Ford Saves South Vietnam

In any world where SVN lasts beyond 1975 what effect is that going to have on the Soviets, particularly their economy? Supporting the North on top of the Arabs,WarPac and the scattered groups in Latin America was expensive and the Soviet economy wasen't getting any better.



And if we get Reagan in 76, he's going to be looking for anti-communist to play the guerilla card against the Soviets ASAP.

Perhaps a early start to the Afganistan War?

We probably don't lose Nicaragua, and maybe not even Iran.
 
Not that the RVN economy was doing better: by 1974 their economy (200 dong to the USD in 1972) resembled Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe in OTL 2010. Presumably that stabilizes when Reagan tries to restore economic and military assistance, and 700 T-55s aren't making a beeline for the Independence Palace...

Keep in mind this was right after/during? the first oil shock, and the pullout of the American army, with obvious economic effects.

This would likely improve.
 
Well, you may have something there. Being neither a Republican nor a Democrat, I do tend to lead more towards Reagan as a 'fool.' But even a fool has some grasp of practical issues.

Read "Reagan In His Own Hand." Even if his conclusions were wrong, the man wasn't dumb.
 
Even though this is a saying the Taliban use, I believe the Vietnamese had something similar.

"The Americans have watched, but we have got the time."
 
Let me repeat: no one is advocating US ground forces. There was a period in 1973-4 for ARVN to revamp their strategy, and they didn't take advantage of it. There was no recon of NVA troop buildups. Why? Because their F-5s (useless against Fishbeds) without ECM equipment would be blown out of the sky by NVA SAMs. Personally, I see three Vietnamese problems in 1973-5.

1) ARVN officer corps: the NCOs fought bravely to the last man. Many of their officers deserted their units (Thieu the foremost, loading his Taipei- bound 707 with as much looted gold as possible), and were selected (esp O-4 to O-7) for their political connections rather than military skills. Many generals were average or better, but the battalion/divisional level was often dead wood.

2) Thieu's interference: "Don't surrender an inch of territory" might sound nice on paper, but they did not have the supplies. If you can only fire 4 artillery rounds a day due to supply problems, don't try to defend 600 miles of military insignificant borderlands.

3) Lack of proper equipment: I've outlined that earlier.

Perhaps one of our resident military experts (which I am definitely not) can outline a plausible scenario for a RVN victory in '75?

Again, Thieu is incomparable at the tipping point of Mid-March, when he was emotionally under great stress. So wrong decisions (Before April 1) and then no decisions (Early April) and then a decision (fled to Taiwan in late April) were made. Many officers, especially 18th division, fought well. With adequate supply and B-52 (better if B-2 were present), The battle of Xuan Loc would have saved RVN for months or even years, like An Loc did.

US ambassador Martin was too optimistic to seek for "negotiations" with PAVN, delaying the evacuation, ignoring other solutions. This might be a weakness.
 
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