For Want of a ... Competent Air Ministry

[Alratan]

Reviewing the history of British aviation in World War II is, in many ways, an example of the triumph of crisis management compensating for rather poor pre-war planning. Now, a large part of this is due to a lack of money, but even more is due to a lack of imagination and motivation on the part of the Air Ministry.

I'm particularly thinking of:

• the massive delay in introducing cannon armed aircraft pre war, which meant that there wasn't enough time to do it properly, due to messing around with getting the licensing arranged before investigating modifications.
• the delay in beginning development work on jets. For example, the de Havilland Goblin took 1 year to design, 2 months to debug, and then a further 10 months to get into production thanks to the limitations on production at that time. The much more powerful Ghost was simply a scaled up version of this original design.

OK, so how can we change this?

In OTL, Viscount Swinton essentially failed as Secretary of State for Air, and his successor, Kingsley Wood was little better. So I suggest that Charles Vane-Tempest Stewart is not successfully hounded out of office by the pacifists in the Labour Party before the election. I will further assume that he retains his post after the election.

The 7th Marquess was a pilot, and believed in preserving the strength of the RAF, so I assume he would be more forceful in making the Air Ministry do its job, and as a long term minister of the department would be successful at changing it's rather slow and conservative culture. Thus, in the late '30s, when trials began to reveal the weakness in the RAF's pipeline, e.g. .303 machine guns being inadequate, and the Peregrine engine being unreliable and lacking potential, the Air Ministry would be more proactive.

Let us say then, that in '37 the Air Ministry realises this, and feels an urgency to do something about it. It issues a specification for:

• an alternative to piston engines in case high power piston engines prove impossible to deploy successfully
• a gun capable of reliably shooting down modern, armoured aircraft

It is soon realised that the Hispano is by far the best option for the gun, and, thanks to Tizard, that Whittle's jets offer the only realistic alternative to pistons.

Unfortunately, the Hispano is French and has to be licensed, and Whittle's Power Jets lacks capacity for the task. It is at this stage that real divergences start to occur. The Air Ministry decides to:

• purchase multiple copies of the gun and give them to British companies to investigate required modifications and how to integrate them into airframes in parallel with licensing negotiations
• nationalise jet development and bring in other designers. Substantial amounts of money flows into Power jet immediately, but the other engine designers are also necessary and need their piece of the work for it to get everything.
• issue a specification for aircraft carrying modified cannon and powered by jets

This is all done by the end of 1937. By the end of 1938:

• many issues with deploying the Hispano have been discovered, and some fixes have been suggested. The Air Ministry have already committed to licensing the design by this point, so they request that the interested companies liaise with the French designers to resolve these issues.
• both Power Jets and Halford, amongst other less successful designs, have delivered stable jet designs, whilst Rolls Royce has developed the Merlin, demonstrating that high power pistons are viable. Despite the latter, and the issues with range and maintenance, that jets have far more potential than pistons.
• new aircraft designs have been submitted, and a de Havilland (forgive me the anachronism, but for a backup, future proofing project the major aircraft manufacturers are likely to be encouraged to concentrate on less risky types) single engined all wood design, and a Westland all metal twin design have been selected to be produced as prototypes

The Air Ministry issues specifications for cannon armed variants of existing piston designs, particularly the Spitfire and Hurricane, and for all new jet powered cannon armed interceptors. By the end of 1939:

• new Spitfire variants are being manufactured with cannon, but limitations on the production of the modified, belt fed Hispanos restrict the number that can be made and prevent the conversion of older aircraft
• prototypes for both jets have flown, and demonstrated excellent performance. Contracts for 200 of each design have been signed, with delivery due to start in June. A conversion course for experienced pilots has been agreed to start in the spring.

So, a little bit of a wank, but hopefully not too much, if anything's impossible or completely implausible, let me know. Handwaving wildly to kill butterflies, what do we think happens next?

There shouldn't be too much impact on the Fall of France, as the jets won't exist and there were few Spitfire deployed there. I would imagine that it means a rather more rapid end to the Battle of Britain, then things start getting interesting. Some questions that occurred to me:

• Where does British jet fighter development go from here, given the lessons the British have learned with their interceptors?
• What is the German response?
• If the Germans also introduce jet interceptors early, how does Bomber Command counter?
• Can it?
• Can jet bombers be manufactured?
• What is the American response?
• Do the British remember their mid air refueling experiments?
• Do the FAA get in on the jet game?

and many others. What are your thoughts?

 

[trekchu]

Post-war, anything is better than OTL.

 

[The Dean]

Oh I could go on for hours on this subject! Just take a look here for a start.

 

[Alratan]

Oh I could go on for hours on this subject! Just take a look here for a start.

I'd say that the scenario you outline here is a combination of excessive pessimism and optimism. Pessimism because 1939 is too late for jets to make a critical impact, particularly as the panic after the Fall of France which lead to the cancellation of most next generation designs in favour of immediate production would probably see it swept away/delayed, and optimistic because in 1939 the final generation pistons still looked very viable and the major firms wouldn't be taken off them.

It was with your thread in mind that I thought the best way to introduce jets earlier was for the British to have minor manufacturers develop them as insurance/backup in case the piston engines ran out of development potential, and this requires that they start earlier. This development of backups, was, I believe, standard pre-war British practice, but they didn't usually consider such radially different options.

I imagine that when the Battle of Britain decisively proves the concept of jets, then Rolls Royce would get heavily involved in jet design and manufacture, improving reliability, range and operational life, but I think until then they'll be kept to debugging the Merlin. This should mean that the British will have surplus Merlin production capacity, as they transition over to producing jets, which will probably mean that that the Meteor will be available in numbers much sooner, which has a big impact on British tank designs, which were crippled for a long time for a lack of sufficiently powerful and reliable engines. The earlier Meteor means that universal tanks will be possible much earlier, as the cruiser tanks can be uparmoured and upgunned whilst retaining their speed.

 

[Triton]

How much pre-war planning can occur due to Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement? Chamerlain signed the Munich Agreement in 1938 conceding the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia to Germany.

Frank Whittle had a working jet engine in 1937. The Battle of Britain occurs in the summer and autumn of 1940.

Was it obvious that Whittle's jet engine was the powerplant of the future? Or was it viewed as an exotic and expensive technology in 1937? You mention that Rolls-Royce was also promising higher performing piston engines that would probably have been less expensive and less risky. I don't agree that because they didn't have a crystal ball that the Air Ministry was incompetent. You're making a judgment based on 20/20 hindsight.

 

[Alratan]

How much pre-war planning can occur due to Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement? Chamerlain signed the Munich Agreement in 1938 conceding the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia to Germany.

Seeing as a more modern view of appeasement is that Chamberlain was cynically sacrificing the counties of Eastern and Central Europe to Hitler to buy time for Britain to rearm, then it is very compatible.

Frank Whittle had a working jet engine in 1937. The Battle of Britain occurs in the summer and autumn of 1940.

Given the H1 took two years to get from the start of the design to production, with significant wartime delays and distraction, then this is just enough time.

Was it obvious that Whittle's jet engine was the powerplant of the future? Or was it viewed as an exotic and expensive technology in 1937? You mention that Rolls-Royce was also promising higher performing piston engines that would probably have been less expensive and less risky.

The point is that in 1937 Rolls' future piston engine, the Peregrine, was having difficulties. It was quite possible that pistons had run out of development space. Note that the TL dosen't say that they've given up on pistons. They've just made a small investment in an alternate technology as a backup, without altering the priorities of the major players at all. Considering that IOTL Tizard, who was the man in charge of Aviation research, made a quite strong recommendation that the research should be funded in 1937, then I don't see this as a particular problem. Consider the minimal sums involved. Power Jets was looking for funding on the order of £12,000/annum to make their proof of concept, the price of 2.4 production Spitfires.

I don't agree that because they didn't have a crystal ball that the Air Ministry was incompetent. You're making a judgment based on 20/20 hindsight.

The story of the Hispano is a succession of delays, where the Air Ministry messed up the licensing negotiations so they took years, and didn't look into what modifications were required until the gun had been licensed.

With the jet, the Air Ministry promised funding, then reneged, then got interested again. At one point money was promised but slow bureaucracy ensured it took a year to arrive.

I feel that the thing which is unlikely is getting an Air Ministry with the mindset to push the envelope, which I suppose is what you're saying, in a way. Giving earlier support to jets and managing the Hispano purchase properly don't really cost anything in the broader scheme of things, but they require a sense of urgency and a willingness to entertain the notion that Britain could really be fighting a war something in the near future. The 7th Marquess could provide this, IOTL he lost his job for wanting to preserve and strengthen the RAF in the early '30s, and as a pilot would probably better understand the significance of the advice of people like Tizard.

 

[merlin]

I think there are two issues here:-

1 - getting the introduction of Canons earlier, and

2 - geting jet aircraft developed, proved, and effective fighter aircraft produced and deployed - earlier than OTL.

Personally, I think item one, is much easier than item two.

When specification F.37/35 was issued - it stipulated four 20mm canon. The RAF ordered five prototypes, two Westland, two Boulton-Paul, and one Supermarine 313; unfortunately it was the Treasury who wouldn't cough up the money - hence only the Westland was built. Not too, that the Hurricane and Spitfire, adaptations, were excluded 'because their designer's drawing offices were too busy; it seemed quicker to order a totally new design from a less occupied company'!
Therefore if the Boulton-Paul aircraft had been built, tested, and production ordered the problems with the canon could have been surmounted earlier. Alternatively, the B-P might have been the only aircraft, with Gloster asked to house canon in their F.34/35 aircraft as a back-up - so give the RAF a capable 'twin' instead of the Blenheim.

But, item two, is not so plausible - even in '41 Tizard wanted production geared to the Typhon and the 'Whittle' - i.e. no more Spitfires!
The idea, that RAF and Government ministers are going to stake the security of the Country on an such a new concept is IMO not tenable - 'good god man, it doesn't even have a propellor'.
The concept had to be tested, which couldn't be turned into a fighter - it only proved the potential, and the necessity for two engines. And, even once ordered in Sept '41, the Meteor didn't reach its first squadron until July/August '44!

 

[trekchu]

The idea, that RAF and Government ministers are going to stake the security of the Country on an such a new concept is IMO not tenable - 'good god man, it doesn't even have a propellor'.

Can I sig that, and use it myself one day?

 

[Markus]

Let us say then, that in '37 the Air Ministry realises this, and feels an urgency to do something about it. It issues a specification for:

• an alternative to piston engines in case high power piston engines prove impossible to deploy successfully
• a gun capable of reliably shooting down modern, armoured aircraft

It is soon realised that the Hispano is by far the best option for the gun, and, thanks to Tizard, that Whittle's jets offer the only realistic alternative to pistons.

Ok, let´s look at mid 30´s fighters. Some are biplanes like the Hawk III or the I-15, some are monoplanes with a fixed landing gear like the Fokker D.XXI. The most advanced operational fighter is probably the Polikarpov I-16. Engines are all generating around 800hp.
Bombers on the other hand were more advanced like the Martin B-10, so if you combine a monoplane design with a retractable landing gear and install one of the new engines –say the 1,300hp+ R-2600 Curtiss-Wright is working on you can build a vastly improved fighter using known technology. Jets “promise” even more, but it’s a) a promise and b) very few people understand jet technology.
Better go with the conventional tech in order to avoid unpleasant surprise. Which was the reason for ordering so many “conventional” Hurricanes – the more advanced tech of the Spitfire might not work.


Regarding cannons. I´m pretty sure no nation had planes with armour and internally self sealing fuel tanks in 1937. In this case even six light machine guns are an effective armament. That changed very fast after Spet.3rd 1939, but even then eight LMG were effective against protected single engine airplanes, only twins were hard to shoot down. Especially if you are short of AP and incendiary ammo like the RAF was. If you want to avoid the troubles with the belt-fed cannons, just install the drum-fed version until you have debugged the design. Not perfect, but better than 8*.303 and any number of non working belt-fed cannon.

 

[Alratan]

Looking at what impact this would have on British strength at the start of the BoB, assuming no changes happen in the BoF. On the eve of the Battle, 9th July 1940, the British would have:

~400 machine gun armed Hurricanes
~200 cannon armed Spitfires
~20 de Havilland alt-Vampires
~20 Westland "Jet Whirlwinds"

counting serviceable planes with type rated pilots.

I'll assume, to make it easier, that the 1939 Vampire is marginally less good than the OTL 1942 design, but generally similar, a small, light, very fast interceptor, and the Westland is an implementation of the bomber destroyer concept with jet engines, a heavily armed and armoured twin. I'll also assume that despite the good work done in the Air Ministry, the RAF still has rather odd pilot deployment strategies.

The first phase, the Battle of the Channel, would go similarly to OTL, although the British would suffer marginally fewer casualties, and the Germans noticeably more, thanks to the presence of cannon armed Spitfire. I'd judge that the jets wouldn't be seriously deployed at this point, as the pilots would still be considered inexperienced and tactics would be unclear. Their lack of range wouldn't help either. All in all, the Germans would still win, and British shipping would abandon the channel.

The second phase would start at around the same time as OTL, around the 11th of August. The British would have around:

~400 machine gun armed Hurricanes + pilots
~250 cannon armed Spitfires + pilots
~40 de Havilland alt-Vampires
~40 Westland "Jet Whirlwinds"

and the Germans

~800 Bf 109s
~200 Bf 110s

This is where we would start to see the real differences come in. I'll assume that all of the jets would be deployed south, with Group 11. I think Park's tactics of using individual squadrons would work better considering the very different performance of the 4 major types under his command. The superiority of the jets to the BF 109E-4 that would be the Germans mainstay is significant, but not overwhelming. The alt-Vampire would have a speed and climb advantage, and a minor armament advantage, whereas the Jet Whirlwind would have better armour and significantly better armament, but about the same speed and climb. The Vampire would be best used to combat escort fighters, along with the Spitfires, whilst the Whirlwinds went for the bombers. The low endurance and short engine life of the early jet would restrict their use, but this is not an insurmountable problem.

My assessment is that the British would probably have done substantially better at this stage. A combination of the cannon and on the Spitfire being more deadly to German aircraft than the OTL machine guns, the alt-Vampire being much more effective at dealing with escort aircraft, and the heavily armed jet Whirlwind vindicating the bomber destroyer concept (for now..) by destroying far more of the bombers in a formation after successful interception. This would be compounded by the German pilots lacking experience in how to combat jet aircraft. This probably wouldn't lead to the Luftwaffe drawing this phase to an early close, and the move away from attacking just coastal airfields and the radar chain would still happen in the last week of August. By this stage German losses, particularly amongst bombers, would be substantially worse than IOTL, and British casualties noticeably lower. The alt-Vampire, in particular, would be doing conspicuously well. The British are still likely to think they are loosing, and the Germans to think they are winning.

It is likely that the East End bombing would be butteflied away, delaying indiscriminate city bombing.

The next phase, of directly attacking airfields still seems likely to occur. The Luftwaffe, suffering from the attentions of jets they find difficult to counter in the air, are likely to argue strongly for attacking them on the ground, where they are considerably less dangerous. Again, the RAF are likely to suffer here, particularly because of Group 12's reluctance to cooperate in guarding Group 11's airfields. The presence of the jets and cannon armed Spitfire will, once again, considerably increase Luftwaffe losses, and it will become clear to the Germans much sooner that the Luftwaffe was loosing the battle for air superiority, and the shift away from Sealion is likely to happen much earlier. As IOTL, Hitler is likely to loose faith in the Luftwaffe in the middle of September, and unlike OTL they are unlikely to be able to persuade him to change his mind. During this period, RAF numbers are likely to remain stable in proportion, and fall in total more gently than IOTL. Although the jets will be more survivable in combat, they will have significantly lower reliability and operational lifespan. This will mean that the apparent success of the jets will become more and more exaggerated over time, as the gap in experience and training between between the average piston pilot and the average jet pilot would widen .

SO, it's the middle of September, city bombing hasn't begun yet dur to butterflies, the Luftwaffe is substantially weaker than OTL, with many more experienced pilots killed and many more planes destroyed rather than damaged. The British, on the other hand, have lost less pilots and planes and suffered less bombing than IOTL, and have a jet force that is just about to start significant growth.

What do the players do?

Downing and Park have been more successful so they are less likely to be binned. The Germans haven't started city bombing yet, so the Luftwaffe needs to persuade Hitler to change his mind so they can still contribute usefully to the war effort against the UK.

 

[Alratan]

When specification F.37/35 was issued - it stipulated four 20mm canon. The RAF ordered five prototypes, two Westland, two Boulton-Paul, and one Supermarine 313; unfortunately it was the Treasury who wouldn't cough up the money - hence only the Westland was built. Not too, that the Hurricane and Spitfire, adaptations, were excluded 'because their designer's drawing offices were too busy; it seemed quicker to order a totally new design from a less occupied company'!

The issue, as I see it, is less with modifications to the aircraft than modifications to the gun, and looking at the timeline for Hispano adoption, the real, enormous delay was that they didn't investigate this until after they had agreed the license.

Therefore if the Boulton-Paul aircraft had been built, tested, and production ordered the problems with the canon could have been surmounted earlier. Alternatively, the B-P might have been the only aircraft, with Gloster asked to house canon in their F.34/35 aircraft as a back-up - so give the RAF a capable 'twin' instead of the Blenheim.

An interesting route, I'll have to look into it.

But, item two, is not so plausible - even in '41 Tizard wanted production geared to the Typhon and the 'Whittle' - i.e. no more Spitfires!
The idea, that RAF and Government ministers are going to stake the security of the Country on an such a new concept is IMO not tenable - 'good god man, it doesn't even have a propellor'.

That's in 1941, after the enormous panic that happened in the Air Ministry after the Fall of France and resulted in the cancellation of most of their long term projects. In 1937 Tizard recommended funding Whittle's jet research.

Again, they are not staking the future of the country. They are investing a very small amount of money as insurance in case development of the next but one generation of piston engines fails. This is all it is, a backup. The sums of money we are talking about are only the cost of a couple of aircraft.

The concept had to be tested, which couldn't be turned into a fighter - it only proved the potential, and the necessity for two engines. And, even once ordered in Sept '41, the Meteor didn't reach its first squadron until July/August '44!

True, because after the Fall of France future development was pretty much stopped, and nearly all effort devoted to producing Merlins. The Halford H1 is a much better model to look at what was achievable, as I descibe in my first post.

Ok, let´s look at mid 30´s fighters. Some are biplanes like the Hawk III or the I-15, some are monoplanes with a fixed landing gear like the Fokker D.XXI. The most advanced operational fighter is probably the Polikarpov I-16. Engines are all generating around 800hp.
Bombers on the other hand were more advanced like the Martin B-10, so if you combine a monoplane design with a retractable landing gear and install one of the new engines –say the 1,300hp+ R-2600 Curtiss-Wright is working on you can build a vastly improved fighter using known technology. Jets “promise” even more, but it’s a) a promise and b) very few people understand jet technology.
Better go with the conventional tech in order to avoid unpleasant surprise. Which was the reason for ordering so many “conventional” Hurricanes – the more advanced tech of the Spitfire might not work

The issue the RAF has in 1937 is that they have a high power piston engine development pipeline, it goes Peregrine -> Vulture, and it's not working yet. As I say above, the Air Ministry is not relying on jets, when it orders them in 1937, it's relying on pistons, but getting a couple of smaller manufacturers to investigate jets as a backup in case something goes wrong with them. It's doing exactly what you recomend, being conservative and trying to avoid any unpleasant suprises in the future.

Then, when the first generation jet demonstrator models do working incredibly well - think of the performance of a Halford H1 compared to a Peregrine in 1938, then it becomes very clear that jets are very useful. Even then, I'm only having small orders being made and most production devoted to Hurricane and Spitfire.

Regarding cannons. I´m pretty sure no nation had planes with armour and internally self sealing fuel tanks in 1937. In this case even six light machine guns are an effective armament. That changed very fast after Spet.3rd 1939, but even then eight LMG were effective against protected single engine airplanes, only twins were hard to shoot down.

It was in 1937 of OTL that the Air Ministry held trials that demonstrated that the time of the machine gun armed fighter was coming to an end, started negotiations to licesnse the Hispano, and issued specifications for cannon armed fighters. All I'm asking is that they implment the decision they made in OTL properly, rather than mesing it up.

Especially if you are short of AP and incendiary ammo like the RAF was. If you want to avoid the troubles with the belt-fed cannons, just install the drum-fed version until you have debugged the design. Not perfect, but better than 8*.303 and any number of non working belt-fed cannon.

It was the drum that caused many of the problems, as it made it hard to fit the gun into existing designs. The key thing is doing something about this earlier, so you can get the belt version debugged in the three years between deciding to use it and needing it. Then converting aircraft is much easier, more reliable, and simply better as more ammo can be carried. Starting earlier also means that you can get the guns designer to help with the process.

 

[merlin]

Rather - than a seperate new thread, shouldn't this be a post on -
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=734

- the last reply to that thread was 22 April.

The only other advantage with the new thread, is being able to digress into different areas where a POD may be of significance, e.g. Battle production stopped in 1936!

 

[Thande]

In OTL, wasn't the Air Ministry very paranoid about letting jets be shot down due to the fear that the Germans might reverse-engineer the engine (obviously not being aware the Germans already had their own jet project). So in this scenario, wouldn't these proto-Vampires be restricted to interceptor operations over the home islands only?

 

[The Dean]

In OTL, wasn't the Air Ministry very paranoid about letting jets be shot down due to the fear that the Germans might reverse-engineer the engine (obviously not being aware the Germans already had their own jet project). So in this scenario, wouldn't these proto-Vampires be restricted to interceptor operations over the home islands only?

Oh they knew about the German jets as the Me 262 appeared before the Meteor entered service. They were just plane stupid.

 

[Alratan]

Rather - than a seperate new thread, shouldn't this be a post on -
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussi...read.php?t=734

- the last reply to that thread was 22 April.

If a Mod's around and can be bothered...

The only other advantage with the new thread, is being able to digress into different areas where a POD may be of significance, e.g. Battle production stopped in 1936!

That's the kind of thing I was looking for. I only know a bit about the 7th Marquess, but as I say, my basic assumption is that having a capable, interested minister would shake up the Air Ministry and make it generally more effective. If that would cause other changes, I'll work them in.

In OTL, wasn't the Air Ministry very paranoid about letting jets be shot down due to the fear that the Germans might reverse-engineer the engine (obviously not being aware the Germans already had their own jet project). So in this scenario, wouldn't these proto-Vampires be restricted to interceptor operations over the home islands only?

Pretty much. That's more of a theoretical concern at this point though, as the range of the early jets is so poor that that's pretty much all they can be used for.

Later on, I expect that the Germans will start deploying their own jets about the same time as the British jets have enough range to usefully reach Germany. How much that would change Air Ministry policy I don't know.

 

[merlin]

The issue, as I see it, is less with modifications to the aircraft than modifications to the gun, and looking at the timeline for Hispano adoption, the real, enormous delay was that they didn't investigate this until after they had agreed the license.
It was the drum that caused many of the problems, as it made it hard to fit the gun into existing designs. The key thing is doing something about this earlier, so you can get the belt version debugged in the three years between deciding to use it and needing it. Then converting aircraft is much easier, more reliable, and simply better as more ammo can be carried. Starting earlier also means that you can get the guns designer to help with the process.

In part I agree, though I'm not sure it was the 'drum'? Firstly what took the time, was converting the metric sizes to imperial measurement for accurate machining.
Where there was a problem with the drum was its capacity - only 60 rounds - which limited the Whirlwind, whereas the Beaufighter just had enough space to re-load.
The main problem once measurement conversion was sorted, was getting them in the wing of a single-engined aircraft - especially the thin wing of the Spitfire. The solution was to mount it on its side, but no one asked the gun what it thought of that - it jammed.
Hence, that is why I prefer the Boulton-Paul route - purpose built aircraft fit for purpose - still time (in comparison with OTL) to get it right.

 

[Alratan]

In part I agree, though I'm not sure it was the 'drum'? Firstly what took the time, was converting the metric sizes to imperial measurement for accurate machining.

This is one of the big reasons why starting the conversion work earlier would help. Pre war, the British manufacturers can directly access the manufacturers original technical diagrams rather than . From what I can tell, there were four major elements to the delay. Getting the Air Ministry to approve the RAF's choice of the Hispano, which took from 1936 to 1937, getting the license, re-engineering to Imperial measurements, setting up a factory, and debugging. If the Air Ministry expedites its purchase decision, has manufacturers start testing and debugging using purchased French versions, and arranges for a British factory to be established in parrallel rather than in series, which is what seems happened, then it could have been under production much earlier.

It is the testing which I see as key. If a couple of prototype planes are fitted with French Hispanos, then the need for a belt fed version will become apparent much earlier than IOTL, and work on them can begin.

Where there was a problem with the drum was its capacity - only 60 rounds - which limited the Whirlwind, whereas the Beaufighter just had enough space to re-load.

I agree this is a significant problem but in my opinion its biggest problem is...

The main problem once measurement conversion was sorted, was getting them in the wing of a single-engined aircraft - especially the thin wing of the Spitfire. The solution was to mount it on its side, but no one asked the gun what it thought of that - it jammed.

It was the drum which meant the gun had to be mounted on its side. If a belt fed version was available then this problem would never have arisen.

Hence, that is why I prefer the Boulton-Paul route - purpose built aircraft fit for purpose - still time (in comparison with OTL) to get it right.

I'm sure that in 1937 when the Air Ministry decided on the Hispano as the only immediate solution, if there had been any way to get a British design, they'd have taken it.

 

[The Dean]

I seem to recall something about a stronger spring in the recoil mechanism being fitted to cure the stoppages in wing mountings. I'll look through my books and get back on that one, once that was sorted the four cannon Hurricanes became the big gun in the air. The belt fed Mosquitoes carried over a ton of ammo if I recall correctly.

 

[Alratan]

I seem to recall something about a stronger spring in the recoil mechanism being fitted to cure the stoppages in wing mountings. I'll look through my books and get back on that one, once that was sorted the four cannon Hurricanes became the big gun in the air. The belt fed Mosquitoes carried over a ton of ammo if I recall correctly.

Thanks for looking. It seems like this would have been a reasonably simple fix if problems with cannon equipped prototypes had been detected pre-war.

I'm surprised I've not received more flack for rehabilitating Lord Londonderry, who later became notorious for attempting to come to an accommodation with Hitler. I've also looked a bit more deeply into the events surrounding his departure. The best explanation I can find is:

However, there was a British sub-plot which affected him more particularly as air minister. Britain was chiefly interested in disarmament of air forces, since the possibility of being bombed removed the traditional protection of the English Channel. On November 10, 1932, Baldwin proclaimed that "the bomber will always get through"—true enough before the days of radar. He wanted to abolish bombers altogether.[5] Both Londonderry and the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Edward Ellington, were keen to retain bombers, partly to control rebellions in outlying parts of the British Empire, especially Iraq. Londonderry fought unavailingly against Treasury-imposed cuts in air expenditure. But when the Disarmament Conference resolved to ban the first use of bombers, he was allowed by MacDonald to announce at Geneva the "Londonderry exception," giving Britain the right to retain bombing for imperial tasks. This annoyed Baldwin and infuriated the peace movement. Londonderry was dubbed "the bomber's friend." The East Fulham by-election of October 1933 saw a huge government majority turn into a Labour victory. This was regarded as showing the strength of pacifist feeling. In this climate, Londonderry's stubborn defense of bombers was distinctly unfashionable.

He was to get even more out of line in the years that followed. In March 1934, faced with evidence of illegal German rearmament of air forces, Baldwin declared that Britain would not allow itself to "be in a position inferior to any country within striking distance of our shores." Astonishingly, Kershaw argues, Londonderry, "far from grasping the opportunity presented by this shift in policy, was prepared to accept a relatively mod-est level of [British] expansion...." Churchill attacked the government's air rearmament program as too tardy and too meager.

In a parliamentary debate in November 1934 Baldwin used figures supplied by the Air Ministry (that is, Londonderry) to refute Churchill's charge that Germany's illegal air force was "rapidly approaching equality with our own." When Hitler announced in March 1935 that Germany had already achieved air parity with Britain, Baldwin was furious with Londonderry for having given him the wrong figures.

Under attack from the left for his defense of bombing and from the right for his inability to provide for Britain's air defenses, Londonderry was politically finished. Baldwin sacked him from the Air Ministry as soon as he became prime minister in June 1935, and a few months later dropped him from the Cabinet altogether. Churchill later wrote that "after having gone through several years of asking for more," Londonderry was "suddenly turned out for not asking enough."

Although the argument about comparative air strengths is quite technical, we now know that Churchill was exaggerating, Hitler was bluffing, and Londonderry was right.[6] Kershaw acknowledges that the technical innovations that enabled the British to defeat the Luftwaffe in 1940 date from Londonderry's time. That's about as much as any air minister could have done, in view of the Treasury's stranglehold on finance. Londonderry's limitations, on which Kershaw dwells unduly—especially his lack of political authority—had no real effect, one way or another.

With this in mind, the best PoD I can see is when Baldwin made his declaration in March 1934, Londonderry stays true to form and asks for more money and planes. I imagine that dosen't get very far, given the travails British finances are in, but gets something. Later, when asked for the figures on German aircraft, Londonderry selects, or the Air Ministry supplies a substantially higher estimate of German airpower. This would be in no way out of character for the Air Ministry/British intelligence, who routinely massively overestimated German strength. This way, he retains a bit more credibility on the right, and Baldwin dosen't feel that he has let him down. Indeed, a little bit of strategic leaking at the right times could strengthen his position, if he is believed to have given correct advice and beeen ignored.

With the PoD thus established in 1934, although the major impacts not coming through until 1935, what other changes to Air Ministry policy do we think would have occured? If a trickle of funding to Whittle comes online early due to there being slightly more money in the budget, does this make my acceleration of jet development more plausible. With more time and energy devoted to the project at this point, the deciscon to take it up as insurance in 1937 is probably more likely.

 

[PMN1]

In OTL, Viscount Swinton essentially failed as Secretary of State for Air, and his successor, Kingsley Wood was little better.

From Anthony Furze's 'Wilfred Freeman: The genius Behind Allied Survival and Air Supremacy 1939 - 1945' - a very interesting book BTW.

'Much of the shortfall (in aircraft production) could be directly attributed to Chamberlain's secret insistence that rearmament should not interfere with the normal course of trade, but Swinton had to accept the blame for the consequences of this 'undisclosed restraint', and on 16th May 1938, he and Weir (his unpaid part-time advisor on production at the Air Council) both resigned. Swinton's replacement was Sir Kingsley Wood, a 'funny, pleasant little cockney' lawyer, who frankly admitted that he 'did not know one end of an aircrfat from another'.

From the small amount i've read on Swinton (and Weir), they don't seem to have been as bad as you suggest - for one, they did get the Shadow Factory programme through for airframes and engines and more support for radar - but seem to have been the victims of Chamberlain's policy and their rejection of the political emphasis on numbers.