Most of Lithuania is likely to join the UoE but the border is going to be a headache: 1) Suwalki is diverse, majority Lithuanian but used to be part of Congress Poland. 2) Memelland. 'nuff said.
Feeble Constitution - A Red-and-Green Russia 1917 Timeline
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Most of Lithuania is likely to join the UoE but the border is going to be a headache: 1) Suwalki is diverse, majority Lithuanian but used to be part of Congress Poland. 2) Memelland. 'nuff said.
The real big issue will be Vilnius and like Suwalki much will depend on the military situation at the time of the ceasefire and who's the first to take control of the zone (Poland or UoE troops), regarding Memeland, well OTL IRC the French and co.simply decided to award it to Lithuania regardless of the local decision to remain on Germany due to the desire to weaking the Germans and that otherwise they will have de facto control of the Lithuania economy, but it the Lithuanians remain in the UoE maybe a simply demilitarization of the region will be enough but it's not a given
On Poland and Lithuania
There are currently Poles fighting in the Austro-Hungarian Polish Auxiliary Corps and in the Polska Siła Zbrojna under German command on the side of the Central Powers (the numbers vary greatly in different texts, I have no idea how many they were), and there are over 25,000 Poles in two Polish Corps fighting on the side of the Entente in the UoE as well as more than three times this number fighting in the "Blue Army" for the Entente on the Western front. And there are several thousand underground fighters in the paramilitary Polska Organizacja Wojskowa now mostly on German-occupied terrain. Politically, there is the Komitet Narodowy Polski in Paris, dominated by Dmowski's ND, and its affiliate Naczelna Rada Ludowa in Poznan, who are on the side of the Entente, closely aligned with France and with an ambivalent, but prevalently positive relation with *Russia. And the Rada Regencyjna, installed by the Germans in Warsaw under their loyal Prime Minister Jan Kanty Steczkowski, a very conservative and tame body obviously pursuing German-friendly policies, some probably out of conviction (they don't like what happens in the UoE), more probably out of opportunity. In Moscow, there's a Naczelny Polski Komitet Wojskowy, which is just as multi-party as the paramilitaries in Poland, but in contrast to the latter opportunistically committed to fighting along with the UoE on the Entente side. And then there are internationalistically minded Polish socialists scattered from Berlin to Moscow, operating outside these national-minded bodies. All much like OTL, except for the Polish Corps in Russia and the Naczelny Polski Komitet Wojskowy which IOTL were caught on the wrong foot by the October Revolution but which ITTL persist.
IOTL, Germany created (in some cases short-lived) facts on the ground in 1918 with Brest-Litowsk; also due to Brest-Litowsk, no single Polish force was still pro-Russian. With the Russian Civil War and especially its regional clusters, the Ukrainian Civil War and the Civil War in the Baltics, an ample window of opportunity arose for ambitious Polish politicians and military leaders to meddle in the East. It was in this climate that Pilsudski's vision of Miedzymorze developed and gained traction. With only half-hearted, tepid support from the Entente (because they fought against the Soviets, but they did not co-operate with the "White" Russian forces), the various factions soon coalesced at least militarily into one army on which one Second Polish Republic rested. ITTL, several circumstances have changed, creating a significantly difference context and atmosphere, with different opportunities.
As you have rightly pointed out, we do not know yet where the front lines will run at the moment of the armistice - even I don't know that yet. There is also the question, if the Germans have to retreat from the East in any form comparable to Compiegne terms for a retreat in the West, which troops on the UoE side are moving in to replace them. The Polish Corps and the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces will have fought side by side for well over a year, for example, but this is going to be a divisive issue for sure.
As for Lithuania, there is the Taryba in Vilnius, which, like IOTL, has both declared independence and declared "firm and special ties" with Germany in late 1917 / early 1918, but was not rewarded with much respect from OHL / Ober Ost. In contrast to OTL, as Germany does not look quite as strong in the East (even though they have taken Petrograd; they have not, for example, gained control over the Ukraine), there has not yet been an election of some Württemberg nobleman as King Mindaugus II. of Lithuania. Let us not forget, though, that many Lithuanians have fled Eastwards and live in the UoE now. Some of them have joined the Republican Guards. Resistance in Lithuania exists (the "men of the woods"), and in contrast to Poland it is quite unambiguously aimed against the German occupiers (and thus not exactly in sync with the Taryba's opportunistic policies), but also not such a big factor.
The new OHL and the new German government, who are willing to give a lot more leeway to their Central Eastern European puppets than before, are focusing on Poland because it's the much bigger factor, but they will soon recognise Lithuanian independence, too, especially when the UoE declines the armistice offer. The Taryba won't even have to elect a German king for that. This does create some facts on the ground which look similar to OTL, so Lithuania's joining the UoE is not guaranteed (remember, Chernov's blunder officially acquiesced to the Lithuanians "choosing their own path" once they're freed from German occupation). It might become an opportune option for the young Lithuanian Republic if Poland claims what they consider to be theirs - on the other hand, would a war-weary democratic Russia really go to war against Poland over Vilnius or Suwalki? Militarily, the Lithuanians are utterly helpless against the Poles who already have components for a national army at their disposal - if the different Polish factions can agree on a joint course of action. Politically, though, it's not a given that things won't be decided at the green table in *Versailles. ITTL, both the Western Entente and the UoE are at the table, and they will negotiate among themselves which representatives of Poland, Lithuania etc. they will accept as negotiating parties. There are considerably less loopholes (in the form of the geopolitical black hole the Soviet Union was IOTL) to circumvent any provisions agreed at the conference ITTL, and the conference will have to sort out the fate of Central Eastern Europe in much greater detail than IOTL precisely because, while allies during war, the UoE and, for example, the British are not likely to be political BFFs.
I fully agree on the fuzzy, essentially yet undefined boundaries of "Poland" and "Lithuania". The Germans will, over the next couple of weeks, probably try to initiate a straightening-out between their two puppet states, but all of that can be blown away by the German collapse all too soon. (Or it could outlive it, you never know.) What we should not carry over from OTL without questioning it, in my view, is the assumption of the great space of maneuvre in a political semi-void which existed IOTL and caused quick coagulations, "wars of the dwarves", and everything that followed from this nation-building...
There are currently Poles fighting in the Austro-Hungarian Polish Auxiliary Corps and in the Polska Siła Zbrojna under German command on the side of the Central Powers (the numbers vary greatly in different texts, I have no idea how many they were), and there are over 25,000 Poles in two Polish Corps fighting on the side of the Entente in the UoE as well as more than three times this number fighting in the "Blue Army" for the Entente on the Western front. And there are several thousand underground fighters in the paramilitary Polska Organizacja Wojskowa now mostly on German-occupied terrain. Politically, there is the Komitet Narodowy Polski in Paris, dominated by Dmowski's ND, and its affiliate Naczelna Rada Ludowa in Poznan, who are on the side of the Entente, closely aligned with France and with an ambivalent, but prevalently positive relation with *Russia. And the Rada Regencyjna, installed by the Germans in Warsaw under their loyal Prime Minister Jan Kanty Steczkowski, a very conservative and tame body obviously pursuing German-friendly policies, some probably out of conviction (they don't like what happens in the UoE), more probably out of opportunity. In Moscow, there's a Naczelny Polski Komitet Wojskowy, which is just as multi-party as the paramilitaries in Poland, but in contrast to the latter opportunistically committed to fighting along with the UoE on the Entente side. And then there are internationalistically minded Polish socialists scattered from Berlin to Moscow, operating outside these national-minded bodies. All much like OTL, except for the Polish Corps in Russia and the Naczelny Polski Komitet Wojskowy which IOTL were caught on the wrong foot by the October Revolution but which ITTL persist.
IOTL, Germany created (in some cases short-lived) facts on the ground in 1918 with Brest-Litowsk; also due to Brest-Litowsk, no single Polish force was still pro-Russian. With the Russian Civil War and especially its regional clusters, the Ukrainian Civil War and the Civil War in the Baltics, an ample window of opportunity arose for ambitious Polish politicians and military leaders to meddle in the East. It was in this climate that Pilsudski's vision of Miedzymorze developed and gained traction. With only half-hearted, tepid support from the Entente (because they fought against the Soviets, but they did not co-operate with the "White" Russian forces), the various factions soon coalesced at least militarily into one army on which one Second Polish Republic rested. ITTL, several circumstances have changed, creating a significantly difference context and atmosphere, with different opportunities.
As you have rightly pointed out, we do not know yet where the front lines will run at the moment of the armistice - even I don't know that yet. There is also the question, if the Germans have to retreat from the East in any form comparable to Compiegne terms for a retreat in the West, which troops on the UoE side are moving in to replace them. The Polish Corps and the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces will have fought side by side for well over a year, for example, but this is going to be a divisive issue for sure.
As for Lithuania, there is the Taryba in Vilnius, which, like IOTL, has both declared independence and declared "firm and special ties" with Germany in late 1917 / early 1918, but was not rewarded with much respect from OHL / Ober Ost. In contrast to OTL, as Germany does not look quite as strong in the East (even though they have taken Petrograd; they have not, for example, gained control over the Ukraine), there has not yet been an election of some Württemberg nobleman as King Mindaugus II. of Lithuania. Let us not forget, though, that many Lithuanians have fled Eastwards and live in the UoE now. Some of them have joined the Republican Guards. Resistance in Lithuania exists (the "men of the woods"), and in contrast to Poland it is quite unambiguously aimed against the German occupiers (and thus not exactly in sync with the Taryba's opportunistic policies), but also not such a big factor.
The new OHL and the new German government, who are willing to give a lot more leeway to their Central Eastern European puppets than before, are focusing on Poland because it's the much bigger factor, but they will soon recognise Lithuanian independence, too, especially when the UoE declines the armistice offer. The Taryba won't even have to elect a German king for that. This does create some facts on the ground which look similar to OTL, so Lithuania's joining the UoE is not guaranteed (remember, Chernov's blunder officially acquiesced to the Lithuanians "choosing their own path" once they're freed from German occupation). It might become an opportune option for the young Lithuanian Republic if Poland claims what they consider to be theirs - on the other hand, would a war-weary democratic Russia really go to war against Poland over Vilnius or Suwalki? Militarily, the Lithuanians are utterly helpless against the Poles who already have components for a national army at their disposal - if the different Polish factions can agree on a joint course of action. Politically, though, it's not a given that things won't be decided at the green table in *Versailles. ITTL, both the Western Entente and the UoE are at the table, and they will negotiate among themselves which representatives of Poland, Lithuania etc. they will accept as negotiating parties. There are considerably less loopholes (in the form of the geopolitical black hole the Soviet Union was IOTL) to circumvent any provisions agreed at the conference ITTL, and the conference will have to sort out the fate of Central Eastern Europe in much greater detail than IOTL precisely because, while allies during war, the UoE and, for example, the British are not likely to be political BFFs.
I fully agree on the fuzzy, essentially yet undefined boundaries of "Poland" and "Lithuania". The Germans will, over the next couple of weeks, probably try to initiate a straightening-out between their two puppet states, but all of that can be blown away by the German collapse all too soon. (Or it could outlive it, you never know.) What we should not carry over from OTL without questioning it, in my view, is the assumption of the great space of maneuvre in a political semi-void which existed IOTL and caused quick coagulations, "wars of the dwarves", and everything that followed from this nation-building...
Lithuanian option for now are pretty much limited, independence mean also being in the middle between the UoE and Poland with the last having some plan towards part of Lithuania or even all of her (a new Commowealth for Pildusky or just an autonomous region for other with more fascist idea) so even if in general is the most appreaciated otpion, people and politicians will feel that's a too risky move unless they have some Great Power back up; and having an already formed goverment and independece declaration it's a very good start...even if many will see it a a risky move.
Yep i doubt that the UoE will go to war for Lithuanian land, too spent on the other side she will defend her own territory if the region decide to remain a member...maybe a middle ground can be logistic and diplomatic support for Vilnius in case even if an independent nation decide to sign a formal alliance with the Union as a mean to protection by 'greedy neighbourghs'
Poland will be complicated, but from the little i had read ( please whoever is much more informed to me on the argument, feel free to correct), the different faction, except some ideological core, fought for a free Poland in general and were more the circumstance of war, who's has been taken you prisoner and who feel had more possibilty to win the war being the general reason for the numbers of different group of polish freedom fighter...with the litteral fight between them over the future of the nation postponed after such place exist again and is at least moderaterly safe.
Frankly i see the immediate postwar situation of Poland more or less like Italy only on steroids, basically a goverment with a lot of claim and no possibility to get everything she ask with the addition of internal instability (both economical and political), hostile neighbours and private group that can act autonomous and force the hand of the goverment (basic the Polish equivalent of D'Annunzio takeover of Fiume).
Support for Pildusky ITTL can be more than tiepid as his planned Intermarum can be seen as a nice counter for Russia/UoE and Germany plus a buffer between the two, i look more for this to the UK and his perennial desire for a Balance of Power in continental Europe.
Regarding Versailles, while the lack of the Russian civil war and the presence at the conference of the UoE mean more stabililty for the balkan region and Turkey, it's also mean that the diplomatic fight will be much more severe than OTL and at the conference the wild card is Wilson; talking again of the italian situation, look how Jugoslavia greatly improved her bargain capacity by letting the US president deciding for her (supported by the UK and France that wanted both limiting italian expansion and made Wilson concentrate on other place while they go shopping) and 'forcing' the Adriatic question to rot unresolved till 1920 with all the know consequences. Now image Wilson taking the same approach with one of the new nation or in any case somewhat hostile towards the UoE or the Polish.
At this we must also take count of two other things:
- Wilson health, more stress will not him any good they can speed up his stroke
- The first red scare, no intervention in Siberia will ease the situation and for now the UoE are technically allies so going so much against the socialist will not be considered feasible or will have less popular support...post war? Who knows? Maybe there will be less scare and paranoia with a much more presentable goverment in charge, but it's not that people like Wilson and Palmer need much excuse to stir up trouble.
Yep i doubt that the UoE will go to war for Lithuanian land, too spent on the other side she will defend her own territory if the region decide to remain a member...maybe a middle ground can be logistic and diplomatic support for Vilnius in case even if an independent nation decide to sign a formal alliance with the Union as a mean to protection by 'greedy neighbourghs'
Poland will be complicated, but from the little i had read ( please whoever is much more informed to me on the argument, feel free to correct), the different faction, except some ideological core, fought for a free Poland in general and were more the circumstance of war, who's has been taken you prisoner and who feel had more possibilty to win the war being the general reason for the numbers of different group of polish freedom fighter...with the litteral fight between them over the future of the nation postponed after such place exist again and is at least moderaterly safe.
Frankly i see the immediate postwar situation of Poland more or less like Italy only on steroids, basically a goverment with a lot of claim and no possibility to get everything she ask with the addition of internal instability (both economical and political), hostile neighbours and private group that can act autonomous and force the hand of the goverment (basic the Polish equivalent of D'Annunzio takeover of Fiume).
Support for Pildusky ITTL can be more than tiepid as his planned Intermarum can be seen as a nice counter for Russia/UoE and Germany plus a buffer between the two, i look more for this to the UK and his perennial desire for a Balance of Power in continental Europe.
Regarding Versailles, while the lack of the Russian civil war and the presence at the conference of the UoE mean more stabililty for the balkan region and Turkey, it's also mean that the diplomatic fight will be much more severe than OTL and at the conference the wild card is Wilson; talking again of the italian situation, look how Jugoslavia greatly improved her bargain capacity by letting the US president deciding for her (supported by the UK and France that wanted both limiting italian expansion and made Wilson concentrate on other place while they go shopping) and 'forcing' the Adriatic question to rot unresolved till 1920 with all the know consequences. Now image Wilson taking the same approach with one of the new nation or in any case somewhat hostile towards the UoE or the Polish.
At this we must also take count of two other things:
- Wilson health, more stress will not him any good they can speed up his stroke
- The first red scare, no intervention in Siberia will ease the situation and for now the UoE are technically allies so going so much against the socialist will not be considered feasible or will have less popular support...post war? Who knows? Maybe there will be less scare and paranoia with a much more presentable goverment in charge, but it's not that people like Wilson and Palmer need much excuse to stir up trouble.
I don't think a red scare is likely at this point ITTL. Moscow is not (yet) apparently in the business of revolution export; anyway, the form of revolution they would end up trying to export (I expect that to happen to some extent eventually; and in a sense that's a plausible if simplistic way to look at what is already going on in Finland) is a whole lot less scarier than Bolshevik Red Terror.
The UoE is loyally fighting on side, which will count for something, and is in some ways even more appealing to American palates than the Tsarist regime was. While there are going to be tensions, their buildup is going to be more gradual. The UoE is also a lot less ideologically cohesive than historical Soviet Union, so that any Red Scare will have more trouble to identify a clear enemy ("Communism" is not as well defined as an ideological bloc at this point ITTL).
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While i agree totally with your analysis, i also don't understimate US enstablishment attitude towards and general treatment of union and socialist and Wilson pettyness and vengefull attitude...so i'm not totally ready to rule out that somekind of red scare will happen in the USA
I don't rule it out either, but if it happens, it will be more gradual and later than IOTL.
The next update is currently being edited by @Betelgeuse, so: time to reply to the remaining comments (all of which really make me happy!!!):
As for Polish national independence being shared as the primary goal and everything else coming second - that's also not what I'm gathering from what I've been reading so far. And I'm not speaking of people squarely opposed to Polish nationalism (like the PPS-Left which split off when Pilsudski steered the PPS too much into nationalist waters, or the SDKPDL or the various Jewish political parties - although all together they certainly made up roughly a quarter of the population even of the comparatively most homogenously Polish regions.
What I mean is that there was absolutely no agreement pre-1917/8 as to HOW and WHERE this Polish national state should be set up. With hindsight, it looks like everyone basically went for "as much as possible!!", but this is a) an oversimplification and b) was made possible only by the relative power void, especially to Poland's East. I'm only picking out Dmowski's Nadek vision vs. Pilsudski's PPS Miedzymorze: Dmowski had always wanted Poland to expand to the West, re-Slavicising formerly Slavic lands now held by the Germans, and he had envisioned this to happen in alliance with Russia. Don't look at the Dmowski Line, this was OTL 1919 in Versailles when a lot of things had gone awry with his initial plans. The Polish-Lithuanian war, the Polish-Soviet and the Polish-Ukrainian Wars were basically following Pilsudski's territorial vision of a multinational third block between Germany and the Russians, and until the oath crisis, Pilsudski had hoped to achieve this with German (and some of this associates later hoped for Austrian assistance instead) help. So, yes, all the Polish nationalists wanted a Polish nation state first, but that doesn't make them form a common army marching in the same direction if the circumstances look different from OTL with no Russian Civil War and Ukraine and Belarus firmly in the UoE and Lithuania probably allying with the latter, while the fate of Germany ITTL has not yet been decided...
The problem with the paramilitary groups running around and forcing the hand of the government is widespread throughout Eastern Europe really. But yes, there are some very high-flying conceptions, and their harsh confrontation with reality is not going to make for a nice post-war Polish political scene...
As I said, this is still an open question to me. Maybe Palmer will go after "Anarchists" instead - maybe Wilson dies earlier - maybe things are quite similar to OTL... we'll see!
I agree that Lithuania's options are limited. One aspect I would add which speaks more for the "loose treaty of alliance" version vs. a full incorporation as a Federative Republic is just how much more conservative the Lithuanian political landscape was in 1918ff. While there was the SDKPL, it was mostly Polish. Lithuanian politics were dominated between a Christian Democratic party, an Agrarian party (but not in the progressive-revolutionary-Narodnik sense like the SRs) and various right-wing conservative parties. There are socio-economic reasons behind this which are difficult to butterfly, so I suppose TTL's Lithuania is going to be rather conservative, too, so that it might consider a military alliance and a free trade agreement with the UoE useful, but it might shy away from joining a federal republic dominated by leftists, where the major political competition is between Narodniki and Marxist SDs...
With regards to the many ordinary people fighting in these units, I would agree that they were probably not primarily motivated by their political ideology. But many of them weren't really motivated by nationalism, either - except for the resistance fighters and the Blue Army which fights on the Western front, the other Polish contingents are mostly made up of conscripts who did not choose to fight.
As for Polish national independence being shared as the primary goal and everything else coming second - that's also not what I'm gathering from what I've been reading so far. And I'm not speaking of people squarely opposed to Polish nationalism (like the PPS-Left which split off when Pilsudski steered the PPS too much into nationalist waters, or the SDKPDL or the various Jewish political parties - although all together they certainly made up roughly a quarter of the population even of the comparatively most homogenously Polish regions.
What I mean is that there was absolutely no agreement pre-1917/8 as to HOW and WHERE this Polish national state should be set up. With hindsight, it looks like everyone basically went for "as much as possible!!", but this is a) an oversimplification and b) was made possible only by the relative power void, especially to Poland's East. I'm only picking out Dmowski's Nadek vision vs. Pilsudski's PPS Miedzymorze: Dmowski had always wanted Poland to expand to the West, re-Slavicising formerly Slavic lands now held by the Germans, and he had envisioned this to happen in alliance with Russia. Don't look at the Dmowski Line, this was OTL 1919 in Versailles when a lot of things had gone awry with his initial plans. The Polish-Lithuanian war, the Polish-Soviet and the Polish-Ukrainian Wars were basically following Pilsudski's territorial vision of a multinational third block between Germany and the Russians, and until the oath crisis, Pilsudski had hoped to achieve this with German (and some of this associates later hoped for Austrian assistance instead) help. So, yes, all the Polish nationalists wanted a Polish nation state first, but that doesn't make them form a common army marching in the same direction if the circumstances look different from OTL with no Russian Civil War and Ukraine and Belarus firmly in the UoE and Lithuania probably allying with the latter, while the fate of Germany ITTL has not yet been decided...
That is an interesting analogy which got me thinking for quite a while.
The problem with the paramilitary groups running around and forcing the hand of the government is widespread throughout Eastern Europe really. But yes, there are some very high-flying conceptions, and their harsh confrontation with reality is not going to make for a nice post-war Polish political scene...
Yeah, the UK might see things this way, but how far will they push it alone? France was on Dmowski's side and wanted primarily Germany curb-stomped; they might prefer keeping good relations with the UoE, too. And I don't see Wilson favouring the Intermarium idea, either.
Oh yes, it will!
Good point!
Agreed. I haven't settled on the question of an American Red Scare yet, but I won't rule it out, either.
This is also true, and I also see good reason for your gradual theory about anti-socialist and anti-UoE sentiment in the US.
As I said, this is still an open question to me. Maybe Palmer will go after "Anarchists" instead - maybe Wilson dies earlier - maybe things are quite similar to OTL... we'll see!
Rethinking about it, if the German and AH Empire fall leaving a geopolitical void in which some sort of revolutionary socialism is a major political player as it may be more likely ITTL, the UoE or some sort of enlarged and looser sort of it may actually see a serious opening for major Revolution Export (I guess it depends partly on how bad the CP armies collapse in the East before Vienna and Berlin ask for armistice; my guess is, it's not going to be pretty for Junkers, and even less for the Austro-Hungarian elites). If revolution in say, Hungary, happens with UoE support, that's a (major) thing. But if it happens in Germany... all bets are off. And Germany is even more clearly close to a truly pre-revolutionary state than IOTL.
In that case, I can see the West to go into a Red Scare mode quickly, and violently.
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I was hoping for an inward focus for the UoE. Re-establishing the Russian Empires territory and having a industrial revolution trumps exporting the revolution outside the nation. They wouldn’t be able to talk with a single voice until they settled matters anyway.
Though playing my own devils advocate: it might be the only thing they can agree on.
Still, leveraging a good relationship with France, Britain and the USA makes sense post war. Even the revolutionaries must understand they can’t change a vast nation like Russia without them
Though playing my own devils advocate: it might be the only thing they can agree on.
Still, leveraging a good relationship with France, Britain and the USA makes sense post war. Even the revolutionaries must understand they can’t change a vast nation like Russia without them
Depend, Hungary was as much a reaction towards Trianon than a true revolution and supporting them, not only mean creating a serious rift between the UoE and the rest of the Entente but also hurt Romanian and possible Czechslovackian interest, two very close allies at the moment.
A-H territory in case of surrender/collapse will be quickly (relatevely) under entente occupation and this mean that the window for any possible revolution will be very thin and will be quickly closed, probably not in all the empire, but in great part of it yes and even with similar ideologies, there are a lot of nationalistic spirit that will prevail and various group will probably fight more against each other than to start any socialist uprising (Yugoslavia will try to get Carinthia and everything that they can absorb, Austria and Hungary had a problematic border, the Czech are the more military organizated but also squeezed between Germany, Poland, Hungary and the UoE
The UK ITTL will probably push a lot Poland, unless France and/or UoE give up something else or Wilson go for stubbornly put his feet down regarding Poland borders...in any case it will cause some serious rift between London and Paris/Moscow with unforeeseble consequences.
IMVHO with the lack of effective widespread warfare in Russia, the various goverment will try to go for some type of action that can be denied in public with at least a modicum of credibility, basically using their own disorganization as an excuse to relax a control that's not very tight from the beginning (except the Czech, they have the more organizated military of the new future nation...but i expect that even them will suffer from unit that 'mutiny' and try to create fact on the ground or go to help 'spontaneus' popular revolt)
In much of former AH, "entente" occupation would mean "Russian" (that is UoE, or at least loosely aligned with Moscow) occupation. Which can lead to any sort of mess, since the UoE is far from centrally unified even ideologically and as you rightly point, all sorts of ethnic demands are going around (which of course, a UoE-like sort of multinational framework is the best way of solving in hindsight, but in context, very few people with a following are going to see the matter in that way). I think we agree the most of the entire former AH and parts of what were the westernmost parts of the Russian Empire and the easternmost ones of the German Empire are going to experience quite of a confused situation shortly... which was the case IOTL as well... but the governing outside force on that mess is going to be, by and large, the UoE itself, even if operating under sever constraints (but a lot less so than the Soviets IOTL).
Tyrol (innsbruck included), Austrian litoral and part of Dalmatia were quickly occupied by the italians OTL and i doubt that ITTL will be different, same for Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia and bits of OTL Austria and Hungary instead in the hands of the Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes and Croats (Pan-Jugoslavism is genuinly on the rage at the moment as Serbia seem to play with the other; sure things can be different due to the greater sufference of the population than OTL 'thanks' to the lessen resources and increased combat, but for now i doubt that they will be on the revolutionary socialism boat).
Galicia will be part of the Polish mess and in Boemia/Moravia there will be the Czech legion, basically one the most organizated easteuropean military force in OTL immediate postwar and i doubt that the UoE military will have the capability to say them no, when they will 'ask' to go to their home to help things up.
So while they will have influence the UoE it's hardly the postwar II URSS in term to capacity to export revoultion/impose his will in east europe
Agreed, I was referring to the Soviet Union in the aftermath of WWI. However, the Czech Legion is "loosely UoE-aligned" here, as is whatever will become of Romania.
Also agreed about Croatia, Bosnia, Tyrol etc. being not on the table. On the other hand, the UoE is already occupying most of the Ukrainian-majority parts of Galicia.
Sure they occupy Galicia...but i think that will be pleaseant like having a cat attached with the claw to your reproductive organ due to the Polish 'desire to be on their own' and diplomatically speaking will be a serious hot topic at Versailles; the Czech Legion is surely friendly to the UoE but this doesn't mean it will support/help export revolution and put Uoe interest as more important than their own. Regarding Romania, well regardless of the goverment there will be the 'screw Hungary' policy implemented and in general this closeness to Romania can make UoE diplomatic effort in the region more difficult
All absolutely true.
I never said there was going to be an orderly transition to Internationalist Workers' Paradise.
OTOH, we tend to look at the immediate WWI aftermath as a period of rampant ethnonationalism in Eastern Europe (and the Middle East) which IOTL it indeed was.
However, we should not forget that this is precisely because ethnationalism was the force able to fill the geopolitical void opened by the fall of the three CP Empires and the Russian one. Ethnonationalism would be solidified as the dominant political fixture of these regions just in this turbulent phase (though it was already a strong force before of course). I admit this is more visible in former Ottoman lands than in former Austrian ones, where national ethnic consciousness were more deeply rooted already. A very different political context may perhaps lead to a less toxically chauvinistic environment overall.
While nationalism will obviously matter and be among the ideological main drivers in the future in any case, it could be that it is not the sole determining factor in future borders and alignments ITTL.
That, in turn, could easily lessen its import in the future, blocking the destructive path that devastated Eastern Europe in the following generation (and again the Balkans in the ninenties) and still haunts it (not to mention how damning the trajectory has been in the Middle East and Caucaus to this day).
However, we should not forget that this is precisely because ethnationalism was the force able to fill the geopolitical void opened by the fall of the three CP Empires and the Russian one. Ethnonationalism would be solidified as the dominant political fixture of these regions just in this turbulent phase (though it was already a strong force before of course). I admit this is more visible in former Ottoman lands than in former Austrian ones, where national ethnic consciousness were more deeply rooted already. A very different political context may perhaps lead to a less toxically chauvinistic environment overall.
While nationalism will obviously matter and be among the ideological main drivers in the future in any case, it could be that it is not the sole determining factor in future borders and alignments ITTL.
That, in turn, could easily lessen its import in the future, blocking the destructive path that devastated Eastern Europe in the following generation (and again the Balkans in the ninenties) and still haunts it (not to mention how damning the trajectory has been in the Middle East and Caucaus to this day).
The next update will mirror how the UoE is internally divided over this question - both between the various factions and even many people in and of themselves being ambivalent about it.
I tend to agree with @lukedalton here. Various factors of OTL's Hungarian socialist revolution are missing ITTL (not only Bela Kun and the "Lenin Boys", but also the general model of "Soviet communism" as the absolute political Other to which you can try to ally yourself when you have no other hope left in this world...), so while Hungary is in a desperate position and it has a significant socialist movement, the outcome may well be rather different from OTL.
Also, yes, the Czechoslovak Legion is probably going to be the best-organised military force in the region.
Also, why would they? They could look forward to an independent Czechoslovak Republic maintaining friendly relations with the UoE, and will probably be very satisfied with this.
More on that soon - but yes, Yugoslavism is at its height in 1918, IOTL just like ITTL. I am considering having it soon take twists and turns quite different from OTL, though. Which may or may not stop their military forces from invading other regions. As far as the worsened material situation is concerned, yes, expect more Green Cadres than OTL being around by this point.
Hmmmm... If you look at the front line map in post #107 again, you will see that AT THE MOMENT, the UoE only controls the Easternmost portion of Galicia, around Tarnopol; they do not even have Lemberg/Lviv/Lwow under their control. This Easternmost part is mostly Ukrainian-speaking and confessionally Greco-Catholic, not Roman-Catholic. Its belonging to the Ukrainian Federative Republic will hardly be a bone of contention at *Versailles, I believe.
The problem begins when the front collapses or, as a condition of the armistice, the A-H army retreats (and dissolves in the process), which could well mean Union troops and Ukrainian forces pushing into the region and encountering nascent Polish formations there. Pushing they probably will, especially since the Czechoslovak Legion will need to cross Galicia in order to reach Slovakia (let alone Bohemia-Moravia). Let's see how that goes.
While I would say that in the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks have really set this avalanche of nationalist violence in motion already before the PoD, I tend to agree that ethno-nationalism was the leading political model in the region and beyond IOTL for reasons which have a lot to do with how WW1 went and ended and with how its aftermath was managed.
The concept of a multi-national federal outlook is, by the way, not only being practiced by the UoE at the moment. There were plenty of people in 1918 around IOTL who toyed with such ideas - the whole Miedzymorze thing had strong federalist rhetoric to it, and among (mostly) Austrian Social Democrats, reform ideas centering around the so-called "personality principle" enjoyed great popularity, in which nations would establish themselves through free individual adherence and be entrusted with a self-administration which would thus not follow unitary territorial delineations but self-affiliated national delineations. So, even the idea of the "nation state" could receive a new angle in a timeline where such projects have a chance. Whether TTL meets this condition, is a different question.
On the other hand, there are armed nationalist groups around in many parts of Eastern Europe: the Macedonian IMRO, Serbian Chetniks, various Croatian groups, the Bohemian Maffie, the aforementioned Polish groups... they won't just go away.