The Islamic Revolution of 1979 has as much a profound impact on the foreign policy of Iran as it did its domestic policy, with the political ascendency of the Shi'a ulema class implementing a foreign policy that decisively sought to expand Iran's geopolitical position through the use of (predominantly, though by no means exclusively, Shi'a composed) non- or semi-state actors and to in the process, undermine the hegemonic position the United States and the regional power of Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Despite being a radical departure from the pro-American, and generally sympathic to Israel and reactionary Arab monarchies, position of the Shah, even by 1975, ruptures were happening in that traditional foreign policy of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. Iran's previously pro-Saudi policy, previously used as a means by which to build a coalition in opposition to Nasser's pan-Arabism, was unravelling due to Iran and Saudi Arabia now rivaling which state would be the hegemonic power leading OPEC (cited, The Oil Kings), with Saudi Arabia taking the position of higher production/lower prices, which the U.S. energy policy was fully in favor of, as opposed to the policy of the Shah, to maintain oil prices as high as possible to continue his ambitious modernization-industrialization program. Coupled with this was the R&D program the Shah initiated with Israel as a means by which to acquire high-yield nuclear warheads, and supplying Israel with a decade of oil supply, referred to as Project Flower. Problem was that while the Israeli government had gone along with this materially generous deal, covertly they were sabatoging the project by providing Iran only with a "Little Boy"-type atomic bomb, as opposed to what was promised. While this deal would not be publically revealed until after the OTL revolution, if the Shah had remained in power, a major diplomatic rupture would seem more than likely.
On the main question, let us say that in 1978, before the events of Bloody Sunday marked the moment of no return for the Pahlavi Dynasty, the Shah had agreed to democratization reforms. This ultimately transformed the Majles (Iranian parliament) from a rubber stamp institution legitimizing Shahist autocracy, into a transparent and democratically-elected body representing the Iranian population. Starting from 1980 and going onwards, what would the foreign policy of this, non-clergy dominated, government of Iran be, and how would it response to OTL events occurring (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, collapse of the Soviet Union, First and Second Intafadas, Invasion of Iraq, etc). Keep in mind, there is still a powerful, right-conservative oriented Islamic party represented in the Majles, but ideologically it is more similar to the moderates of OTL Iran (e.g. Hassan Rouhani).
Despite being a radical departure from the pro-American, and generally sympathic to Israel and reactionary Arab monarchies, position of the Shah, even by 1975, ruptures were happening in that traditional foreign policy of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. Iran's previously pro-Saudi policy, previously used as a means by which to build a coalition in opposition to Nasser's pan-Arabism, was unravelling due to Iran and Saudi Arabia now rivaling which state would be the hegemonic power leading OPEC (cited, The Oil Kings), with Saudi Arabia taking the position of higher production/lower prices, which the U.S. energy policy was fully in favor of, as opposed to the policy of the Shah, to maintain oil prices as high as possible to continue his ambitious modernization-industrialization program. Coupled with this was the R&D program the Shah initiated with Israel as a means by which to acquire high-yield nuclear warheads, and supplying Israel with a decade of oil supply, referred to as Project Flower. Problem was that while the Israeli government had gone along with this materially generous deal, covertly they were sabatoging the project by providing Iran only with a "Little Boy"-type atomic bomb, as opposed to what was promised. While this deal would not be publically revealed until after the OTL revolution, if the Shah had remained in power, a major diplomatic rupture would seem more than likely.
On the main question, let us say that in 1978, before the events of Bloody Sunday marked the moment of no return for the Pahlavi Dynasty, the Shah had agreed to democratization reforms. This ultimately transformed the Majles (Iranian parliament) from a rubber stamp institution legitimizing Shahist autocracy, into a transparent and democratically-elected body representing the Iranian population. Starting from 1980 and going onwards, what would the foreign policy of this, non-clergy dominated, government of Iran be, and how would it response to OTL events occurring (Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, collapse of the Soviet Union, First and Second Intafadas, Invasion of Iraq, etc). Keep in mind, there is still a powerful, right-conservative oriented Islamic party represented in the Majles, but ideologically it is more similar to the moderates of OTL Iran (e.g. Hassan Rouhani).