Feeble Constitution - A Red-and-Green Russia 1917 Timeline
- Thread starter Salvador79
- Start date
But that's what the Bolsheviks did IOTL I believe, and though I imagine the peace party will gain in strength as the German close in, I think the CA will still be dominated by the defensists are still going to stay a strong majority.
Worst case, the fall of St Petersburg can be associated with the memory of Napoléon in Moscow
Worst case, the fall of St Petersburg can be associated with the memory of Napoléon in Moscow
Ok, the OTL 1905-1918 in Finland as a summary:
- The 1809-era autonomy supported by the mainly Swedish-speaking old elites had been a target of determined Russification campaign during the reign of Nicholas II.
-Finnish old four estates-based political system had reacted to this threat to their political power by two approaches: appeasement ("Old Finns") and legalistic, non-violent opposition ("Young Finns".)
-At the same time the Social Democrats turned to a power in Finnish politics by gaining support from the non-landowning segments of the agrarian population. The right-wing parties opposed their rise by cooperating with the Russian authorities.
-1905 was a year of unrest and major strikes, but no real bloodshed among Finnish population. The behaviour of rebelling Russian garrison troops and the threat of public unrest made both sides of the political spectrum to organize their own paramilitary guard units to protect their interests.
-The guards never dismantled after 1905, as they had been based to pre-existing civilian organizations like firebrigades, hunting associations, trade unions, sports teams and the like.
-Turmoil of 1905 also unexpectedly turned Finland from agrarian and largely seremonial feodal estate system to a modern parliamentary representative democracy with universal suffrage for the whole population in virtually overnight. Immediately the Russian authorities started to view the new Parliament (Eduskunta) with dismay.
-So a crash change to democracy without any transfer period, and a lot of relative power to the voters without addressing the real issues in the Finnish society: municipal-level decisionmaking, agrarian land question of tenant farming, and the status of Finnish autonomy.
-After 1905 violent opposition and terrorism gained more support in Finland, but they remained marginal positions. The Activist movement that established the Jääkäri recruitment program worried Russian authorities, but lacked power to truly threaten their position.
-The old elites at the Senate cooperated with Petrograd and the Governor-General, while Eduskunta held numerous elections where the SDP gained more seats, but real changes to the issues that mattered to their voters were not going forward.
-SDP party leaders were Kautskyans and urged caution and patience, but the rank and file agitators were much more prone to promote violent revolution as the only possible solution.
-War was an initially a major boon to Finnish economy. Russian fortification works all over the country provided a source of income, and all Finnish industries profited from the conflict as domestic demand grew.
-Later on the situation quickly deteriorated. Inflation hit the wages hard, and the rising cost of food made Finnish economy really vulnerable just when the Russian rail transport system begun to implode. Threat of hunger was a real issue by 1918.
So, a tl;dr = SDP wanted real power, and was happy with autonomy within Russia as long as real legislative and economic power would turn to hands of Eduskunta.
Right-wing parties were afraid of violent revolution and land reform, and wanted to maintain law and order. They too initially viewed autonomy within Russia as a preferable outcome, and only turned their course after Lenin and the Bolsheviks took over in OTL.
-Red Guard rank and file were promoting a violent revolution, and their basis of power lay in the industrial worker population and trade unions that were also a rural phenomenon, especially in southern Finland.
-Jääkäri movement wanted to establish an independent Finland, and viewed German Empire as the only potential guardian of Finnish statehood.
- Right-wing politicians wanted the Russian garrison forces out of the country, as they were afraid that they would side with local Red Guards in a case of a revolt.
-All key decisionmakers in Finnish politics knew one another well, but in OTL underestimated the despair of common citizens. The reforms that were enacted after the Civil War in OTL were still being prepared by the time Red Guards started their revolt in OTL.
- The 1809-era autonomy supported by the mainly Swedish-speaking old elites had been a target of determined Russification campaign during the reign of Nicholas II.
-Finnish old four estates-based political system had reacted to this threat to their political power by two approaches: appeasement ("Old Finns") and legalistic, non-violent opposition ("Young Finns".)
-At the same time the Social Democrats turned to a power in Finnish politics by gaining support from the non-landowning segments of the agrarian population. The right-wing parties opposed their rise by cooperating with the Russian authorities.
-1905 was a year of unrest and major strikes, but no real bloodshed among Finnish population. The behaviour of rebelling Russian garrison troops and the threat of public unrest made both sides of the political spectrum to organize their own paramilitary guard units to protect their interests.
-The guards never dismantled after 1905, as they had been based to pre-existing civilian organizations like firebrigades, hunting associations, trade unions, sports teams and the like.
-Turmoil of 1905 also unexpectedly turned Finland from agrarian and largely seremonial feodal estate system to a modern parliamentary representative democracy with universal suffrage for the whole population in virtually overnight. Immediately the Russian authorities started to view the new Parliament (Eduskunta) with dismay.
-So a crash change to democracy without any transfer period, and a lot of relative power to the voters without addressing the real issues in the Finnish society: municipal-level decisionmaking, agrarian land question of tenant farming, and the status of Finnish autonomy.
-After 1905 violent opposition and terrorism gained more support in Finland, but they remained marginal positions. The Activist movement that established the Jääkäri recruitment program worried Russian authorities, but lacked power to truly threaten their position.
-The old elites at the Senate cooperated with Petrograd and the Governor-General, while Eduskunta held numerous elections where the SDP gained more seats, but real changes to the issues that mattered to their voters were not going forward.
-SDP party leaders were Kautskyans and urged caution and patience, but the rank and file agitators were much more prone to promote violent revolution as the only possible solution.
-War was an initially a major boon to Finnish economy. Russian fortification works all over the country provided a source of income, and all Finnish industries profited from the conflict as domestic demand grew.
-Later on the situation quickly deteriorated. Inflation hit the wages hard, and the rising cost of food made Finnish economy really vulnerable just when the Russian rail transport system begun to implode. Threat of hunger was a real issue by 1918.
So, a tl;dr = SDP wanted real power, and was happy with autonomy within Russia as long as real legislative and economic power would turn to hands of Eduskunta.
Right-wing parties were afraid of violent revolution and land reform, and wanted to maintain law and order. They too initially viewed autonomy within Russia as a preferable outcome, and only turned their course after Lenin and the Bolsheviks took over in OTL.
-Red Guard rank and file were promoting a violent revolution, and their basis of power lay in the industrial worker population and trade unions that were also a rural phenomenon, especially in southern Finland.
-Jääkäri movement wanted to establish an independent Finland, and viewed German Empire as the only potential guardian of Finnish statehood.
- Right-wing politicians wanted the Russian garrison forces out of the country, as they were afraid that they would side with local Red Guards in a case of a revolt.
-All key decisionmakers in Finnish politics knew one another well, but in OTL underestimated the despair of common citizens. The reforms that were enacted after the Civil War in OTL were still being prepared by the time Red Guards started their revolt in OTL.
That is an interesting parallel. (I mean Napoleon, the Bolshevik move is evident.)
@Karelian thanks for updating everyone!
So, what Do you think, if a Finnish leftist government Passes a torppa reform with less compensation than OTL and enacts what OTL understands as social democratic industrial reforms, would the Right rise in violent reform against the government and look for German Help?
Also, @Karelian what are your thoughts on my 1917 Social Democrats-Maalaisliitto coalition?
Well, the for starters the Agrarian League is ideologically a typical Nordic agrarian party, representing the conservative land-owning parts of the rural population, so I find their cooperation with SRs a bit far-fetched. The Party leader, Santeri Alkio, is an interesting character, and a strong promoter of economic justice, so he might arrange such a move in this type of scenario. Thus the Agrarian League is a kingmaker in this sense, and they'd push for a land reform. I'd argue that the bill the Tokoi coalition government (which historically included the right-wing parties as well) represents to the Eduskunta would be near-identical to the OTL postwar "Laki vuokra-alueiden lunastamisesta (135/1918)" - one of the tragedies of the Finnish Civil War was that there existed a national consensus regarding the land question since 1910s, but ultimately the process of implementing the law took so long that it was presented to Eduskunta only a day before the Civil War began. So the law draft was already there, and the government figures had agreed upon the general details in advance. So the land question is easy to avoid, especially since in OTL on 14 July 1917 the Finnish parliament passed a bill on equal and universal suffrage and eligibility in local or municipal elections. In OTL this law was not ratified by the Provisional Government and the first democratic municipal elections in which all men and women who were over the age of 20 in the election year were allowed to vote and be nominated were scheduled for March 1918 - but by then the country was already in a state of a civil war.
Holding these elections by the end of 1917 would do a lot to defuse tensions.
The harder question is the matter of food security: http://finland100.fi/2017/08/29/the...rom-russia-caused-a-food-shortage-in-finland/ - there are potential PODs here - if Russian rail transportation network performs just a little better than OTL, the mood in Finnish society won't be as desperate as in OTL, giving the goverment more time to deal with black markets and get the rationing system up and running. Here the municipal elections are another key issue, as they will transfer power from the old elites to democratically elected municipal councils that in OTL worked remarkably well: http://finland100.fi/2017/08/29/municipal-democracy-the-glue-of-society/
So, even the food issue can be solved. But the real elephant in the room is the question of monopoly of violence, state sovereignty.
Tokoi senate lacks a functioning police force, let alone any kind of an army, and they worry about their position vis-a-vis the increasingly militant Red Guards and Suojeluskunta movement. In OTL the Finnish right-wing activists of Militärkommittén (Sotilaskomitea) held a meeting at Stockholm on 16th of May 1917, a day after their representatives had promised to the German military attache that they could raise a fighting force of 75 000 soldiers and train 200 000 more to support a German landing to Finland. I don't know whether they would proceed with this plan in a situation where Finland has regained her autonomy and the situation in Russia is so markedly different.
Now, you mentioned that the Finnish Federative Republic has not emphasized military autonomy "quite so much". Does this mean that they want to return to the pre-1905, and re-establish the national army of Finland, established in the conscription act of 1878 and disbanded in 1905? This could theoretically enable the government a way out of the Mexican standoff between the two armed paramilitary formations together with municipal-level organization of public security services.
Well, it's the historical force that stabilized the postwar Finnish politics as the punamulta (Red Earth) government coalitions. I still emphasize the fact that there were repeated attempts to create national coalition governments up to the beginning of the Civil War, and there were many events both in and outside of Finland that ultimately led to the OTL Civil War: http://finland100.fi/2017/09/11/on-...ernment-in-the-world-started-to-rule-finland/
I thought him extremely interesting, too. If I'm doing a longer proper Finland feature, he will feature prominently. Would you be willing to proofread it or even contribute?
With the negotiation process concerning autonomy going on ITTL, I suppose it'll be submitted to the Eduskunta around the same time. Do you really think an early "Red Earth" coalition would legislate a reform identical with one brought in Finnish/Young Finnish support? My intuition was that it would be more "radical", in the sense that more smallholdings would be created and compensations which severely burden the budget of the Finnish Federative Republic would be limited, but you are the expert here, and I'll go with your judgment.
I'm positive that this municipal reform isn't blocked by the Petrograd CA, so this should go ahead as planned ITTL.
That's an interesting link you're proposing. I fear Russian rail transportation isn't going to be miraculously improved ITTL, but Chernov's/Vikhliaev's removal of price controls on cereals was undertaken in the knowledge that the wartime agricultural regime had seen overt cereal production plummeting (because it was no longer worth the peasants' effort, and an SR-led government wouldn't opt for the kind of brutal requisitions the Bolsheviks undertook IOTL which would force peasants back into coerced production, and even that worked so badly IOTL that Lenin introduced the NEP. So, let's say there's more grain available in the Ukraine and Russia; as for how it gets to Finland, I'm still not entirely certain. The overview you linked to also mentioned already-paid US grain imports... who'd be shipped across the Arctic, I suppose? I fear there will still be severe food shortages and trouble resulting from that.
I wasn't thinking about the restoration of a Finnish national army of such moderate size - I was thinking the CA in Petrograd and especially its military committee / voykom under Pavel Lazimir are only really open towards establishing autonomous armed forces if these either seek independent states outside of Russia (Czechoslovak Legion, Bessarabian Legion), or take over massive responsibility for upholding the front, thereby relieving the chaotic Russian divisions who are in the midst of a process of transformation with lots of desertions etc. thrown in, (Latvian, Ukrainian, Armenian territorial defense forces). Finland's share of the Republic's defense is maintaining the maritime defenses and the fleet stationed there, that can't be discussed away. Those soldiers and sailors were almost all Russians, or at least there were almost no Finns among them. "Fennoising" them was not an option. Maintaining them AND creating ANOTHER territorial defense army of their own sounds like a costly effort which the Finnish Senate may not desire enough to push it through against concerns regarding territorial disintegration still present in Petrograd regardless of who governs. A small national army of 5,000-6,000 like the historical one from the 1880s and 1890s might just be OK - but I was thinking the Senate would rather go for building up (training and equipping) its police forces. I imagine it would recruit from among the paramilitary forces, too, especially from those among the left-leaning ones who are not openly pro-Bolshevik. Recruitment from the Suojeluskunta sounds unlikely on a national level under a centre-left Senate, but for municipal security forces in places with bourgeois majorities, it could be an option. TTL's CA in Petrograd isn't going to object to that, so count it as being under way in the second half of 1917, even if this means putting up with impromptu "requisitionings" by Russian federal soldiers stationed in Finland...
Since the national coalition government was formed in March already, it is formed ITTL, too. I suppose it breaks apart in May or June as the Social Democrats, boldened by the developments in Russia (while the bourgeois parties are more scared by them), become more courageous concerning the protection of labour rights, the already mentioned plans for agrarian reform etc. It would be nice for Finland to achieve independence on a broad national consensus ITTL, but I fear that while IOTL, the Social Democrats retreated as their initiatives were blocked by Petrograd, ITTL, the bourgeois parties might retreat if Social Democratic reforms gather too much speed with explicit consent and exhortation from Petrograd.
But I'm not 100 % sure, so I'm open to altering this - a consensus government in Finland with a small national army would not derail the rest of my TL plans too much, so... if you're interested in collaborating on a Finland chapter, I'd be happy to converse with you through PM. If not, I'll gladly continue to discuss things here on the board.
Eight: Russian Realignments (November 1917)
London (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland): The Herald [1], November 13th, 1917:
WORLD HOLDS BREATH AFTER LATEST RUSSIAN REALIGNMENTS
by George Lansbury
An eery silence has returned to the streets of the Russian capital Petrograd, and even along the long frontline between the Central Powers and their Russian enemies, most cannons have fallen silent after the events of last week in Petrograd. Russia, and with it the entire world, seems to hold its breath. Will there be peace in the East? Will the hopes of the millions for a new social order in Russia come true?
Political change had been overdue in Petrograd. The fall of Reval to the German Eighth Army last Monday was the straw that broke the camel’s back. On Wednesday, everything went so fast that, doubtlessly, good organization has stood at the back of the precipitous course of events. Supreme Commissioner Victor Chernov handed in his resignation, expressing his regret as to his inability to stop the German advance. In the Constituent Assembly, revolutionary icon Maria Spiridonova spoke, to great applause not only from her fellow SR members, of the chance to build a “truly revolutionary coalition” based on the will of the revolutionary workers and soldiers, who would push all those aside who were attached to the old order. The Bolshevik Pavel Dybenko, an envoy from the sailor’s supreme soviet Centrobalt, spoke to the Constituent Assembly at the invitation of Military Commissioner Pavel Lazimir, and expressed the sailors’ support for a new attempt at a truce and for purging the armed forces of counter-revolutionary officers and bourgeois saboteurs. Alleged back-benchers in the SR faction presented their suggestion of Boris Kamkov as candidate for Supreme Commissioner.
As all parties withdrew into faction meetings and news filtered out from the Taurid Palace, the streets of Petrograd filled with people with and without uniforms, armed and unarmed, for or against what they thought was going on. Some people got hurt and some windows were broken. But as Thursday dawned at the Taurid Palace and the delegates returned to the plenum, it would slowly become clear just how many certainties of Russia’s revolutionary political scene had been shattered. The Mezhraiontsy Adolf Joffe, Anatoly Lunacharsky, David Ryazanov, Moisei Uritsky and Lev Karakhan announced their support for Kamkov’s candidacy – and for the reunification of Russia’s Social Democracy. Then they were joined by a large group of Internationalist Mensheviks led by Yuri Larin, who had abandoned their spokesman Julius Martov and formed a common “Constituent Assembly faction for the unification of an International Revolutionary Social Democratic Labour Party” with the Mezhraionka. Fyodor Dan invited Martov, who denounced Kamkov as a “second-rate Russian Robespierre”, back into the Menshevik faction, which had been almost halved as the so-called “Bread faction” under Matvei Skobelev walked out to join the IRSDLP-unification faction, expressing their hope that Kamkov would commit himself to policies which would finally ensure the workers across Russia’s industrial branches sufficient wages to really meet all vital needs of their families. And the split went even right through the Bolshevik faction, this most organized and disciplined of all Russian parties, as a group of 32 Bolshevik delegates including Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoniev and Joseph Stalin, announced their support for Kamkov, and deserted the Bolshevik faction for the IRSDLP-unification faction and demanded the chairmanship of the committee for industry, labour and transportation (Transtrudkom) for one of them, while the leader of the remaining Bolshevik rump faction, Vladimir Lenin, announced the party’s continued opposition to “a repression which does not differentiate between revolutionary socialist soldiers, who refuse to kill and die in the imperialists’ war, and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries; a repression which aims not to secure the socialist revolution, but the continuation of the war”.
In the speech with which he accepted his candidacy, Boris Kamkov announced a policy platform which can be rightly appraised as the most progressive in the world: He promised to offer an unconditional armistice to all Central Powers, to provide relief to city-dwellers by legally abolishing all forms of rent, to respect all negotiated autonomy statutes, and to radically reform the Russian military, security, and justice systems through more popular participation, the replacement of unreliable officers and army units with voluntary forces who are really defending the revolution, and a determined fight against sabotage and counter-revolution, helped by a new special sub-commission which would receive extraordinary competencies for the duration of one year.
Only Alexander Kerensky of the Popular Socialist Labour faction stood against Kamkov in the election, which the latter won with 339 votes against Kerensky’s 167. [2] Since then, Kamkov has begun to restructure the Commission, replacing Menshevik commissars with men from the new IRSDLP-unification faction, whose new spokesman is Anatoly Lunacharsky, the new commissar for education. More important, at least beyond Russia’s borders, was that Kamkov has indeed sent an offer for a truce without conditions to the governments of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. The world holds its breath as the answers from Berlin, Vienna, Constantinople and Sofia are awaited. Is this the beginning of the end of the war which hundreds of millions across the world have waited for? On the streets of Russia’s capital, where riots had broken out and the realignment of the government has been greeted with plunderings and even firefights, an irregular force of over a thousand men and even women under arms, whose exact composition we could not yet make out but which is evidently loyal to the new regime, has restored peace and order for the moment. Within Russia, people are holding their breath, too, waiting not only for an answer to the vital question of war and peace, but also if the promises of the new government are going to hold. The eyes of the world are upon Russia and its bold political vanguard, and the hearts of workers across the world are filled today with the hope for peace and for justice and a new society rising from the ashes of the crumbling imperialist capitalist order, today in Russia, maybe tomorrow in other countries whose population is fed up with their war-mongering elites, too?
[1] During the war, the Daily Herald was not appearing daily. Thus, some degree of summary of what has happened in the past few days, too, is in order, I believe. Also, this is a newspaper from the pacifistic left wing of Labour at the time, and Lansbury has embraced even OTL’s October Revolution at first.
[2] Note how many votes are missing here. Around a dozen CA members from the right wing have been arrested under charges of participating in the counter-revolutionary coup, while almost the entire KD faction has temporarily walked out of the CA in protest against these arrests. Beyond that, over 150 delegates are abstaining – not only Lenin’s remaining Bolsheviks and anarchists, but also, and more numerous, the delegates of various national minorities who had been left out of the conspiratorial talks and who thus view Kamkov’s new coalition as potentially hostile vis-à-vis further autonomy statutes, e.g. for Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, and the various Muslim minorities
WORLD HOLDS BREATH AFTER LATEST RUSSIAN REALIGNMENTS
by George Lansbury
An eery silence has returned to the streets of the Russian capital Petrograd, and even along the long frontline between the Central Powers and their Russian enemies, most cannons have fallen silent after the events of last week in Petrograd. Russia, and with it the entire world, seems to hold its breath. Will there be peace in the East? Will the hopes of the millions for a new social order in Russia come true?
Political change had been overdue in Petrograd. The fall of Reval to the German Eighth Army last Monday was the straw that broke the camel’s back. On Wednesday, everything went so fast that, doubtlessly, good organization has stood at the back of the precipitous course of events. Supreme Commissioner Victor Chernov handed in his resignation, expressing his regret as to his inability to stop the German advance. In the Constituent Assembly, revolutionary icon Maria Spiridonova spoke, to great applause not only from her fellow SR members, of the chance to build a “truly revolutionary coalition” based on the will of the revolutionary workers and soldiers, who would push all those aside who were attached to the old order. The Bolshevik Pavel Dybenko, an envoy from the sailor’s supreme soviet Centrobalt, spoke to the Constituent Assembly at the invitation of Military Commissioner Pavel Lazimir, and expressed the sailors’ support for a new attempt at a truce and for purging the armed forces of counter-revolutionary officers and bourgeois saboteurs. Alleged back-benchers in the SR faction presented their suggestion of Boris Kamkov as candidate for Supreme Commissioner.
As all parties withdrew into faction meetings and news filtered out from the Taurid Palace, the streets of Petrograd filled with people with and without uniforms, armed and unarmed, for or against what they thought was going on. Some people got hurt and some windows were broken. But as Thursday dawned at the Taurid Palace and the delegates returned to the plenum, it would slowly become clear just how many certainties of Russia’s revolutionary political scene had been shattered. The Mezhraiontsy Adolf Joffe, Anatoly Lunacharsky, David Ryazanov, Moisei Uritsky and Lev Karakhan announced their support for Kamkov’s candidacy – and for the reunification of Russia’s Social Democracy. Then they were joined by a large group of Internationalist Mensheviks led by Yuri Larin, who had abandoned their spokesman Julius Martov and formed a common “Constituent Assembly faction for the unification of an International Revolutionary Social Democratic Labour Party” with the Mezhraionka. Fyodor Dan invited Martov, who denounced Kamkov as a “second-rate Russian Robespierre”, back into the Menshevik faction, which had been almost halved as the so-called “Bread faction” under Matvei Skobelev walked out to join the IRSDLP-unification faction, expressing their hope that Kamkov would commit himself to policies which would finally ensure the workers across Russia’s industrial branches sufficient wages to really meet all vital needs of their families. And the split went even right through the Bolshevik faction, this most organized and disciplined of all Russian parties, as a group of 32 Bolshevik delegates including Lev Kamenev, Grigory Zinoniev and Joseph Stalin, announced their support for Kamkov, and deserted the Bolshevik faction for the IRSDLP-unification faction and demanded the chairmanship of the committee for industry, labour and transportation (Transtrudkom) for one of them, while the leader of the remaining Bolshevik rump faction, Vladimir Lenin, announced the party’s continued opposition to “a repression which does not differentiate between revolutionary socialist soldiers, who refuse to kill and die in the imperialists’ war, and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries; a repression which aims not to secure the socialist revolution, but the continuation of the war”.
In the speech with which he accepted his candidacy, Boris Kamkov announced a policy platform which can be rightly appraised as the most progressive in the world: He promised to offer an unconditional armistice to all Central Powers, to provide relief to city-dwellers by legally abolishing all forms of rent, to respect all negotiated autonomy statutes, and to radically reform the Russian military, security, and justice systems through more popular participation, the replacement of unreliable officers and army units with voluntary forces who are really defending the revolution, and a determined fight against sabotage and counter-revolution, helped by a new special sub-commission which would receive extraordinary competencies for the duration of one year.
Only Alexander Kerensky of the Popular Socialist Labour faction stood against Kamkov in the election, which the latter won with 339 votes against Kerensky’s 167. [2] Since then, Kamkov has begun to restructure the Commission, replacing Menshevik commissars with men from the new IRSDLP-unification faction, whose new spokesman is Anatoly Lunacharsky, the new commissar for education. More important, at least beyond Russia’s borders, was that Kamkov has indeed sent an offer for a truce without conditions to the governments of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. The world holds its breath as the answers from Berlin, Vienna, Constantinople and Sofia are awaited. Is this the beginning of the end of the war which hundreds of millions across the world have waited for? On the streets of Russia’s capital, where riots had broken out and the realignment of the government has been greeted with plunderings and even firefights, an irregular force of over a thousand men and even women under arms, whose exact composition we could not yet make out but which is evidently loyal to the new regime, has restored peace and order for the moment. Within Russia, people are holding their breath, too, waiting not only for an answer to the vital question of war and peace, but also if the promises of the new government are going to hold. The eyes of the world are upon Russia and its bold political vanguard, and the hearts of workers across the world are filled today with the hope for peace and for justice and a new society rising from the ashes of the crumbling imperialist capitalist order, today in Russia, maybe tomorrow in other countries whose population is fed up with their war-mongering elites, too?
[1] During the war, the Daily Herald was not appearing daily. Thus, some degree of summary of what has happened in the past few days, too, is in order, I believe. Also, this is a newspaper from the pacifistic left wing of Labour at the time, and Lansbury has embraced even OTL’s October Revolution at first.
[2] Note how many votes are missing here. Around a dozen CA members from the right wing have been arrested under charges of participating in the counter-revolutionary coup, while almost the entire KD faction has temporarily walked out of the CA in protest against these arrests. Beyond that, over 150 delegates are abstaining – not only Lenin’s remaining Bolsheviks and anarchists, but also, and more numerous, the delegates of various national minorities who had been left out of the conspiratorial talks and who thus view Kamkov’s new coalition as potentially hostile vis-à-vis further autonomy statutes, e.g. for Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Estonia, and the various Muslim minorities
So here's our November. I'll be away for a week on an almost-offline holiday, but I'm already looking forward to reading your feedback!
Hnau
Banned
This handsome fellow in charge of the Russian Republic?? How could things go wrong? He'd be the darling of newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic.
I am concerned that Kamkov may not really mean what he says that he supports an "unconditional truce". IOTL, he opposed the Brest-Litovsk treaty after it was revealed how much territory the Germans really wanted. Yet, with more success at unifying socialism under one coalition/party, a lifelong goal of his, it may be that he'll be more focused on that project. It's very different being the head of government, rather than a leader of a small political party, it may be that he'll be more willing to put more on the table in order to keep his power.
Kamkov looked indeed a suitable candidate to steer a large body of the SRs farther to the left, and forge alliances.
This handsome fellow in charge of the Russian Republic?? How could things go wrong? He'd be the darling of newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic.
I am concerned that Kamkov may not really mean what he says that he supports an "unconditional truce". IOTL, he opposed the Brest-Litovsk treaty after it was revealed how much territory the Germans really wanted. Yet, with more success at unifying socialism under one coalition/party, a lifelong goal of his, it may be that he'll be more focused on that project. It's very different being the head of government, rather than a leader of a small political party, it may be that he'll be more willing to put more on the table in order to keep his power.
Western newspapers mostly despise the separate Peace course, and when his ex-Bolshevik-led transttudkom begins expropriating foreign-owned enterprises, Kamkov doubtlessly could become the handsome face of The Evil...
Oh, the war... Kamkov's unconditional truce offer is in contrast to Chernov's a few months earlier, who had held "No annexations, No indemnities" as Peace Terms up and thus formulated conditions from the beginning. Kamkov offers to stop firing, and then talk without predefined Limits.
The Thing is, if the CP were rational, they'd take this. The Germans could throw their Divisions to the West in time, A-H would stay lucky, Bulgaria has a chance to stay in the war, and the Ottomans had enough on their Plate still.
But Rationality and war..
This bring the question if the CP, in this scenario, as being capable to send in the west troops from the russian front? They were extremely important for the success of the Caporetto offensive and if the CP don't launch an offensive at this time, they will need to wait till the end of winter for another possibility
OTL according to Hoffman the Central Powers were willing to settle for a huge amount less than Brest-Litovsk. They wanted an "independent" Polish monarchy as a buffer state and control of the Baltic states. The Bolsheviks kept making balcony speeches instead of serious negotiation and unintentionally revealed how weak their position actually was. If Kamkov is able to find a couple of genuinely experienced negotiators - whether from trade unions or left leaning or just patriotic ex-Tsarist diplomats he could gain a peace on advantageous terms compared to OTL.
The Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo has happened on OTL schedule, in late October. A-H pressed for it as a last chance iotl and ittl. It happened with a few German Units from the Eastern front, but also from Alsace etc. Nothing much Changed here - Kamkov's offer is too late to make a difference Here, Just Like OTL's October rev. Gas was what won it for the CP anyway...
But of course the CP could send in more men now to storm across the Piave and threaten Northern Italy, probably causing Italian surrender. Or they could Train them for a better--prepared Spring Offensive.
Peace with Russia earlier is a big Deal. If it Happens.
Agreed on Bolshevik negotiation blunders. Russian weakness was an open Secret, though, anyway, and imperial German war aims had a fatal tendency to grow even bigger when modest achievements appeared realistic.
Better terms than OTL and greater stability within could make 1918 a much better year for consolidating Revolution and republic. I'll think about it..
Not now due to the winter, after the italian army is a too good position to being defeated without making any army attacking bleed too much to being of some utility after (second Piave basically broke the A-H when they launched their offensive in support of the German spring attack) and even a better prepared Spring Offensive mean just postponing the invevitable while destroying whatever remain of the army, they have already lost when the USA had declared war to the CP, they are just too stubborn to accept it
I tend to agree with your Assessment of the Military chances (although @Zulfurium has made a strong Case for a reversal not being quite Impossible).
This "stubbornness" is something I believe is difficult to overcome. What that means specifically for Russia, we'll see.
Nine: Wasted Chances in Brest-Litowsk? (December 1917)
New York City (USA): New York World, Christmas edition 1917
OPEN DIPLOMACY: AN OPPORTUNITY WASTED
by Arno Dosch-Fleurot
Five weeks have gone past since the peace negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers have begun in Brest-Litowsk [1], and the highest hopes have been disappointed. Worldwide peace will not be among the modest presents under this year’s Christmas trees. The negotiations “without secret diplomacy”, as Russia’s leading diplomat Tobias Axelrod put it, have revealed a lot. Most sadly, they have also revealed that there is probably no agreement over an end to the terrible carnage in Europe in sight between those who conversed in Brest-Litowsk under the eyes and ears of the global public [2] – and when new delegations shall return on New Year’s, the chances for a peace agreement will be even slimmer.
I have been honored by the Russian people and their Commissar for Foreign Affairs to be included among the men and women who aid their representatives at these negotiations. My aid, it was made clear to me, was to consist in relating to a global audience faithfully what is being discussed. Like many Russian and international colleagues, I have endeavored to do my best – but I have begun to ask myself if our work has really helped the Russian cause at all. The case of Janos Forgách contacting Moyshe Zilberfarb to sound out the possibilities of a separate Austro-Russian peace [3] illustrates this. The proposal was promptly forwarded by the latter, in his good faith in open diplomacy, and appeared in newspapers from Manchester to Petrograd on the next day, compelling Czernin [4] to publicly deny any such initiative and reassure his German allies that Austria-Hungary would only accept a peace involving all parties present to the negotiations. [5]
Such a peace appears less likely with every day of negotiations. Kühlmann [6] has countered Russia’s pledge that lasting peace cannot be built on imperialist territorial annexations by upholding that lasting peace required the national self-determination of the Poles, Lithuanians and other Balts, but this nod to national self-determination has since back-fired spectacularly after the Steinberg proposal [7] and German general Hoffmann’s reply that perhaps peace would be easiest to achieve if every party took to looking after national self-determination in the territories their armed forces presently controlled [8] – in this case, the German “might makes right” approach was not even palatable to their Turkish allies [9] Whichever topic the negotiations touch upon, common ground appears to evaporate with every day of discussions. Even prolonging the armistice over the holidays until new participants could join on New Year’s was an agreement which threatened to fall through several times.
Now, we can be sure that each side is going to bring their Poles, their Balts and probably even their Finns to the negotiation table – and that is going to impede any agreement just as much as the diplomatic trial balloon of the proposed Jewish Autonomy [10] and the inclusion of a Rumanian delegation. [11]
By all means, talking to each other is better than shooting each other. The paradox of Brest-Litowsk, though, is that the longer both sides continue to talk, the more likely they become to start shooting at each other afterwards again. It was Russian weakness which created the occasion of the talks in Brest-Litowsk. With every week which passes without a single shot being fired on the Eastern European front, though, Russia regains its strength: Military commissioner Lazimir is replacing war-weary unit by war-weary unit with highly motivated political batallions and ethnic defense corps or liberation legions and ordering less warlike men into urgent works on multiple rows of deep defensive fortifications and restoration of the rail roads. The consolidation of a broad coalition and the dreaded Temporary Special Commission [12] have managed to quell both anti-revolutionary and anarchist [13] resistance within Russia, and with the reconquest of Lugansk from Kaledin’s Cossack host, the last pocket of resistance against the revolution has begun to fall. In contrast to these developments, the recent wave of wild strikes across Austria and Germany has intensified [14]. Russia still cannot muster sufficient forces to stop a renewed German advance on their capital and industrial centers, but the cost of a renewed German attack increases with every day, and Ober Ost is aware of this as much as it is aware of the desire for peace on the “home front” and the heavy toll which this autumn’s fierce carnages in Flanders and the Alps have exacted on the German army. The German delegation in the first round of talks has shown reserve with regards to recommencing hostilities – but the German supreme army command may well send envoys into the next round with the clear mission to either reach a quick and satisfactory agreement, or end the truce.
It is – and I believe more and more people in Russia as well as in our country are losing their doubts about this – the fault of the German military leadership that the opportunity to establish a lasting peace through open diplomacy will probably be wasted. My Christmas wish for this year is that this fear of mine is unfounded, and that I can be of a greater service still to the Russian people who has put its trust in me and to my American readership who likewise wishes for an end to this terrible war and a just and lasting peace.
[1] I thought about having it take someplace else, but the Russians are in the same impotent position as IOTL to successfully demand a relocation to any place other than such a Ober Ost military HQ at a railroad hub.
[2] The thrust against secret diplomacy is something the Bolsheviks and Left SRs could easily agree on IOTL (and which had some appeal way beyond these groups). IOTL, the October regime published various secret international pacts, and in Brest-Litowsk, their delegation brought a stenotypist to protocol all conversations. ITTL, where the rupture in the way state authority is perceived and exercised is at no point anywhere near as drastic as OTL’s October Revolution, the secret pacts are not leaked yet, but the rejection of secret diplomacy is still consensus among the Russian delegates. Instead of stenotypists, they have brought journalists from all over the world and from the various Russian newspapers to the negotiations as members of the Russian delegation – among them Rosch-Fleurot and one John Reed…
[3] There were several covert Austro-Hungarian attempts at sounding out the possibility of a separate peace with various members of the Entente IOTL. Emperor Charles was clearly aware of the desperate situation the dual monarchy was in.
[4] Count Ottokar Czernin, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister IOTL and ITTL.
[5] Czernin had been attempting separate peace talks, albeit with Britain and/or France, when he took office. By late 1917, though, he was convinced that Russia could be pushed to surrender at almost any terms, and frequent German contributions both on the Alpine and on the Romanian fronts have clearly demonstrated to the Austro-Hungarians that parting with Germany would doom the k.u.k., even if the Russian arch-enemy should be neutralized for the time being.
[6] Germany’s foreign minister IOTL and ITTL.
[7] In TTL’s Brest-Litowsk, Isaac Steinberg, who as a Socialist Revolutionary accompanies the Social Democratic Foreign Commissar / Inokom Tobias Akselrod – all important civil as well as military positions in the Russain delegation being bi-partisan to reflect the interests of both coalition partners –, proposes in the second week of December, in response to the German insistence on Polish and Lithuanian independence, a map for where plebiscites under the supervision of all present parties should be held with regards to the adherence of the territory to a neutral and independent Poland and Lithuania. The potentially Polish territories notably included, besides the Russian partition, also the Prussian Posen province and the Austrian Partition, too; an idea which was immediately laughed at by both Kühlmann and Czernin, of course.
[8] When he got angry with Bolshevik stalling and balcony speeches, Hoffmann made a similar remark IOTL.
[9] Like IOTL, Russian forces (and increasingly ethnic Armenian forces) are still holding a front line in Western Armenia, considerably West of the pre-war border between the Ottoman and Russian Empires.
[10] On the Russian side, there is quite a number of Jewish Territorialists in TTL’s delegation as they were influential both in OTL’s Bundists and Fareynikte and thus both within non-Leninist social democracy and among the SRs, not the least among them Steinberg himself, so the German side brought the idea up mainly as a diversion to increase the disorientation in the Russian delegation and make them more susceptible to a later, more “pragmatic” German proposal.
[11] IOTL, the Romanians concluded a separate peace negotiation when they saw that Bolshevik Russia would abandon them. ITTL, things are less clear, and there has been no devastating Kerensky Offensive, but Romania still knows they can't stay in the war if the Russians drop out, so I thought at least THEY would WANT to be included, and I thought a politically broader Russian delegation might view this favourably and even push for it when provoked on the matter of "lasting peace" and "national self-determination".
[12]Acronymically, and not only in this regard, the VreChreKom (or Vecheka) has a lot in common with OTL’s Cheka. The less ruptural transformation of the justice system ITTL and the generally more legalist outlook of TTL’s CA-backed revolutionaries mean, though, that while Vrechrekom / Vecheka are still going to use bad old Okhrana traditions in “interrogation” and have the right to shoot militant “counter-revolutionaries” and “anarchists” as if they were military combattants, they at least cannot infinitely detain people in concentration camps without a trial.
[13] Where those Bolsheviks who follow Lenin into opposition against Kamkov's coalition regime put up organised resistance against the inclusion of Red Guards into the new regime's military and paramilitary structures, they are lumped in with the anarchists. Lenin and his CA faction are still spared from this fate so far, though.
[14] IOTL, these strikes – not entirely unrelated to the peace discussions in Brest-Litowsk and the example of the Russian Revolution, but primarily caused by hunger and combustible shortages – only reached an acute level in January 1918. ITTL, peace talks begin a month earlier, and so do the solidary peace strikes.
OPEN DIPLOMACY: AN OPPORTUNITY WASTED
by Arno Dosch-Fleurot
Five weeks have gone past since the peace negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers have begun in Brest-Litowsk [1], and the highest hopes have been disappointed. Worldwide peace will not be among the modest presents under this year’s Christmas trees. The negotiations “without secret diplomacy”, as Russia’s leading diplomat Tobias Axelrod put it, have revealed a lot. Most sadly, they have also revealed that there is probably no agreement over an end to the terrible carnage in Europe in sight between those who conversed in Brest-Litowsk under the eyes and ears of the global public [2] – and when new delegations shall return on New Year’s, the chances for a peace agreement will be even slimmer.
I have been honored by the Russian people and their Commissar for Foreign Affairs to be included among the men and women who aid their representatives at these negotiations. My aid, it was made clear to me, was to consist in relating to a global audience faithfully what is being discussed. Like many Russian and international colleagues, I have endeavored to do my best – but I have begun to ask myself if our work has really helped the Russian cause at all. The case of Janos Forgách contacting Moyshe Zilberfarb to sound out the possibilities of a separate Austro-Russian peace [3] illustrates this. The proposal was promptly forwarded by the latter, in his good faith in open diplomacy, and appeared in newspapers from Manchester to Petrograd on the next day, compelling Czernin [4] to publicly deny any such initiative and reassure his German allies that Austria-Hungary would only accept a peace involving all parties present to the negotiations. [5]
Such a peace appears less likely with every day of negotiations. Kühlmann [6] has countered Russia’s pledge that lasting peace cannot be built on imperialist territorial annexations by upholding that lasting peace required the national self-determination of the Poles, Lithuanians and other Balts, but this nod to national self-determination has since back-fired spectacularly after the Steinberg proposal [7] and German general Hoffmann’s reply that perhaps peace would be easiest to achieve if every party took to looking after national self-determination in the territories their armed forces presently controlled [8] – in this case, the German “might makes right” approach was not even palatable to their Turkish allies [9] Whichever topic the negotiations touch upon, common ground appears to evaporate with every day of discussions. Even prolonging the armistice over the holidays until new participants could join on New Year’s was an agreement which threatened to fall through several times.
Now, we can be sure that each side is going to bring their Poles, their Balts and probably even their Finns to the negotiation table – and that is going to impede any agreement just as much as the diplomatic trial balloon of the proposed Jewish Autonomy [10] and the inclusion of a Rumanian delegation. [11]
By all means, talking to each other is better than shooting each other. The paradox of Brest-Litowsk, though, is that the longer both sides continue to talk, the more likely they become to start shooting at each other afterwards again. It was Russian weakness which created the occasion of the talks in Brest-Litowsk. With every week which passes without a single shot being fired on the Eastern European front, though, Russia regains its strength: Military commissioner Lazimir is replacing war-weary unit by war-weary unit with highly motivated political batallions and ethnic defense corps or liberation legions and ordering less warlike men into urgent works on multiple rows of deep defensive fortifications and restoration of the rail roads. The consolidation of a broad coalition and the dreaded Temporary Special Commission [12] have managed to quell both anti-revolutionary and anarchist [13] resistance within Russia, and with the reconquest of Lugansk from Kaledin’s Cossack host, the last pocket of resistance against the revolution has begun to fall. In contrast to these developments, the recent wave of wild strikes across Austria and Germany has intensified [14]. Russia still cannot muster sufficient forces to stop a renewed German advance on their capital and industrial centers, but the cost of a renewed German attack increases with every day, and Ober Ost is aware of this as much as it is aware of the desire for peace on the “home front” and the heavy toll which this autumn’s fierce carnages in Flanders and the Alps have exacted on the German army. The German delegation in the first round of talks has shown reserve with regards to recommencing hostilities – but the German supreme army command may well send envoys into the next round with the clear mission to either reach a quick and satisfactory agreement, or end the truce.
It is – and I believe more and more people in Russia as well as in our country are losing their doubts about this – the fault of the German military leadership that the opportunity to establish a lasting peace through open diplomacy will probably be wasted. My Christmas wish for this year is that this fear of mine is unfounded, and that I can be of a greater service still to the Russian people who has put its trust in me and to my American readership who likewise wishes for an end to this terrible war and a just and lasting peace.
[1] I thought about having it take someplace else, but the Russians are in the same impotent position as IOTL to successfully demand a relocation to any place other than such a Ober Ost military HQ at a railroad hub.
[2] The thrust against secret diplomacy is something the Bolsheviks and Left SRs could easily agree on IOTL (and which had some appeal way beyond these groups). IOTL, the October regime published various secret international pacts, and in Brest-Litowsk, their delegation brought a stenotypist to protocol all conversations. ITTL, where the rupture in the way state authority is perceived and exercised is at no point anywhere near as drastic as OTL’s October Revolution, the secret pacts are not leaked yet, but the rejection of secret diplomacy is still consensus among the Russian delegates. Instead of stenotypists, they have brought journalists from all over the world and from the various Russian newspapers to the negotiations as members of the Russian delegation – among them Rosch-Fleurot and one John Reed…
[3] There were several covert Austro-Hungarian attempts at sounding out the possibility of a separate peace with various members of the Entente IOTL. Emperor Charles was clearly aware of the desperate situation the dual monarchy was in.
[4] Count Ottokar Czernin, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister IOTL and ITTL.
[5] Czernin had been attempting separate peace talks, albeit with Britain and/or France, when he took office. By late 1917, though, he was convinced that Russia could be pushed to surrender at almost any terms, and frequent German contributions both on the Alpine and on the Romanian fronts have clearly demonstrated to the Austro-Hungarians that parting with Germany would doom the k.u.k., even if the Russian arch-enemy should be neutralized for the time being.
[6] Germany’s foreign minister IOTL and ITTL.
[7] In TTL’s Brest-Litowsk, Isaac Steinberg, who as a Socialist Revolutionary accompanies the Social Democratic Foreign Commissar / Inokom Tobias Akselrod – all important civil as well as military positions in the Russain delegation being bi-partisan to reflect the interests of both coalition partners –, proposes in the second week of December, in response to the German insistence on Polish and Lithuanian independence, a map for where plebiscites under the supervision of all present parties should be held with regards to the adherence of the territory to a neutral and independent Poland and Lithuania. The potentially Polish territories notably included, besides the Russian partition, also the Prussian Posen province and the Austrian Partition, too; an idea which was immediately laughed at by both Kühlmann and Czernin, of course.
[8] When he got angry with Bolshevik stalling and balcony speeches, Hoffmann made a similar remark IOTL.
[9] Like IOTL, Russian forces (and increasingly ethnic Armenian forces) are still holding a front line in Western Armenia, considerably West of the pre-war border between the Ottoman and Russian Empires.
[10] On the Russian side, there is quite a number of Jewish Territorialists in TTL’s delegation as they were influential both in OTL’s Bundists and Fareynikte and thus both within non-Leninist social democracy and among the SRs, not the least among them Steinberg himself, so the German side brought the idea up mainly as a diversion to increase the disorientation in the Russian delegation and make them more susceptible to a later, more “pragmatic” German proposal.
[11] IOTL, the Romanians concluded a separate peace negotiation when they saw that Bolshevik Russia would abandon them. ITTL, things are less clear, and there has been no devastating Kerensky Offensive, but Romania still knows they can't stay in the war if the Russians drop out, so I thought at least THEY would WANT to be included, and I thought a politically broader Russian delegation might view this favourably and even push for it when provoked on the matter of "lasting peace" and "national self-determination".
[12]Acronymically, and not only in this regard, the VreChreKom (or Vecheka) has a lot in common with OTL’s Cheka. The less ruptural transformation of the justice system ITTL and the generally more legalist outlook of TTL’s CA-backed revolutionaries mean, though, that while Vrechrekom / Vecheka are still going to use bad old Okhrana traditions in “interrogation” and have the right to shoot militant “counter-revolutionaries” and “anarchists” as if they were military combattants, they at least cannot infinitely detain people in concentration camps without a trial.
[13] Where those Bolsheviks who follow Lenin into opposition against Kamkov's coalition regime put up organised resistance against the inclusion of Red Guards into the new regime's military and paramilitary structures, they are lumped in with the anarchists. Lenin and his CA faction are still spared from this fate so far, though.
[14] IOTL, these strikes – not entirely unrelated to the peace discussions in Brest-Litowsk and the example of the Russian Revolution, but primarily caused by hunger and combustible shortages – only reached an acute level in January 1918. ITTL, peace talks begin a month earlier, and so do the solidary peace strikes.
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