Forcing the Dardanelles with ships.

I was reading a little bit of Gallipoli and I'm wondering about what would've happened if the British and French navies had attempted to force the Dardanelles, like Roger Keyes had proposed rather than attempt to attack by land.

Winston Churchill actually had his own input on the idea, "I marveled much in those sad days at the standard of values and sense of proportion which prevailed among our politicians and naval and military authorities” who, “confident of breaking the line in France” with yet another offensive, sacrificed a quarter of a million men while refusing to lose "one hundredth part as many sailors and a dozen old ships" in the Dardanelles- where victory had actually been possible"

Any theories about how the attack would've went?
 
They tried that. Turns out that, as a vital corridor that ran through the demographic, economic, and political (if not geographical) heart of their country, the Turks wanted to defend the straits rather badly. So the first ships they sent hit mines and the rest understandably backed off. The French and British Admiralties were understandably not keen of getting their entire fleet sunk suicidally charging through a nest of mines. One extremely expensive ship per extremely cheap mine is a trade that ultimately favors the Central Powers. When they sent in minesweepers, they were either blown up by coastal guns positioned to cover the minefields or spent so much time dodging shells that they couldn't clear the mines.

The whole point of Gallipoli was to take the coastal guns via overland assault after making an amphibious landing. That way the minesweepers could clear the minefields and let the combat ships through. Rather understandably, the Turkish Army objected. Violently.
 
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Was it that hard to destroy the coastal fortifications?

By themselves, the guns could have conceivably been suppressed. It's when suppressing them requires sailing into a minefield that things become rather more difficulty. Minefields, both naval and land, are in effect like any other natural or man made obstacle: by themselves, a delay at worst or a minor nuisance at best. But when covered by firepower? They become extremely lethal.
 

jahenders

Banned
All too true, but I still think it might have been possible had the wallies planned and led it better.

First, had they moved quicker in prepping for the attack, the Turks would have had less time to lay mines and reinforce gun positions. It took the Brits and French a while to get the fleet together and their intentions were not exactly secret. But maybe moving faster and more quietly just wasn't in the cards.

So, dealing with the situation they found ...

The first ships DID hit mines, but that was in part because the minesweeping was almost totally useless. Instead of actually using military minesweepers, what they used was civilian tugs/trawlers with CIVILIAN CREWS. The ships were incredibly slow and, thus, VERY vulnerable to fire from the shores, the crews were not used to enduring enemy fire, and they had little luck in destroying mines. That screw up slowed the entire fleet and left them under the Turkish guns much longer than it should have. Then, when the fleet eventually tried to push on, a couple ships hit mines and the fleet turned back. Things were bad at that point, but the could still have pushed on, but the the commander lost nerve.

I see two options, either one of which have worked:
1) Use decent minesweepers -- faster, military, more effective. This would have gotten the fleet through faster and reduced losses to mines.

2) Simply ignore the mines and push through FAST, led by some tough but old ships. Sure, they'd have taken some losses, but one battleship pushing through (even if lost) can clear a good channel through mines. In IOTL they took losses from both shore gunfire AND mines, so even if they took more losses from mines, they'd be as well off and they'd be through.

By themselves, the guns could have conceivably been suppressed. It's when suppressing them requires sailing into a minefield that things become rather more difficulty. Minefields, both naval and land, are in effect like any other natural or man made obstacle: by themselves, a delay at worst or a minor nuisance at best. But when covered by firepower? They become extremely lethal.
 
LOTS of mines

More mines can be laid by night, by small boats. IIRC, one battleship was lost on a mine in a cleared channel--problem is that the Turks un-cleared it by night. And--how many battleships--even obsolete ones--are you willing to lose? And how many are the civilians willing to let you lose? And then you still have the problem of well sited guns shooting at your ships. Can it be cracked? Probably. Can the Allies AFFORD to crack it? Very questionable.

For that matter, the propaganda war--a steady string of announcements of battleships sunk is not a good thing...
 

LordKalvert

Banned
The problem with taking out the shore batteries is that it takes a direct hit on the shore batteries to knock out the guns while the shore batteries can damage any part of the ship

The shore batteries can also be hidden in such a way to make it almost impossible to be hit. A howitzer can fire over the horizon while a ships gun is very limited in that capacity

The Admiralty told Salisbury way back in 1895 that it was suicidal. Goschen was so disgusted with the idea he just walked out of the cabinet room

Its an insanely difficult problem. The ships have to run a narrow gauntlet, loaded with mines with shore batteries along the coast for what would seem forever. Even if you run the gauntlet and make it to the Sea of Marmara, what then? You would constantly need to send in resupply that is getting the same punishment (The Turkish government will just flee inland)

Then there are the submarines
 
Could an extended Dardanelles voyage by Entente battleships lead to a [more] successful Gallipoli? Even with the losses taken by the Entente fleet and morale losses, could the Ottomans expand too much ammunition on the Entente ships, lose too many fortresses and guns or become overconfident or too vulnerable that there would be less troops and guns facing the ANZAC, French and British troops on 25 April? That said, was battleship support necessary for Gallipoli and could this be postponed until Italian, Russian and British [Imperial] reinforcements arrive if the Ottomans lost too many guns?
[And, this could be combined with other factors mentioned earlier about Gallipoli and the Dardanelles.]
In response to the comment below, I'm referring to an Ottoman pyrrhic victory over the Entente ships.
 
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Could an extended Dardanelles voyage by Entente battleships lead to a [more] successful Gallipoli? Even with the losses taken by the Entente fleet and morale losses, could the Ottomans expand too much ammunition on the Entente ships, lose too many fortresses and guns or become overconfident or too vulnerable that there would be less troops and guns facing the ANZAC, French and British troops on 25 April? That said, was battleship support necessary for Gallipoli and could this be postponed until Italian, Russian and British [Imperial] reinforcements arrive if the Ottomans lost too many guns?
[And, this could be combined with other factors mentioned earlier about Gallipoli and the Dardanelles.]

If it is more successful then there won't be a landing. The landing was to allow navel passage (god knows how they thought that would work even if they take the peninsular there are still guns on the other side)
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The Allies lost three capital ships when they tried it,

I was reading a little bit of Gallipoli and I'm wondering about what would've happened if the British and French navies had attempted to force the Dardanelles, like Roger Keyes had proposed rather than attempt to attack by land.

Winston Churchill actually had his own input on the idea, "I marveled much in those sad days at the standard of values and sense of proportion which prevailed among our politicians and naval and military authorities” who, “confident of breaking the line in France” with yet another offensive, sacrificed a quarter of a million men while refusing to lose "one hundredth part as many sailors and a dozen old ships" in the Dardanelles- where victory had actually been possible"

Any theories about how the attack would've went?

The Allies lost three capital ships (pre-dreadnoughts) the time they tried, and suffered heavy damage (IIRC) three more, including one of the British battle cruisers...

The Allies can keep trying, but the odds only get worse for them, presumably.

Best,
 
The consensus of the "professionals" (Fisher chief among them) was that forcing the Straits by a purely naval action would have resulted in a disaster: IIRC the estimation was that at least 2/3 of the capital ships involved would be sunk, and most ot the others would be seriously damaged.
Please don't mention Churchill: the First Lordship is a civilian position, and should have never have been involved in operational decisions. Obviously Churchill being Churchill bullied every one else and wanted to micromanage issues which he was neither competent nor entitled to meddle in.

There were 4 different but synergic defenses in the Dardanelles:
  • the layered minefields were the main defense. They should have been cleared by fast minesweepers, but these were not available for the Dardanelles front, even if the British navy commanders in the Mediterranean had been requesting them since mid January. Instead fishing trawlers manned by civilians were used,and these could not move faster than 2-3 knots given the strong adverse current in the strait current
  • the second defense (fixed batteries protecting the mine fields) were quite effective against slow-moving trawlers
  • the third defense consisted of quite a large number of mobile howitzers, which were almost impossible to be silenced by ship guns
  • finally there were the forts, which could send plunging fire against capital ships. While the forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles were (partially) reduced by ship guns, the same was impossible for the forts further down (it was not possible to observe the hits and direct the fire). Anyway even the outer forts required landing parties to demolish them with explosive charges

Add to this that the Ottomans had ample reserves of ammunition by the end of February, while the British commanders had orders to avoid wastage since their own reserves of shells were limited.
Another problem was represented by the need of supplying the capital ships which might eventually reach the sea of Marmara: it had to be done with unarmored ships and colliers, easy prey for the mobile howitzers, and in any case the minefields would have been replenished again after the capital ships had passed.

What should the few ships which might eventually reach the sea of Marmara do? Shell Constantinople? The same ships sooner or later would have to run again the gauntlet of the Narrows to reach the Aegean sea and safety.

It is quite obvious that any naval action should have been strongly supported by landing a serious number of soldiers on the Gallipoli peninsula, to silence the mobile howitzers and the batteries protecting the minefields, and to observe and direct the naval shelling of the forts. There were about a quarter million Ottoman troops in the area, 2/3 of them on the European side with good communications and prepared positions. How many troops should have been landed by the Entente? From where should these troops be taken? The British command on the western front was deadly against releasing even a single line division, and Kitchener himself was at best lukewarm, and quite relieved when Churchill pushed for a purely naval action.
Forcing the Straits (landing plus naval shelling and mine clearing) might have conceivably succeeded in late 1914, assuming a professional preparation and a surprise element. Doing it in 1915 was an exercise in madness.

Incidentally, the Russians asked for a "demonstrative action" to relieve the pressure; forcing the Straits and knocking the Ottomans out of the war was a horse of a very different color.
 
Queen Elizabeth...sunk?

I recall reading that the Queen Elizabeth was taken under steeply plunging fore at one point--from large guns. That had real potential to seriously damage or even sink the newest, most powerful dreadnought in the fleet. THAT would have taken the wind out of the Royal Navy.

(Sadly, some of my books didn't make the move south, so I can't confirm the memory--take this with a grain of salt.)
 
I recall reading that the Queen Elizabeth was taken under steeply plunging fore at one point--from large guns. That had real potential to seriously damage or even sink the newest, most powerful dreadnought in the fleet. THAT would have taken the wind out of the Royal Navy.

(Sadly, some of my books didn't make the move south, so I can't confirm the memory--take this with a grain of salt.)

The Queen Elizabeth was ordered not to enter the Narrows
 
Could an extended Dardanelles voyage by Entente battleships lead to a [more] successful Gallipoli? Even with the losses taken by the Entente fleet and morale losses, could the Ottomans expand too much ammunition on the Entente ships, lose too many fortresses and guns or become overconfident or too vulnerable that there would be less troops and guns facing the ANZAC, French and British troops on 25 April? That said, was battleship support necessary for Gallipoli and could this be postponed until Italian, Russian and British [Imperial] reinforcements arrive if the Ottomans lost too many guns?
[And, this could be combined with other factors mentioned earlier about Gallipoli and the Dardanelles.]
In response to the comment below, I'm referring to an Ottoman pyrrhic victory over the Entente ships. In other words, what if the Ottomans defeated the Entente fleet heavily, but lost too many ships, guns and shells along with fortresses that the Entente would find a second attempt at Gallipoli by troops feasible and this time, it succeeds early compared with reality or the later attempts? Or could the Ottomans be too overconfident or vulnerable to the extent that it enables the Entente campaign at Gallipoli to succeed? And, any thoughts about the Italians [at least some ships, planes and [lower quality, reserve, colonial or marine] troops participating in the Gallipoli campaign itself?
If it is more successful then there won't be a landing. The landing was to allow navel passage (god knows how they thought that would work even if they take the peninsular there are still guns on the other side)
 
Problem is, the Ottoman's aren't the only front in the war. They aren't even a major one. If you devote a significant naval contingent to forcing the straits then you run the risk of breaking the blockade on Germany and, worst case, letting the HSF loose.

Doesn't seem worth it when you take that into account.
 
Can someone tell me why they chose to land on the peninsula, was the alternative of landing on the Asian side and working your way up that much worse?
 

jahenders

Banned
True, but they could have done both at the same time and make them mutually supportive. It would complicate things for the Turks.

Instead, the two were quite separate so the Turks could turn all attention from problem 1 to problem 2.

If it is more successful then there won't be a landing. The landing was to allow navel passage (god knows how they thought that would work even if they take the peninsular there are still guns on the other side)
 

jahenders

Banned
All true about the defenses. However, the whole concept was that if they can (somehow) get through the strait to the Sea of Marmara and threaten Constantinople then that would be enough to drive the Turks out of the war. This may have been wishful thinking, but it's true that the Turks weren't exactly 'all in' at that point. They had resisted joining the war at all and only joined after the wallies refused to send them some ships they'd ordered and a couple German ships pulled into Constantinople.

So, IFFFFF that works and Turkey bows out, the wallied fleet shouldn't need resupply and should have no problem going back through the strait.

True, even if they shell Constantinople, Turkey may just pull in land, but the political decision is that they weren't dedicated enough to the war to risk having to evacuate Constantinople and then have it battered.

There were 4 different but synergic defenses in the Dardanelles:
  • the layered minefields were the main defense. They should have been cleared by fast minesweepers, but these were not available for the Dardanelles front, even if the British navy commanders in the Mediterranean had been requesting them since mid January. Instead fishing trawlers manned by civilians were used,and these could not move faster than 2-3 knots given the strong adverse current in the strait current
  • the second defense (fixed batteries protecting the mine fields) were quite effective against slow-moving trawlers
  • the third defense consisted of quite a large number of mobile howitzers, which were almost impossible to be silenced by ship guns
  • finally there were the forts, which could send plunging fire against capital ships. While the forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles were (partially) reduced by ship guns, the same was impossible for the forts further down (it was not possible to observe the hits and direct the fire). Anyway even the outer forts required landing parties to demolish them with explosive charges

Add to this that the Ottomans had ample reserves of ammunition by the end of February, while the British commanders had orders to avoid wastage since their own reserves of shells were limited.

Another problem was represented by the need of supplying the capital ships which might eventually reach the sea of Marmara: it had to be done with unarmored ships and colliers, easy prey for the mobile howitzers, and in any case the minefields would have been replenished again after the capital ships had passed.

What should the few ships which might eventually reach the sea of Marmara do? Shell Constantinople? The same ships sooner or later would have to run again the gauntlet of the Narrows to reach the Aegean sea and safety.
.
 
Can someone tell me why they chose to land on the peninsula, was the alternative of landing on the Asian side and working your way up that much worse?



Normally, the idea behind such landings on peninsulas is to get behind the guns, or ignore the guns and advance up the opposite side and bypass the guns. Campaign reading says the invasion had -no maps- of how freaking difficult the country was on the way to the coastal guns side. By then the landings had been pinned down by the Turks and couldn't move along the coast on their side either. Until they landed and sent up some spotter aircraft they believed there were only some rolling hills inland.
 
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