France-Austria and Russia-Germany

Deleted member 94680

So, which bloc benefits the longer war is delayed? The UK-France-Turkey-Austria-(Japan, possibly) bloc, or the Germany-Russia bloc?

Germany-Russia surely? The longer Russia has to modernise and industrialise without the ‘distractions’ of War, the better.

A Russia on a par industrially and socially with the other European Great Powers is an entirely different beast to the OTL Romanov Empire.
 
What's the latest war could occur? 1914? 1909? 1919?

That depends far more on events than a year, per say. Basically, when does Germany and Russia grow to the point that they can't move without pressing out of their containing cordon, or some crisis tries to pierce into Russia or Germany's "vital space" of Eastern Europe, the Baltic, Central Asia, ect?
 
That depends far more on events than a year, per say. Basically, when does Germany and Russia grow to the point that they can't move without pressing out of their containing cordon, or some crisis tries to pierce into Russia or Germany's "vital space" of Eastern Europe, the Baltic, Central Asia, ect?
Ok, so what things will be consistent with OTL?
I assume that both sides will still try to get colonies. We could see Britain and France crowd Germany out of the most strategically situated land in Africa, resulting in some kind of Cape-to-Cairo and/or Cape-to-Ceuta railway built (in order to aid the Ottoman Empire's development). Germany still gets colonies but more of them are in Asia vis a vis Africa. I could see an intensified focus on the Pacific. Nonetheless they are still lost quickly in the war ITTL.
Russia is still interested in China. It's still likely to go to war with Japan.

It would also be interesting if Alaska was sold just like OTL, but to Germany. Such a sale could be the spark of Anglo-German hostility - the Brits worried that Germany might have ambitions on Canada.
 
Ok, so what things will be consistent with OTL?
I assume that both sides will still try to get colonies. We could see Britain and France crowd Germany out of the most strategically situated land in Africa, resulting in some kind of Cape-to-Cairo and/or Cape-to-Ceuta railway built (in order to aid the Ottoman Empire's development). Germany still gets colonies but more of them are in Asia vis a vis Africa. I could see an intensified focus on the Pacific. Nonetheless they are still lost quickly in the war ITTL.
Russia is still interested in China. It's still likely to go to war with Japan.

It would also be interesting if Alaska was sold just like OTL, but to Germany. Such a sale could be the spark of Anglo-German hostility - the Brits worried that Germany might have ambitions on Canada.

I'm actually more inclined to think Germany would go with a "Bismark's Map of Africa" policy on colonies: while AH is certainly in a rough position, Germany also has to place more focus on land security and will have less of a global economic footprint which would discourage the level of naval and colonial "push" they took in our timeline. Certainly they aren't buying Alaska, of all things: it's completely isolated and would be a nightmare to project power to from their base in the Baltic. Russia too isent in a particularly good position for overseas territories, so I think you're more liable to see greater development/commercial penetration of Central Asia, Persia, and especially China and Korea in a south-east, primarily land based strategy of gaining influence. If Germany does adopt a global Empire, it's need a better base... maybe purchasing Spain's colonial possessions or gaining controlling interests in the Dutch East Indies? As part of co-operation with Russia to dominate the Chinese market the Phillipenes could be a solid base to hedge against Japan.

As for changes in the map to Africa, a modernizing Ottomans are liable to stake a few claims: taking the place of German influence in Zanzibar and out competing the Italians in Somalia, for instance, as well as having a stronger position in Arabia. The British and French probably don't mind them taking a slice of the pie; hell, I could see given the right events the continued formal Ottoman administration of Egypt (As a compromise between the British and French, who continue to enjoy commercial dominance) leading to an Ottoman Sudan/Nile Basin. The British likely take up the German positions in Southwest Africa, while the French don't have to compromise in Cameroon and can take the lot, though I wouldn't discount some of the less desirable sand splotches ending up in the hands of minor powers as vanity projects/prestige symbols. Portugal could end up with Southwest Africa as part of a "Pink Map" scenario, for instance, in a timeline where Egypt isent under a British monopoly her lesser colonial presence on the eastern coast makes the Cape to Cairo railway plan never emerge if the Brits are ok with hedging Portugal's position against a (for whatever reason) Pro-German Spain

In this timeline I'd argue Japan is liable to get the short end of the stick as her ambitions get boxed in, now that I put some thought into it. Maybe she ends up in the American sphere as a result, with US interests unable to push an open door in China instead doubling down on the Japanese market. Italy too gets more boxed in; probably subject to Franco-Habsburg "Finlandization" if Austria dosent look like its liable to become a Sick Man (Though still potentially liable to be murdered...) anytime soon. The nation was still very underdeveloped and rural well into the early 1900's... maybe she ends up suffering the fate of OTL's Ottomans, never getting the conditions to expand beyond her pre-industrial past and becoming a playground for French, Austrian, and British commercial interests and a "quaint country villa".
 
I'm actually more inclined to think Germany would go with a "Bismark's Map of Africa" policy on colonies: while AH is certainly in a rough position, Germany also has to place more focus on land security and will have less of a global economic footprint which would discourage the level of naval and colonial "push" they took in our timeline. Certainly they aren't buying Alaska, of all things: it's completely isolated and would be a nightmare to project power to from their base in the Baltic. Russia too isent in a particularly good position for overseas territories, so I think you're more liable to see greater development/commercial penetration of Central Asia, Persia, and especially China and Korea in a south-east, primarily land based strategy of gaining influence. If Germany does adopt a global Empire, it's need a better base... maybe purchasing Spain's colonial possessions or gaining controlling interests in the Dutch East Indies? As part of co-operation with Russia to dominate the Chinese market the Phillipenes could be a solid base to hedge against Japan.
Is there any guarantee Russia sells Alaska at all ITTL? What if they decide to hold on to it for geopolitical power projecting purposes?
Agree re: Philippines - it would be the crown jewel of the German colonies, if Germany adopted the strategy of Global Empire.
As for changes in the map to Africa, a modernizing Ottomans are liable to stake a few claims: taking the place of German influence in Zanzibar and out competing the Italians in Somalia, for instance, as well as having a stronger position in Arabia. The British and French probably don't mind them taking a slice of the pie; hell, I could see given the right events the continued formal Ottoman administration of Egypt (As a compromise between the British and French, who continue to enjoy commercial dominance) leading to an Ottoman Sudan/Nile Basin. The British likely take up the German positions in Southwest Africa, while the French don't have to compromise in Cameroon and can take the lot, though I wouldn't discount some of the less desirable sand splotches ending up in the hands of minor powers as vanity projects/prestige symbols. Portugal could end up with Southwest Africa as part of a "Pink Map" scenario, for instance, in a timeline where Egypt isent under a British monopoly her lesser colonial presence on the eastern coast makes the Cape to Cairo railway plan never emerge if the Brits are ok with hedging Portugal's position against a (for whatever reason) Pro-German Spain
Wouldn't Cape to Cairo be possible if it was a multi-nation venture under Britain, Portugal, and Turkey, with all three countries profiting from the venture?
In this timeline I'd argue Japan is liable to get the short end of the stick as her ambitions get boxed in, now that I put some thought into it. Maybe she ends up in the American sphere as a result, with US interests unable to push an open door in China instead doubling down on the Japanese market. Italy too gets more boxed in; probably subject to Franco-Habsburg "Finlandization" if Austria dosent look like its liable to become a Sick Man (Though still potentially liable to be murdered...) anytime soon. The nation was still very underdeveloped and rural well into the early 1900's... maybe she ends up suffering the fate of OTL's Ottomans, never getting the conditions to expand beyond her pre-industrial past and becoming a playground for French, Austrian, and British commercial interests and a "quaint country villa".
Ironically, US commercial interests doubling down on Japan helps it long-term - it could become an economic powerhouse sooner and to greater extent than OTL. Tying oneself to the US at this point is a very good bet, though few will realize that at the time. Japan also has Korea and Taiwan, presumably (but with little chance to gain anything else), so it has some space to protect itself outside of the Home Islands but without so much that military influence grows out of control like OTL.
In regards to Italy, I could see the country having even more emigration than OTL, meaning that Italians might be more influential in the Western Hemisphere. Butterflies, butterflies, butterflies...
 
Is there any guarantee Russia sells Alaska at all ITTL? What if they decide to hold on to it for geopolitical power projecting purposes?
Agree re: Philippines - it would be the crown jewel of the German colonies, if Germany adopted the strategy of Global Empire.

Wouldn't Cape to Cairo be possible if it was a multi-nation venture under Britain, Portugal, and Turkey, with all three countries profiting from the venture?

Ironically, US commercial interests doubling down on Japan helps it long-term - it could become an economic powerhouse sooner and to greater extent than OTL. Tying oneself to the US at this point is a very good bet, though few will realize that at the time. Japan also has Korea and Taiwan, presumably (but with little chance to gain anything else), so it has some space to protect itself outside of the Home Islands but without so much that military influence grows out of control like OTL.
In regards to Italy, I could see the country having even more emigration than OTL, meaning that Italians might be more influential in the Western Hemisphere. Butterflies, butterflies, butterflies...

The reasons Russia sold Alaska, as far as I can tell, still seem to be there (Total indefensability from a hostile Britain, it being an underdeveloped and tapped out of furs money sink, already having more empty wasteland than they knew what to do with, ect.) They're barely in a better position to make use of it that the Germans, and selling it off to the Americans at the very least keeps it out of British hands, who from Canada could develop it into a knife pointed at Russia's Pacific basin.

Indeed, if they take that approach... though now that I mull it over getting a Pro-German Spain dosen't require too much thought even if it does require a bit of luck(?) for Germany. Have Prince Leopold Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen decide to spend one of his summer vactions in Barcelonia and have him fall in love with the place, to the point that he happily accepts the offer of the Spainish Throne and easing Bismark's initiative to get King (Later Kaiser) Whilhelm I to allow it. The German government gets a little more intransigent about French opposition to the affair, harsh words are exchanged, offers to mediate by Britain are turned down (Perhaps with the intention of offering the throne to a Bavarian as a compromise) finally convincing them that Bismark is a "bad faith" actor intent on fully unifying Germany and disrupting the balance of power (With his ultimate goal so close at hand, he plays more aggressive and less tactfully than usual in the affair) until in the anger something goes off and triggers the Franco-Prussian war. Since Leopold never rejects the offer of the throne, the Cortes duely elects him post-war and France is in not position to resist, with Prussia now in a position to proclaim the Reich (Strong-arming in the southern German states much to Austria's distress).

In such an environment, in which Austria feels threatened by Germany and the Germans gain a few more Infamy points for adding the Humiliate and Take State Wargoals without the approperate Casus Belli (To use a Victoria 2 reference), I could see them turning to France as a natural check to potential Prussian expansionism and reaching a detante with the Ottomans in order to limit their vulnerability. Britain, trying to contain the new German state in its usual attempt to prevent a single hegemon from dominating the continent (And thus able to focus the bulk of their attention on expansion outside Europe... into Britain's interests) would try to smooth this along diplomatically so she dosen't have to commit her own resources to keeping the situation in Europe set up in her favor (Especially heading off a potential Austro-Russian alliance; Austria's only viable alternative to check Germany without France, which would mean Britain now has to be willing to risk a major war if she wants to keep her rival in The Great Game out of the Balkans and bottled up navally in the Black Sea). Faced with that potential for otherwise being isolated diplomatically, Russia and Germany would then naturally gravitate towards one another, and would have a German friendly Spain (German monarch, plus likely more sympathy towards them than the French from the Cortes, who would interpret the events of the Succession Crisis as France not respecting her sovereignty). This would create the right diplomatic conditions for the proposed alliance structure without running the risk of overly affecting key events in the early to mid 1800's. Granted, you probably butterfly away or at least result in a far more Pro-Turkish Congress of Berlin (Since the conditions that would result in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 with the Ottomans fighting alone are hardly the case here, with British and French backing and a sympathetic Austria).

On Japan's grounds... I don't think it'd exactly be them choosing to align with the US. My guess is it'd be a bit more like Hawaii; the dominance of US commerce would result in greater American influence in their politics, and domestic industry could very well find its growth retarded due to competition with American imports (Who, of course, won't get tariffs slapped on them) and pressures from bussiness representatives who don't want to see their potential customers becoming competition themselves to the imported goods. We're not nearly at the point yet that labor cost in the US is going to be a factor in jobs getting outsourced to East Asia (This is the time of Sinclair's The Jungle, after all. Indeed, cheap Italian labor making another immigrant wave might even drive down labor costs a tiny bit more if its leans too much on the US... or maybe they help out Argentina). I think Korea could be interesting though; if American commerce tries to "jump off" from Japan there only to start bumping up against Russian interests in Manchuria.

(Wow... this setting is flowing really easily to me.)
 
Is there any guarantee Russia sells Alaska at all ITTL? What if they decide to hold on to it for geopolitical power projecting purposes?
Agree re: Philippines - it would be the crown jewel of the German colonies, if Germany adopted the strategy of Global Empire.

If I recall correctly, the US had been in negotiations to acquire Alaska for years, if not decades. My gut wants to tell me from the 40s, but I can't give you a source or anything similar at the time. Point being that the US took years to make such a deal.

There's the issue of Monroe Doctrine Violation, which would sour relations with the US and, more importantly at the time, the UK greatly (the UK being the real guarantor of said Doctrine until the latter portion of the 19th century). I think Alaska would be even farther from Germany than it was from Russia, and just as poorly/even more poorly accessed. Seems prime territory to be swamped by American/Canadian migrants at a later point in time, especially in the even that resources are found.

Too little reward at the time.
 
If I recall correctly, the US had been in negotiations to acquire Alaska for years, if not decades. My gut wants to tell me from the 40s, but I can't give you a source or anything similar at the time. Point being that the US took years to make such a deal.

There's the issue of Monroe Doctrine Violation, which would sour relations with the US and, more importantly at the time, the UK greatly (the UK being the real guarantor of said Doctrine until the latter portion of the 19th century). I think Alaska would be even farther from Germany than it was from Russia, and just as poorly/even more poorly accessed. Seems prime territory to be swamped by American/Canadian migrants at a later point in time, especially in the even that resources are found.

Too little reward at the time.

Speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, I suppose there's always South America as a potential outlet that Germany might look to to release some of her pent-up industrial-commerical potential. I wonder if that might lead to tensions between them and The United States (though less than our historical issues, when they were also trying to project military and political influence as well). There's also the possibility that Spain, if she's selling off her colonial empire to the Germans, might spark an issue with Puerto Rico or Cuba (Though, considering there was actually fairly substantial Loyalist sentiment in the later, I think she might actually try to negotiate with the Cubans as they did IOTL... Puerto Rico is alot less of a point of prestige or value). Would Washington consider a sale a violation of the Monroe Doctrine? Or would it accept that Spain has the right to dispose of its territory as it pleases?
 
Would Washington consider a sale a violation of the Monroe Doctrine? Or would it accept that Spain has the right to dispose of its territory as it pleases?

I'm rather certain it would, especially as by the time a sale would become feasible, it'd be towards the latter end of the 19th century if we're sticking to relatively familiar trends, by my understanding of Cuba. And the US had both been interested in Cuba as their own outlet for decades. Puerto Rico less so, but it's just as threatening.
 
I'm rather certain it would, especially as by the time a sale would become feasible, it'd be towards the latter end of the 19th century if we're sticking to relatively familiar trends, by my understanding of Cuba. And the US had both been interested in Cuba as their own outlet for decades. Puerto Rico less so, but it's just as threatening.

I have no doubt the US would consider any lapse in Spainish rule over Cuba as a good enough reason to step in itself, but I'm less sure they'd make a fuss about Puerto Rico. Especially if we're talking about a timeline where Germany isen't pressing out colonially quite as much (For example, in Samoa) and is weaker/more contained in general. Though its just as likely that Spain retains formal ownership and political control of its Caribbean possessions while German capitalists increasingly gain economic dominance, similar to American enterprises IOTL. Taking any kind of dramatic steps based on that (just normal international commerce) probably woulden't fly with the electorate. That raises the question of just how well Spain can work with the local elites to maintain loyalty in her American holdings.
 
I have no doubt the US would consider any lapse in Spainish rule over Cuba as a good enough reason to step in itself, but I'm less sure they'd make a fuss about Puerto Rico. Especially if we're talking about a timeline where Germany isen't pressing out colonially quite as much (For example, in Samoa) and is weaker/more contained in general. Though its just as likely that Spain retains formal ownership and political control of its Caribbean possessions while German capitalists increasingly gain economic dominance, similar to American enterprises IOTL. Taking any kind of dramatic steps based on that (just normal international commerce) probably woulden't fly with the electorate. That raises the question of just how well Spain can work with the local elites to maintain loyalty in her American holdings.

Well, from what I understand, it's less a case of the US wouldn't be interested, but more that the US really eyed Cuba as the prize in the Caribbean, and also it was fairly strategic, considering how near it was to Florida and how a squadron could easily interdict traffic to New Orleans and the Mississippi. Cession of the island to Germany (of which a large portion of the population wanted integration with Spain, and the other part wanted autonomy in Spain or independence) would both lead to further internal troubles and lead to the introduction of another power to the American political scene, which the US had been trying to undo for a while.

So, while not as polarizing, it'd certainly be a very controversial move in the US and would at best chill relations between the two countries, especially if Germany continues to press debt payment and other concerns elsewhere in the Caribbean (assuming everything goes as OTL, which it wont).

The German economic dominance seems more likely, though it'll definitely alienate the US some (the Germans are still muscling in, and have an informal empire of Spanish colonies to take advantage of). The lack of any tensions in Samoa might help (and will keep tensions going between the US and Great Britain for a while longer), but as those are resolved, the US will probably drift even closer to Britain than they did OTL in the face of this German front intruding into the Americas.

I mean, it's certainly plausible, as economic dominance won't lead to war, but this will likely have knock-on effects, as the Germans "propping up" the Spanish and preventing anyone acquiring parts would be... bothersome to certain American powers.
 
Well, from what I understand, it's less a case of the US wouldn't be interested, but more that the US really eyed Cuba as the prize in the Caribbean, and also it was fairly strategic, considering how near it was to Florida and how a squadron could easily interdict traffic to New Orleans and the Mississippi. Cession of the island to Germany (of which a large portion of the population wanted integration with Spain, and the other part wanted autonomy in Spain or independence) would both lead to further internal troubles and lead to the introduction of another power to the American political scene, which the US had been trying to undo for a while.

So, while not as polarizing, it'd certainly be a very controversial move in the US and would at best chill relations between the two countries, especially if Germany continues to press debt payment and other concerns elsewhere in the Caribbean (assuming everything goes as OTL, which it wont).

The German economic dominance seems more likely, though it'll definitely alienate the US some (the Germans are still muscling in, and have an informal empire of Spanish colonies to take advantage of). The lack of any tensions in Samoa might help (and will keep tensions going between the US and Great Britain for a while longer), but as those are resolved, the US will probably drift even closer to Britain than they did OTL in the face of this German front intruding into the Americas.

I mean, it's certainly plausible, as economic dominance won't lead to war, but this will likely have knock-on effects, as the Germans "propping up" the Spanish and preventing anyone acquiring parts would be... bothersome to certain American powers.

Again, agreed with that point on Cuba. Though I'm far less versed in the views of the population of Puerto Rico; only that you don't have the same American business and security interests on that island as compared to its big brother. Perhaps merely leasing out land for a coaling station/naval base would be more of the appropriate flavor? I could easily see it sprouting into a a "Little Germany" and developing into a base for commercial activity/German merchants operating in the Caribbean Rim, if only due to German law applying there (Probably on tact agreement with the Spanish government, who would find their rule on the rest of the island bolstered by bringing in some prosperity?)

In general, though, I'm trying to think the scenario through in a timeline where Germany has less international clout, political-commerical power projection, liquid and physical/industrial capital and naval ambitions in general. If South America is the route she decides to go to try to get around the Franco-British-Austrian attempts to hedge her in, than she certainly is going to bump up against American interests... but what other choice does Berlin have if they want to find an export market for her goods? And if she can't get that, than there's a real hard cap on just how large her industry can get, which widely swings just how big of a power Germany actually is during the late 19th/early 20th century. A timeline where her acendency is muted without the country itself getting totally hamstrung thought would be interesting...
 
I could easily see it sprouting into a a "Little Germany" and developing into a base for commercial activity/German merchants operating in the Caribbean Rim, if only due to German law applying there (Probably on tact agreement with the Spanish government, who would find their rule on the rest of the island bolstered by bringing in some prosperity?)

From what I understand, the US policy of enforcing English language curriculum on Puerto Rico was vigorously opposed. Outside of a few small coastal enclaves, I don't see Puerto Rico becoming a German-speaking outside of a few havens - a relatively autonomous Puerto Rico (effectively a condominium) would probably remain more Spanish-speaking in culture than it would have nowadays. Not saying that there couldn't be some coastal enclaves; just pointing out that German influence would be markedly less, and more distant, than American influence.

German influence in a Spanish Empire, essentially being the German informal Empire, does sound like a good bet for what you want... Might let the Spanish be a little more successful later on, as they'd have the Germans behind them the entire time, prodding them along.

And that isn't to say that there can't be some Pro-German regimes in South America. I "think" that Brazil was fairly pro German at this time...
 
From what I understand, the US policy of enforcing English language curriculum on Puerto Rico was vigorously opposed. Outside of a few small coastal enclaves, I don't see Puerto Rico becoming a German-speaking outside of a few havens - a relatively autonomous Puerto Rico (effectively a condominium) would probably remain more Spanish-speaking in culture than it would have nowadays. Not saying that there couldn't be some coastal enclaves; just pointing out that German influence would be markedly less, and more distant, than American influence.

German influence in a Spanish Empire, essentially being the German informal Empire, does sound like a good bet for what you want... Might let the Spanish be a little more successful later on, as they'd have the Germans behind them the entire time, prodding them along.

And that isn't to say that there can't be some Pro-German regimes in South America. I "think" that Brazil was fairly pro German at this time...

My apologies; I probably could have been a little clearer in my language. I meant the community that would grow up around the German naval base when I was speaking of an area of greater Germanic cultural influence; more along the veins of a Western Hemisphere Tsingtao than German immigrants flooding the island or forced assimilation of the locals. I figure you might start seeing bilingualism develop among the elite, though, since if German capital is dominating the island their language might increasingly become the "trade tounge", so to speak. I'm liking the idea of Spain being part of the German informal Empire though... and as I was mulling earlier, that seems to be a natural outgrowth of the scenario I proposed that would allow for this Russo-German alliance (Namely a more belligerent German approach to the Franco-Prussian War's initial crisis that results in them getting painted as the aggressor and require a stronger arm to force the South German states to join, alienating Britain and Austria, for which Prince Leopold accepting the offer of the Spainish throne could be a great catalyst). After its instability and steady decline, I imagine the Cortes would realize Spain needs to hitch its wagon to another power if it wants the space to reform (Similar to late Ottoman attitudes and Japan's position during the Meji IOTL), and Berlin seems like the natural candidate.

As for pro-German governments in Latin America, Colombia would have a reason to feel alienated from the Americans as well (The whole Panama debacle is still liable to happen), and I believe there was a notable bussiness relationship with and expat community in Chile. There's also the possability that butterflies affect Argentina's relationships, potentially having Germany being a bigger trading partner if knock-on effects make it so Germany dosen't raise huge import tariffs on grain.
 
You are sort of assuming the later 19th century early 20th century plays out as OTL.

So

All of the French investment ( and British for that matter) goes into Austria and the Ottomans as do their democratic impulses leading to a strong stable multi ethnic state with a modern army well equipped from the arsenals of Skoda. The Balkans is a patchwork of prosperous states without German Princelings, squabbling over trade rights and tariffs not fighting wars. Sandwiched between its traditional ally France and Austria - Hungary Italy plays a part in the Scramble and colonises East Africa.

The French investment in Russia was intended to modernise Russia so it could be a good ally vs Germany. The same value in the smaller, and more modern geography of AH will have a greater impact proportionately.

So after an initial spurt of investment Germany looks to home leaving the Tsar with limited and highly conditional investments. Increasingly the Prussian General staffs plans for war look like a suicidal charge into the teeth of the highly modernised AH and French defences with the slower mobilising Russians being left to reap the rewards of German sacrifice, or the Sacrifice of the German working class. Increasingly the Southern German States draw closer to their traditional Austrian and French Allies leading to the Crisis of 1905 when Bavaria Wurttemburg and Baden refusing to back the Imperial Expedition to Russia during the Russo Japanese war. In the aftermath of the Dogger Bank incident the Kaisers intemperate and public remarks lead to demands from Britain for clarification as German Intervention would trigger the full belligerence of the British Empire on the side of plucky little Japan and demands the return of the Russian Baltic fleet to home port or failing that internment in a neutral port for the duration. Italy mindful of its colonial interests immediately endorses the British position and receives concessions in East Africa.

The Kaiser reacts with more threats but the Southern German states explicitly refuse to participate in a Naval war against Britain with no possibility of victory.

The only solution available to break out of the ring is according to the General staff an immediate attack into Belgium, France, Bohemia and Austria but the Southern Germans refuse to participate in such insanity and only in Prussia are the mobilisation orders followed.

The death march of the Prussian Army into the machine guns of the KuK entrenched in its fortified zone is the prelude to revolution in Berlin and the early fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese receiving massive material support from the British Empire does the same in Russia. In Russia the repression is violent and successful. In Prussia the troops refuse to fire on their brothers in what will become known as the Beer Hall Putsch socialists and elements of the army command agree that the Kaiser must abdicate and march on the Palace demanding democracy. After two weeks peaceful occupation the mob fed and moderately watered by Berlin Beer Halls get their way and a new democratic constitution is granted with the Kaiser going into exile in central Russia.
 
You are sort of assuming the later 19th century early 20th century plays out as OTL.

So

All of the French investment ( and British for that matter) goes into Austria and the Ottomans as do their democratic impulses leading to a strong stable multi ethnic state with a modern army well equipped from the arsenals of Skoda. The Balkans is a patchwork of prosperous states without German Princelings, squabbling over trade rights and tariffs not fighting wars. Sandwiched between its traditional ally France and Austria - Hungary Italy plays a part in the Scramble and colonises East Africa.

The French investment in Russia was intended to modernise Russia so it could be a good ally vs Germany. The same value in the smaller, and more modern geography of AH will have a greater impact proportionately.

So after an initial spurt of investment Germany looks to home leaving the Tsar with limited and highly conditional investments. Increasingly the Prussian General staffs plans for war look like a suicidal charge into the teeth of the highly modernised AH and French defences with the slower mobilising Russians being left to reap the rewards of German sacrifice, or the Sacrifice of the German working class. Increasingly the Southern German States draw closer to their traditional Austrian and French Allies leading to the Crisis of 1905 when Bavaria Wurttemburg and Baden refusing to back the Imperial Expedition to Russia during the Russo Japanese war. In the aftermath of the Dogger Bank incident the Kaisers intemperate and public remarks lead to demands from Britain for clarification as German Intervention would trigger the full belligerence of the British Empire on the side of plucky little Japan and demands the return of the Russian Baltic fleet to home port or failing that internment in a neutral port for the duration. Italy mindful of its colonial interests immediately endorses the British position and receives concessions in East Africa.

The Kaiser reacts with more threats but the Southern German states explicitly refuse to participate in a Naval war against Britain with no possibility of victory.

The only solution available to break out of the ring is according to the General staff an immediate attack into Belgium, France, Bohemia and Austria but the Southern Germans refuse to participate in such insanity and only in Prussia are the mobilisation orders followed.

The death march of the Prussian Army into the machine guns of the KuK entrenched in its fortified zone is the prelude to revolution in Berlin and the early fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese receiving massive material support from the British Empire does the same in Russia. In Russia the repression is violent and successful. In Prussia the troops refuse to fire on their brothers in what will become known as the Beer Hall Putsch socialists and elements of the army command agree that the Kaiser must abdicate and march on the Palace demanding democracy. After two weeks peaceful occupation the mob fed and moderately watered by Berlin Beer Halls get their way and a new democratic constitution is granted with the Kaiser going into exile in central Russia.

Better equipment is a very big and much needed bonus for the KuK however it doesnt solve its horrible leadership and doctrine problem. Also british and french investment doesnt solve the internal problems of the Empire - those werent really economic. And the Balkans states will squabble over the bits of the Balkans and more money will only allow them to get more weapons for it. I also dont see your problems with south Germany. They are the least threatened by a british war so the idea of them basically revolting over it is unlikely. Also you are underestimating german nationalism. Because of this your proposal wont work.
 
You are sort of assuming the later 19th century early 20th century plays out as OTL.

So...

I wouldn't say that: I'm just saying the broader social-economic and political trends (domestically) would still be mainly in place. There's no good reason, for example, that Russia would lose its interests in expanding into Eastern Asia, colonialism in Africa would lose viability, or that growing industrial capacity would lead to nations searching out ways to get new markets. However, other things would change; an Ottomans with solid international support and better financial footing aren't going to end up having to raise the crushing taxes (and resort to the resulting harsh enforcements/repression) in the Balkans that lead to them having to fight a war with Russia in 1877-78 alone, so their position in the Balkans is less likely to be broken. Italy, pinned between two allies, would also logically find its expansionist ambitions supressed, and so I'd say is less likely to get a foothold in the Scramble for Africa and would find its own economy more deeply tied to the French and Austrians. Spain, to, would have a more stable government, which itself has knock-on effects in their society and adds another minor piller in the colonial scene.
 
Better equipment is a very big and much needed bonus for the KuK however it doesnt solve its horrible leadership and doctrine problem. Also british and french investment doesnt solve the internal problems of the Empire - those werent really economic. And the Balkans states will squabble over the bits of the Balkans and more money will only allow them to get more weapons for it. I also dont see your problems with south Germany. They are the least threatened by a british war so the idea of them basically revolting over it is unlikely. Also you are underestimating german nationalism. Because of this your proposal wont work.

I agree the South German states being so troublesome really seems less than likely; though they might be a little more noise towards any initial push to develop a world-class navy on the grounds Germany lacks the global interests to make it worth it. However, don't underestimate decades of butterflies in A-H; sure, they'd still be facing the language problem and the Magyar obstructionism, but if there's better infrastructure and economics in general ethnic tensions are going to be less important, and without a major Serbia and Italy effectively contained, with the main threat perceived now to be from Germany and Russia, national military needs probably lead to having a somewhat different military doctrine (Since quick, preventive wars wouldn't be applicable options for handling the Russo-German threat)
 
So, besides South America and Spain, is there any other viable regions for integration into the German "informal empire" of economic hegemony? I suppose the easy answer, with the alliance structure as it is, would be Russia itself: Germany may not have capital to invest in Russian industry, but the market is big enough to absorb the output of German domestic firms (probably in exchange for grain). Such a commercial relationship would probably dramatically slow down Russian industrialization though, since investing in mineral extraction and agriculture for export to Germany would be a more profitable venture for Russia's limited investment pool than trying to set up competing manufactures (The "Resource Curse"/DutchDisease), not to mention the likely political pressures by both their governments.
 
So, besides South America and Spain, is there any other viable regions for integration into the German "informal empire" of economic hegemony? I suppose the easy answer, with the alliance structure as it is, would be Russia itself: Germany may not have capital to invest in Russian industry, but the market is big enough to absorb the output of German domestic firms (probably in exchange for grain). Such a commercial relationship would probably dramatically slow down Russian industrialization though, since investing in mineral extraction and agriculture for export to Germany would be a more profitable venture for Russia's limited investment pool than trying to set up competing manufactures (The "Resource Curse"/DutchDisease), not to mention the likely political pressures by both their governments.
Russia and Germany being very complimentary economically helps them in the lead-up to the war yet also probably bites them in the back in the aftermath of losing a world war - neither side is very diversified economy, designed to work well without the other part.
 
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