Oh dear. Amanullah Khan realy needed that win.
I wait for Falecius to finish ME update with baited breath.
Feeble Constitution - A Red-and-Green Russia 1917 Timeline
- Thread starter Salvador79
- Start date
I wait for Falecius to finish ME update with baited breath.
The colonial squabble will interest also Italy for his own compensation, OTL the departure of the italian delegation mean that they had to face the fait accomplit and basically accept anything to save a little of face...here seem different, even because seem Wilson have found someone else to redirect his 'attention' (yes i mean Kerensky...WW was not really the one that will forget or forgive what he had done)
Regarding Italy: did it not have its hands rather full with Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Somaliland already? (Plus all the EFP missions...)
sure, but this doesn't mean don't try for more (the war need to be justified) and in practice what she will probably get is what the Anglo-French give to Fascist Italy in the late 20's and early 30's so there is not much to pacify or is something that will be needed to be done in any case. It just that by obtaining at this stage it mean a lot of face saving for the current goverment.
Just 2 point:
- Regarding Ethiopia/Abyssinia, while an objetive of the colonial politics, the italian goverment was more for economic penetration than utter conquest like Benny. At Versailles in OTL he was for gaining British support in building a railway that linked Eritrea to Somalia and that will pass through west Ethiopia and to have official economic primacy over western Ethiopia and Rome was ready to give his support for the irrigation work near lake Tana in Sudan.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italo-Ethiopian_Treaty_of_1928 this will be the framework of any treaty between Italy and Abyssinia at the time for the other claim
- Regarding Lybia, yep even OTL Italy was a little tired and after an initial military expansion the italian goverment accepted to come to term with both arab (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tripolitanian_Republic ironically the italian not pressing on them started a series of intercine fight that basically 'forced' the italian military to take direct control of the zone) and the Senussi; basically homerule (Legge Fondamentale and the Accord of Al-Rajima).
Regarding the Senussi, honestly if they disband their military unit (or at least do that for the biggest formation and limit the force of the Emir) with the nonfascist goverment Rome can be happy with that in a 'live and let live' fashion but if this is perceived as just a pause before a new attempt to fight...well see OTL Lybia pacification
I think the railway may be in the cards.
Oh, and yes, of course, Wilson will not forget Kerensky's insult...
Hi! First time poster, but after finally catching up from page 1 to page 33 consider me on board this really fine timeline! 👌
There's something that seems missing amid the current uncertainties about the future of continental Europe and adjacent parts of the world: what's going on with Willy II? I know that he relocated to the Netherlands like IOTL, but without having abdicated and with at least two European powers who are very willing to consider him the #1 war criminal on the planet. Could it be that the Kaiser won't enjoy the luxury of retiring into semi-obscurity in this alternate post-WW1 world?
Though maybe this is all wishful thinking on my part and next update we'll find "Wild" Bill Hohenzollern delighting the American masses with his crazy skill with a Colt in every theater east of the Mississippi (God, now that's a concept for a TL...).
There's something that seems missing amid the current uncertainties about the future of continental Europe and adjacent parts of the world: what's going on with Willy II? I know that he relocated to the Netherlands like IOTL, but without having abdicated and with at least two European powers who are very willing to consider him the #1 war criminal on the planet. Could it be that the Kaiser won't enjoy the luxury of retiring into semi-obscurity in this alternate post-WW1 world?
Though maybe this is all wishful thinking on my part and next update we'll find "Wild" Bill Hohenzollern delighting the American masses with his crazy skill with a Colt in every theater east of the Mississippi (God, now that's a concept for a TL...).
Welcome to the thread, and glad you like it!
Yes, not having abdicated means that Prussian loyalists, of which many are still running around with weapons in the Eastern half of Prussia, can still say they're bound by their oath to him. Other than that, the option of restoring the Reich with him is currently relegated to the marginalised and internally divided conservative fringe; at this moment, German opinion from national liberals to the radical left predominantly views him as the colossal failure who ruined them and their country. (An opinion which was the majority's view IOTL, too, but ITTL, he screwed up even more clearly, and openly saying otherwise gets you into the (if you're lucky, only metaphorical) firing line of the occupation authorities.
The Dutch government rejected an extradition request IOTL. There might be at least two ways how he still gets caught: either Prime Minister Ruijs de Beerenbrouck thinks joining the EFP is a good idea (for economic reasons probably), and the EFP makes extradition of all "war criminals" a condition for admission. Or there is some sort of secret service abduction... although I think if the Dutch government knows that Bill becomes too much of a liability, they'll probably tell him to pack and go elsewhere. (Latin America?)
The only option I'll certainly exclude is the one you suggested in your last sentence, which had me bursting out with laughter on the subway when I read it. Can't get the picture out of my head now ;-)
Thanks! I hope I'll be able to be of help, as other readers have been so far. Otherwise, well, it's still a +1 for your readership.
Oh, so the conservative fringe, besides being marginalized (and probably actively persecuted in the EFP mandates where the Räte are dominant) is also internally divided? Along which lines, if I might ask? Since it would be quite ironic for the country's politics to take an exquisitely French turn and feature both a divided Far-Right and Far-Left.
With the Russian Revolutionaries of TTL not being sworn enemies of religions and theism, de Beerenbrouck might even manage to paint a Dutch accession to the EFP as palatable to the Christian parties, though the idea of parliamentarians of the Anti-Revolutionary Party voting to become members of the brainchild of the two revolutionary countries of Europe par excellence is delightful in its absurdity.
German émigrés from a fallen regime hiding in South America, huh? Where did I already hear that one?
It's just so absurd that it makes you desire it could be plausible.
Howard Waldrop did it with Nietzsche in "The Last Ride of German Freddie"
Many lines, both old and new.
Some old dividing lines are probably fading: without any new elections on the national level, national Conservative politicians still belong to different parties, but the differences between Deutschkonservative Partei and the freikonservative Deutsche Reichspartei are becoming more and more obsolete today. Still, no national elections means no catalyst for the formation of a DNVP or anything like it. More importantly among these old, inherited divisions within the Far Right is the bad blood between those conservatives who had continued to back the imperial governments and voted for their budgets, and those aggressive ultra-nationalists, who IOTL and ITTL rallied in the Deutsche Vaterlandspartei during the Great War, who had begun to view themselves as oppositional years before the war. Even those divisions are losing importance very quickly right now, of course, but personal animosities e.g. between Völkische like Ludwig Roselius and traditional aristocratic Conservatives like Ernst von der Heydebrand und der Lasa persist. The political style which the former adopt and which I tried to emulate in Update #12 was deeply repulsive to the latter.
New dividing lines are gaining importance:
- In a number of states, separatists and nationalists are pitted against each other. In Bavaria, for example, the BVP is rather conservative, but staunchly pro-Bavarian independence, and it will not get along at all with ultra-nationalist all-German groups, which IOTL were also very active there, and while they have suffered severely ITTL, they won't be eliminated entirely. In Hannover, as we've discussed already, there is the anti-Prussian DHP who wants a state of their own with a Welf King, whereas other conservatives will see the splintering of Germany as its worst weakness and problem. Similar conflicts plague them in the Rheinprovinz: stay loyal to old Prussia, demand the reinstatement of the Provincial government etc. and reject the secession of the Rhenish Republic? Or support Adenauer's moderately conservative junta against the greater threat of the Red Revolution, even if this means cementing the partition and playing lapdog to the French? Etc. etc.
- The conservative fringe is obviously radicalising itself under pressure, but in which direction? This has something to do with the old dividing lines mentioned above, or at least there will be continuities, but it escalates now: appeal to the masses, emphasise nationalism (and probably also antisemitism etc.), play the game of the mass democracy, cloak yourselves as populists (see OTL's misnomers from this time like "Prussian Socialism"... or indeed the "National Socialist German Workers' Party")? Or reject this mob rule, emphasise tradition and culture, property and propriety etc.? The lines which IOTL divided the DNVP (and especially that wing which would later secede as the DKP) on one side and the groups which later coalesced into the NSDAP on the other side exist in other form, within other contexts and also to some degree with other content, but they exist ITTL, too.
- Even in a situation of marginalised opposition, splintering is always an option with regards to strategy: there will be parts of the Far Right who condone terrorist attacks against socialist politicians, occupation authorities etc. and others who will insist on legality; there will be some who support elections for a Constituent Assembly and others who won't; there will be some who will try to co-operate with benign foreign powers like the British and others who hate the British more than anything in the world etc.
I fully agree on all these points
By the way, religion is going to be a topic 5-6 updates down the line which I have been planning for quite a while.Nice summary! Now everything is a lot clearer.
I fully agree on all these points
The chapter where you introduced allohistorical economic theories and principles (like auto-preference) was one of my favorite updates. I can hardly wait to see how you deal with the new religious landscape in the UoE. I hope Russian Cosmism is going to play a part, even a minor one.
Never heard of them, either the author or the book. Thank you, it looks like something that is worth the read!
It's a short story. Howard Waldrop is an American author of some rather good historical speculative fiction. His stories "The Ugly Chickens", "Ike at the Mike" (alternate history with a twist) and "Untergang des Abendelanders" (cowboy fiction meets Spenglerian philosophy) are all delights not to be missed!
Probably tomorrow.Oh dear. Amanullah Khan realy needed that win.
I wait for Falecius to finish ME update with baited breath.
Fifty-Seven: The Future of the Arabs, the Future of Egypt (June 1919)
Here is the guest contribution by @Falecius on the Middle East, and I must say, I love it a lot! Thank you so very much for writing it!
The Future of the Arabs, the Future of Egypt
By Muṣṭafà Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī [1]
al-Mu’ayyad, June 25th, 1919
I write, as news come from the West, of the agreement between the Italian government and the leaders of the peoples of Libya, from the North, of the formation of the new Muslim autonomies in Russia, and from the East, of the Emirate of Syria receiving the recognition of the colonizer.[2]
I write, and here in Cairo itself the streets teem with the sons and daughters of the Homeland, claiming their right as citizens. A right that the English still deny here, despite their retreat of some troops from inland Syria.
Hope, I believe, beckons to our oppressed land, hope that shines in the hearts of all Egyptians. The English have seen their arrogance for what it is worth, across the dreadful bloodshed of the Flemish trenches, and so have the French. More arrogance had the Germans, and behold, what came to be of their once proud realm. The might of their armies shattered facing the will of the freedom-loving peoples.
The subjects of the Russian Empire have broken their chains, and put the power-hungry monster-dream of Empire to rest – they now tend a helping hand to their former Muslim subjects in Turkistan and the Caucasus and in Tartary, to build a true brotherhood of nations [3]. Let us all pray in homes and mosques and churches and synagogues, that they will stay true to such a bold promise, will God that the brotherhood of nations, the very one His Noble Scripture announced, will come for all us to see.
And when Russia sets such a lofty example, and even the greedy Italian colonizers [4] do see reason in their dealings with the Tripolitanian Republic, it stands to us Arab peoples to understand our place in this new world, a world consumed by war and still teeming of promise for the survivors of the onslaught.
I regard with moved heart the Egyptian people now taking pride in their Homeland and demanding the occupier to leave. Let us look at the bright example of our Syrian and Iraqi brethren, let us extend to them our hands and share our struggles.
The English have been keen to support the Syrians and the Iraqis and the Hijazis against the Turks, and they are keeping their word to them so far, in their strange way. A lighthouse shines on us from Damascus, where Amir Faysal has returned from Chantilly with the promise of the national freedom for the Arabs of the Levant.
The promises of Chantilly, the promise of the liberated Russians to the world! Peace for all, freedom for all, justice for all! The promises of Damascus, where the Committee presided by dr Rashid Rida is drafting the Constitution of the Syrian emirate!
Alas, not all words at Chantilly have been so noble. The vices of the powerful have clouded the promise, indeed. Faysal had to concede much to the colonizing greed, that the French can still strangle the Syrian realm from Lebanon and Cilicia, the English from Palestine, the Saudi-led bigoted fools from the Southeast. Nor do we know yet if his brother would be capable enough to bring the Iraqi quarrelling factions to a common table. Basra and Mosul and Baghdad and Deir az-Zor, how different are these provinces and their inhabitants! Yet, Arabs all of them, they are. Let them agree with the Kurds of Sherif Pasha a common border and live in the peace and brotherhood they deserve after the Turkish oppression. [5]
The English themselves are slowly coming to accept, that they cannot lord over us as they used to think they could, as long as France really worries about the Rhine more than the Euphrates. Balfour himself, having granted to other peoples what was not his to give, offering Palestine to the Zionist Jews, has asked France to let the Syrians alone. It is a mutilated Syria that will join the new community of nations, without Lebanon and the land west of the Jordan. But a free Syria for its people will it be nonetheless, and no fault of the Majlis in Damascus that the Lebanese leaders refused to join it. Neither fault of Faysal to have talked to the Jewish leaders, who seem to be proving more reasonable than the English minister trying to please them. [6]
The ultimate fate of Palestine, as well as the matter of the exact borders between the Kurdish lands and Iraq and Syria, will need further finesse, and we cannot pretend that the colonizing Powers will not want to project their interests. Watchful, Arabs, you must be!
For the greed of the capitals of Europe is not exhausted, not the American support to be granted, nor the Turkish threat spent yet[7], nor the Russian help ever so forthcoming.[8]
We will seek, as Egyptians, the inspiration of the Emirate of Syria and the Iraqi Administration, to reclaim our own land for ourselves. If they chart a Constitution in Damascus, we keep calling for one in Cairo, so that our own people can join the brotherhood of Chantilly, that our sons and daughters [9] can live free and take part in the life of their nations.
[1] A prominent Egyptian writer and journalist at the time, although relatively obscure nowadays. He stood usually afloat of actual politics, but sympathized with the Egyptian nationalist cause, Islamic reformism and toyed with utopian socialism. His translations from French (actually not translated by al-Manfalūṭī himself – his mastery of French was poor) were widely read, as were his opinion pieces on the newspaper al-Mu’ayyad. His style was particularly appreciated, and indeed notable at the time. I did my best to try to convey a glimpse of it here.
[2] Basically, both the British and the French have recognized in principle that Faysal and the Syrian National council in Damascus do represent the legitimate, albeit provisional, voice of the inhabitants of Syria. This is not as much as recognizing Syria as a fully independent state yet, though.
[3] [by Salvador79]:The Russian press, both Muslim and not, is a lot more critical of this protracted process in which a lot of high hopes have been dampened and what appears to be the ultimate outcome is somewhat far from what the various groups had initially wanted. I have a little authorial overview on the matter almost finished, and am working on a map, but I'll post this separately. I believe Falecius is preparing a map for TTL's Middle East, too, which should be posted first.
[4] Egyptian opinion was broadly hostile to Italian colonialism in Libya and highly sympathetic to the Libyan resistance. Italy is now trying to reach a peaceful agreement with the Libyan insurgents, exactly as was done IOTL. The Libyan Statutes, that amounted to Libya becoming integral but autonomous part of Italy with the locals enjoying full civil rights, were announced on June 1st historically and the same happens here. The differences are that the Italians operating with better faith: they have not been humiliated by Wilson at Versailles and are not scared by a large Yugoslavia, the Turkish activity in Libya is even less significant than IOTL given how many pressing concerns the Turks have elsewhere, and like everyone else, they have Germany to worry about. This means that the Italian forces in Libya are weaker and both sides have more incentives to reach a fair agreement and stick to it. Clearly, this does not mean that everyone is going to happily dance together in peace thereafter. There are Libyan groups very unhappy about Italian colonialism still, and many in Rome who do not really believe the Arabs to be their equals. However, there’s reason to hope that the bloodbath that “pacification” of Libya turned out historically could be avoided.
[5] al-Manfalūṭī is being optimistic here. The main thing the provisional national council of Iraq can agree upon is that they want the British out, fast. Things are not yet the point of armed insurgency, and the British have plonked Faisal’s brother Abdallah into Baghdad hoping to sort out the mess, but neither are the British going to leave entirely and immediately; things might easily spiral into violence. Also, the Iraqi leaders think that the Ottoman vilayet of Mosul should be part of Iraq, a notion that the Kurds and Assyrians in northern half of said vilayet tend to disagree with, with some vague Union backing. Since this is where known oil reserves are (a point whose importance is lost to al-Manfalūṭī) the definition of borders here is unlikely to turn out a smooth process. Things are still quite in flux in the area. Also note that Deir az-Zor is said to be part of Iraq here. The Iraqis claimed it IOTL, and with Sykes-Picot essentially gone, are likely to keep it.
[6] This is a personal initiative by Faysal (done earlier than IOTL and from a much stronger position) met with general publicly sympathetic noises among the Zionist leaders as well as much irritation among the Syrian nationalist leadership. However, whatever talks are ongoing are not going anywhere clear, except that Faysal hints, in principle, that he might be willing to write off Palestine for time being (not that he controls the area anyway).
[7] The nationalist military council convened in Ankara under Mustafa Kemal; they are evaluating their very limited options. The mess in Germany is a very clear cautionary tale of what happens if you refuse the victor’s peace. Their strategic position is between an extremely hostile Union to the East whose army in the theatre is largely made of angry Armenians, and the hungry Greeks to their West. Chances of military resistance seem very dim. However, alt-Sèvres is shaping as a very unpalatable deal, and they have some troops still.
[8] While Kerensky and Wilson hate each other, in the Middle East their aims broadly align. Both dislike stuff like Sykes-Picot and agree in principle on self-determination, although here Wilson is unwilling to confront the British sending a commission to investigate the local people desires. It does not matter much, since the British themselves are a lot closer to treating the Syrians with something approaching fairness. Also, note that al-Manfalūṭī still thinks in terms of “Russia”, not “Union of Equals”.
[9] The point about daughters is not purely rhetorical. The discussions about Syrian constitution include the idea of voting rights for women, something that the Union of Equals already has, and the Americans and the British are doing as well. It is obviously controversial in Syria, but there’s already a Feminist movement both there and in Egypt that supports the nationalist cause. Al-Manfalūṭī is not a Feminist fellow traveller as such, but he certainly thinks that women have been historically oppressed and that they should have access to better education and public participation.
The Future of the Arabs, the Future of Egypt
By Muṣṭafà Luṭfī al-Manfalūṭī [1]
al-Mu’ayyad, June 25th, 1919
I write, as news come from the West, of the agreement between the Italian government and the leaders of the peoples of Libya, from the North, of the formation of the new Muslim autonomies in Russia, and from the East, of the Emirate of Syria receiving the recognition of the colonizer.[2]
I write, and here in Cairo itself the streets teem with the sons and daughters of the Homeland, claiming their right as citizens. A right that the English still deny here, despite their retreat of some troops from inland Syria.
Hope, I believe, beckons to our oppressed land, hope that shines in the hearts of all Egyptians. The English have seen their arrogance for what it is worth, across the dreadful bloodshed of the Flemish trenches, and so have the French. More arrogance had the Germans, and behold, what came to be of their once proud realm. The might of their armies shattered facing the will of the freedom-loving peoples.
The subjects of the Russian Empire have broken their chains, and put the power-hungry monster-dream of Empire to rest – they now tend a helping hand to their former Muslim subjects in Turkistan and the Caucasus and in Tartary, to build a true brotherhood of nations [3]. Let us all pray in homes and mosques and churches and synagogues, that they will stay true to such a bold promise, will God that the brotherhood of nations, the very one His Noble Scripture announced, will come for all us to see.
And when Russia sets such a lofty example, and even the greedy Italian colonizers [4] do see reason in their dealings with the Tripolitanian Republic, it stands to us Arab peoples to understand our place in this new world, a world consumed by war and still teeming of promise for the survivors of the onslaught.
I regard with moved heart the Egyptian people now taking pride in their Homeland and demanding the occupier to leave. Let us look at the bright example of our Syrian and Iraqi brethren, let us extend to them our hands and share our struggles.
The English have been keen to support the Syrians and the Iraqis and the Hijazis against the Turks, and they are keeping their word to them so far, in their strange way. A lighthouse shines on us from Damascus, where Amir Faysal has returned from Chantilly with the promise of the national freedom for the Arabs of the Levant.
The promises of Chantilly, the promise of the liberated Russians to the world! Peace for all, freedom for all, justice for all! The promises of Damascus, where the Committee presided by dr Rashid Rida is drafting the Constitution of the Syrian emirate!
Alas, not all words at Chantilly have been so noble. The vices of the powerful have clouded the promise, indeed. Faysal had to concede much to the colonizing greed, that the French can still strangle the Syrian realm from Lebanon and Cilicia, the English from Palestine, the Saudi-led bigoted fools from the Southeast. Nor do we know yet if his brother would be capable enough to bring the Iraqi quarrelling factions to a common table. Basra and Mosul and Baghdad and Deir az-Zor, how different are these provinces and their inhabitants! Yet, Arabs all of them, they are. Let them agree with the Kurds of Sherif Pasha a common border and live in the peace and brotherhood they deserve after the Turkish oppression. [5]
The English themselves are slowly coming to accept, that they cannot lord over us as they used to think they could, as long as France really worries about the Rhine more than the Euphrates. Balfour himself, having granted to other peoples what was not his to give, offering Palestine to the Zionist Jews, has asked France to let the Syrians alone. It is a mutilated Syria that will join the new community of nations, without Lebanon and the land west of the Jordan. But a free Syria for its people will it be nonetheless, and no fault of the Majlis in Damascus that the Lebanese leaders refused to join it. Neither fault of Faysal to have talked to the Jewish leaders, who seem to be proving more reasonable than the English minister trying to please them. [6]
The ultimate fate of Palestine, as well as the matter of the exact borders between the Kurdish lands and Iraq and Syria, will need further finesse, and we cannot pretend that the colonizing Powers will not want to project their interests. Watchful, Arabs, you must be!
For the greed of the capitals of Europe is not exhausted, not the American support to be granted, nor the Turkish threat spent yet[7], nor the Russian help ever so forthcoming.[8]
We will seek, as Egyptians, the inspiration of the Emirate of Syria and the Iraqi Administration, to reclaim our own land for ourselves. If they chart a Constitution in Damascus, we keep calling for one in Cairo, so that our own people can join the brotherhood of Chantilly, that our sons and daughters [9] can live free and take part in the life of their nations.
[1] A prominent Egyptian writer and journalist at the time, although relatively obscure nowadays. He stood usually afloat of actual politics, but sympathized with the Egyptian nationalist cause, Islamic reformism and toyed with utopian socialism. His translations from French (actually not translated by al-Manfalūṭī himself – his mastery of French was poor) were widely read, as were his opinion pieces on the newspaper al-Mu’ayyad. His style was particularly appreciated, and indeed notable at the time. I did my best to try to convey a glimpse of it here.
[2] Basically, both the British and the French have recognized in principle that Faysal and the Syrian National council in Damascus do represent the legitimate, albeit provisional, voice of the inhabitants of Syria. This is not as much as recognizing Syria as a fully independent state yet, though.
[3] [by Salvador79]:The Russian press, both Muslim and not, is a lot more critical of this protracted process in which a lot of high hopes have been dampened and what appears to be the ultimate outcome is somewhat far from what the various groups had initially wanted. I have a little authorial overview on the matter almost finished, and am working on a map, but I'll post this separately. I believe Falecius is preparing a map for TTL's Middle East, too, which should be posted first.
[4] Egyptian opinion was broadly hostile to Italian colonialism in Libya and highly sympathetic to the Libyan resistance. Italy is now trying to reach a peaceful agreement with the Libyan insurgents, exactly as was done IOTL. The Libyan Statutes, that amounted to Libya becoming integral but autonomous part of Italy with the locals enjoying full civil rights, were announced on June 1st historically and the same happens here. The differences are that the Italians operating with better faith: they have not been humiliated by Wilson at Versailles and are not scared by a large Yugoslavia, the Turkish activity in Libya is even less significant than IOTL given how many pressing concerns the Turks have elsewhere, and like everyone else, they have Germany to worry about. This means that the Italian forces in Libya are weaker and both sides have more incentives to reach a fair agreement and stick to it. Clearly, this does not mean that everyone is going to happily dance together in peace thereafter. There are Libyan groups very unhappy about Italian colonialism still, and many in Rome who do not really believe the Arabs to be their equals. However, there’s reason to hope that the bloodbath that “pacification” of Libya turned out historically could be avoided.
[5] al-Manfalūṭī is being optimistic here. The main thing the provisional national council of Iraq can agree upon is that they want the British out, fast. Things are not yet the point of armed insurgency, and the British have plonked Faisal’s brother Abdallah into Baghdad hoping to sort out the mess, but neither are the British going to leave entirely and immediately; things might easily spiral into violence. Also, the Iraqi leaders think that the Ottoman vilayet of Mosul should be part of Iraq, a notion that the Kurds and Assyrians in northern half of said vilayet tend to disagree with, with some vague Union backing. Since this is where known oil reserves are (a point whose importance is lost to al-Manfalūṭī) the definition of borders here is unlikely to turn out a smooth process. Things are still quite in flux in the area. Also note that Deir az-Zor is said to be part of Iraq here. The Iraqis claimed it IOTL, and with Sykes-Picot essentially gone, are likely to keep it.
[6] This is a personal initiative by Faysal (done earlier than IOTL and from a much stronger position) met with general publicly sympathetic noises among the Zionist leaders as well as much irritation among the Syrian nationalist leadership. However, whatever talks are ongoing are not going anywhere clear, except that Faysal hints, in principle, that he might be willing to write off Palestine for time being (not that he controls the area anyway).
[7] The nationalist military council convened in Ankara under Mustafa Kemal; they are evaluating their very limited options. The mess in Germany is a very clear cautionary tale of what happens if you refuse the victor’s peace. Their strategic position is between an extremely hostile Union to the East whose army in the theatre is largely made of angry Armenians, and the hungry Greeks to their West. Chances of military resistance seem very dim. However, alt-Sèvres is shaping as a very unpalatable deal, and they have some troops still.
[8] While Kerensky and Wilson hate each other, in the Middle East their aims broadly align. Both dislike stuff like Sykes-Picot and agree in principle on self-determination, although here Wilson is unwilling to confront the British sending a commission to investigate the local people desires. It does not matter much, since the British themselves are a lot closer to treating the Syrians with something approaching fairness. Also, note that al-Manfalūṭī still thinks in terms of “Russia”, not “Union of Equals”.
[9] The point about daughters is not purely rhetorical. The discussions about Syrian constitution include the idea of voting rights for women, something that the Union of Equals already has, and the Americans and the British are doing as well. It is obviously controversial in Syria, but there’s already a Feminist movement both there and in Egypt that supports the nationalist cause. Al-Manfalūṭī is not a Feminist fellow traveller as such, but he certainly thinks that women have been historically oppressed and that they should have access to better education and public participation.
In a word, poorly.Exactly as I suspected.
Britain is the only major power which is not actively interested in sticking it to Turkey very hard. France did give up on Cilicia IOTL, partly because they focused on Syria. Here, however, they are willing to mostly write off Syria in exchange for other concessions - but that means they are going to stick into Cilicia, and make common cause with Italy and Greece (if they can agree) about the Turkish spoils. At the same time, the Armenians are setting the tone of the Union politics toward Turkey. The US are, out of spite, less openly pro-Armenian as a consequence - but they are still on that page overall, in the limited way they care about the matter at all. Italy is both more satisfied and less committed elsewhere - meaning more willing to reach an understanding with Greece about Anatolia, and with more international backing for expanding their presence there. Kurdistan is still quite a mess, but the largest factions are trying to emphatically distance themselves from Ankara - it helps that Sherif Pasha denounced the Armenian Genocide, that makes him a presentable face to the Allies, whereas the alternative would be being on the wrong side of vengeful Armenian bayonets.
Thing is, the strategic predicament of Kemal here is so desperate that he and the rest of the nationalist leadership may anticipate catastrophic defeat and decide to swallow Sèvres anyway - that would be rational thing to do, but depends on exactly how hard the victors decide to turn the screws - too much, and Kemal might feel there's nothing to lose anyway.
Swallowing alt-Sevres would be difficult and out of character for Kemal, but it's not going to be his job anyway.
Like IOTL, the negotiations are conducted with the Sultan's official government, at whose head alternate, like IOTL, the more liberal Damat Ferid Pasha of the Freedom and Accord Party and the more conservative Ahmet Tefvik Pasha, after the CUP has been chased out and the Lower House of Parliament been dissolved like IOTL.
IOTL, the Sultan's governments were losing power and credibility very fast because a) they were seen as the Entente's puppets selling out Turkish interests and b) Kemal's nationalists were beginning to achieve some degree of coherence, able to conjure up some sort of democratic legitimacy with their various "Congresses" and then later the national elections, and they scored the first successes on the Armenian front.
ITTL, a) applies, too, but b) doesn't. The Congress of Ankara is a clandestine military business of army commanders who are refusing their demobilisation orders but who haven't scored any victory whatsoever so far. There won't be national elections in any of the occupied zones in 1919.
It was the electoral victory of the Kemalists in December 1919, but even more so the turning military tide from 1920 onwards which made Kemal's side emerge as the legitimate and de facto government of Turkey.
So far, while the Sultan's government doesn't look any better than IOTL, the Kemalists look more like a conspiracy of rogue generals whose troops are in the full process of converting from military to paramilitary, from "former Ottoman armies officially in the process of demobilisation but de facto still operating" into "large groups of well-armed rebels and terrorists".
If Damat Ferid Pasha, or anybody else, is going to sign alt-Sevres, they won't be able to suppress these groups on their own. They'll have to rely on Entente troops to do the dirty work for them. If things continue the way the look right now, the Ottoman Empire looks like it's going to be a rump state with a serious guerilla problem (and the same goes for any occupation zones with many Turks or other disgruntled groups in them).
Like IOTL, the negotiations are conducted with the Sultan's official government, at whose head alternate, like IOTL, the more liberal Damat Ferid Pasha of the Freedom and Accord Party and the more conservative Ahmet Tefvik Pasha, after the CUP has been chased out and the Lower House of Parliament been dissolved like IOTL.
IOTL, the Sultan's governments were losing power and credibility very fast because a) they were seen as the Entente's puppets selling out Turkish interests and b) Kemal's nationalists were beginning to achieve some degree of coherence, able to conjure up some sort of democratic legitimacy with their various "Congresses" and then later the national elections, and they scored the first successes on the Armenian front.
ITTL, a) applies, too, but b) doesn't. The Congress of Ankara is a clandestine military business of army commanders who are refusing their demobilisation orders but who haven't scored any victory whatsoever so far. There won't be national elections in any of the occupied zones in 1919.
It was the electoral victory of the Kemalists in December 1919, but even more so the turning military tide from 1920 onwards which made Kemal's side emerge as the legitimate and de facto government of Turkey.
So far, while the Sultan's government doesn't look any better than IOTL, the Kemalists look more like a conspiracy of rogue generals whose troops are in the full process of converting from military to paramilitary, from "former Ottoman armies officially in the process of demobilisation but de facto still operating" into "large groups of well-armed rebels and terrorists".
If Damat Ferid Pasha, or anybody else, is going to sign alt-Sevres, they won't be able to suppress these groups on their own. They'll have to rely on Entente troops to do the dirty work for them. If things continue the way the look right now, the Ottoman Empire looks like it's going to be a rump state with a serious guerilla problem (and the same goes for any occupation zones with many Turks or other disgruntled groups in them).
I love the possibilities which Falecius has opened up for Syria ITTL, by the way. And for unruly Egypt...
Map-wise, it looks like the Brits get a lot more power in the Middle East. The article is already alluding, though, that any way in which they could use this power can screw the whole situation up really badly for them.
The UoE has not even very officially and aggressively taken a stance of anti-colonialist national liberation in Paris.
But with their relations with the UK and the US worsening, this might change, and they might try to tap this potential for soft power projection, which would throw open a can of worms whose lid has already been lifted a little.... But nothing's a given, of course. It might still turn out differently. (They must keep at least the French and the Italians on their side, and both would not welcome openly anti-imperialist rhetoric from Kerensky... who wasn't exactly the type for radical and consistent anti-imperialist thought anyway)
Map-wise, it looks like the Brits get a lot more power in the Middle East. The article is already alluding, though, that any way in which they could use this power can screw the whole situation up really badly for them.
The UoE has not even very officially and aggressively taken a stance of anti-colonialist national liberation in Paris.
But with their relations with the UK and the US worsening, this might change, and they might try to tap this potential for soft power projection, which would throw open a can of worms whose lid has already been lifted a little.... But nothing's a given, of course. It might still turn out differently. (They must keep at least the French and the Italians on their side, and both would not welcome openly anti-imperialist rhetoric from Kerensky... who wasn't exactly the type for radical and consistent anti-imperialist thought anyway)
Regarding Lybia, oh well...the agreement reached with the arabs and Senussi will surely stir protest from the Nationalist but also from a broader groups of people in the nations, Lybia as cost Italy a lot of blood and tresure and many will see such treaty as a defeat signed by a weak goverment; on the other hand between the German occupation and the current economic situation there were little else to do (but there will be consequence, at least a lot of noisy protest with some violence at national level...and politically, the ANA and Benny at least will milk it a lot).
On a more pratical level, while the Senussi Emirate have a strong leadership and the population is relatively united under it , the arab Tripolitanian Repubblic...it's not; basically see OTL modern Lybian civil war, the only thing that they have in common was the desire to get at least such agreement with Italy or to throw the colonial oppressor out the country, but once the first objective has been achieved and there is the need to form some more stable institution things fall apart, OTL fascist or not, the italian goverment will have stepped in due to the chaos and violence to restore order and in pratice take control of the place and ITTL after a couple of years things will be probably been the same.
On a more pratical level, while the Senussi Emirate have a strong leadership and the population is relatively united under it , the arab Tripolitanian Repubblic...it's not; basically see OTL modern Lybian civil war, the only thing that they have in common was the desire to get at least such agreement with Italy or to throw the colonial oppressor out the country, but once the first objective has been achieved and there is the need to form some more stable institution things fall apart, OTL fascist or not, the italian goverment will have stepped in due to the chaos and violence to restore order and in pratice take control of the place and ITTL after a couple of years things will be probably been the same.
Also, I liked the vague allusions al-Manfalūṭī is making to both pan-Arab (joining their hands with their Syrian and Iraqi brethren etc.) and, well, how would we call the idea of "joining the brotherhood of Chantilly"? Chantilly created a European Federation of Peace, but "pro-European" doesn't fit. Internationalist? Progressive? Hmmm....
This vagueness of ideas and concepts (the same goes for "socialism" in many places...) and even borders very much catches the exact atmosphere I feel, too, when I immerse myself into my TL's 1918/1919...
This vagueness of ideas and concepts (the same goes for "socialism" in many places...) and even borders very much catches the exact atmosphere I feel, too, when I immerse myself into my TL's 1918/1919...