Force Z survives Dec 10th 1941 and is then exists as a ‘fleet in being’

Well, the Japanese also had four carriers (Div1 Akagi & Kaga and Div 2 Hiryu & Soryu) covering the landing) as well as BatDiv 3 (the four Kongo class ships) covering the operation already. Had there be a chance of engaging Force Z, the IJN could have shift those forces a few miles closer to the invasion force, or even detached BatDiv 3. This assumes the RN ships aren't caught either in Darwin or at sea in the two months between December 10 and the start of the Java Operation.

Thanks Cal

When you say a few miles where they litterally a covering force ie just over the horizon or simply in that region of the pacific?
 
Indomitable was supposed to have been included in Force Z.

Was that going to be a game changer?

Ivan

Anything that prevents the Japanese airgroups from turning up and attacking with impunity without interferance is a game changer.

In the Med often all it took was a handful of Fulmars (literally 2 or 3) that prevented entire bomber formations from attacking allied shipping effectively.

Early in 42 one of the IJN land based Air groups (4th Kōkūtai) tried to attack the Lexington and the attack was disrupted by a relative handful of F4F Wildcats (O'Hare won his MOH during this battle) and the air group was ultimately slaughtered.

So yes I imagine HMS Indomitable and her 30 odd fighter planes might have come in useful.
 
It depends what game you're talking about. POW was unlucky to be sunk on 10th December - it would take very little to butterfly that golden torpedo away.

However, if this just ends up with POW being sunk a month or two later in the Java Sea, then nothing has really been accomplished. The only way it acts as a game-changer is if it can significantly delay Japanese operations, and to do that probably involves destroying an invasion convoy.
 

CalBear

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Thanks Cal

When you say a few miles where they litterally a covering force ie just over the horizon or simply in that region of the pacific?

The Kido Butai (minus CarDiv 5) left Staring Bay, Cebes on February 25 to cover the invasion of Java. On February 27th they had a strike up to attack the Langley, but land based air beat them to the target. Kido Butai aircraft sank USS Pecos and USS Edsell off Christmas Island on March 1st as part of its mission to pick off shipping attempting to escape Java Sea via Sunda Strait.

Depending on the day the Covering Force was either in the Java Sea itself or in position to strike any serious enemy concentration from February 21, when it returned to Staring Bay after the Darwin Raid until March 26th when IJN operations in support of the Java invasion force ended and the carrier force left Staring Bay for the Indian Ocean Raid. Call it a half day's steaming from being able to launch major strikes against any position in Java Sea, Banda Sea, Makassar Strait
 

CalBear

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Indomitable was supposed to have been included in Force Z.

Was that going to be a game changer?

Ivan

It is worth noting that the 22nd Air Flotilla was specifically reinforced with 25 A6M to provide escort for its G3M and G4M torpedo/level bombers. The Zeros had the range to stay with the bombers anywhere in the South China Sea. No escort was provided on December 10th based on the lack of organic air cover for Force Z (interestingly, a small force of RAAF B-339 (Brewster Buffalo) was assigned to provide air cover, but thanks to errors, primarily by Admiral Phillips, the unit was not even launched until the IJN attack on Force Z had been underway for nearly an hour) and the manner in which RN formation was located by search aircraft.
 

Saphroneth

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It is worth noting that the 22nd Air Flotilla was specifically reinforced with 25 A6M to provide escort for its G3M and G4M torpedo/level bombers. The Zeros had the range to stay with the bombers anywhere in the South China Sea. No escort was provided on December 10th based on the lack of organic air cover for Force Z (interestingly, a small force of RAAF B-339 (Brewster Buffalo) was assigned to provide air cover, but thanks to errors, primarily by Admiral Phillips, the unit was not even launched until the IJN attack on Force Z had been underway for nearly an hour) and the manner in which RN formation was located by search aircraft.
I'm fairly sure that a escorted-attack force being met by defending fighters would still be less effective than an unescorted and unopposed attack force, and frankly if you degrade the Japanese attack more than slightly you might save one of the ships - can't remember which, but one nearly survived, and I want to say it was PoW.
(Edit - yes, it was the single torpedo hit on PoW which cut her power and wrecked her AAA on both sides as well as her steering.)
 
It is worth noting that the 22nd Air Flotilla was specifically reinforced with 25 A6M to provide escort for its G3M and G4M torpedo/level bombers. The Zeros had the range to stay with the bombers anywhere in the South China Sea. No escort was provided on December 10th based on the lack of organic air cover for Force Z (interestingly, a small force of RAAF B-339 (Brewster Buffalo) was assigned to provide air cover, but thanks to errors, primarily by Admiral Phillips, the unit was not even launched until the IJN attack on Force Z had been underway for nearly an hour) and the manner in which RN formation was located by search aircraft.

The RAAF Squadron was 16 Brewster buffelo fighters and its commander had designed a process where the beleived that he could maintain 6 planes overhead at all times

However Adm Phillips wanted to maintain the element of surprise and believed that radioing their position to the RAAF in order for them to find them would give away their position and precence to the Japanese.

That being said Japanese patrol Aircraft had dropped flares on a nearby Japanese fleet during the night (thinking that they were British) and Force Z believed erroniously that they had been discovered and was heading south anyway haven decided to not attack the bridgehead - so it does beg the question why they maintained radio silence if they believed that they had been discovered and were no longer seeking to suprise the Japanese?

I guess it comes down to operational conservatism and the best lessons being learned by the survivors!
 
Anything that prevents the Japanese airgroups from turning up and attacking with impunity without interferance is a game changer.

In the Med often all it took was a handful of Fulmars (literally 2 or 3) that prevented entire bomber formations from attacking allied shipping effectively.

Early in 42 one of the IJN land based Air groups (4th Kōkūtai) tried to attack the Lexington and the attack was disrupted by a relative handful of F4F Wildcats (O'Hare won his MOH during this battle) and the air group was ultimately slaughtered.

So yes I imagine HMS Indomitable and her 30 odd fighter planes might have come in useful.

If we are going to ignore Indomitable running aground can we also pretend that the collision of Formidable and Illustrious on the night of 15/16th December 1941 didn't happen?

Formidable was under repair for 44 days (21/12/41 to 03/02/42) and the repairs to Illustrious took nearly 60 days (30/12/41 to late February 1942).

Formidable left the UK for Ceylon on 17/02/42 and arrived on 24/03/42, 35 days later. Illustrious did not leave the UK until 23/03/42 and arrived in Durban on 22/04/42, 30 days later.

If there was no damage to repair is it reasonable to have them leave the UK on 21/12/41 and arrive in Ceylon 35 days later, i.e. on 25/01/42? From there they can be sent to Singapore to reinforce Prince of Wales, Repulse and Indomitable. Would their presence give Percival the confidence to hold out for longer? And would Yamamoto send Nagumo's carriers there to wipe the British out?
 
IIRC Indomitable couldn't have made it to Singapore by 10 Dec even if she didn't run aground, there wasn't enough time.

I think that given the weak CAGs the RN had at the time if she was operating in concert with Force Z in the Sth China Sea she would have been sunk by something, be it cruisers, submarines or aircraft.
 
IIRC Indomitable couldn't have made it to Singapore by 10 Dec even if she didn't run aground, there wasn't enough time.

I think that given the weak CAGs the RN had at the time if she was operating in concert with Force Z in the Sth China Sea she would have been sunk by something, be it cruisers, submarines or aircraft.

Eh?

Not this again.....

Obviously air groups change but as a rule of thumb

USS Yorktown at the Battle of Coral Sea with an air group that had 14 Fighter planes (Non folding wing F4F3s) in addition to the 30 Dive and 9 Torpedo bombers she carried.

She went into battle with 53 operational aircraft (14 fighters)

Once she got F4F4s with their folding wings those numbers rose (operational experience demanded it) - just in time for Midway

Indomitable in 1942 carried 24 Sea Hurricanes (some of them cannon armed), 12 Wildcats and 16 Albacores - some sources give 1 ASV equipped Swordfish as well - for 52 / 53 Aircraft - (36 fighters)

Obviously Yorktown was focused on a more strike oriented air group but it does show that the air groups were not too dissimilar

But yes Indomitable was both not ordered to go to Singapore - after her Caribbean work up she was due to go to Gib and after her 'avoidable' grounding wouldn't have made it anyway if she had.

Obviously everything would have changed post Pearl Harbour......but Indomitable is not getting to Singapore for 10th Dec
 
The Japanese lucked out sinking Force Z but tbh the entire plan seemed designed to give the Japanese a chance to luck out. They were in the process of dominating the region navally and aerially with greatly superior forces with a hard on for attacking anything that looked like a battleship. Sending unprotected battleships into that mess just seems like either rank desperation or cynical hoping that they die somewhat usefully to me.

Even with a carrier providing backup that just means the Japanese Carriers which were operating relatively nearby would focus all their attention on Force Z possibly leading to worse losses than OTL.
 
There was little to no luck involved with the sinking of Force Z, Phillips blundered blindly about with no recon into an area literally teeming with Japanese forces. Apart from the IJN air fleets numbering over 100 aircraft there were 8 submarines and two surface groups totalling 2 capital ships, 6 cruisers and 12 destroyers, all packed into a few hundred miles of sea. It's a fucking miracle that Phillips survived as long as he did, certainly not because of quality Admiral-ing.

BS-14-5.jpg
 
Force Z survives Dec 10th 1941 and is then maintained as a ‘fleet in being’ (Churchills desire apparently was for POW and Repulse to become a threat to Japanese Ambitions like Tirpitz had become to the British)

There are several PODs that should allow Force Z to escape serious damage on the 10th Dec 1941

1) More disruption to the attacking air groups. While the various Strike groups attacked in a disrupted fashion anyway (they had split up to find the fleet) – Early in the battle 1 group of bombers had attacked a destroyer, HMS Tenados (which was operating alone ahead of the main force) having wrongly identified it as a battleship and dropped their ordnance on the WW1 Destroyer for no effect.

It’s possible that this attacking wave of bombers could have directed more of the attacking waves onto this wrong target and this would have resulted in less planes attacking POW and Repulse.

2) More ships. Several Light Cruisers were at Singapore.
HMS Durban, Danae, Dragon and Mauritius. Now the first 3 are older ships but HMS Mauritius, a Crown Colony Class is Brand new with a comprehensive and modern AAA Suite.

Apparently there was a design fault where she was equipped with a self deguazing system which had caused serious corrosion to her fire main and attempts were underway to repair this in Singapore.

Seems very un Royal Navy to me for a ‘first rate’ Ship like Mauritius to sit out a potential battle and its not too much to imagine that her crew manage to get her ready for battle in time to sortie.

If Mauritius and a number of the other Cruisers had accompanied the fleet the additional AAA / potential targets might have made a difference.
3) This is the most obvious one. 453 Squadron RAAF through foul means or fair manage to maintain a partial or even full cover over Force Z. The units acting commander believed that he could have maintained a rolling cover of at least 6 fighters throughout the day and had even come up with a plan but received a negative response from Adm Phillips and his staff. Apparently the Commander of 488 Squadron RNZAF also proposed the same thing but again his plan was turned down.

We know from other engagements that even the prescience of a handful of fighter planes can seriously disrupt an attacking formation. Certainly there would be less chance of the formations turning up and attacking anywhere near as effectively as they wished and managed OTL if there was friend fighter cover.

4) Perhaps even more obvious. In the absence of proper intel and decent air support – the fleet stays in port. This for me in hindsight is probably the most obvious POD but several things mitigate against it. Firstly – so un Royal Navy it verges on ASB for them to sit in port while their enemy sails where he pleases where their exists the potential to stop him. Particularly when the RN knew that the Army and RAF was being hard pressed to the north. Secondly – they had seriously underestimated their enemy - he was, so they thought, Buck Toothed and short sighted and flew Obsolete biplanes that could hardly fly let alone threaten capital ships. So I dismiss this as a realistic option.

So a combination of the first 3 results in a stronger and better defended force Z that is more able to survive its encounter with the various IJN Land based air groups.

Then once returned to Singapore the Force becomes the core of a ‘Fleet in Being’ with 2 Capital ships, 4 light and 1 heavy Cruisers and a gaggle of Destroyers – what effect could/would this have had on subsequent events particularly if later reinforced with ABDA ships (which alone struggled to have any impact) and later in March 1942 by HMS Warspite, the 4 Rs (if all 4 were sent) and a fleet carrier or 3 (not necessarily British)?

There is also option 5. That is the Admiralty persuades Churchill to do what they wanted to do. That is to assemble a strong Eastern Fleet in Ceylon and then send it to Singapore.

Therefore when the Japanese turned their attention to the Indian Ocean, Phillips or Somerville's "Force A" would be strengthened by a modern fast battleship, a battlecruiser, Exeter, Perth and 3 destroyers.
 
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