Fitter Italian military during WW2

Can they stay an Axis member in good standing while not declaring War in 1940?

Italy has a small industrial base, similar to Japan.
Yet they didn't rampage for 6 months like the Japanese did.

The biggest problem, was the average Italian Fighting Man wasn't really into the whole conquest thing, like their German and Japanese counterparts.

Once you move away from the lack of Elan and no worthy cause, you have the problem of the Binary organization of Division, and those Divisions commanded by Political Generals.

With that out of the way, Italy rearmed too soon, a real problem given that technology was changing fast Armor and Aircraft, so what they had available in 1939, wasn't top tier anymore.

To change this, you need to start doing PoDs long before Italy went with the 'Pact of Steel'
 
.

The biggest problem, was the average Italian Fighting Man wasn't really into the whole conquest thing, like their German and Japanese counterparts.

Might rephrase this as, "...average Italian fighting man liked his adversary nations better than his allies...a whole lot better"
 
The Italians should have had a plan for when they declared war. They squandered strategic initiative initially, which is where the other Axis powers got their flashy successes. Even if you argue that the situation evolved much faster than could be predicted, there really should have been files labeled “How to take Malta on war day 0” and “How to invade Egypt next week” in Italian HQ. Alternatively, they should have noticed they didn’t have such plans for good reasons and avoided war altogether.
 
The Spanish civil war has been cited before in these threads. It was useful for experience, but the Italians donated a lot of gear to the Spanish, all stuff they could have used. Being less generous could help.

The Italian military was also oversized. On paper it was a large army, but it was made up of lots of light infantry. This is a particular issue considering their fighting was across the ocean, and dependent on supply lines instead of over land. A smaller, more effective force could be properly equipped, training and select from the population with the best morale/zeal. Instead of shipping over masses of troops that promptly gave up.

The Italians could have also functioned better if they worked closer with the Germans, and realised their place in the alliance. A junior partner heavily reliant on the senior. Instead of trying to launch grand campaigns it couldn't sustain.
 
This is my flippant answer.

In British English, fit means sexually attractive, in addition to healthy and fit as in fit-for-purpose.

E.g. "That Kelly Brook's a fit bird. I could do her!" Means, "Kelly Brook is a very attractive young lady. I would very much like to have sex with her!"

That is why the last time we had a thread, called a "Fitter Italian Military," I suggested conscripting Manuela Arcuri's grandmother into the Italian Army and using her as a weapon in the propaganda war.

For example during the TTL Siege of Tobruk the Regia Aeronautica would drop leaflets on the defenders, which would have a photograph of her dressed as a POW camp guard below the legend, "Two Good Reasons to Surrender!"
 
That's not fair, we had them in WW1...
I know you're joking, but it's not a far fetched an idea and not necessarily bad for the Allies.

IIRC Count Caprioni was so pro-British that he sold 1,000 aircraft to the RAF in the first half of 1940 and the aircraft had been given Air Ministry serial numbers.

The Italians did better in WWI than they are usually given credit.

The Italians could have produced more 1940-43 on the Allied side because they could obtain raw materials from outside the Mediterranean.

Keeping the Mediterranean open to British merchant shipping 1940-43 would increase the carrying capacity of the available ships by not having to go around the Cape of Good Hope.

It would turn the Mediterranean Sea into an Allied Lake, which meant no need for Force H and a weaker Mediterranean Fleet could be maintained so more ships for the Home Fleet and Far East. I'm guessing that the land and air forces used to fight Italy 1940-43 IOTL would be sent to Italy ITTL to help the Italians defend themselves against a German invasion of northern Italy.

It would encourage the French to fight on from North Africa. It would make the French evacuation to North Africa easier, because the Italians wouldn't be bombing the evacuation ports and attacking the ships on their journey to North Africa. Also, many French people and some material could be evacuated via Italy.
 
Last edited:
Let's say, in 1935, Mussolini is assasinated by a communist. His successor, probably Italo Balbo, is a bit more motivated to enter into an Anti-Comintern pact. He is also going to be a fair bit Anti-German so he's going to want maybe push for a closer relation with the Little Entente. There is a whole reorganization of the military towards fighting a land war in Europe rather than behaving as colonial power. Industrial cooperation and no expensive colonial expansion means the Italians get better funded and equipt military.

It's a bit hard to see how this Italy goes along with the Nazi program.
 

Deleted member 1487

I know you're joking, but it's not a far fetched an idea and not necessarily bad for the Allies.

IIRC Count Caprioni was so pro-British that he sold 1,000 aircraft to the RAF in the first half of 1940 and the aircraft had been given Air Ministry serial numbers.

The Italians did better in WWI than they are usually given credit.

The Italians could have produced more 1940-43 on the Allied side because they could obtain raw materials from outside the Mediterranean.

Keeping the Mediterranean open to British merchant shipping 1940-43 would increase the carrying capacity of the available ships by not having to go around the Cape of Good Hope.

It would turn the Mediterranean Sea into an Allied Lake, which meant no need for Force H and a weaker Mediterranean Fleet could be maintained so more ships for the Home Fleet and Far East. I'm guessing that the land and air forces used to fight Italy 1940-43 IOTL would be sent to Italy ITTL to help the Italians defend themselves against a German invasion of northern Italy.

It would encourage the French to fight on from North Africa. It would make the French evacuation to North Africa easier, because the Italians wouldn't be bombing the evacuation ports and attacking the ships on their journey to North Africa. Also, many French people and some material could be evacuated via Italy.
Depending on how things play out, this could end up worse in the long run for the Brits as the US might not be nearly as inclined to provide L-L aid if the Allies are still on the continent and the BoB doesn't happen, while Barbarossa isn't really viable until Italy is wrapped up, which means it may well not happen ITTL. Germany is spared considerable resources not propping Italy up, both pre-war and throughout the conflict, while Britain has to expend it's own limited resources supplying Italian industry and committing troops and equipment to Italy. Yes they had savings in the Mediterranean, but a lot of that then goes into propping Italy up. We had a major argument around that issue in a relatively recent thread about an Allied Italy.

Granted there are a ton of variables and it could be better for the Allies, but that is hardly guaranteed.
 
Let's say, in 1935, Mussolini is assasinated by a communist. His successor, probably Italo Balbo, is a bit more motivated to enter into an Anti-Comintern pact. He is also going to be a fair bit Anti-German so he's going to want maybe push for a closer relation with the Little Entente. There is a whole reorganization of the military towards fighting a land war in Europe rather than behaving as colonial power. Industrial cooperation and no expensive colonial expansion means the Italians get better funded and equipt military.

It's a bit hard to see how this Italy goes along with the Nazi program.
AIUI Mussolini was initially hostile towards Nazi Germany. He was a friend of Chancellor Dollfuss of Austria and sent Italian troops to the Austrian border in 1934.

Again, AIUI, what pushed him into an Alliance with Hitler was the British and French response to his invasion of Abyssinia. That is that Germany gave Italy raw materials that were denied to him by Anglo-French economic sanctions.

Therefore, a possible POD is that he doesn't invade Abyssinia and give help Franco in the Spanish Civil War. Not doing that would save money that could be used to modernise the Italian armed forces and industrialisation projects in Italy like building more steel works and car plants.
 
Depending on how things play out, this could end up worse in the long run for the Brits as the US might not be nearly as inclined to provide L-L aid if the Allies are still on the continent and the BoB doesn't happen, while Barbarossa isn't really viable until Italy is wrapped up, which means it may well not happen ITTL. Germany is spared considerable resources not propping Italy up, both pre-war and throughout the conflict, while Britain has to expend it's own limited resources supplying Italian industry and committing troops and equipment to Italy. Yes they had savings in the Mediterranean, but a lot of that then goes into propping Italy up. We had a major argument around that issue in a relatively recent thread about an Allied Italy.

Granted there are a ton of variables and it could be better for the Allies, but that is hardly guaranteed.
Points taken.
 
Italy stays neutral at first and then invades the oil-less Vichy colonies after the Battle of Moscow, whilst still neutral with Germany :evilsmile:
 
The Italians should have had a plan for when they declared war. They squandered strategic initiative initially, which is where the other Axis powers got their flashy successes. Even if you argue that the situation evolved much faster than could be predicted, there really should have been files labeled “How to take Malta on war day 0” and “How to invade Egypt next week” in Italian HQ. Alternatively, they should have noticed they didn’t have such plans for good reasons and avoided war altogether.
Although I wholeheartedly agree, another reason for squandering the strategic initiative was that when Italy declared war it looked as if Germany had all but won the war for them and that the British and French would ask for an armistice in months if not weeks without Italy lifting a finger. Therefore, they didn't have to take risks that seemed unnecessary at the time.

Having written that I think that Rome should have complied with the Duke of Aosta's requests for reinforcements a few months earlier. I also think that they should have agreed that the estimates of the British military strength in Aden, East Africa and the Sudan were excessive and that he should be allowed to attack while he had the chance.

With that in mind, I think that there should also have been a file on, "How to take Khartoum on war day 0". IOTL the Italians had 2 battalions of paratroops in June 1940 and they were both based in Libya. Therefore, it should be possible to take Khartoum by an air landing soon after Italy entered the war, had there been adequate forward planning.
 
Although I wholeheartedly agree, another reason for squandering the strategic initiative was that when Italy declared war it looked as if Germany had all but won the war for them and that the British and French would ask for an armistice in months if not weeks without Italy lifting a finger. Therefore, they didn't have to take risks that seemed unnecessary at the time.

Having written that I think that Rome should have complied with the Duke of Aosta's requests for reinforcements a few months earlier. I also think that they should have agreed that the estimates of the British military strength in Aden, East Africa and the Sudan were excessive and that he should be allowed to attack while he had the chance.

With that in mind, I think that there should also have been a file on, "How to take Khartoum on war day 0". IOTL the Italians had 2 battalions of paratroops in June 1940 and they were both based in Libya. Therefore, it should be possible to take Khartoum by an air landing soon after Italy entered the war, had there been adequate forward planning.
There were several Sudanese battalions who, along with reinforcements from Egypt, would have eventually slaughtered the paras if left alone. Plus, Karthoum would require building up vulnerable airstrips in S-E Libya.

HOWEVER, it is my opinion that a determined-enough attack out of East Africa into Sudan might have led to a Sudanese mutiny, especially if Port Sudan is taken early (it got raided by cavalry the Italians somehow snuck through the desert OTL)
 
I know you're joking, but it's not a far fetched an idea and not necessarily bad for the Allies.

IIRC Count Caprioni was so pro-British that he sold 1,000 aircraft to the RAF in the first half of 1940 and the aircraft had been given Air Ministry serial numbers.

The Italians did better in WWI than they are usually given credit.

The Italians could have produced more 1940-43 on the Allied side because they could obtain raw materials from outside the Mediterranean.

Keeping the Mediterranean open to British merchant shipping 1940-43 would increase the carrying capacity of the available ships by not having to go around the Cape of Good Hope.

It would turn the Mediterranean Sea into an Allied Lake, which meant no need for Force H and a weaker Mediterranean Fleet could be maintained so more ships for the Home Fleet and Far East. I'm guessing that the land and air forces used to fight Italy 1940-43 IOTL would be sent to Italy ITTL to help the Italians defend themselves against a German invasion of northern Italy.

It would encourage the French to fight on from North Africa. It would make the French evacuation to North Africa easier, because the Italians wouldn't be bombing the evacuation ports and attacking the ships on their journey to North Africa. Also, many French people and some material could be evacuated via Italy.

Got a link to the 1940 sale of aircraft to the Brits?
 
Although I wholeheartedly agree, another reason for squandering the strategic initiative was that when Italy declared war it looked as if Germany had all but won the war for them and that the British and French would ask for an armistice in months if not weeks without Italy lifting a finger. Therefore, they didn't have to take risks that seemed unnecessary at the time.

Having written that I think that Rome should have complied with the Duke of Aosta's requests for reinforcements a few months earlier. I also think that they should have agreed that the estimates of the British military strength in Aden, East Africa and the Sudan were excessive and that he should be allowed to attack while he had the chance.

With that in mind, I think that there should also have been a file on, "How to take Khartoum on war day 0". IOTL the Italians had 2 battalions of paratroops in June 1940 and they were both based in Libya. Therefore, it should be possible to take Khartoum by an air landing soon after Italy entered the war, had there been adequate forward planning.

What's the value in taking Khartoum?
 
Top