Before you consider what would happen after the fact, I think you should first explain why the Norwegians and especially the Swedes would allow Anglo-French military access in the first place. While the Norwegians might be easier to convince of the need for the intervention, the Swedish government was quite adamant IOTL to not allow the Allies into its territory. Stockholm rightly thought that by allowing access it would commit Sweden into the unfolding European war as a side, and would furthermore risk being considered having de facto joined the Allies, especially by the Nazi government. The Swedes were not fools, and understood that the control of the iron mines was one major reason for the intervention. Given that staying out of the war was the overriding concern of the Swedes, and that independent control of Swedish iron was one of the foremost guarantees Sweden could maintain a non-aligned position between the combatant sides (like in WWI), I personally find it hard to square this particular circle.
Note that Finland's refusal to send an official plea for help to the Allies in early 1940 was partly based on Helsinki's wish not to commit to deliberately drawing Sweden into the war as well (apart from the fact that by then the Finnish leadership understood that all help that would arrive, as per the information received from London and Paris, would be both too little and too late). Finland's decision to seek peace with Stalin instead, even with heavy terms, can then partly be seen as something of a self-sacrifice for Sweden's benefit - a matter that might not be appreciated as well in Sweden as it is in Finland.
Quite clearly some POD(s) before December 1939 or even before the beginning of the Winter War would be needed so that Stockholm could be convinced to take this very risky path.