Feeble Constitution - A Red-and-Green Russia 1917 Timeline
- Thread starter Salvador79
- Start date
Is Auto-Preference wise enough when it comes to railways? I know the Russian civil war hasn't been there to rip apart Russian infrastructures and industrial basis, but it was still in a bad shape from the war. Are communalized industries up for the task of supplying the new rails to lay and the locomotives and wagons to run on them? My understanding is that Russia would have been heavily reliant on imports to rebuild its infrastructure after the war, and if I get it right, Auto-Preference pretty much exclude that.
I think the capitalist will win.
But I think the macroeconomists at the time are for market socialism on the neoclassical economic side. There were early examples of people who advocate market socialism like Leon Walras.
Maybe the UoE will take some pointers from the anarchist side of economics, like mutualism and left-wing market anarchism.
On Prohibition
Ever since the beginning of the Great War, restrictions on the sale of alcohol had been in place in Tsarist Russia. Although there were outspoken voices for prohibition in Tsarist Russia, too, this measure was taken top-down and meant to keep the army in fighting shape. One of its most relevant consequences, perhaps, was to eliminate a very important source of revenue for the imperial budget... At our TL's PoD, they are still in place.
Finnish Prohibition, IOTL and ITTL, went further. It didn't even allow the sale of alcoholic beverages in restaurants, nor even the production.
I think the most plausible course of events is that the Constituent Asssembly devolves regulations on alcohol and drugs, given the very diverging views on the matter across the vast country. That means, after the Concordance, the Finnish Federative Republic is free to pursue its own Prohibition policy, which means the Eduskunta's decision could be seen as retroactively self-sufficient, or the clock could start ticking from the moment of the law's publishing, which means a few months delay.
I think similar "dry laws" might become a reality in the Estonian and Latvian Federative Republics, too (there was a degree of correlation between confession and the stance towards Prohibition in the late Russian Empire, too: while there were plenty of Orthodox Prohibitionists, too, Protestants were most firmly in favour of Prohibition). On the other hand, given the great economic relevance which wine (and champagne) production had in Bessarabia and Georgia, I think it is safe to assume that these federative republics will turn "wet" as soon as they can, or maybe limit prohibition to hard liquor (but I don't think even that is a given, since wine-growing regions tend to distill their spirits from pomace, which can be used as animal fodder otherwise but really doesn't have the same competition with food production that cereals have, from which vodka is produced across Russia).
Regarding Ukraine and Russia, I think the case is difficult. The division between Prohibitionists and people who thought it was counter-productive (fiscally, administratively, and no fun at all, either) cuts across the political spectrum, with Social Democrats, Narodniks, and Kadets all having both "dry" and "wet" people in their ranks. What I am rather positive about is that the tsarist solution is going to be scrapped (booze only in restaurants is a solution that smacks of classist prejudice). But will it be simply repealed, or will liquor sale simply be prohibited everywhere? Or will Russia and Ukraine devolve it to their oblasts and okrugs? (In that case, expect the Crimea to continue to produce champagne...) I don't know. This was the heyday of Prohibition, on the other hand, the new federative republics don't have their own gold reserves and thus very little financial space for maneuvre, so fiscal considerations could be relevant arguments against it.
One problem with this decentralised system is that there is, constitutionally enshrined, freedom of movement of people and free trade of goods across the entire Union of Equals. For strict Prohibitionists like Finland (and maybe Estonia and Latvia, too), this means that they cannot simply stop booze from being carried across the country (which they weren't really able to IOTL, either, if I'm not much mistaken, but for practical reasons), which complicates matters further.
This is a topic that will cause a lot of ruckus in Finland. Even during the Russification campaign, the custom system remained intact - and it formed the main source of public revenue:
https://tulli.fi/en/web/tullimuseo/history-of-finnish-customs1/finland-s-own-customs-service
Hm.
I'm not dead set on the decision of free internal trade... (it would make Finnish prohibition easier, too). What was the Finnish SDP's position on this? Often, in those days, Social Democrats were rather opposed to customs because of their degressive effects (poor people spend a larger percentage of their money on the consumption of goods and thus pay relatively more customs than wealthy people who don't spend all their income on consumption), and demanded to replace customs as a source of revenue with progressive income taxation...
The SDP press was initially in favour of "soviet power", stating that the state had to take more active part in foreign trade, and that "the type of soviet power that prevails in customs service" (in Finland) was a preferable course of action.
"Maaliskuun alussa Kuusinen näki tarpeelliseksi selittää Tiedonantajassa
valtiosäännön tarkoitusta. Hänen mukaansa se, saiko Suomi harvainvaltaisen
vai kansanvaltaisen perustuslain, ratkaistiin juuri käynnissä olleessa luokkien
välisessä taistelussa, koska entinen senaatti oli aloittanut sodan saadakseen
voimaan oman hallitusmuotonsa. Tässä vaiheessa Kuusinen oli vielä toiveikas
ja uskoi, että kansanäänestys uudesta valtiosäännöstä voitaisiin toimittaa ke-
väällä sodan päätyttyä.
Kuusisen mukaan oli huomattava, että uudella valtiosäännöllä voitiin
järjestää valtiollinen demokratia, mutta "sen kautta ei voida oleellisesti muut-
taa yhteiskunnan taloudellista rakennetta." Siksi kirjoittajan ohjeen mukaan
työväen oli valloitettava vaikutusvalta suurissa työpaikoissa ja valtion otettava eri suurtuotannon aloja välittömästi käsiinsä tai taloudelliseen valvontaansa. Lisäksi valtion piti alkaa harjoittaa ulkomaankauppaa ja pankkitoimintaa ja
vasta kaikki nämä toimet muuttaisivat talousjärjestelmää. Korostaessaan valtiosäännön tarkoittavan vain valtiollisen kansanvallan perustamista Kuusinen
kuitenkin kiinnitti huomion muutamiin kohtiin, jotka koskivat elimellisesti
edellä mainittua talousjärjestelmän ainakin jonkinasteista sosialisointia. Niitä
olivat lakko-oikeus, valtion oikeus hankkia omaisuutta ja ryhtyä yrittäjäksi ja
kolmanneksi valtionhallinnon eri aloilla työskentelevien oikeus edustukseen
niissä. Tästä esimerkkeinä Kuusinen mainitsi sen suuntaisen neuvostovallan,
kuin oli jo käytössä rautatie-, posti- ja tullihallinnossa ja johon valtiosääntö
antoi mahdollisuuden.
Kuusisen artikkelin ilmestymisen jälkeisenä päivänä, 3.3., Sirola piti Se-
naatintorilla puheen, jossa hän noudatteli Kuusisen antamia suuntaviivoja.
Työmiehen selostuksen mukaan Sirola totesi, että moni oli varmaan etsinyt
kansanvaltuuskunnan valtiosääntöesityksestä sosialismia, mutta oli löytänyt
sitä hyvin vähän: "Aivan oikein. Ei sitä siellä olekaan paljoa, sillä sosialismi
onkin toteutettava kumouksella taloudellisella alalla ... Valtiokoneiston on oltava niin notkea, niin vapaa, ettei se sitä kumousta ehkäise." Tällä hän viittasi
muun muassa siihen, että työväenjärjestöt voisivat käyttää vaikutusvaltaansa
eri hallintoalojen keskusvirastoissa, kuten rautatieläiset."
Sorry for being unclear. I meant before the Revolution...
EDIT: Probably there wasn't much thought about changing the status quo before February 1917... or was there during the 1905 revolution? Or else, anything from between February and October.
Last edited:
The customs officials had their own unions, which in OTL organized their own soviets in February 1918, and elected commissars to lead them.
https://tulli.fi/web/tullimuseo/art...2305/neuvostot-ja-komissaarit-tullikamareissa
Edit: This was the line promoted by SDP, especially the radical wing. The goal was to retain state control of customs service, as can be seen from the draft constitution of Kansanvaltuuskunta. The OTL draft constitution stated:
"Tullien määräämisessä ja niistä toisten valtioiden kanssa sopimuksia tehtäessä pidettäköön periaatteena, että kansan yleisesti tarvitsemat kulutustavarat mikäli mahdollista tulevat joko tullivapaiksi tahi entisten tullien alennuksista osallisiksi, sekä niinikään tärkeimpäin kotimaisten teollisuudenhaaralla ja maatalouden tuotantoaan varten tarvitsemat aineet ja välineet pääsevät mahdollisimman alhaisilla tullimäärillä tahi tullivapaasti maahan."
So customs-free basic consumer goods and raw materials for domestic industries and agricultural production, but nothing about abolishing customs in general.
On Economic Systems and Economic Thought
But political economic theory is going to be an indirect and very important (and exciting!) source of inspiration, too, of course.
I'm playing with the idea of the political system with its two main parties - the SRs and the SDs - mirroring itself in two emerging schools of economic thought, one at Petrograd University and the other at the Lomonosov in Moscow.
Petrograd is destined to be the more radical one (because the city was the most radically left-wing even in February 1917, and since then it has been ravaged and depopulated various times over in 1918 and at least its first wave of repopulation was led by Trotsky, with the following waves of returning refugees, soldiers, and sailors probably also being rather disproportionately imbued with revolutionary spirit), and the more Western-looking one, which both hint towards it becoming the place where Russia's Marxist school of economic thought gathers and develops. People like Stanislav Strumilin and Vladimir Groman come to mind, and of course, first and foremost - if his rump Bolsheviks return into the fold of the IRSDLP(u), which they well might, now that the war is over and the window for a second revolution seems to have closed and the IRSDLP(u) is radicalising itself in the opposition anyway - Nikolai Bukharin. The Petrograd School of Marxian Economics would certainly attract - even if its salaries might be meagre and general living conditions in Petrograd rather adverse at least in the first couple of years - Marxist-leaning economic thinkers from many other countries in the world. The economic thought which is maybe developed and taught here could, in turn, inspire lots of young students from across the world, especially since intellectual institutions associated with "the opposition" (even within Russia) are often imbued with a spirit of Bohemianism and counter-culture.
That leaves the Lomonosov in Moscow as the more "official" school of economic thought with more direct influence on Russian policies, at least in this phase. Grand old figures of Narodnik economic thought like Vasily Vorontsov are dying around this time, for them, all of this is coming too late. Probably at least Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky lives longer if the overall health and food situation is improving instead of worsening over 1919, but even then, he's probably staying in Ukraine and inspiring things there. This institution, too, will probably actively seek input from thinkers from others parts of the world and maybe receive it - although I wasn't thinking so much about left-wing anarchists as about Georgists and populist-progressives like this man. Maybe they can help and shape a promising new generation of neo-Narodnik economic thinkers - one with particular potential, I think, is this young fella...
Whichever direction real systemic transformations take will depend a lot on concrete material as well as equally concrete party- and union-political developments than on systemic political economic thought, I suppose.
But political economic theory is going to be an indirect and very important (and exciting!) source of inspiration, too, of course.
I'm playing with the idea of the political system with its two main parties - the SRs and the SDs - mirroring itself in two emerging schools of economic thought, one at Petrograd University and the other at the Lomonosov in Moscow.
Petrograd is destined to be the more radical one (because the city was the most radically left-wing even in February 1917, and since then it has been ravaged and depopulated various times over in 1918 and at least its first wave of repopulation was led by Trotsky, with the following waves of returning refugees, soldiers, and sailors probably also being rather disproportionately imbued with revolutionary spirit), and the more Western-looking one, which both hint towards it becoming the place where Russia's Marxist school of economic thought gathers and develops. People like Stanislav Strumilin and Vladimir Groman come to mind, and of course, first and foremost - if his rump Bolsheviks return into the fold of the IRSDLP(u), which they well might, now that the war is over and the window for a second revolution seems to have closed and the IRSDLP(u) is radicalising itself in the opposition anyway - Nikolai Bukharin. The Petrograd School of Marxian Economics would certainly attract - even if its salaries might be meagre and general living conditions in Petrograd rather adverse at least in the first couple of years - Marxist-leaning economic thinkers from many other countries in the world. The economic thought which is maybe developed and taught here could, in turn, inspire lots of young students from across the world, especially since intellectual institutions associated with "the opposition" (even within Russia) are often imbued with a spirit of Bohemianism and counter-culture.
That leaves the Lomonosov in Moscow as the more "official" school of economic thought with more direct influence on Russian policies, at least in this phase. Grand old figures of Narodnik economic thought like Vasily Vorontsov are dying around this time, for them, all of this is coming too late. Probably at least Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky lives longer if the overall health and food situation is improving instead of worsening over 1919, but even then, he's probably staying in Ukraine and inspiring things there. This institution, too, will probably actively seek input from thinkers from others parts of the world and maybe receive it - although I wasn't thinking so much about left-wing anarchists as about Georgists and populist-progressives like this man. Maybe they can help and shape a promising new generation of neo-Narodnik economic thinkers - one with particular potential, I think, is this young fella...
Speaking of Moscow, I think that the real seat of the economic thought there would not be the (formerly Imperial) Moscow University (which, I should note, has been only given the name of Lomonosov in 1940 OTL, as part of the general trend of the Stalinist 'renationalization' of the historical narrative), but rather the independent, privately funded Shanyavsky University (that might see its status 'officialized' after the revolution). Speaking of the economists, OTL it attracted such figures as Nikolai Kondratyev, Alexander Chayanov, and Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky whom you've already mentioned.
Oh yes indeed! I'm switching to this version. And how could I forget Chayanov!
On Railroads
I see politics at work here, though. There must be some degree of compromise between "red" and "green" unions in the Supreme Soviet, not just for majority decisions, but also because nobody wants to risk a prolonged railroad strike. And rail industries are, I've thought, one of the most logical choices for such a compromise. Not only do railroad workers have the highest unionization levels - and of a "red" union, too. But there are also rational, systemic arguments: there are few industrial sectors where central planning makes as much sense as here. If the state is everyone's single purchaser anyway, and the state makes its plans for years ahead as it must, and rolling stock and rails need to suit each other anyway, there are some valid arguments for centralising the whole thing. Yes, some factories producing rolling stock will probably have suffered (in Petrograd and Riga mostly), but there are many others on Kharkiv, Kiev, on the Upper Volga etc., and Petrograd's industrial infrastructure must be rebuilt anyway. Foreign capital would be nice for this reconstruction - but at this point in time, the Supreme Soviet, and not only they, still hope that they will receive plenty of money from the War Recovery Fund provided by reparation payments by the Central Powers. And rebuilding the rails themselves, well, that's a task Russia's communalised industries are certainly up to (this had been a state business anyway all the time).
Auto-preference for the railways may prove not to be wise. But I think it was plausible enough for the Supreme Soviet to adopt it nonetheless.
The Supreme Soviet's plan for the years up to 1925 envisions new construction work on the following routes: the Turkestan-Siberian railway (closing the long gap between Aulie-Ata and Semipalatinsk) and more railways connecting the oil fields of Turkestan with the Caspian Sea, also completion of Nizhny Novgorod-Kotelnich, Kazan-Sverdlovsk... (and I suppose a lot more which I'm happy if you suggest them). Other than that, much of the network needs heavy reconstruction works.
Yes, Russian rails are in a bad shape, mostly in the Western half.
I see politics at work here, though. There must be some degree of compromise between "red" and "green" unions in the Supreme Soviet, not just for majority decisions, but also because nobody wants to risk a prolonged railroad strike. And rail industries are, I've thought, one of the most logical choices for such a compromise. Not only do railroad workers have the highest unionization levels - and of a "red" union, too. But there are also rational, systemic arguments: there are few industrial sectors where central planning makes as much sense as here. If the state is everyone's single purchaser anyway, and the state makes its plans for years ahead as it must, and rolling stock and rails need to suit each other anyway, there are some valid arguments for centralising the whole thing. Yes, some factories producing rolling stock will probably have suffered (in Petrograd and Riga mostly), but there are many others on Kharkiv, Kiev, on the Upper Volga etc., and Petrograd's industrial infrastructure must be rebuilt anyway. Foreign capital would be nice for this reconstruction - but at this point in time, the Supreme Soviet, and not only they, still hope that they will receive plenty of money from the War Recovery Fund provided by reparation payments by the Central Powers. And rebuilding the rails themselves, well, that's a task Russia's communalised industries are certainly up to (this had been a state business anyway all the time).
Auto-preference for the railways may prove not to be wise. But I think it was plausible enough for the Supreme Soviet to adopt it nonetheless.
The Supreme Soviet's plan for the years up to 1925 envisions new construction work on the following routes: the Turkestan-Siberian railway (closing the long gap between Aulie-Ata and Semipalatinsk) and more railways connecting the oil fields of Turkestan with the Caspian Sea, also completion of Nizhny Novgorod-Kotelnich, Kazan-Sverdlovsk... (and I suppose a lot more which I'm happy if you suggest them). Other than that, much of the network needs heavy reconstruction works.
On Other Industries and ISOMA Priorities
Much of the Fifth Congress of Soviets had to deal with the conversion of wartime production to peace-time production. In some cases, this is easy and a real relief: Belarussian potash production no longer delivering its produce to the production of ammunition but to the production of fertilisers is comparatively easy and an immense help. In many other cases, where industrial production lines had been adjusted (e.g. the munitions factory in the example above), things are tougher. Here, the congress has combined outright planning in some sectors with directing credit allocation in others and with attempting to foster conditions in which foreign capitalists are induced to invest in others where nothing else was deemed to be realistic.
The heated controversy about whose jurisdiction foreign capital, international joint-ventures etc. were under (the soviets, because it's capital, or the Presidential cabinet and its Foreign Minister, because it's foreign?) has not exactly been resolved by the Fifth Soviet Congress, but a modus vivendi for the moment has been found: the supreme soviet upholds the claim of soviet authority over all economic activity in Russia, including any sorts of international co-operation, but it has generally approved of international co-operation, foreign direct investment etc. in all sectors not bound by Auto-Preference, and it has singled out a few sectors specifically where regional and local soviets are ordered not to undertake any measures which would threaten these co-operations (e.g. expropriating the investors).
Also, the Fifth Congress has busied itself with the Inter-Soviet Office of Mutual Aid (ISOMA), conducted a heated debate about alleged corruption and nepotism (the no. 1 explanation for misallocation, either because awareness of other factors is less present or because, even though people know there are other reasons, it is not politically expedient to discuss them as such when you can also simply find a scapegoat and blame them to have diverted funds for the benefit of their cronies, which is of course something that will always occur to some degree), and specified a new and stricter code for the ISOMA's dealings (who gets to decide about which applications, and more criteria for judging applications for credits.
Sometimes, these three policies (conversion of wartime production to peacetime needs; industrial sectors where foreign co-operation / investment is sought and specifically protected, and ISOMA credit policies) are all intertwined. One such example is the mechanisation of agriculture, which the Fifth Congress wants to stimulate. Focusing industrial development on the needs of agriculture is a politically logical choice in Russia at this moment. Many horses traditionally used in agriculture have perished in the Great War. The Putilov factory in Petrograd, which had some experience with producing motorised vehicles fit for agricultural purposes before the war, as well as the Russo-Balt factory in Riga, for which the same goes, had their production geared towards wartime needs after 1914. In 1918, both have suffered devastations by the Germans. Now, the Fifth Congress of Soviets has designated that politically pre-discussed joint-ventures, e.g. for re-building and outfitting (parts of) the Putilov plant with the US-based Ford corporation to produce tractors like this one (a Fordson-Putilovets):
shall fall under special protection clauses (so that Ford does not need to fear expropriation). At the same time, ISOMA managers have been elected and instructed with an agenda of providing loans for well-organised agricultural co-operatives so that they can acquire such tractors as the above-mentioned. Mechanising agriculture, so the plan, can free up land previously needed for grazing labour animals, and so increase agricultural output while requiring less worktime.
(In the Soviet Union of OTL, the tractors above became famous for breakdowns and malfunctions... but who could know that in 1919? And maybe the problems are fixed faster ITTL?)
Much of the Fifth Congress of Soviets had to deal with the conversion of wartime production to peace-time production. In some cases, this is easy and a real relief: Belarussian potash production no longer delivering its produce to the production of ammunition but to the production of fertilisers is comparatively easy and an immense help. In many other cases, where industrial production lines had been adjusted (e.g. the munitions factory in the example above), things are tougher. Here, the congress has combined outright planning in some sectors with directing credit allocation in others and with attempting to foster conditions in which foreign capitalists are induced to invest in others where nothing else was deemed to be realistic.
The heated controversy about whose jurisdiction foreign capital, international joint-ventures etc. were under (the soviets, because it's capital, or the Presidential cabinet and its Foreign Minister, because it's foreign?) has not exactly been resolved by the Fifth Soviet Congress, but a modus vivendi for the moment has been found: the supreme soviet upholds the claim of soviet authority over all economic activity in Russia, including any sorts of international co-operation, but it has generally approved of international co-operation, foreign direct investment etc. in all sectors not bound by Auto-Preference, and it has singled out a few sectors specifically where regional and local soviets are ordered not to undertake any measures which would threaten these co-operations (e.g. expropriating the investors).
Also, the Fifth Congress has busied itself with the Inter-Soviet Office of Mutual Aid (ISOMA), conducted a heated debate about alleged corruption and nepotism (the no. 1 explanation for misallocation, either because awareness of other factors is less present or because, even though people know there are other reasons, it is not politically expedient to discuss them as such when you can also simply find a scapegoat and blame them to have diverted funds for the benefit of their cronies, which is of course something that will always occur to some degree), and specified a new and stricter code for the ISOMA's dealings (who gets to decide about which applications, and more criteria for judging applications for credits.
Sometimes, these three policies (conversion of wartime production to peacetime needs; industrial sectors where foreign co-operation / investment is sought and specifically protected, and ISOMA credit policies) are all intertwined. One such example is the mechanisation of agriculture, which the Fifth Congress wants to stimulate. Focusing industrial development on the needs of agriculture is a politically logical choice in Russia at this moment. Many horses traditionally used in agriculture have perished in the Great War. The Putilov factory in Petrograd, which had some experience with producing motorised vehicles fit for agricultural purposes before the war, as well as the Russo-Balt factory in Riga, for which the same goes, had their production geared towards wartime needs after 1914. In 1918, both have suffered devastations by the Germans. Now, the Fifth Congress of Soviets has designated that politically pre-discussed joint-ventures, e.g. for re-building and outfitting (parts of) the Putilov plant with the US-based Ford corporation to produce tractors like this one (a Fordson-Putilovets):
shall fall under special protection clauses (so that Ford does not need to fear expropriation). At the same time, ISOMA managers have been elected and instructed with an agenda of providing loans for well-organised agricultural co-operatives so that they can acquire such tractors as the above-mentioned. Mechanising agriculture, so the plan, can free up land previously needed for grazing labour animals, and so increase agricultural output while requiring less worktime.
(In the Soviet Union of OTL, the tractors above became famous for breakdowns and malfunctions... but who could know that in 1919? And maybe the problems are fixed faster ITTL?)
Last edited: