My question to the knowledgeable on this site is if Finland went all in with the germans does Leningrad fall and when. If so how does it affect rest of invasion. Also does it affect offensive towards Murmansk. What are butterflies.
But if going fully with the Germans is not an option, and if German victory is not probable, then why risk entering the continuation war at all, with all the suffering it means?
But if going fully with the Germans is not an option, and if German victory is not probable, then why risk entering the continuation war at all, with all the suffering it means?
Do you have any link to discussions on this, or perhaps refer to a book? I think there was some furor in Finland a few years ago about the entry, but I have not seen any details.
I don't think there has been any furor in Finland about joining the Continuation War recently. There has been discussion about the "separate war thesis" which has been considered untenable by younger-generation historians like Jokisipilä and Silvennoinen. And there have been new studies about the poor treatment of Soviet civilians in eastern Karelia, and of Soviet soldiers in Finnish POW camps, and of Finnish cooperation with Nazi authorities in intelligence efforts and POW exhanges, etc. So, the older Finnish views that have tended to downplay Finnish responsibility for attacking the USSR in the Continuation War, and ones that have been willing to overlook the more tragic sides of the war (and Finnish culpability for atrocities against Soviets or their mistreatment) have been brought into new, critical light recently. But I can't put my finger on any recent studies by Finnish professional historians saying that trying to stay neutral, even with all the grave risks that would have carried, would have been truly realistic for Finland in 1941.
One topic which has gotten more public attention lately is the role and activities of Finnish volunteers in the Waffen-SS. Although I haven't read Mauno Jokipii's research on the topic (which I have actually sitting in my bookself), the past research seems to have quite few issues which either aim to downplay the potential role of Finnish volunteers in war crimes or show a high level of naivety on the part of researchers. The National Archives of Finland started a reseach project on this topic after the Simon Wienthal Center had asked President Niinistö for official investigation and new evidence of war crimes were found, namely a letter where one volunteer complains that (freely translated) "to shoot Jews you don't need as much skill as we have."
You're right, I forgot to mention this. There's been a lot of talk about André Swanström's recent book on the Finnish Waffen-SS men, which was apparently conceived as an attempt to remedy what is wrong with Jokipii's book. I have not read Swanström myself, but looking at the comments about the book in the media, I think that the writer somewhat succumbs to hindsight and over-analysis in his arguments about the participation of the Finnish SS volunteers in actual summary killings of civilians. In other words, he seems to be making rather bold interpretations on pretty slim actual evidence. The quote you mentioned is in fact a case in point: IMO the most realistic interpretation is that whoever wrote it knew that Jewish civilians were being shot by German troops, and used this information to make a rather morbid joke/comment. But as evidence for saying that the man actually knew that Finns were complicit in such acts or that he himself was... For that, it is very slim evidence, if evidence at all.
The National Archives' report to be published in February will be probably a more interesting paper on the topic. They have gathered primary sources from abroad and have attempted to chronicle activities of all individual Waffen-SS volunteers, so it will be probably a very interesting read. It will be in English, so even non-Finns can take a look at it when it comes out.
My question to the knowledgeable on this site is if Finland went all in with the germans does Leningrad fall and when. If so how does it affect rest of invasion. Also does it affect offensive towards Murmansk. What are butterflies.
The more interesting alternative is a scenario where the Germans are allowed to send troops to Isthmus, and agree to take care of the occupation of Leningrad.In this case it's very possible that the offensive towards River Svir is abandoned with the concentration of forces in the Karelian Isthmus.
One very real possibility is that the Finnish offensive fails. The motivation of the Army for an attack would be quite low and the defenses north of the city were not insignificant. Finnish forces did not really have the firepower and training to break through extensive field fortifications.
I have always wondered how holding back was anything but wishful thinking. It's like saying dont be to mad I only hit you in the stomach not the face. It seems the decision should either all in or all out. So the POD is they go all in. Can leningrad fall in late july early August. If it does what happens specifically with Murmansk and Moscow with the forces and logistics that are freed up.
It worked to be sure but was to me a huge gamble with no reason to believe it would be successful. I am asking was one the reasons the Russians stopped because of allied pressure and was that allied pressure the reward for the limited nature of their war.You seem not to understand the Finnish position as a small democratic country between two big totalitarian powers, one that in 1939 would have most wanted to stay out of the world war entirely. Saying that the decision "should have been" either all in or all out is not an analysis of where Finland was in 1941, it is rather based on a rather crude mischaracterisation of how the dynamics of the OTL situation worked. Missing the shades of grey and insisting on a black and white picture, if you will. A bit like arguing that Sweden's goal of staying out of the war as a neutral was nonsensical and that they should have just chosen a side and be done with it.
Saying that Finland just decides to go all in is not a POD, it is a handwave. Actual PODs that might lead to such a decision might be something like Finland going Fascist/authoritarian in the 30s, or, say, Mannerheim dying before the war and such a general rising to the top who is more pro-German, especially if combined with a *Winter War that leads more damage and resentment in Finland. But then of course these kinds of changes would likely produce knock-on effects and butterflies already before 40-41, especially to do with the Winter War (or an alternate Finno-Soviet war in the roughly same timeframe).
(About you calling the Finnish position "wishful thinking": the OTL result after 1945 was a Finland that stayed independent and unoccupied by either side. As wishful thinking goes, it was quite successful, all things considered. Sure, there was a lot of luck involved. But then we can also say that the Finnish political and military leadership did do a heck of a job leading the country through WWII with a comparatively very small amount of damage to the people and the nation.)
It worked to be sure but was to me a huge gamble with no reason to believe it would be successful.
what are the prospects at Murmansk? that seems the target where Finnish support would have been decisive? my understanding Lend-Lease could not transit thru Iran until well into 1942.
I am asking was one the reasons the Russians stopped because of allied pressure and was that allied pressure the reward for the limited nature of their war.