The Canadians paid to maintain the nuclear delivery systems, which are necessarily more expensive. The weapons were still property of their country of origin.
Do you mean no Canadian aircrafts in Europe then?If Canada can somehow get out of the strike role in Europe, then a force of F-106 Deltas should suffice for NORAD.
I don’t understand why they never copied the U-2.
Just a different role for CAF in Europe. Delta Dart can serve as air superiority interceptors, same as the Saab 35 Draken in northern NATO. We can also send rotaries and transports. And the F-106 can carry the Genie nuke.Do you mean no Canadian aircrafts in Europe then?
It must be noted that the PAF flew clapped out (ex-USAF "A's") versions; first gen J-79's in them, and with aircrew that were nowhere near the standard of NATO training. And they also (due to poor training) tried to use the 104 in ACM engagements, a role for which it was never designed.I looked at the combat service of the F-104 and it was... quite subpar from what I got. I haven't discussed at theoretical stuff, rather at what happened when the Starfighter was actually used, and it didn't particularly shine, being wrecked by MiG-21 in Indian-Pakistanese wars.
I don't think so.If Canada can somehow get out of the strike role in Europe, then a force of F-106 Deltas should suffice for NORAD.
Was there any domestic military airplane effort which you approve of?Thoughts?
It must be noted that the PAF flew clapped out (ex-USAF "A's") versions; first gen J-79's in them, and with aircrew that were nowhere near the standard of NATO training. And they also (due to poor training) tried to use the 104 in ACM engagements, a role for which it was never designed.
Down in the dirt over Eastern Europe there's little chance that a MiG-21 will catch/gain a firing solution on a 104G in burner.
I hate hypotheticals like this, for just this reason.
It never happened, and there is little more than speculation to back it up.
My personal involvement with Canada's CF-104 community is the foundation upon which I base my opinion.
Poorly flown (tactically), obsolete "Starfighters" (built in 1955-56 and given to the PAF under MAP) getting "waxed" by the InAF in 1970 is really rather irrelevant to the point I'm making here.
In 1963 the WARPAC had little means of dealing with the NATO threat. By 1968 they still had little means of dealing with the threat.
Was there any domestic military airplane effort which you approve of?
Just a different role for CAF in Europe. Delta Dart can serve as air superiority interceptors, same as the Saab 35 Draken in northern NATO. We can also send rotaries and transports. And the F-106 can carry the Genie nuke.
It’s not tactical nukes, but the Dart can carry bombs for strike roles too. Shown here with six 500 lb bombs. When we’re done with the Darts we’ll get some NR-349 for NORAD.
Farhad Navykhan puts the French translation of Influence of Sea Power on world History back on his desk and thinks.
Iran has not had a real fleet since the days of Xeres, but that does not mean that Iran can’t develop sea power by using the well trained and effective air force as a seed. The Soviets are on the verge of collapse and desperate for cash.
Time for some aerial sea power- of the Iranian kind. Who knows how far Iran’s reach will get? The Sea Power influenced Iranians then purchase….
And oh yeah, why not some...
- Tu-95 Bears (Ubber long range recon, all the way to Diego Garcia?)
- SU-24 Fencers ( Big, long range, twin engined fighters. Unlike Phantoms, parts are easy to buy).
- TU-22 Backfires (The pearl of Soviet Naval aviation and potential carrier killers. A must have for the new Iranian Sea Power).
- Illyushin-78 tankers (Iranian pilots can "eat their belts", but their planes "Gotta have gas" - Patton)
- Forgers (not really useful, but a small number make an interesting study for a future “pocket carrier”. Maybe for presence operations and supporting Shias in danger)
It’s not tactical nukes, but the Dart can carry bombs for strike roles too. Shown here with six 500 lb bombs.
It must be noted that the PAF flew clapped out (ex-USAF "A's") versions; first gen J-79's in them, and with aircrew that were nowhere near the standard of NATO training. And they also (due to poor training) tried to use the 104 in ACM engagements, a role for which it was never designed.
Down in the dirt over Eastern Europe there's little chance that a MiG-21 will catch/gain a firing solution on a 104G in burner.
I hate hypotheticals like this, for just this reason.
It never happened, and there is little more than speculation to back it up.
My personal involvement with Canada's CF-104 community is the foundation upon which I base my opinion.
Poorly flown (tactically), obsolete "Starfighters" (built in 1955-56 and given to the PAF under MAP) getting "waxed" by the InAF in 1970 is really rather irrelevant to the point I'm making here.
In 1963 the WARPAC had little means of dealing with the NATO threat. By 1968 they still had little means of dealing with the threat.
Translated from the http://www.airwar.ru/enc/spy/s13.html:
After the crash of Lockheed's U-2 in Soviet Union in 1960, a special team of experts searched the site for a long time, collecting everything, down to the smallest particles hit by cars. The debris collected was first thoroughly studied by experts at the airport of the State Red Research and Testing Institute (GK NII VVS) in Chkalov. The most interesting equipment was sent to a variety of research institutes and design bureaus, and only the airframe remained on display at an exhibition center in Moscow's Maxim Gorky Central Park of Culture and Rest. But it soon disappeared, although the public did not care where the wreckage had been sent - to scrap or to a museum. In fact, here is what happened. All the remains of the U.S. secret glider were carefully sorted out and sent to OKB-49 at Taganrog, led by Beriev.
The very first to begin a deep study of captured equipment were the engine specialists. On June 28, governmental decree #702-288 was issued which called for replication of the Pratt & Whitney J75-P-13 engine. A copy designated RD-16-75 was built in Kazan at OKB-16 led P.Zubtsa. The American turbojet gas generator proved quite successful, and based on it was proposed to develop engines for heavy vehicles, including the Tu-104, instead of the RD-3M. The aircraft's intelligence equipment made possible the collection of significant amounts of information. the GK NII VVS concluded that an aircraft capable of flying at such high altitudes and long range with such limited weight was of great interest to the Air Force.
Two months later, on August 23, taking into account the proposals of the Ministry of Defense and the State Committee for Aviation Technology, the government issued decree #918-383 relative to the replication of the Lockheed U-2 spy plane and the material remains of the downed aircraft. The Soviet equivalent was designated S-13. The main goal of this work was a comprehensive study of design, technological and operational features of the U-2, and the development of design elements, materials and equipment for later use in domestic aircraft.
The main contractor for the work was OKB-49. Dozens of subcontractors had a hard time keeping up with the pace taken by the Beriev team because of governmental pressure. In the first quarter of 1962 the first two machines were required to be presented at the joint flight tests of the Ministry of Defense and Aviation Industry. Overall, plants #49 and #86 were ordered to produce five examples of the S-13.
The plants had less than two years to copy and test the ejection seat, parachute, high altitude suits and pilots overalls, fuel, engine oil, radio communications and flight-navigation equipment, radio and photographic reconnaissance, i.e. all the "stuffing" without which operation of an aircraft is not possible.
According to the results of flight tests consideration was given to the possibility of using the S-13 for atmosphere probing, destroying drifting enemy balloons and other airborne targets. At the same time, all aircraft were equipped with "73-13" (AFA-60) aerial cameras.
In early 1961, a tendency for the weight of the aircraft to increase was revealed. For example, the mass of the chassis had increased from 100 to 150 kg, while the SIGINT station was heavier by 10 kg, rapidly "flooded" by the weight of the other systems and units. Unfortunately, our industrial culture could not match American weight standards. By April 1, 1961, the metal fuselage layout and complete prototyping equipment were prepared, and by July 1, production of working drawings of the aircraft was completed.
To shorten the finishing work the production teams on the ground and the in-flight crew (aboard the Tu-16 flying laboratory) were handed over working drawings and technical documentation covering the completion of the RD-16-75 engine, hydraulic systems and mechanisms of control flaps, brake flaps and landing gear, pilot simulation, the autopilot system, and more. Many tests of wind tunnel models were performed at TsAGI, which showed extremely high aerodynamic performance. Suffice it to note that the maximum drag coefficient reached 25.
Everything went according to plan, but on May 12, 1962, governmental decree #40-191 abruptly called for all work on the S-13 to cease. The Russian version of the American Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance plane never appeared in the skies of the USSR. Despite this, the domestic aviation industry gained some experience to develop new materials, processes and technical solutions embodied later in modern aircraft.
I believe a small number of Bears were exported to Indonesia when the country was leaning socialist.Unrealistic in terms of possibility of export and affordability. Only SU-24 and II-78 were ever exported.
Though Iran can never develop the ability to truly defend against the United States as the US could stack up to say, four carrier battle groups against an opponent if it really and truly wants to, I think a credible Iranian ability to defend against an "after thought" US strike could be developed via skill, the right equipment and access to Russian intelligence and expertise.Combination of SU-24 and II-78 and domestic made naval surveillance plane would make a potent local deterrence against naval power projection, but one need to realise that it takes much more to defend against a USN CVBG.
I agree, Iran's new sea power would need to include some well operated (a key need) advanced Kilo submarines for both reconnasiance and a possible nasty diesel surprise. The Iranians would also need access to Russian satellites.Moreover, Tu-95 and Tu-22M are just one part of the Soviet A2/AD system. The Soviet maritime surveillance system, the backbone of its A2/AD system, was much more than just TU-95.
but when used as a air superority fighter how does the F-104G fare against Mig21PF/PFM/MF ?
f-104S would be far superior though
I believe a small number of Bears were exported to Indonesia when the country was leaning socialist.
That aside, any export prohibitions on say Backfires would need to be looked at before and after the Soviet Union collapsed. Following the collapse, a lot of previous export prohibitions were subject to modifications- so long as the customer paid full price and posed no future threat to Russia. For example, the Soviets never exported nuclear submarines. After the collapse, the Russians leased two advanced nuclear submarines long term to India.
Depends what you mean by 'truly defend'. Defeating the US in open battle? Obviously not. Making any war so costly that the US will would break before the Iranian one in any realistic environment? That's a lot more accessible and pretty much what Iran has been setting itself up to achieve. For the hypothetical air force OoB, I'd argue that getting the capability to deploy access denial systems within as large an area as possible would be the main goal when it comes to facing the US. If Iran can reliably set up long-duration sleeper mines in a very large area, it would make any war inherently too costly to be reasonable.Though Iran can never develop the ability to truly defend against the United States as the US could stack up to say, four carrier battle groups against an opponent if it really and truly wants to, I think a credible Iranian ability to defend against an "after thought" US strike could be developed via skill, the right equipment and access to Russian intelligence and expertise.
I was referring to short range fights btw F104G and fished F/J , I think f104S is the only bvr equipped starfighterAre you refering to long range or short range fights? In a dogfight, I think the Mig21 would win. Vietnam proved they could do it against better fighters than the 104. There would be no long range 21 vs 104G fights simply because neither carried long range weapons (at least at the 104's time, I believe modern Indian updated 21 can carry long range AAMs). The 104S carried Sparrows and, latter on, Aspides so it would have a massive advantage in a long range fight.
Yes, that is what I mean by "truly defend". Iran would probably want to deter quick and easy military interventions by the United States and make an US military action require a relatively large mobilization to initiate. Then, they would probably want to be able to resist long enough until international pressure called off the action.Depends what you mean by 'truly defend'. Defeating the US in open battle? Obviously not. Making any war so costly that the US will would break before the Iranian one in any realistic environment? That's a lot more accessible and pretty much what Iran has been setting itself up to achieve.