my view exactly and I have seen discussions in various histories of the Pacific War talking about the shortages of skilled and experienced officers and enlisted men hampering their combat effectiveness (and damage control) later in the war. Although I would have to dig for where I found that.
One of Shattered Swords' key points was all about losing the plane handling people, not the pilots. There's also the teamwork and working together factor and what that book also points out, the very manual bottleneck nature of getting planes rearmed and back in the air inherent with Japanese carrier design. I would imagine there were differences in being a plane handler between their carriers, none of the originals being quite the same-except maybe the Shokaku's, Americans being much more standardized too. Book also talked about how damage control was very compartmentalized training, not universal per US, these officer's getting killed outright on some carriers at Midway in the 1020 attacks. Reminded me of Soviet officers doing the role of NCO's and Officer, having no real NCO's in Cold War era.
The mechanical aptitude stuff crops up elsewhere in the war advantage Americans also - in Snow and Steel on the Bulge, author points out a big advantage per capita US verses Germans on who knows how to drive before showing up for service, how that affects Germans - - inexperienced, inadequately trained drivers, driving mechanically unreliable vehicles.