just strong enough), altough I wonder how much an Anscarid presence in Burgundy would be a problem for wannabee-emperors. Eventually a lot of this possible plan depends from the capacity of Guilhelmids to monopolize the nobiliar clientele of Louis III from one hand, and what would happen in Italy in regard to Provence as Guilhelmid overall ambitions weren't dependent on holding Provence.

So, sort of stabilization in Italy, around various Franco-Italian potentes?

"Mess" is the right word, and of course the sources (particularly on the Italian side of things) are not very thorough. As my knowledge of Aquitaine is very thin, it's hard for me to speculate on how the Guilhelmids would have gained power in Provence or the manner in which they would wield it once they had it. IOTL Provence/Burgundy was peripheral to the empire, strategically valuable but not strictly necessary for the retention of Italy, and thus it was perfectly effective to retain it as a "vassal kingdom" until a dynastic lapse permitted its integration into the constellation of imperial titles. An imperial French/Aquitanian interest in Burgundy/Provence is going to be entirely different, as I rather doubt a loose vassal kingship will suffice if the aim is to keep a firm and steady hand on Rome and the Italian kingdom. The region is so strategically important to a "FHRE" that I can scarcely imagine it working without the emperors at the very least holding the royal title, which they must almost inevitably claim by force.

Anyway, there's a reason that Louis the Blind, Hugh, and Rudolph II were invited into Italy; the fact that they were "outsiders" with no familial or territorial presence in the kingdom was a feature, not a bug, as far as the potentates of Lombardy were concerned. I tend to see this as a reaction against Berengar, who was a "native prince" in the sense that his base of power was in Italy itself (specifically Friuli), from which he rebounded from near-defeat several times. I suspect it is this, more than anything else, which allowed him his cockroach-like longevity despite facing numerous counter-claimants and outright disasters (see: the Brenta) during his reign. A "foreign" king, in contrast, would in theory have to rely more on the local aristocracy and the great magnates and would hold a more fragile throne - that was certainly true of Rudolph II, who despite overthrowing Berengar (a tremendous achievement in itself) fled back to Burgundy almost as soon as Hugh made his bid. So long as Berengar had his redoubt in Friuli, he could usually fall back and lick his wounds without abandoning the kingship, but when a "foreign" king fell back on his own resources it meant falling out of Italy entirely, and that was just peachy for the aristocracy which had gotten rather used to inviting a new king in when the old one became too onerous. Hugh's attempt to resolve this problem, as mentioned, relied on creating anew a "little Provence" in Italy by importing his Provencal court and filling the ranks of the magnates with his kinsmen, but this had the fairly predictable effect of unnerving the Italian aristocracy, particularly after the debacle of Anscar, Sarlio, and Hubert in Spoleto demonstrated just how faithless and bluntly self-interested the king was towards his vassals.

One of the "native" Franco-Italians, like the Anscarids, could potentially make for a more stable kingdom, but the problem is getting them there, because as mentioned the noble factions are inclined towards inviting weak kings (or rather strong kings who will be placed in a position of weakness once they reign in Italy). Notably the Anscarid Berengar II took the kingship not by invitation but by usurpation, playing the part of the all-powerful vizier to the ineffective Lothair until it seemed acceptable to get rid of him entirely (if you believe that he was poisoned). The Anscarids are in a decent position to do it because they're really the gatekeepers of the north, geographically speaking; the King of Burgundy can only with difficulty be "invited in" if Ivrea does not comply. Nobody can possess a firm command of Italy without them, or at least without their lands.

Alternately, a TL without Hugh might see the rise of the Hucboldings, because the alternative to Hugh was Rudolph II of Burgundy and the Hucboldings were among his strongest supporters. Boniface, later Duke of Spoleto, was married to Rudolph's sister and amassed significant territory in the Emilia/Modena/Romagna region under Rudolph's brief and friendly rule, only to be significantly undermined by Hugh (although he did gain Spoleto as Hugh's power deteriorated). While Rudolph ruled Boniface was very nearly the second man in the kingdom, given the titles of dux et marchio as well as conciliarius regis and entrusted by the king to mediate disputes on his behalf. Being related to both the Guidoni of Spoleto (formerly emperors) and the Burgundian house of Welf, the Hucboldings could well have been in a position to aspire to greater things had they not faced the loss of a friendly king early on when Rudolph abandoned the kingdom.

I would hardly call the rise of these magnates "stabilization" - more likely is a continuation of the earlier civil wars in which claimants with local power-bases in Italy (i.e. Berengar and the Guidoni) slug it out with occasional foreign intervention, with the Pope ruining everything as usual by switching sides when either becomes too overbearing. The problem is that unlike Germany, where the stem duchies were fairly territorially distinct and the kingship was initially more of a primus inter pares, Italy possessed no clear territorial divisions (save, perhaps, for Tuscany) and had not only a royal title but an imperial one which left no doubt that its holder was much more than merely the biggest magnate in the land. With so little definition on the ground and such a grand title up for grabs, it's difficult to imagine Italy stabilizing into an array of territorial magnates under an elective kingship in the manner of Germany.

If the aim is just to screw over the region generally so as to provide a sustained opening for Aquitaine, you could have Hugh kick the bucket in the early 930s; perhaps he gets killed at his abortive Roman wedding in 932 instead of ignominiously escaping out a window. This brings Rudolph back into the picture, who still lacks control over Provence but will now be quite busy reclaiming his lapsed kingship in Italy, particularly given that Hugh's brother Boso is Margrave of Tuscany and may very well have his own supporters for the throne. Provence is vulnerable, and even if the Aquitainians make no effort to claim it in 932, historically Rudolph died in 937 leaving a minor son as his heir. This leaves a pretty big leadership gap in both Provence-Burgundy and Italy, and no matter who "wins" in Italy, any man who controls either of the western Alpine kingdoms (or both) is candidate #1 for being invited in by the disgruntled Italian aristocrats to get rid of which ever locally-based king is making their lives difficult at the moment.

This is a damned complex topic and sometimes quite hard for me to follow, I'll admit.

Not that much, actually : you had a few potentes and kings able to be technically exalted (I really appreciate this expression in this context, by the way) but many were either both territorially established and the other relatively dependent on royal favour (Bosonids of Burgundy) to really go for Italy. Rodolf is one of the serious claimant I could see, but as you said he wasn't exactly welcomed in Italy. In the case of a Carolingian victory at Soissons*, and Robertians out of the picture for a while, I don't see much candidates : Guilhelmids, in the case of a provencal takeover maybe? I kinda doubt it for the aformentioned reasons, tough. Who else? Burgundy Bosonids? Maybe, but they would be in the same situation than Hubertides IMO.
Now, maybe you had other names in mind?

The supply of Carolingians becoming rather thin by this point, presumably the Pope will turn to other options, which will include Italian magnates (Anscarids, Hucboldings) and the southern German dukes (the Duke of Bavaria tried his hand at invading Italy on his own several times IOTL) or indeed the Kings of Germany, who while presumably "screwed" in this TL probably won't cease to be potentially valid anti-emperors given their strong historical interest in the title and their geographic proximity to Italy. But the thing is, you don't really need a surfeit of contenders to make the papal strategy of opposition work; you just need two.

That's especially interesting.

I think a Polabian state is plausible, but a non-imperial Germany is practically a necessity for it (and even then it's not an easy sell). The Polabian Slavs showed a remarkable resistance to what was by all accounts a superior German power, but their fate was very nearly preordained given German imperial dominance in the region and the subjection of Denmark and Poland to imperial vassaldom. You can get an inkling of how things might have been during the reign of Boleslaw the Brave, who for a while challenged German authority, conquered Lusatia and Meissen, and compelled the newly-crowned Emperor Henry II to actually ally with the pagan Lutici against the Poles. The alliance broke down as soon as the Polish threat became less pressing, however, and the Polabians in general never managed to stay out of tribal civil wars for long.

Fundamentally, they were divided between the often-rival confederacies of the Obodrites and the Veleti/Lutici, with the former becoming a nominally Christian principality whose rulers alternated between German and Danish allegiance while the Lutici remained more staunchly pagan for longer and apparently had a more decentralized authority. A major problem was that Christianity was seen by many as a tool of German dominion, and very rightfully so. German weakness both temporal and ecclesiastical creates an opening for Polabian princes/chiefs to promote Christianity without necessarily being seen as foreign puppets, and Christianization (at least of the leadership) is essential for the survival of the Polabians as an entity in such a location between Christian powers.

I expect the unifying force, if it comes, will be from the Obodrites, whose rulers Christianized earlier and which became a more centralized polity thanks in part to Danish influence. They were allies of Charlemagne against the Saxons and Veleti, for purely political reasons, and are probably in the best position to create a Polabian state if German hegemony is curtailed and their leaders are deft enough to play their neighbors off each other.
 
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"Mess" is the right word, and of course the sources (particularly on the Italian side of things) are not very thorough. As my knowledge of Aquitaine is very thin, it's hard for me to speculate on how the Guilhelmids would have gained power in Provence
The sources on the Aquitain side are probably even less clear, giving that it was a relatively peripherical region (a sum of what we know of Xth century Gascony is limited, apart that the region was probably raided over by Scandinavians until the late Xth, and that it was strongly associated with Navarre, maybe having taken the royal title from time to time while being still tied up with Aquitains, etc.).
But if we assume that Guilhèm I's support was based on his father own's interventionism in Provence, there's a certain loyalist facade as he broke with Boson to enforce Carloman II's rule on Arles, enjoying some form of regency in Aquitaine and Bourgogne (and obtaining counties as Mâcon and Lyons) before he lost Carloman's support to Richard.
But while Bernard II switched sides in reaction (giving his support to Charles), there's parallels between the two successive Guilhelmids policies on Provence : territorial advancement, support of the loyalist side, a strong use of episcopal (but as well monastical, as in the possible case for Cluny) network.

While it's hard for everyone to speculate on the how of things exactly, I could see (keeping in mind we don't know what happens exactly) Boson Guilhelmid eventually benefiting from its kinship with Louis, his influence and dynastic prestige, and the relative local reject of Hugues to appear as a "restorer" at least in a first time, trading his support for Louis III against a aprt of Hubertid honores (I'm especially thinking of the confirmation of Guilhelmid presence in Lyons, and an extension in Vienna).

Now if we use the aformentioned PoD at the Battle of Soissons to effectively crush Robertians for the time being, it makes Carolingians the arbitrors of the region, alongside whoever replaces Ottonids ITTL. I think, but it's open to debate, it gives Louis III a bit more leverage, as without Robertian support, Bosonids would be less able to pull all their weight. In this case, the kingdom of Provence would be in an even more complex situation which, interestingly could be paralled with the Provencal-Bourguignon situation in the XIIth century divided along foreign influences and presence.

I tend to think as well, possibly wrongly, that Guilhelmids would be less wielding the kingdom, even as trusted men of Bosonid kings, than serving a quasi-vice roys in the southern kingdoms, especially in Vienne. Contrary to Hugues, whom power was based on the kinship with Louis and imperial ambitions, Aquitains didn't needed (at least this much) to undergo the same headlong rush he did.
The question on what would be a situation with a divided Provence without Ottonian or Robertian meddling, and how a separated Provence from Italy would go on, seems to me to be relatively important for what matter the constitution of a F-HRE.

I agree that there's an awful lot of speculation there, but frankly giving the time period, it's really hard not to do so.

An imperial French/Aquitanian interest in Burgundy/Provence is going to be entirely different, as I rather doubt a loose vassal kingship will suffice if the aim is to keep a firm and steady hand on Rome and the Italian kingdom. The region is so strategically important to a "FHRE" that I can scarcely imagine it working without the emperors at the very least holding the royal title, which they must almost inevitably claim by force.
Thing is, we have an experience of a dual vassalic kingship among Late Carolingians, with the Aquitain kingship. The title wasn't always claimed by Carolingians (altough regularily stressed) and while you stopped to have a litteral Aquitain regnum at the death of Carloman II, the idea of an Aquitain kingship didn't disappeared as such as the nomination of prince/marquis/dukes of the main part/dukes of the kingdom/dukes, etc. in Aquitaine was still pretty much a thing in the Xth.
I wouldn't want to give the impression that such is bound to happen in Provence, it depends from a lot of things to even work roughly, but I think a loose control (if not by proxy in the case of Provence) of the Burgundian regni could be enough for a significant Italian policy : that it would be successful or efficient, tough, is another matter.
It's not going to be comfortable for this TL wannabe-emperors, that's sure : but while carving it up politically is a short-term solution that is likely to bite back, it may be the real only way as I don't see how Late Carolingians could pull such a move.

That said, a possible change would be to see Bosonids swallowing up Robertian network after Soissons, and then having a go for Western Francian kingship, and from there imperial title, but it seems a bit convoluted. Do you think it would be a better solution ITTL?

the fact that they were "outsiders" with no familial or territorial presence in the kingdom was a feature, not a bug, as far as the potentates of Lombardy were concerned. I tend to see this as a reaction against Berengar, who was a "native prince" in the sense that his base of power was in Italy itself (specifically Friuli), from which he rebounded from near-defeat several times. I suspect it is this, more than anything else, which allowed him his cockroach-like longevity despite facing numerous counter-claimants and outright disasters (see: the Brenta) during his reign.
An interesting insight : I do not know nearly as much as I would on Xth century Italy.

Nobody can possess a firm command of Italy without them, or at least without their lands.
With a stronger Clunisian reform ITTL (again due to a different Aquitaine), wouldn't the pontifical power, at least institutional power, be reinforced gradually?

The problem is that unlike Germany, where the stem duchies were fairly territorially distinct and the kingship was initially more of a primus inter pares, Italy possessed no clear territorial divisions (save, perhaps, for Tuscany) and had not only a royal title but an imperial one which left no doubt that its holder was much more than merely the biggest magnate in the land.

With so little definition on the ground and such a grand title up for grabs, it's difficult to imagine Italy stabilizing into an array of territorial magnates under an elective kingship in the manner of Germany.
So the territorialisation of potentes was, if I understand your point correctly, significantly late compared to Germany but western Francia as well? (Guilhelm I was one of the first territorial rulers of the kingdom IOTL)
I was, actually, rather thinking of a delayed stabilization of Italy along territorial lines, but you're saying that it was already the case : couldn't it evolve in the direction of a greater political desintegration within the various duchies and non-territorial ensembles as it happened in France IOTL?

As I envisioned a Carolingian (or possibly French Bosonid, see above) intervention in Italy in the late Xth, rather than in the early part IOTL, wouldn't that let time for a French king that is not as limited geopolitically than early Capetian were to intervene on an even more chaotic Italy? How much this intervention would be efficient is another questions again, of course.

This leaves a pretty big leadership gap in both Provence-Burgundy and Italy, and no matter who "wins" in Italy, any man who controls either of the western Alpine kingdoms (or both) is candidate #1 for being invited in by the disgruntled Italian aristocrats to get rid of which ever locally-based king is making their lives difficult at the moment.
It's a fair point, but apart from Bosonids or related families as Anscarids; I'm not sure it would be that echoed locally : as you said, you need to be two to play this game, and non-Provencal families may not answer as much as the Pope would want. Couldn't it led to a similar situation than IOTL, with an italian kingship devolving into a quasi-decennal kingship turning among iItalian nobles, allowing for a weaker-than-IOTL emperors-wannabee to have a go at Italy?

I'd want to stress tough, that firm control over Italy isn't that needed, as long Rome remains fairly "defeudalized". It's admittedly the hardest part, but the clerical reforms were already ongoing there, so it's not hopeless. Your opinion?

The supply of Carolingians becoming rather thin by this point, presumably the Pope will turn to other options, which will include Italian magnates (Anscarids, Hucboldings) and the southern German dukes (the Duke of Bavaria tried his hand at invading Italy on his own several times IOTL) or indeed the Kings of Germany, who while presumably "screwed" in this TL probably won't cease to be potentially valid anti-emperors given their strong historical interest in the title and their geographic proximity to Italy. But the thing is, you don't really need a surfeit of contenders to make the papal strategy of opposition work; you just need two.
Yeah, I agree it makes the situation there really difficult.

-On Wends-
That's really well tought.
 
I tend to think as well, possibly wrongly, that Guilhelmids would be less wielding the kingdom, even as trusted men of Bosonid kings, than serving a quasi-vice roys in the southern kingdoms, especially in Vienne. Contrary to Hugues, whom power was based on the kinship with Louis and imperial ambitions, Aquitains didn't needed (at least this much) to undergo the same headlong rush he did.

The question on what would be a situation with a divided Provence without Ottonian or Robertian meddling, and how a separated Provence from Italy would go on, seems to me to be relatively important for what matter the constitution of a F-HRE.

Unfortunately I don't know all that much about the nobility of Provence, although I presume King Boso had significant local support to be able to claim the kingship in the manner he did.

After reading what you've posted and poking around the Aquitanian genealogy (which I knew little about), I certainly agree that a Guilhemid survival, particularly in the form of a son by Engelberga the Bosonid, presents a reasonable chance of extending Aquitainian influence or even rule there. It's too late to avert the usurpation of Hugh, but Hugh's demise would leave only Charles-Constantine and his descendants (and his supposed in-laws at Vienne) as serious local competitors, and my impression (not based on much, admittedly) is that their rise in the later guise of Counts of Provence owed much to the breakdown of royal power after Hugh's Italian venture and subsequent death and its replacement by the feebler and more distant royal presence of the Burgundian Welfs.

Your other alternative, a Bosonid rise at the expense of the Robertians, has its attractions, although it seems to me that a Bosonid on the throne may be only marginally more successful at maintaining the profile of the Carolingians than the early Capetians were (which is to say, hardly at all). One wonders whether it might be easier to possess the imperial title first, before the Francian kingship, so as to present oneself as "Carolingian" in title if not in lineage, but I'm not very well acquainted with the manner in which the pre-Capetian French chose their kings.

An interesting insight : I do not know nearly as much as I would on Xth century Italy.

The history of Berengar's life seems to feature several points at which he is beaten or rendered irrelevant, and then shortly thereafter appears again in Friuli to make a new bid for recovery. IIRC, Arnulf of Carinthia even divested him of Friuli, only for him to reappear there once Arnulf withdrew from the kingdom. He very obviously had a durable foundation of power there. It seems odd, since the region does not have terrific importance in the later 10th century save as a geographically useful "march" for Germany to extend itself into Italy, but it may be that the Magyars - who hit Friuli first and hardest - contributed to the decline of that region such that it no longer really constituted the power base which it had been under Berengar.

With a stronger Clunisian reform ITTL (again due to a different Aquitaine), wouldn't the pontifical power, at least institutional power, be reinforced gradually?

I'd want to stress tough, that firm control over Italy isn't that needed, as long Rome remains fairly "defeudalized". It's admittedly the hardest part, but the clerical reforms were already ongoing there, so it's not hopeless. Your opinion?

Well, there was already Cluniac influence in Rome fairly early on, even under the Tusculani/Theophylacti; although the family is notorious for the supposed worldliness and corruption of "their" popes, Alberic II was a patron of Odo of Cluny and supported his reform of monasteries in central Italy. The distinction to make, I think, is that while Alberic was quite happy to "reform" the monasteries into something more creditable and useful to him, the career of Odo in Italy made no immediate impression on the Papacy itself, which under Alberic was actually quite creditable morally but quite restrained politically.

How the power of the Papacy develops depends a great deal on how the "French emperors" exert themselves in Rome. IOTL the 10th and early 11th century papacy became hyper-politicized as a result of its importance to competing Roman clans, whose struggles the emperor could intervene in decisively but not permanently. Presumably the "French emperors" are not going to be any more able to intervene regularly in Rome than the Germans. A similar situation to OTL is thus very plausible, and will probably be necessary if the "French emperors" are to actually gain the title; Alberic's principality was hostile to the notion of a crowned emperor (which is why he resisted Hugh so bitterly) and if Rome continues to remain in the strong hands of such a "prince" then the imperial title is unlikely to be granted to anyone. At the very least the emperors will have to keep reliable men in Tuscany and Spoleto to keep them from "pulling an Alberic" (that is, Alberic I, not II) and using their power to assert themselves in the city.

How do you see a Cluniac reform being "stronger" under royal/imperial Guilhemid patronage? Just in terms of the resources they are granted by an ascendant Aquitainian state, or in some other way?

So the territorialisation of potentes was, if I understand your point correctly, significantly late compared to Germany but western Francia as well? (Guilhelm I was one of the first territorial rulers of the kingdom IOTL)

I was, actually, rather thinking of a delayed stabilization of Italy along territorial lines, but you're saying that it was already the case : couldn't it evolve in the direction of a greater political desintegration within the various duchies and non-territorial ensembles as it happened in France IOTL?

The Lombard duchies in the north didn't really survive the Carolingian conquest (unlike those in the south, which remained extant until the Norman conquest), and as a result the territories of the proceres/magnates of Italy in this period are very often either ad-hoc distributions of the formerly royal territory or myriad assemblages of estates and rectorships (such as what the Hucboldings acquired in Emilia/Modena). See, for instance, the division of south-western Lombardy which developed under Hugh and Berengar II (apologies for the poor picture):

P32xnTw.jpg


None of these are familiar territorial entities to us, yet they all have recognizable descendants: the Marca Arduinica or "March of Turin" eventually passed to the House of Savoy, the Marca Aleramica or "March of Western Liguria" remained with the Aleramici and became Montferrat, and the Marca Obertenga or "Eastern Liguria" was the base of the Obertenghi and eventually the House of Este as the family's power migrated eastwards. As territorial entities, however, they tended to lack cohesion because of the rise of the communes and the fact that they were de novo territorial creations which did not necessarily bind the local counts all that closely to the margraves or deprive them of their rights. Indeed, the emperors (particularly and famously Conrad II) tended to side with the valvassores against the magnates, assuring them of their succession rights and undermining the authority and thus the territorial integrity of the margravial states.

The only constituent states which really possessed durability were Tuscany, which alone among the old Lombard duchies retained its full territorial integrity (until the death of Matilda of Canossa), and perhaps Spoleto, although that territory was frequently divided from and then re-combined with Camerino in a rather confusing manner. The rest became a checkerboard of rural aristocratic holdings, ecclesiastical/monastic estates, and urban communal centers, and in that sense one might say Italy never really "territorialized" in the way I think you mean it, at least not until much later in the medieval era once the rise and fall of the communes created coherent statelets based around powerful urban centers.

The late 10th century is not too late for a foreign king, Guilhemid, Bosonid, or otherwise, to come in and remake the map. Tuscany may remain Tuscany, but everything else is probably fair game to be carved up and apportioned among the king's supporters, which is exactly how things went down in southwestern Lombardy c. 950 as mentioned. You can't get all that much more "disintegrated" than OTL aside from breaking up Tuscany as well.
 
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Unfortunately I don't know all that much about the nobility of Provence, although I presume King Boso had significant local support to be able to claim the kingship in the manner he did.
Strangely enough, not that much : contrary to the possible (but disputed) royal claims of the dukes of Gascony that would have been buiilt both on an established clientele and with ties to the Kingdom of Pampelune, Boson's regnum is largely opportunistic, and non-descript.
Boson was initially more of a viceroy of sort in Aquitaine, then Italy and critically Provence (where he gain some honores) for Charles the Bald : his power came from his proximity with the imperial court than his honores (which he inherited as he didn't kept his former Aquitain's). He timely leaved the imperial boat at Quiery in spite being called by Charles, and Boson joined the general nobiliar revolt in Aquitaine.

It might be strange for an "imperial man" but he was not really hesistating to join up with local potentes if he had to, especially in a really fin de règne ambient.
I'll spare you the details of conflicts about who recieved which honores, and how everyone felt screwed by Louis II, but it eventually turns out that nobody really wanted to proclaim Louis as emperor in Arles as it was initially planned, while he became close enough from Carolingian circles (on which he was tied matrimonially) Boson not really making huge efforts in this direction and more focused on his own interests before a mostly benevolent (for his person) pope. While Guilhelmid collect honores (mostly taken from Adalelmids,, convenient scapegoats), Boson is trying to be crowned king of Italy which fizzles almost immediatly.

The shaky succession of Louis II, between Louis and Carloman fron one hand, Louis the Younger from another, allows Boson to make another attempt at kingship successfully this time.
He's supported by local nobles, but more significantly by the episcopalian community including outside Provence. Most of his nobiliar support probably comes from Charles' clientele, altough Boson barely manage to have half of Charles' rengum, the half more devasted by the troubles of the late IXth (including, notable, Saracenic piracy).
Giving that he joined back with Bernard II Adalelmid, that kept his honores in Provence against Guilhelmids, we might have a rag-tag support from bishops wanting some stablility (especially from someone having some pontifical trust), and a nobility that may feel is not enough taken in consideration.

Note that the royal title of Boson is non-descript : it's hard to say if he was looking at an italian (the pontifical favour turns after his royal election, so that's more or less gone) or aquitain kingship, however, but in the misdt of troubled and quick succession, Boson manage to carve out an opportunist and vague kingship whom only the divisions, undecision and early deaths of various Capetians really save; and not even completly (loosing most of formerly Adalelmid-held Burgundy as well as Lyonnais).

It's a mix of opportunism, succession crisis, and networking, more than just local support. Giving the historical consequences for the late IXth and Xth century, it's quite amazing. (Boson really makes me think he was sort of Carolingian Charles d'Anjou).

After reading what you've posted and poking around the Aquitanian genealogy (which I knew little about), I certainly agree that a Guilhemid survival, particularly in the form of a son by Engelberga the Bosonid, presents a reasonable chance of extending Aquitainian influence or even rule there. It's too late to avert the usurpation of Hugh, but Hugh's demise would leave only Charles-Constantine and his descendants (and his supposed in-laws at Vienne) as serious local competitors, and my impression (not based on much, admittedly) is that their rise in the later guise of Counts of Provence owed much to the breakdown of royal power after Hugh's Italian venture and subsequent death and its replacement by the feebler and more distant royal presence of the Burgundian Welfs.
Indeed, Aquitain genealogies tend to be blurry at best (the Raimondine traditional genealogy at least left out two Raimonds and one Pons in the list, and they are one of the most known families), but Boson Guilhelmid is quite an interesting PoD.
I was less expecting to butterfly away Hugues's presence, than having Guilhelmids appearing as Carolingian-Bosonid "loyalists", and push Hugues out of Provence as Rodolphe II did IOTL, appearing as supporters of Louis III. Their ambitions are unknown, but, as said, their relatively affirmed territorial strength doesn't really makes me think they would go for the royal title, and just takeover Hugues' honores in Marca Vienensis.

Now, would they try to pull the same policy Bernard II Guilhelmid did with Carloman II (pulling a regency for Louis III, then Charles-Constantin) or try a bid the for throne is let to imagination : but geopolitically, I'd say the former makes more sense (and would be more helpful ITTL), altough Boson Guilhelmid could possibly not realize how much is position in Aquitaine is still dependent from a relative delicate balance (especially if Ebles Manzar still is Count of Poitiou ITTL, which might be better to care of, as pointed in the post 28).

That said, I'm not too sure how Welfs would react to this, in a TL where Robertians are weakened, and Burgundian Bosonid not as much able to benefit from their support.

Your other alternative, a Bosonid rise at the expense of the Robertians, has its attractions, although it seems to me that a Bosonid on the throne may be only marginally more successful at maintaining the profile of the Carolingians than the early Capetians were (which is to say, hardly at all). One wonders whether it might be easier to possess the imperial title first, before the Francian kingship, so as to present oneself as "Carolingian" in title if not in lineage, but I'm not very well acquainted with the manner in which the pre-Capetian French chose their kings.
Yeah, I was afraid of this, altough I saw less a Bosonid rise at the expense of Robertians, than Bosonid inheriting Robertian networks and part of honores. Not unlike Arnulfids did with Peppinids in the VIIth century.

Now for the choice of Western Francian kings...It would be relatively agreeable to say it was elective, but it was a really unformal election, which several potentes didn't acknowledged (Aquitain potentes tended to refuse to acknowledge Robertian kings) : it eventually depends a lot on what happened in northern France, closer to royal circles, at this point, the succession being eventually more or less settled (sometimes not, as with Charles III acknowledged in the southern part as king of Franks, Aquitains and Goths) with peripherical potentes in exchange of honores, beneficii or alliances; all of this with back-and-return for legitimisation to German kings : a wonderful, chaotic mess.
So basically, it's maybe less of an election, than an appointed kingship trough several potentes, usually close to royal networks or powerful enough; and usually a contested choice par Aquitains, Goths, Champenois or Bourguignon, except with tractations, if it involved another dynasty than Carolingians (a very, very accident-prone dynasty : as you said, candidates were running low, so it would be nice if we had more of these).

The distinction to make, I think, is that while Alberic was quite happy to "reform" the monasteries into something more creditable and useful to him, the career of Odo in Italy made no immediate impression on the Papacy itself, which under Alberic was actually quite creditable morally but quite restrained politically.
I agree, but the greater autonomisation of the clergy, monastic or episcopalian, would still have a strong drive ITTL. With time, especially with the hot seat that was italian kingship, the idea of a more clean clergy (I entierly agree that the Tusculani Papacy really had a bad rap on this regard), and less devoted to great families when it come to secular matter is going to be particularily important and pervasive within Christian society, as IOTL. Not just within the clergy, but among the nobility as well, where you did have an echo for re-evangelisation of feudal society historically.
Hence one of the reasons why I think that a later Western French intervention in Italy might be preferrable to form an HRE-equivalent.

At the very least the emperors will have to keep reliable men in Tuscany and Spoleto to keep them from "pulling an Alberic" (that is, Alberic I, not II) and using their power to assert themselves in the city.
Is there no chance to have Tusculani simply wearing out, in lack of royal legitimacy to strengthen their principalty? After all, the number of families in the late Carolingian world that could have had a go for territorial survival, but crumbled because of the lack of legitimisation for their extension is quite significant. Or is it too late to really play any role in Italy?

How do you see a Cluniac reform being "stronger" under royal/imperial Guilhemid patronage? Just in terms of the resources they are granted by an ascendant Aquitainian state, or in some other way?
Well, partially so : after all Cluny foundation is both due to an initial re-evangelisation of French society, and because it allowed Guilhèm to really strengthen his presence in the part of Burgundy he held. I could see something similar, within a Provence where Guilhelmids represent a strong influence, more regional foundations, earlier.
Similarily (copy-pasting post 25, if you allow me), it's worth noting that the moral decline of the clergy and its "nobiliarisation" in France went in par with the decline of the Carolingian dynasty, Robertians hardly behaving differently from other nobles until Robert II.

ITTL, Carolingians could end with a stronger clergy that what existed IOTL (especially without Ottonian influence on Xth century clergy), patrially due to a concious and maintained policy as the episcopalian support was a strong feature of their own legitimization in France. On the other hand, this clergy isn't as dependent on royal (or there imperial) power that it tended to be in Germany : the regalian role of the clergy is more present in the east of the kingdom (and probably Lotharingia as part of F-HRE ITTL), and tends to disappear quickly more you go west and south.

It's hard to say if the regional councils would be maintained as IOTL, altough I do think that strong potentes as Aquitaine would. But the Peace of God movements would be likely changed due to a possible (but really relative) imperial appeasement : it wouldn't be butterflied away, tough, as a F-HRE would be still particularily troubled in several regions, with an emperor not rally able to hold out conflicts in peripherical regions if at all (while still more able to do so that the Xth century IOTL).

We might see a dynamic where a stronger Cluniac movement benefits Carolingian dynasty, which in turns legitimate Cluniac influence in Italy, etc. A bit far-fetched, I agree as on the other hand, it would mean create an imperial-pontifical relationship out of it, rather than strengthening reforms because of a previously existing imperial-pontifical relationship. Hence why I'd prefer your opinion on this as well, as it depends a lot on Roman policies : what you said tough, doesn't really makes me confident.


The Lombard duchies in the north didn't really survive the Carolingian conquest (unlike those in the south, which remained extant until the Norman conquest), and as a result the territories of the proceres/magnates of Italy in this period are very often either ad-hoc distributions of the formerly royal territory or myriad assemblages of estates and rectorships (such as what the Hucboldings acquired in Emilia/Modena). See, for instance, the division of south-western Lombardy which developed under Hugh and Berengar II (apologies for the poor picture):
Any reason why the Carolingian conquest was this destructuring in Italy? Usually, they kept most of the frames in took over regions. In fact, why did it happened in most of Carolingian Italy except Spoleto and Tuscany (I would have said Friul as well, which seem to have been distinct already before the Frankish conquest, but...).

I'm not exactly sure to understand how these political formations did legitimized themselves without at least a token power : or was the chaotic kingship the expression of this need of formalisation of honores which without inner jnbalance, had to be short-lived?

The late 10th century is not too late for a foreign king, Guilhemid, Bosonid, or otherwise, to come in and remake the map. Tuscany may remain Tuscany, but everything else is probably fair game to be carved up and apportioned among the king's supporters, which is exactly how things went down in southwestern Lombardy c. 950 as mentioned. You can't get all that much more "disintegrated" than OTL aside from breaking up Tuscany as well.
So, we might need some various non-Carolingian kings (but not emperors) messing just enough with Italy until the late Xth/early XIth, and allowing a Carolingian firm takeover?
 
It's a mix of opportunism, succession crisis, and networking, more than just local support. Giving the historical consequences for the late IXth and Xth century, it's quite amazing. (Boson really makes me think he was sort of Carolingian Charles d'Anjou).

That's pretty impressive and fascinating, and something I was quite unaware of.

I was less expecting to butterfly away Hugues's presence, than having Guilhelmids appearing as Carolingian-Bosonid "loyalists", and push Hugues out of Provence as Rodolphe II did IOTL, appearing as supporters of Louis III. Their ambitions are unknown, but, as said, their relatively affirmed territorial strength doesn't really makes me think they would go for the royal title, and just takeover Hugues' honores in Marca Vienensis.

Did Rudolph really push Hugh out of Provence? I'm aware that Hugh "traded" it c. 933 in exchange for Rudolph's renunciation of Italy, but by all appearances Hugh and his Bosonid relations continued to exert power in Provence and Hugh was able to flee there after the loss of his sovereign power to Berengar II. My impression was always that Hugh's cession of Provence was really only partial, either by mutual agreement or as a result of the practical difficulty of the Burgundian Welfs exerting power over the Bosonid-controlled south.

...a wonderful, chaotic mess.
So basically, it's maybe less of an election, than an appointed kingship trough several potentes, usually close to royal networks or powerful enough; and usually a contested choice par Aquitains, Goths, Champenois or Bourguignon, except with tractations, if it involved another dynasty than Carolingians (a very, very accident-prone dynasty : as you said, candidates were running low, so it would be nice if we had more of these).

Well, that bodes well for our prospective Bosonid/Guilhemid emperor, although I suppose there's little historical basis for the election of a king who was already king (let alone emperor) elsewhere unless you go back to the 9th century Carolingians when the crowns seem to have been passed back and forth among the various dynastic heirs rather freely. Do you consider it plausible for a Guilhemid king/emperor in Aquitaine/Provence/Italy, with no real territorial presence in the north, to receive the French kingship in the event of an opportune Carolingian dynastic failure there?

I agree, but the greater autonomisation of the clergy, monastic or episcopalian, would still have a strong drive ITTL. With time, especially with the hot seat that was italian kingship, the idea of a more clean clergy (I entierly agree that the Tusculani Papacy really had a bad rap on this regard), and less devoted to great families when it come to secular matter is going to be particularily important and pervasive within Christian society, as IOTL. Not just within the clergy, but among the nobility as well, where you did have an echo for re-evangelisation of feudal society historically.
Hence one of the reasons why I think that a later Western French intervention in Italy might be preferrable to form an HRE-equivalent.

I consider the bad rap of the Tusculani papacy to be mostly deserved, just not during the reign of Alberic II. Whereas Alberic's control of the city meant that the person of the pope was irrelevant so long as he was compliant, the more multipolar situation of Rome under the later Tusculani suggested a strategy in which the family members (and sometimes the counts themselves) took the papal throne so as to directly control its benefices and legitimating power more strongly against rival families. Essentially, the papacy was de-politicized under Alberic II but hyper-politicized under his successors, and lumping these two states together into one "Tusculan Papacy" results in some inaccuracy.

Otherwise I agree that the trend of "re-evangelisation" will not be denied, and if it is even stronger than OTL it will be bad news for the Tusculani and other competing families, assuming that by this time Alberic's principality has degenerated into the multipolar Rome of his successors as OTL. Notably, however, if you significantly change Hugh's life you are also likely to get a very different result in Rome; I'm not sure who Marozia reaches out to c. 932 if Hugh is out of the picture; possibly she grooms Alberic II to succeed her in a less antagonistic manner than he did historically or finds some other potentate to be her champion.

Is there no chance to have Tusculani simply wearing out, in lack of royal legitimacy to strengthen their principalty? After all, the number of families in the late Carolingian world that could have had a go for territorial survival, but crumbled because of the lack of legitimisation for their extension is quite significant. Or is it too late to really play any role in Italy?

Tusculani legitimacy was not really dependent on royal or even imperial power, at least not initially. Theophylact was indeed an imperial appointee as iudex palatinus, but thereafter the early Tusculani preferred the civic honors of Rome (usually expressed as some combination of "consul," "senator," and "patrician") alongside titles which reflected their custodianship of the papacy like "sacri palatii vestararius." Alberic II married the daughter of Hugh only as his second choice, and even then only because he was placed under some duress by Hugh and had been encouraged to reconcile by Odo of Cluny. His initial preference was in fact a Byzantine bride, which he failed to procure.

His was a fairly secure foundation given the weakness of royal power but it was limited in its scope; a legitimacy based on the Roman polity and papal custodianship did not work very well outside Rome's immediate environs, and indeed despite the apparent ability of Alberic II we know of no attempt to expand his power beyond Latium. Ensconced in the city, he could repel formidable adversaries, but without some further basis of power there was nowhere further to go (which, incidentally, is why in my own Tusculani TL Alberic's rise is facilitated by his acquisition of his father's duchy of Spoleto). His son Octavian/John XII would attempt some expansionism to the south, but he failed both on account of his own poor judgment and the fact that the dual princely-papal office he held only served to discredit him given his manifestly un-priestly behavior. Thereafter the Tusculani reverted from a position of near-dictatorial rule to being one of a handful of rival noble families in Rome, as mentioned.

We might see a dynamic where a stronger Cluniac movement benefits Carolingian dynasty, which in turns legitimate Cluniac influence in Italy, etc. A bit far-fetched, I agree as on the other hand, it would mean create an imperial-pontifical relationship out of it, rather than strengthening reforms because of a previously existing imperial-pontifical relationship. Hence why I'd prefer your opinion on this as well, as it depends a lot on Roman policies : what you said tough, doesn't really makes me confident.

In some ways the Italian clergy was more like the German, with bishops serving as territorial lords - Hugh's cousin Manasses, for instance, who was the simultaneous bishop of Arles, Verona, Mantua, and Trento, as part of Hugh's grand strategy to dominate Italy by putting his relations everywhere where he could fit them ("if you don't have enough cousins to fill all the sees, just put the same cousin in all the sees at once!"). The breakdown of royal authority, the relative importance of the cities in Italy both in terms of their lesser degree of decline (compared to the rest of the post-Roman West) and their strategic value against the Magyars, and the legacy of episcopal rule in the old Exarchate territories all meant that urban-based bishops tended to be men of considerable temporal power during this time. The Cluniac movement had an effect here, but the role of the Italian clergy as holders of regalia and temporal estates remained an issue into the reign of Emperor Frederick, who remonstrated against the ecclesiastical retention of Italian regalia which he felt rightly belonged to the emperor.

A Frankish/Aquitainian supremacy in Italy may well combat this trend, although what really did away with it in Lombardy was not imperial action but the rise of the communal movement, which being based in the urban centers which the bishops had once been dominant in was much more effective at divesting them of their temporal estates or at least co-opting them into the service of the commune. Patriarchal rule in Aquileia/Friuli is almost certainly averted by such a TL, and indeed I think it's quite possible that the Duchy/March of Friuli (probably based out of Verona) will re-emerge in some form as it would be of immense strategic importance to a "French emperor" who controls neither Bavaria nor the Slavic marches to the east, presumably under German, Hungarian, Croat, or Byzantine control.

Any reason why the Carolingian conquest was this destructuring in Italy? Usually, they kept most of the frames in took over regions. In fact, why did it happened in most of Carolingian Italy except Spoleto and Tuscany (I would have said Friul as well, which seem to have been distinct already before the Frankish conquest, but...).

I'm not exactly sure to understand how these political formations did legitimized themselves without at least a token power : or was the chaotic kingship the expression of this need of formalisation of honores which without inner jnbalance, had to be short-lived?

I would say this is the result of Tuscany, Friuli, and Spoleto all becoming "marches" in the Carolingian sense, territories which were instilled with more autonomy and entrusted to Frankish lords so as to protect the borders of the empire. Friuli was a bulwark against the Avars and Slavs in the east, the early Dukes of Spoleto under Frankish supremacy were active opponents of the Byzantines, and Tuscany was early on more of a "maritime march" (Bonifacio in Corsica being named for Margrave Boniface, who campaigned against the Saracens in that island) but also had strategic importance with regards to the Papacy.

Lombardy proper presumably had no need for strong margravial leadership, particularly since the Carolingians had little need for defenses in western Italy. The result was the profusion of various counties in Lombardy which, when the civil war years came, could hardly contend with the margravial states. When Carolingian rule failed in Italy, we immediately see that the major "native" contestants were based in these marches: Berengar of the Unruochings in Friuli and Guy and Lambert of the Guidoni in Spoleto. Adalbert II of the Bonifacii in Tuscany is a more obscure figure than the others and never made a claim to kingship/imperium himself, but he was a key player in those years who switched sides between various claimants as it pleased him and successfully navigated the admittedly difficult waters of late 9th/early 10th century Italian politics with his considerable march intact.

A major contender based in Lombardy proper, meanwhile, does not appear until the rise of the Anscarids, whose March of Ivrea was a creation of the Guidoni in the 880s; they were not really credible candidates for royalty until noble opposition to Hugh crystallized around the person of Berengar II, perhaps as a result of the ill-treatment of Anscar in Spoleto, by which time the Unruochings, Guidoni, and Bonifacii were all extinct. Even then Berengar felt it necessary to legitimate himself as consors regni to Hugh and Lothair before ultimately claiming the kingship for himself, and then attempting to marry Lothair's widow to his own son and co-king. The Unruochings and Guidoni, meanwhile, were from the start credible candidates for Carolingian kingship, with Guy of Spoleto originally making a bid for the West Francian throne before ultimately "settling" for Italy (much to the chagrin of Berengar).

So, we might need some various non-Carolingian kings (but not emperors) messing just enough with Italy until the late Xth/early XIth, and allowing a Carolingian firm takeover?

That's plausible, although for the kings not to be emperors it's pretty much mandatory to preserve Alberic's "Principality of Rome" or something like it; nobody else in that era was very successful in keeping the Italian kings from also assuming the imperial mantle.
 
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That's pretty impressive and fascinating, and something I was quite unaware of.
Did you ever hear the tragedy of King Boso of Provence?

No?

I tought not. It's not a story Robertians would tell you. It's a Carolingian legend. King Boson was a great potens among Carolingians, so cunning and opportunist he could use the imperial institution to influence bishops and noble to create a realm...He had such luck, he could even see his opponents dying early.


He could actually outsmart Carolingians?


The nobiliar networking is a pathaway to many gains some consider to be tyrannical.


What happened to him?


He became so ambitious...the only thing he was afraid of was losing chances to be crowned emperor, which eventually, of course, he did. Unfortunatly, he taught his clients everything he knew, then the nobles put his dynasty into sleep. Ironic. He made Provence an outpost for the imperial crown, but not for himself.


Is it possible to learn this power?

Not from a Robertian.


Did Rudolph really push Hugh out of Provence? I'm aware that Hugh "traded" it c. 933 in exchange for Rudolph's renunciation of Italy, but by all appearances Hugh and his Bosonid relations continued to exert power in Provence and Hugh was able to flee there after the loss of his sovereign power to Berengar II. My impression was always that Hugh's cession of Provence was really only partial, either by mutual agreement or as a result of the practical difficulty of the Burgundian Welfs exerting power over the Bosonid-controlled south.

It's true that Hugues kept several honores in Provence, giving to Rodolphe what he didn't really owned in the rengum, such as Raoul's owned Marca Viennensis, in order to avoid yet another claimant for Italy. As you said, he relocated a lot of Burgundian supporters in Italy (more or less drivens for events, as Hughues counter-raids against Arabs in Provence points), and while his brother Boson and his nephew Mannasès were relay of his power there, as both joined Hugues (Manassès collecting bishopries as if there was no tomorrow), it really gave room for Charles-Constantin IOTL to make a comeback in Provence.
So, yes, it's less Rodoplhe single-handly pushing Hugues out of Provence, than Hugues trying to save the day by allowing Raoul and Rodolphe to strengthen or expend their rule, as Rodoplhe abandon its italian claims, and keeping Charles-Constantin out.

So, ITTL, having Guilhelmids beneficing not only from a lasting control of Marca Viennensis (they had IOTL), but as well from a lesser Robertian influence (Raoul of Burgundy more or less was elected less as a Bosonid than a semi-Robertians thanks to Hugues l'Abbé), eventually forcing the hand of Hugues d'Arles, possibly quicker than IOTL with the benefit to paint themselves as loyalists (rather than opportunists) in the operation and with the support of part of Provencal nobility.

* Technically, there's no difference between Raoul and Rodolphe, one being the "scholarly" turn of the first : for simplicity sake, I call the king of France Raoul, and the King of Burgundy Rodolphe. It's important to notice that onomastic highlight some alliances or claims; as with the shitload of Boson in Aquitaine and Provence; as well why Rollon was baptised as Robert (Robertian) and his son William (Guilhelmid)

Do you consider it plausible for a Guilhemid king/emperor in Aquitaine/Provence/Italy, with no real territorial presence in the north, to receive the French kingship in the event of an opportune Carolingian dynastic failure there?
While a Guilhelmid king in Italy or Provence is plausible, an Aquitain kingship is probably out of question. You really had some institutional taboo about making Aquitaine a regnum divided from Francia at this point (altough you certainly had the concept of a distinct geopolitical frame) and splitting temptatives were usually made by supporting a Carolingian claim.
At this point, Aquitains were fairly uninterested on northern French matters, except when a Robertian was elected, and then supporting a Carolingian for the throne. Giving that the appointed kingship of WFrancia was essentially the result of northern French potentes choices (and not even all of them) with an episcopalian (and later Ottonian) influence...
No, I don't see Guilhelmids not only doing this, but even willing.

As for Italy, I'm not sure how it would go : admittedly, the duke of Aquitaine could claim kingship in Italy or even be called by the pope, but I don't really see them trading a fairly important principalty in Aquitaine, for a mirage in Italy. Others did fall for it, yes, but their own former principalties weren't that firmly held. Maybe, tough, in the case of several sons, you could see one Guilhelmid which didn't taken Aquitaine and/or Provence out of the split of titles, going for an Italian kingship with Aquitain support?
For what matter Provence, the initial takeover would probably be made trough giving some lip service at least to Louis the Blind and possibly to his son Charles-Constantin. How it would evolve is again a matter of how Guilhelm's successors would deal out of their territorialized principalty, but taking over the kingship might not be that interesting for them, as they played a relative (Guilhèm II doesn't seem to have militaryily supported Charles III, while he strongly opposed Robert and Raoul) support to Carolingians IOTL. I'm rather under the impression of a build-up as you had with Thibaldids in Northern France.

*Not traditionally accounted for.

Otherwise I agree that the trend of "re-evangelisation" will not be denied, and if it is even stronger than OTL it will be bad news for the Tusculani and other competing families, assuming that by this time Alberic's principality has degenerated into the multipolar Rome of his successors as OTL. Notably, however, if you significantly change Hugh's life you are also likely to get a very different result in Rome; I'm not sure who Marozia reaches out to c. 932 if Hugh is out of the picture; possibly she grooms Alberic II to succeed her in a less antagonistic manner than he did historically or finds some other potentate to be her champion.
What would be the trends in Roman policies if Hugues d'Arles is still king in Italy, mostly cut from Provence, and Elder Welfs possibly out of the picture, at least more so than IOTL?
Or for that matter, in Italy, keeping in mind there's no Ottonians as feudal hegemons?

Would it be possible to see bits of Italy to simply "leave" the italian geopolitical ensemble ITTL (a bit like Friul IOTL in the XIth, or Gothia from Aquitaine in the Xth?), leading to a more limited (and rump-like) kingdom of Italy to appear?


The breakdown of royal authority, the relative importance of the cities in Italy both in terms of their lesser degree of decline (compared to the rest of the post-Roman West) and their strategic value against the Magyars, and the legacy of episcopal rule in the old Exarchate territories all meant that urban-based bishops tended to be men of considerable temporal power during this time.
Which doesn't seem a huge departure from the episcopalian importance in Aquitain politics : altough less regal than feudal, the urban-based bishop of Gothia were a good part responsible for what happened in Provence in the late IXth and early Xth centuries.

Patriarchal rule in Aquileia/Friuli is almost certainly averted by such a TL, and indeed I think it's quite possible that the Duchy/March of Friuli (probably based out of Verona) will re-emerge in some form as it would be of immense strategic importance to a "French emperor" who controls neither Bavaria nor the Slavic marches to the east, presumably under German, Hungarian, Croat, or Byzantine control.
I'm not sure a F-HRE emperor would be really able to enforce his rule so far : most of peripherical areas as Aquitaine and Italy might escape most of its direct power, meaning that the pontifical-imperial relation would be possibly closer to what existed in the VIIIth. Aka, an interventionist imperial kingship, making some order in Italy, beneficing from a clerical alliance (and, from there, Rome). It would be at best an unbalanced situation : if the communal movement happens more or less as IOTL tough, we might see a "mediterranean crescent" of municipal autonomies corresponding roughly to the IOTL zones of italian communi and Occitan comunas which would form a continuity of autonomous urban ensemble trough a "entente" between urban nobles, bishops and lay patricians.

I would say this is the result of Tuscany, Friuli, and Spoleto all becoming "marches" in the Carolingian sense, territories which were instilled with more autonomy and entrusted to Frankish lords so as to protect the borders of the empire. Friuli was a bulwark against the Avars and Slavs in the east, the early Dukes of Spoleto under Frankish supremacy were active opponents of the Byzantines, and Tuscany was early on more of a "maritime march" (Bonifacio in Corsica being named for Margrave Boniface, who campaigned against the Saracens in that island) but also had strategic importance with regards to the Papacy.
I'm not really sure : the various pyrenean marches went trough something similar with Gothia corresponding more or less to IOTL region of former Midi-Pyrénées-Languedoc-Rousillon and Catalonia; or the lax union between the marches of Toulouse, Gothia and Spain from one hand, and various Aquitain counties (Albi, Cadurcin, etc.). Yet, and while the region was particularily divided politically, it still formed as territorials principalties and statelets relatively early on.

There's as well the issue of Marca Viennensis/Lyons but admittedly, it could as well be a result of what you describe, and general uber-feudalisation of the French ensemble.

Lombardy proper presumably had no need for strong margravial leadership, particularly since the Carolingians had little need for defenses in western Italy. The result was the profusion of various counties in Lombardy which, when the civil war years came, could hardly contend with the margravial states. When Carolingian rule failed in Italy, we immediately see that the major "native" contestants were based in these marches: Berengar of the Unruochings in Friuli and Guy and Lambert of the Guidoni in Spoleto.
So, if I understand it well : the competition for secondary honores that were after-tought for Carolingians, favoured bigger ensembles that already amassed several contrary to the smaller and desunified counties and marches in Padan plain?


Adalbert II of the Bonifacii in Tuscany is a more obscure figure than the others and never made a claim to kingship/imperium himself, but he was a key player in those years who switched sides between various claimants as it pleased him and successfully navigated the admittedly difficult waters of late 9th/early 10th century Italian politics with his considerable march intact.

That's plausible, although for the kings not to be emperors it's pretty much mandatory to preserve Alberic's "Principality of Rome" or something like it; nobody else in that era was very successful in keeping the Italian kings from also assuming the imperial mantle.
Which wouldn't be that harmful : a suite of "petty-emperors" is not the same as the revival of a new imperial structures (ITTL, hopefully, made by French kings). In fact, it could help transmissions of claims. Again, it's a tall order, but the whole idea of a French-based HRE is too, so we abut it as much as we can : there's no doubt it would be a significantly weaker ensemble than Ottonian HRE.
 
Did you ever hear the tragedy of King Boso of Provence?

No?

I tought not. It's not a story Robertians would tell you. It's a Carolingian legend. King Boson was a great potens among Carolingians, so cunning and opportunist he could use the imperial institution to influence bishops and noble to create a realm...He had such luck, he could even see his opponents dying early.


He could actually outsmart Carolingians?


The nobiliar networking is a pathaway to many gains some consider to be tyrannical.


What happened to him?


He became so ambitious...the only thing he was afraid of was losing chances to be crowned emperor, which eventually, of course, he did. Unfortunatly, he taught his clients everything he knew, then the nobles put his dynasty into sleep. Ironic. He made Provence an outpost for the imperial crown, but not for himself.


Is it possible to learn this power?

Not from a Robertian.

XD
Well, this was not a meme I expected from alternatehistory.com.

admittedly, the duke of Aquitaine could claim kingship in Italy or even be called by the pope, but I don't really see them trading a fairly important principalty in Aquitaine, for a mirage in Italy. Others did fall for it, yes, but their own former principalties weren't that firmly held.

I assumed the same; the imperial mantle does exert a certain pull, but perhaps not strong enough for a prince with considerable and stable possessions not at all adjacent to Italy.

Maybe, tough, in the case of several sons, you could see one Guilhelmid which didn't taken Aquitaine and/or Provence out of the split of titles, going for an Italian kingship with Aquitain support?

I wonder which would be considered "senior," given that the imperial title was superior but any sane person would recognize that Aquitaine was the safer bet. The idea of the imperial crown as a secundogeniture for Aquitaine seems rather upside-down, but I suppose it's understandable.

What would be the trends in Roman policies if Hugues d'Arles is still king in Italy, mostly cut from Provence, and Elder Welfs possibly out of the picture, at least more so than IOTL?
Or for that matter, in Italy, keeping in mind there's no Ottonians as feudal hegemons?

Alberic II successfully resisted Hugh in large part because of the very early "communal" identity of Rome and the weakness of Hugh, who seems to have received little support from the other magnates (who presumably had no great interest in Hugh gaining the imperial title). That said, I must admit that the ability of the Italian kings to gain the imperial title had actually been in some doubt just before then; Rudolph didn't have the time to manage it, but even Berengar did not actually gain the imperial title until 915, decades into his reign. The uncertain state of the Italian monarchy in the north made the "Roman expedition" problematic even to Italian kings well before the rise of Alberic II to the Roman principality.

I don't see any reconciliation between Hugh and Alberic - even after being offered Hugh's daughter in marriage, which he accepted, Alberic still didn't permit him the empire. When Otto came on the scene, Alberic denied him too, and there might have been a much more serious showdown subsequently had Alberic not died fairly early (in his 40s) and been succeeded by his much weaker son. My interpretation is that the very notion of a crowned emperor threatened Alberic's own legitimacy, which was pseudo-imperial even though he never actually called himself emperor - his right to rule was predicated on a civic Romanity* and direct papal custodianship which didn't really mesh all that well with the notion of Carolingian-style imperium which was understood to comprise a guardianship of Rome and the Papacy. His rule simply couldn't abide an emperor in the West, so he was unwilling to sell it to Hugh or Otto at any cost.

(*Which, although pretty narrowly civic, did make callbacks to classical history - Alberic famously roused the Romans against Hugh by asking them rhetorically whether men who were once "slaves" of Rome (that is, Burgundians) ought to rule Rome as its masters. The answer he got was a very emphatic and well-armed "no.")

Hugh's overthrow didn't have much to do with Alberic, at least not directly; it was his attempts to keep loyalists in Tuscany and Spoleto (and thus to remove disloyal margraves, sometimes brutally) which turned the magnates and particularly the Anscarids against him. If Hugh does remain on the throne even despite these rifts, he is presumably not getting any stronger, and Roman politics remains in stasis for as long as Alberic lives. The question is then what happens to Alberic's successor, assuming his plan to create his son as Pope and Prince remains the same: Octavian/John XII was incompetent and was already losing control of the situation before Otto deposed him, and broke with his father's policy of never admitting an emperor by crowning Otto, although by that point he was basically forced to since he had alienated pretty much everyone else.

Then again, this "dual coronation" only happened because the pope and prince died within a year of each other; the principality could presumably have continued as a secular state had this timing been less fortuitous. Alternately, a more successful pope-prince might have, in the absence of strong Italian or imperial power in central Italy, created an independent and temporally powerful Papacy in an early anticipation of events that happened IOTL many years later; but the revulsion felt by reform-minded contemporaries towards this gross "secularization" of the papacy is probably not easily overcome. It's also quite possible, and perhaps most likely, that there will be a reversion to "the norm" in Roman politics, in which several families/factions struggle for power and use the offer of the crown as leverage to gain the help of outside powers in their civic battles.

While I don't usually like to put everything down to personalities, we're talking about a very small-scale situation here in which a lot was dependent on the capabilities of the man who succeeded Alberic.

As for Italy generally, I expect we would see an extremely compromised kingship if Hugh remained on the throne. Lothair might well succeed him anyway - there's not that many credible alternatives if the Welfs and Ottonians stay out. Tuscany is likely to go its own way, as is Spoleto, particularly if the Hucboldings manage a recovery and consolidate the Spoletan duchy with their holdings in Emilia and Romagna as Boniface was attempting to do. The Anscarids may still attempt to become the power behind the throne, as their position recommends them for it. I suspect what the kingdom was heading for was a kingship which was so depleted of resources and so compromised by the autonomy and ambitions of the margravial states (including, now, Ivrea) that "native" recovery would only be possible if one of the margravial states seized the throne for itself - that is, an outcome not too different than OTL, although accelerated IOTL by Berenger's revolt and usurpation.

Would it be possible to see bits of Italy to simply "leave" the italian geopolitical ensemble ITTL (a bit like Friul IOTL in the XIth, or Gothia from Aquitaine in the Xth?), leading to a more limited (and rump-like) kingdom of Italy to appear?

Yes, and the most likely departures are Tuscany and Spoleto. A Hucbolding Spoleto may be somewhat more involved in Italian affairs thanks to its holdings further north, but a non-Hucbolding Spoleto is likely to gravitate towards the southern Lombard principalities and style itself in a similar manner. Tuscany, meanwhile, was far less ravaged by the Magyars than Lombardy, and had a far larger margravial demesne within itself than the King of Italy controlled in Lombardy. As a result, Tuscany was a quite capable self-contained state, prosperous, geographically stable, and well-protected by its own mountain range. It's very capable of a de facto independence from weak Italian kings, although I suspect Tuscany is more likely to maintain a nominal allegiance to the crown than Spoleto, which I can see separating itself almost entirely from the Italian system and potentially even gravitating towards the Byzantine sphere.

Friuli by this time had ceased to exist as a coherent entity. If it comes back, it will be reconstituted from scratch, as it was IOTL in the guise of the Patriarchate of Aquileia.

I'm not sure a F-HRE emperor would be really able to enforce his rule so far : most of peripherical areas as Aquitaine and Italy might escape most of its direct power, meaning that the pontifical-imperial relation would be possibly closer to what existed in the VIIIth. Aka, an interventionist imperial kingship, making some order in Italy, beneficing from a clerical alliance (and, from there, Rome). It would be at best an unbalanced situation : if the communal movement happens more or less as IOTL tough, we might see a "mediterranean crescent" of municipal autonomies corresponding roughly to the IOTL zones of italian communi and Occitan comunas which would form a continuity of autonomous urban ensemble trough a "entente" between urban nobles, bishops and lay patricians.

An intriguing idea, although I'm not sure how that would play out in practice; IOTL the communal movement (at least in Italy) was an inveterate enemy of imperial power and vice versa.

So, if I understand it well : the competition for secondary honores that were after-tought for Carolingians, favoured bigger ensembles that already amassed several contrary to the smaller and desunified counties and marches in Padan plain?

I would say so. The Padanian plain, particularly south of the Po, was a prosperous country but seems to have created no magnates worthy of note, instead being subdivided into various ecclesiastical and lay estates which were bones of contention between the king and his magnates but did not themselves constitute an independent base of power. Tuscany, Ivrea, and the later Arduini-Aleramici-Obertenghi marches more or less all owed their origins to the secondary class of Frankish milites who came into Italy on the coattails of Carolingian and post-Carolingian kings who installed them in strategic places so as to secure loyalty in a fractious and unstable kingdom.

Which wouldn't be that harmful : a suite of "petty-emperors" is not the same as the revival of a new imperial structures (ITTL, hopefully, made by French kings). In fact, it could help transmissions of claims. Again, it's a tall order, but the whole idea of a French-based HRE is too, so we abut it as much as we can : there's no doubt it would be a significantly weaker ensemble than Ottonian HRE.

If you did want to get a sustained "imperial moratorium," you could probably also do it by allowing Tuscany and Spoleto to become semi-independent and remain hostile to the imperial ambitions of rump Italian kings. I doubt either margrave would actually take the title for himself, but if their intentions are to distance themselves from the control of Pavia then denying imperial authority to the King in Pavia is a reasonable step to take. Without pliant vassals in those marches, the Italian kings have no reasonable chance of achieving the crown.
 
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I wonder which would be considered "senior," given that the imperial title was superior but any sane person would recognize that Aquitaine was the safer bet. The idea of the imperial crown as a secundogeniture for Aquitaine seems rather upside-down, but I suppose it's understandable.
To be honest, I could see elder sons claiming the Italkian kingship, and leaving Aquitaine to young sons : it's not common but does have historical precedents (or rather "succedents") in Western France and Aquitaine : for exemple how the Raimondine succession in Tripoli and Toulouse worked out (with the Syrian title going to the elder son, eventually).
There is, maybe, the idea that an elder son might be better endowed in matter of networking and resources, without the need to engage all the honores. It's mostly a supposition, tough.

That said, I must admit that the ability of the Italian kings to gain the imperial title had actually been in some doubt just before then; Rudolph didn't have the time to manage it, but even Berengar did not actually gain the imperial title until 915, decades into his reign. The uncertain state of the Italian monarchy in the north made the "Roman expedition" problematic even to Italian kings well before the rise of Alberic II to the Roman principality.
So, technically, a Carolingian dynasty that would recover from Robertian line ending into quick and declining succession, could be in a relatively good position (with Guilhelmids "neutralizing" part of Provence as for opening the road*, to deal with "exhausted", so to speak, Italian magnates that aren't either able or willing to form territorial principalties instead of competing for the regnum?

*I wouldn't see Aquitain nobles, tough, having a real part into such expeditions : they were content with Carolingians and vaguely loyalists, but it doesn't mean they were dynamic supporters.

Alternately, a more successful pope-prince might have, in the absence of strong Italian or imperial power in central Italy, created an independent and temporally powerful Papacy in an early anticipation of events that happened IOTL many years later; but the revulsion felt by reform-minded contemporaries towards this gross "secularization" of the papacy is probably not easily overcome. It's also quite possible, and perhaps most likely, that there will be a reversion to "the norm" in Roman politics, in which several families/factions struggle for power and use the offer of the crown as leverage to gain the help of outside powers in their civic battles.
Couldn't we see, with a French king, supported trough a stronger (if relatively so) Cluniac movement* with what would implies regarding strengthening royal power, even a little as an equivalent to Peace of God movements for ewemple, being seen as a possible support for this pontifical-princley Roman state (Again something quite akin to the de facto alliance between Peppinids and Ducatus Romanus, trough clerical policy in Francia) in moves that would initially have not that much to do with the imperial kingship, but gradually leading to it?

I agree with you that Carolingian imperial idea (or rather, late carolingian imperial idea) would be hard pressed to fit entierly, but that's the beauty of it : we don't as much search for the continuation of Carolingian imperium, than a revival of imperial idea in Latin Europe that could claim a continuity but be something different as it happened with HRE (again, despite all claims). Of course, ITTL, the differences between Carolingia and HRE would be more marked.

*It doesn't have to be entierly Cluniac : we could as well buff parallel movement as Gorze (Gorgoniac reform does have a ring) or Brogne with St. Gerard's reforms in Lotharingia especially if the French Carolingians manage to keep the region (as it would be preferrable, as it would greatly enforce their prestige and power in WFrance)

An intriguing idea, although I'm not sure how that would play out in practice; IOTL the communal movement (at least in Italy) was an inveterate enemy of imperial power and vice versa.
It did develloped as such IOTL, true, and I'd expect that a lot of its institutional and cultural frames would be changed, more or less importantly ITTL. But I think that there was a common base in Northern Italy and Southern France to have an urban polities frame : I'm thinking essentially to these cities (regardless of the demographical size, altough it played) being polycenters of power (patrician nobilty, episcopalian centers, mix of local families, and rise of a non-nobiliar elite* which tend to be patricianized still).

I'll think that the greater survival of allodii in Southern France and Italy (or survival of allodial freedoms, even in seniorial lands) close to city (or even urban allodi) might have played a role, but I'm less certain there.

*Less tied to trade, than management and renewed monetary role eventually from one part, and administrative management for the other


IMO, there's room for the development of urban autonomy movements or trends ITTL, even if in different frames.
 
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So, technically, a Carolingian dynasty that would recover from Robertian line ending into quick and declining succession, could be in a relatively good position (with Guilhelmids "neutralizing" part of Provence as for opening the road*, to deal with "exhausted", so to speak, Italian magnates that aren't either able or willing to form territorial principalties instead of competing for the regnum?

Quite possible, although not all of the margravial states exhausted themselves in the contention for the kingship. The Bonifacii in Tuscany, for instance, never made a bid for the throne even in times of serious royal weakness, and while they sometimes backed a royal/imperial candidate they spent other civil wars basically fence-sitting. The only real "hostile takeover" perpetrated by a Tuscan margrave as far I am aware was by the second-to-last Bonifacii margrave Guido/Guy, who became Marozia's second husband and conquered Rome by her side, but he died of apparently natural causes a few years later, and Tuscan "rule" of Rome (it seems to have really been Marozia's rule, backed with Tuscan muscle) proved ephemeral. The family died out shortly thereafter,* the last margrave Lambert having been treacherously removed by Hugh, but Bosonid aquisition didn't really change the politics of the state - the first margrave, Hugh's brother Boso, proved unreliable and was removed by his brother, and the second, Hugh's illegitimate son Hubert, basically sided with whoever was king, swiftly reconciling with Berengar II even though Berengar overthrew his father and allegedly killed his half-brother (!) and then becoming an imperial loyalist in due course. Under both Tuscan dynasties the foreign policy can be roughly summed up as "we don't really care who the king is, we'll play ball, just leave us alone."

Presumably this policy of ambivalent neutrality would be even more effective with regards to a distant French emperor/king, which gives further support to the notion that Tuscany might drift out of the Italian orbit.


*Wikipedia claims Boniface III of Tuscany as a "restored" Bonifacii margrave, but I suspect this is name confusion, because that Boniface was actually a Hucbolding descended from Boniface of Spoleto.

Couldn't we see, with a French king, supported trough a stronger (if relatively so) Cluniac movement* with what would implies regarding strengthening royal power, even a little as an equivalent to Peace of God movements for ewemple, being seen as a possible support for this pontifical-princley Roman state (Again something quite akin to the de facto alliance between Peppinids and Ducatus Romanus, trough clerical policy in Francia) in moves that would initially have not that much to do with the imperial kingship, but gradually leading to it?

I agree with you that Carolingian imperial idea (or rather, late carolingian imperial idea) would be hard pressed to fit entierly, but that's the beauty of it : we don't as much search for the continuation of Carolingian imperium, than a revival of imperial idea in Latin Europe that could claim a continuity but be something different as it happened with HRE (again, despite all claims). Of course, ITTL, the differences between Carolingia and HRE would be more marked.

I could see this, I suppose - you need a more creditable pope than Octavian/John XII (or maybe just an older Octavian by way of a longer-lived Alberic II - rising to a principality and the papacy at such a young age is probably not conducive to the wise use of power). With a strong Cluniac reform, I could see this taking the form of a sort of "monastic state," using the Terra Sancti Benedicti of Monte Cassino as an example; Alberic II was (as mentioned) a Cluniac reformer in his own way, and IOTL "Roman" abbeys like Farfa, Subiaco, and Tre Fontane came to control quite large estates in Latium and outside it. The Princely-Papal state is likely to be most interested in expansion into Capua and Spoleto, the latter particularly since it was the subject of both claims of papal suzerainty and a dynastic claim of the Tusculani. The "French Emperor" might well secure these territories for them as part of the "alliance" you describe.

My biggest doubt about the "papal-princely" notion is regarding succession. Alberic's intent was clearly to keep all secular and ecclesiastical power in the hands of his family, but the non-dynastic character of bishops was so baked into the system that I have difficulty seeing a father-son (or uncle-nephew) lock on the Papacy as lasting very long. When it ends, you're back to the OTL mess of rival Roman families fighting over the chair and its associated benefices, and this is a poor means from which to rule a central Italian state. Somehow or another, this system would need to stabilize, and in a "FHRE" situation the ability of the emperor to intervene and restore order is presumably even weaker than that of the HRE IOTL.

You could, of course, go in other directions with Papal governance, as this is a particularly fluid and formative time in terms of institutional development in Rome. Other ideas I've considered before are a "papal republic" of sorts (a group of noble families passes the supreme title around, and constant infighting is avoided because the benefices and honors of the papacy are devolved to a noble-ecclesiastic Curia - think Venice with the Pope instead of the Doge) or a "papal shogunate" (Basically Alberic II forever - a dynasty or series of dynasties styles itself as consuls and vestararii, perhaps also taking "imperial palatine judge" honors to display their nominal clientage to the empire). Both have significant problems but it's interesting to consider other ways papal authority could have developed.

It did develloped as such IOTL, true, and I'd expect that a lot of its institutional and cultural frames would be changed, more or less importantly ITTL. But I think that there was a common base in Northern Italy and Southern France to have an urban polities frame : I'm thinking essentially to these cities (regardless of the demographical size, altough it played) being polycenters of power (patrician nobilty, episcopalian centers, mix of local families, and rise of a non-nobiliar elite* which tend to be patricianized still)

My understanding is that the communal movement and royal power worked best together when there was a common enemy, i.e. the rural nobility; the king seeks to raise funds and reign in his barons, and the burghers are quite willing to pay him for his baron-reigning-in efforts (in the form of a charter and its enforcement). That didn't work well in Italy because a) the rural nobility was fairly weak and fragmented, and the cities eventually proved capable of usurping or co-opting them, b) the insistence of the emperors, in particular Frederick I, in taking control of vast imperial regalia in Italy and securing this revenue stream by foisting foreign podestas upon the cities, and c) opposition mustered by forces hostile to imperial strength in Italy, most importantly the Pope but also the Sicilians and Byzantines.

I could potentially see an imperial-communal alliance arising if the margravial states in Italy didn't fall apart, and in fact proliferated, as then the imperial power might promote civic autonomy as a counterbalance to those territorial lords (leading to a Reichsstadt phenomenon in Italy in which the cities gain immediacy within the FHRE). It's difficult to imagine that happening without territorial consolidation in rural Italy, however; it's best to have counts/margraves that are in a position too lofty for a mere civitas to challenge in order to create the conditions for that kind of civic-imperial partnership.
 
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