Finland advances

My question to the knowledgeable on this site is if Finland went all in with the germans does Leningrad fall and when. If so how does it affect rest of invasion. Also does it affect offensive towards Murmansk. What are butterflies.
 
Soviets probably would still win the war and things would be much harsher for Finland. Stalin might be more willingful occupy Finland.
 
I think that in order to make this happen, you would have to first explain why in the world would Finland want to do it. Mannerheim was dead set against the Finnish military advancing to Leningrad itself, and the top political leadership agreed with him that it would have definitely been a Bad Move in several ways.

For the general Axis war effort, the fall of Leningrad would be a boon. But for Finland particularly, it is hard to see any positive sides to the attack in the short and medium term. The attack itself would be very costly for the Finnish military, which was operating at the limits of its logistic capabilities anyway. The Finns would be looking at thousands, maybe tens of thousands more casualties than IOTL. This would be very bad for the national morale. And then the occupation of Leningrad, in which the Finnish troops would have to take part in, would be brutal, and would lower morale even more. Finland would have to commit more resources at the front, and for the occupation, and this all would make the Finns even more dependent on the Germans in terms of food, fuels and various other necessary goods. This would reduce Finland's OTL comparative independence in terms of Berlin's wishes and demands. It would be a very dangerous road to take. In practice, and in the view of the Allies, Finland ITTL could not avoid being seen as directly complicit in Nazi crimes. IOTL the decision not to attack the city managed to keep the Finnish image among the Allies, the Americans especially, somewhat positive (on the heels of the justified defensive battle of the Winter War) even if they were fighting alongside Hitler's forces. ITTL, I can well see the assault on Leningrad to make the US to declare war on Finland by 1942 as well. There would be various negative knock-on effects for the Finns.

ITTL, if the Axis capture of Leningrad does not lead to Axis victory in the end, which is quite possible, then for Finland the war will likely end into a brutal Soviet occupation and likely annexation into the USSR in a situation where the Western Allies don't really care what Stalin does to the Finns after they so comprehensively hitched their cart to the Nazi horse.
 
But if going fully with the Germans is not an option, and if German victory is not probable, then why risk entering the continuation war at all, with all the suffering it means?
 
But if going fully with the Germans is not an option, and if German victory is not probable, then why risk entering the continuation war at all, with all the suffering it means?

Because the Finnish leadership looked at the nation's strategic situation and thought that going it alone was not possible, at least not without huge hardships to the Finnish people. The USSR was continually hostile after the Winter War, and Germany controlled practically all of Finland's trade routes towards the west. In 1940 Finland was looking at a de facto blockade of its trade by the two totalitarian giants. And after the loss of territories to the USSR, Finland was not even nearly self-sufficient in terms of food. For 1941, trying to stay neutral might have spelled famine, even without thinking about the possibility of Stalin renewing his attempt to annex Finland (like he did to the Baltic states in the summer of 1940).

When you think that you can't make it alone, then you have to ally with a bigger power. The USSR was right out as a prospective ally, after it had proven its hostility to Finland, and the attempted defensive alliance with Sweden was not possible due to Stockholm's unwillingness to go against what Moscow and Berlin were saying. A limited alliance with Germany, to protect the nation against the USSR (like the Finns would sell the situation to the Allies officially) was then the only realistic option left.

Remember that in 1941 the Finns did not know how a German-Soviet war would end. Germany might have been able to win, and in this case Finland would have happily shared the spoils. But the Finns were careful and tried to hedge their bets as well as it was possible. If Germany does not win, then Finland would be at the mercy of the USSR. For that potential eventuality, it would be best not to go too "all in" in terms of supporting Hitler. Like the Finns thought at the time, small nations don't decide world wars. The major powers do, and the smaller ones just try to make the best of it.
 
Do you have any link to discussions on this, or perhaps refer to a book? I think there was some furor in Finland a few years ago about the entry, but I have not seen any details.
 
But if going fully with the Germans is not an option, and if German victory is not probable, then why risk entering the continuation war at all, with all the suffering it means?

To add what DrakonFin said above, when Finland joined Germany, the defeat of USSR was seen more likely than by the time the question of Finnish participation in the siege became relevant. Some Finns, most importantly Mannerheim, had already noted by autumn 1941 that Germany was seriously behind its original schedule in its war against the USSR. Longer the campaign drags on, less likely Finnish participation becomes. I think that if Germany had advanced quicker, Finland might have been more willing to join it.
 
Do you have any link to discussions on this, or perhaps refer to a book? I think there was some furor in Finland a few years ago about the entry, but I have not seen any details.

I don't think there has been any furor in Finland about joining the Continuation War recently. There has been discussion about the "separate war thesis" which has been considered untenable by younger-generation historians like Jokisipilä and Silvennoinen. And there have been new studies about the poor treatment of Soviet civilians in eastern Karelia, and of Soviet soldiers in Finnish POW camps, and of Finnish cooperation with Nazi authorities in intelligence efforts and POW exhanges, etc. So, the older Finnish views that have tended to downplay Finnish responsibility for attacking the USSR in the Continuation War, and ones that have been willing to overlook the more tragic sides of the war (and Finnish culpability for atrocities against Soviets, or their mistreatment) have been brought into new, critical light recently, after the fall of the USSR. But I can't put my finger on any recent studies by Finnish professional historians saying that trying to stay neutral, even with all the grave risks that would have carried, would have been truly realistic for Finland in 1941. This would be the kind of a counter-factual argument professional historians here don't really go for, anyway.

What I know, though, is that there are some Swedish writers that have recently argued critically against Finland's decision to ally with Nazi Germany, like the journalist Henrik Arnstad whose views have been considered rather exaggarated by Finnish professional historians. In my own view, people like Arnstad are too willing to apply (moralistic) modern standards and hindsight into historical events, instead of trying to analyze and understand the real conditions where the historical decisions they write about were actually made in.

As for recent Finnish scholarship, I think you might find the 2009 book Finland 1944 by the Helsinki University history professor Henrik Meinander useful. It is a modern look into the Finnish position during WWII, written from the POV of the last crucial months of Finland's war against the USSR.
 
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I don't think there has been any furor in Finland about joining the Continuation War recently. There has been discussion about the "separate war thesis" which has been considered untenable by younger-generation historians like Jokisipilä and Silvennoinen. And there have been new studies about the poor treatment of Soviet civilians in eastern Karelia, and of Soviet soldiers in Finnish POW camps, and of Finnish cooperation with Nazi authorities in intelligence efforts and POW exhanges, etc. So, the older Finnish views that have tended to downplay Finnish responsibility for attacking the USSR in the Continuation War, and ones that have been willing to overlook the more tragic sides of the war (and Finnish culpability for atrocities against Soviets or their mistreatment) have been brought into new, critical light recently. But I can't put my finger on any recent studies by Finnish professional historians saying that trying to stay neutral, even with all the grave risks that would have carried, would have been truly realistic for Finland in 1941.

One topic which has gotten more public attention lately is the role and activities of Finnish volunteers in the Waffen-SS. Although I haven't read Mauno Jokipii's research on the topic (which I have actually sitting in my bookself), the past research seems to have quite few issues which either aim to downplay the role of Finnish volunteers in war crimes or show a high level of naivety on the part of researchers. The National Archives of Finland started a research project on this topic last year after the Simon Wienthal Center had asked President Niinistö for official investigation and new evidence of war crimes were found, namely a letter where one volunteer complains that (freely translated) "to shoot Jews you don't need as much shooting skill as we have."
 
One topic which has gotten more public attention lately is the role and activities of Finnish volunteers in the Waffen-SS. Although I haven't read Mauno Jokipii's research on the topic (which I have actually sitting in my bookself), the past research seems to have quite few issues which either aim to downplay the potential role of Finnish volunteers in war crimes or show a high level of naivety on the part of researchers. The National Archives of Finland started a reseach project on this topic after the Simon Wienthal Center had asked President Niinistö for official investigation and new evidence of war crimes were found, namely a letter where one volunteer complains that (freely translated) "to shoot Jews you don't need as much skill as we have."

You're right, I forgot to mention this. There's been a lot of talk about André Swanström's recent book on the Finnish Waffen-SS men, which was apparently conceived as an attempt to remedy what is wrong with Jokipii's book. I have not read Swanström myself, but looking at the comments about the book in the media, I think that the writer somewhat succumbs to hindsight and over-analysis in his arguments about the participation of the Finnish SS volunteers in actual summary killings of civilians. In other words, he seems to be making rather bold interpretations on pretty slim actual evidence. The quote you mentioned is in fact a case in point: IMO the most realistic interpretation is that whoever wrote it knew that Jewish civilians were being shot by German troops, and used this information to make a rather morbid joke/comment. But as evidence for saying that the man actually knew that Finns were complicit in such acts or that he himself was... For that, it is very slim evidence, if evidence at all.

I do support the new look into the service of the Finnish volunteers in the Waffen SS, and I am interested to see what comes of it. But I do wish that the researchers who are part of the project do remember to hold on to their objectivity as professional historians, and carefully weigh the documents and evidence they come across (in the vein of how Lars Westerlund has handled the Soviet POW and civilian prisoner issue in that particular project) instead of trying to make it into a springboard for personal advancement in the cut-throat world of Finnish academia, by pushing bold new interpretations on limited evidence, just because "this issue needs to be talked about" and "existing interpretations need to be challenged".
 
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You're right, I forgot to mention this. There's been a lot of talk about André Swanström's recent book on the Finnish Waffen-SS men, which was apparently conceived as an attempt to remedy what is wrong with Jokipii's book. I have not read Swanström myself, but looking at the comments about the book in the media, I think that the writer somewhat succumbs to hindsight and over-analysis in his arguments about the participation of the Finnish SS volunteers in actual summary killings of civilians. In other words, he seems to be making rather bold interpretations on pretty slim actual evidence. The quote you mentioned is in fact a case in point: IMO the most realistic interpretation is that whoever wrote it knew that Jewish civilians were being shot by German troops, and used this information to make a rather morbid joke/comment. But as evidence for saying that the man actually knew that Finns were complicit in such acts or that he himself was... For that, it is very slim evidence, if evidence at all.

The National Archives' report to be published in February will be probably a more interesting paper on the topic. They have gathered primary sources from abroad and have attempted to chronicle activities of all individual Waffen-SS volunteers, so it will be probably a very interesting read. It will be in English, so even non-Finns can take a look at it when it comes out.
 
The National Archives' report to be published in February will be probably a more interesting paper on the topic. They have gathered primary sources from abroad and have attempted to chronicle activities of all individual Waffen-SS volunteers, so it will be probably a very interesting read. It will be in English, so even non-Finns can take a look at it when it comes out.

I agree, it will be interesting to see what comes out of it. Looking at the list of members of the group (and in reference to what I wrote above) I am happy that such shall we say more seasoned people like Kimmo Rentola, Vesa Tynkkynen and Lars Westerlund are involved along with the younger researchers like Swanström and Silvennoinen...
 
My question to the knowledgeable on this site is if Finland went all in with the germans does Leningrad fall and when. If so how does it affect rest of invasion. Also does it affect offensive towards Murmansk. What are butterflies.

In this case it's very possible that the offensive towards River Svir is abandoned with the concentration of forces in the Karelian Isthmus.

One very real possibility is that the Finnish offensive fails. The motivation of the Army for an attack would be quite low and the defenses north of the city were not insignificant. Finnish forces did not really have the firepower and training to break through extensive field fortifications.
 
In this case it's very possible that the offensive towards River Svir is abandoned with the concentration of forces in the Karelian Isthmus.

One very real possibility is that the Finnish offensive fails. The motivation of the Army for an attack would be quite low and the defenses north of the city were not insignificant. Finnish forces did not really have the firepower and training to break through extensive field fortifications.
The more interesting alternative is a scenario where the Germans are allowed to send troops to Isthmus, and agree to take care of the occupation of Leningrad.
 
I have always wondered how holding back was anything but wishful thinking. It's like saying dont be to mad I only hit you in the stomach not the face. It seems the decision should either all in or all out. So the POD is they go all in. Can leningrad fall in late july early August. If it does what happens specifically with Murmansk and Moscow with the forces and logistics that are freed up.
 
what are the prospects at Murmansk? that seems the target where Finnish support would have been decisive? my understanding Lend-Lease could not transit thru Iran until well into 1942.
 
I have always wondered how holding back was anything but wishful thinking. It's like saying dont be to mad I only hit you in the stomach not the face. It seems the decision should either all in or all out. So the POD is they go all in. Can leningrad fall in late july early August. If it does what happens specifically with Murmansk and Moscow with the forces and logistics that are freed up.

You seem not to understand the Finnish position as a small democratic country between two big totalitarian powers, one that in 1939 would have most wanted to stay out of the world war entirely. Saying that the decision "should have been" either all in or all out is not an analysis of where Finland was in 1941, it is rather based on a rather crude mischaracterisation of how the dynamics of the OTL situation worked. Missing the shades of grey and insisting on a black and white picture, if you will. A bit like arguing that Sweden's goal of staying out of the war as a neutral was nonsensical and that they should have just chosen a side and be done with it.

Saying that Finland just decides to go all in is not a POD, it is a handwave. Actual PODs that might lead to such a decision might be something like Finland going Fascist/authoritarian in the 30s, or, say, Mannerheim dying before the war and such a general rising to the top who is more pro-German, especially if combined with a *Winter War that leads more damage and resentment in Finland. But then of course these kinds of changes would likely produce knock-on effects and butterflies already before 40-41, especially to do with the Winter War (or an alternate Finno-Soviet war in the roughly same timeframe).

(About you calling the Finnish position "wishful thinking": pretty much any position Finland could have adopted could have been characterized as wishful thinking in retrospect. Stay alone and try to stay neutral: wishful thinking, most likely you'll just get steamrolled by one or both of the sides, like Poland and the Baltic states. Go all in into an alliance with Hitler: it would have been wishful thinking to believe that Nazi Germany could soundly beat the USSR with its massive manpower and resources, especially when still at war against Britain and others, too. For a small country caught in between the sides in a world war, not becoming utterly thrashed, occupied and annexed by one of the bigger powers, at least, is in itself wishful thinking.

The OTL result after 1945 was a Finland that stayed independent and unoccupied by either side. As wishful thinking goes, it was quite successful, all things considered. Sure, there was a lot of luck involved. But then we can also say that the Finnish political and military leadership did do a heck of a job leading the country through WWII with a comparatively very small amount of damage to the people and the nation.)
 
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You seem not to understand the Finnish position as a small democratic country between two big totalitarian powers, one that in 1939 would have most wanted to stay out of the world war entirely. Saying that the decision "should have been" either all in or all out is not an analysis of where Finland was in 1941, it is rather based on a rather crude mischaracterisation of how the dynamics of the OTL situation worked. Missing the shades of grey and insisting on a black and white picture, if you will. A bit like arguing that Sweden's goal of staying out of the war as a neutral was nonsensical and that they should have just chosen a side and be done with it.

Saying that Finland just decides to go all in is not a POD, it is a handwave. Actual PODs that might lead to such a decision might be something like Finland going Fascist/authoritarian in the 30s, or, say, Mannerheim dying before the war and such a general rising to the top who is more pro-German, especially if combined with a *Winter War that leads more damage and resentment in Finland. But then of course these kinds of changes would likely produce knock-on effects and butterflies already before 40-41, especially to do with the Winter War (or an alternate Finno-Soviet war in the roughly same timeframe).

(About you calling the Finnish position "wishful thinking": the OTL result after 1945 was a Finland that stayed independent and unoccupied by either side. As wishful thinking goes, it was quite successful, all things considered. Sure, there was a lot of luck involved. But then we can also say that the Finnish political and military leadership did do a heck of a job leading the country through WWII with a comparatively very small amount of damage to the people and the nation.)
It worked to be sure but was to me a huge gamble with no reason to believe it would be successful. I am asking was one the reasons the Russians stopped because of allied pressure and was that allied pressure the reward for the limited nature of their war.
 
It worked to be sure but was to me a huge gamble with no reason to believe it would be successful.

You could say the same about Finns helping Germans more in Leningrad. It would be extremely costly operation and take resources from other fronts. At the same time, although the fall of Leningrad would certainly help Germans, it's unclear that it would change the outcome of the war. If you don't believe that the fall of Leningrad would result in the German victory, it makes more sense to take a more passive role.

what are the prospects at Murmansk? that seems the target where Finnish support would have been decisive? my understanding Lend-Lease could not transit thru Iran until well into 1942.

Taking Murmansk would be very difficult, even with a greater Finnish contribution. The terrain is very defensible and the Red army units in the area in general were very effective contrary to stereotypes from other fronts at this stage of the war.
 
I am asking was one the reasons the Russians stopped because of allied pressure and was that allied pressure the reward for the limited nature of their war.

The main reasons Stalin stopped the attack against Finland and agreed to an armistice in the fall of 1944 was that the Red Army could not break the Finnish Army in the summer of 1944, and Stalin needed a lot of those troops still on the Finnish front for the more important general advance against Germany in the south. The Red Army had a lot of men and tanks, but its reserves were not entirely inexhaustible, especially not at this point of the war. There had to be some prioritization. At this point in time, Stalin simply saw conquering Finland to require more resources than it would be worth to gain Finland as an occupied area.

The Western Allied attitude towards Finland mattered, too. There was some understated Allied pressure on Stalin, I guess, but mainly the effect of Western Allies at that point was that Stalin believed that the Americans and British supported the existence of an independent Finland. They had, after all, been consistently very positive towards Finland in 1939-40, up to sending material help and volunteer troops, and the British threatening a general intervention against the USSR. And then of course the Americans never declared war against Finland in the first place. The Western Allied had a measure of lingering goodwill towards Finland since the Winter War, when Finland was a cause célèbre in the West, and there was some understanding in both Britain and the US for the Finnish desire to take back the land lost to the USSR in 1940. This is why even the British only declared war on Finland several months into the Finnish attack in Karelia, only after the Finnish troops had crossed the 1920 border.

Had Finland gone "all in" against Leningrad, this leftover goodwill among the Western Allies would have vanished during 1942-43, and even more to the point, it would have had a big effect on Stalin's attitude. At this point if the Germans would have despite the capture of Leningrad failed to keep their advance deeper into the USSR going, the Finnish leadership would have gradually found out that they had backed the wrong horse (like IOTL). ITTL they would have found extricating Finland out of the war as an independent, even somewhat intact nation a lot more difficult than IOTL, if not impossible. Stalin would have been out for blood, and might have pushed for the occupation and annexation of Finland out of sheer thirst for vengeance - never mind the cost in Red Army troops. In the worst case scenario, like I have commented in some previous threads, this might have led to huge demographic changes in Finland though Stalinist repression, population transfers and mass expulsions, and in the end the Finns might have ended up as a minority in their own land, a now majority Russian/Slav "Finnish" SSR.
 
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