Federalist French Revolution?

Historically French Revolution was controlled by the Jacobins, i.e. Those who want to stamp out regional identities in favour of a national one.

What if the french revolution was regionalist like the Spanish Revolution? A revolution that emphasise on regional cultural differences?
 
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The problem is that girondine federalism is essentially a non-urban elitist stance. Girondings were not only far from a political party with a same line, but federalism was a bit too much tied with counter-revolutionnary tendencies (or at the very last, the tendencies that wanted to full stop at 1791).

I would point, that while what was really proposed by Girondins was some sort of decentralization, the actual federalism stance was essentially a anti-girondine accusation based more on fears of what could happen in a civil war (as in département refusing to federate with the others, and try to pull a federation of its own with others) than a real political program.
 

Sulemain

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One thing I've never really been able to get an answer for is why the French Revolution went so nutty as it did, from the Constitutional Monarchy that was established to The Terror.
 
If a regionalist revolution was not possible, how about a regionalist restoration?

None would have been possible, going against the tendency of the times.

While Ancien Régime kept a great deal of decentralized institutions, these tended to disappear before more centralized ones (Parliments and Estates being less relevant after a time than Généralités). It's why the king called the General Estates rather than using traditional institutions, as it made him the political referent.

At the very "best", you would have a return to pre-1789 institutions, but a return to 1791 administration under the royal power seems more plausible IMHO.
 
One thing I've never really been able to get an answer for is why the French Revolution went so nutty as it did, from the Constitutional Monarchy that was established to The Terror.

Basically because the Constitutional Monarchy was eventually desired by no political faction. King, court and high nobility wanted to restore a true royal power; urban elites wanted a British-like system, rural elites (including nobility) wanted a return to the good old times where the king had a powerful councils, and radical elites wanted a more or less democratic system.

Such fool's bargain was doomed to crush, big time. The war declaration made the crush even more dramatic, as it tied inner issues to the real risk of a foreign invasion (that is, at the beggining of nationalist age, wasn't going to do much good).

Eventually, a radical change had to appear and, effectivly, the Terror managed to get the upper hand thanks to a radical program. What was criticized was less the Terror than that it lasted after the foreign invasion and civil war prospect were far less threatening.
The same elites (at least, outside great cities) that hailed the Constituion of 1791 were the same that supported the Terror, the same that claimed being anti-Montagnards from the start, and the best supporters of Bonaparte.

So, lacking of real stable support from outside urban movements, Montagnards factions (remember, there's no real unified party during French Revolution), willing to set in place their political program, were much wary of their rivals and opponents (that's why Robespierre tried to calm down inner divisions by beheading the leaders of radical and moderate factions, being both opposed to a greated radicalisation and to compromise with the center).
 
The problem is that girondine federalism is essentially a non-urban elitist stance.
Girondins certainly seized and held for months several major cities in Southern France - Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux.

What would it take for the Girondins to repel the counterattack of Jacobin armies?
 
Girondins certainly seized and held for months several major cities in Southern France - Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux.
When you look at a map about it, a really interesting thing can be seen : Revolted cities and regions were often commercial regional or local centers, that definitely knew a crisis in face of the global war on the French Revolution; but not directly threatened by them.

Then you have to remember that "federalist" takeover, is a political rather than military (forces involved being largely under 1 000 men) one. Elites, notables always had to dispute their influence to lasting jacobine influence (that was sometimes important and rooted enough, to make Girondins execute them as in Marseille, where they held the municipality before Girondin takeover) and eventually, Montagnards managed to use differents points to make this influence winning over when possible (see point 3)

There were places, as Avignon, that were under Girondin (from Marseille rather than local ones) only for 1 month, by exemple, leading to Marseille's Jacobin to grew in more important force. See the conflict there was far less a classical civil war (as in Russian Civil War) that a struggle of power with each technically girondine held region having to fight with not only revolutionnary armies but as well against local jacobine sections.

What would it take for the Girondins to repel the counterattack of Jacobin armies?
1) Royalist/Coalition support. And that would be the political, then physical, death of Girondins. IOTL the occasional alliances or truces did decredibilized them totally, as it happened in Provence.

2) Montagnards crumbling onto their own contradictions. It would make civil war worse and lasting, but Girondins could hold their ground.

3) Montagnards being far less prone to compromise than IOTL. Historically, they knew they could won politically said cities and regions, face to the growing danger of Coalition and royalists insurrection. Eventually, the so-called federalist insurrection died out off strong support.
Having Montagnards pulling a far radical politic (that in face of these danger, would be their political death, followed by a physical one), could allow Girondins to hold more for a time.
 
One thing I've never really been able to get an answer for is why the French Revolution went so nutty as it did, from the Constitutional Monarchy that was established to The Terror.

A big part of it was that the elections of 1792 (which produced the National Convention, and later the Terror) were not very democratic in the modern sense - although there was universal manhood suffrage, there was no secret ballot, and thus Jacobin sympathizers (who were better-organized than rival groups) engaged in a significant amount of voter intimidation. Also, many royalists did not vote at all, regarding the new regime as illegitimate. Overall turnout was reportedly only around 12%.
 
A big part of it was that the elections of 1792 (which produced the National Convention, and later the Terror) were not very democratic in the modern sense - although there was universal manhood suffrage, there was no secret ballot, and thus Jacobin sympathizers (who were better-organized than rival groups) engaged in a significant amount of voter intimidation. Also, many royalists did not vote at all, regarding the new regime as illegitimate. Overall turnout was reportedly only around 12%.

This.

History could have been changed if the Jacobin thugs were checked?
 
Actually, the elections condition relativly disfavoured popular support.
Depsite the nominal universal suffrage, only contributors were really able to vote, without real modification of ratio of voters in countryside.
You have to couple that with an ongoing tendency to abstention (10% of Paris voters actually voted) and to moderation : so much for voter intimidation.

For the better organisation of jacobins, I really disagree. They gained support and organisation precisely because 1792 elections granted them so (thanks to the war, with left being favoured in threatened départements, as mentioned above).
Furthermore, far from being an unified party, they were divised in many tendencies called afterwards : Montagne (itself pretty much divided), Girondine Jacobins, Plaine Jacobins.

A revolutionnary club is more an affiliation than a party : no programs, no platform, no real assembly group.

Contrary to Paris, furthermore, if Jacobins managed to gain hold on several places, don't really succeed to get over local notabilities : either abandoning provinces (as Robespierre), or searching local compromises.

Eventually the first victor of 1792 are center/center-left revolutionaries, while the Marais would be eventually more and more joined up by Montagne, it's this group that would eventually rule France up to 1799, supporting different groups regarding what they saw as necessary (as in, not much criticizing Terror and even supporting it, but doing so when it was considered as no longer necessary).
 
Actually, the elections condition relativly disfavoured popular support.
Depsite the nominal universal suffrage, only contributors were really able to vote, without real modification of ratio of voters in countryside.
You have to couple that with an ongoing tendency to abstention (10% of Paris voters actually voted) and to moderation : so much for voter intimidation.

For the better organisation of jacobins, I really disagree. They gained support and organisation precisely because 1792 elections granted them so (thanks to the war, with left being favoured in threatened départements, as mentioned above).
Furthermore, far from being an unified party, they were divised in many tendencies called afterwards : Montagne (itself pretty much divided), Girondine Jacobins, Plaine Jacobins.

A revolutionnary club is more an affiliation than a party : no programs, no platform, no real assembly group.

Contrary to Paris, furthermore, if Jacobins managed to gain hold on several places, don't really succeed to get over local notabilities : either abandoning provinces (as Robespierre), or searching local compromises.

Eventually the first victor of 1792 are center/center-left revolutionaries, while the Marais would be eventually more and more joined up by Montagne, it's this group that would eventually rule France up to 1799, supporting different groups regarding what they saw as necessary (as in, not much criticizing Terror and even supporting it, but doing so when it was considered as no longer necessary).

You are probably more knowledgeable about this topic than I am, but I did read before that part of the reason for the low turnout was that in areas where pro-Revolution factions were in power (referring to them all as "Jacobins" may be overstating things, granted) intimidation of voters was substantial, to the point where many people were afraid to cast a ballot for the "wrong" candidate and so didn't even come to the polls.
 
but I did read before that part of the reason for the low turnout was that in areas where pro-Revolution factions were in power (referring to them all as "Jacobins" may be overstating things, granted) intimidation of voters was substantial, to the point where many people were afraid to cast a ballot for the "wrong" candidate and so didn't even come to the polls.

It's actually quite the contrary. You had more votes in urban settings, while countryside votes didn't changed qualitativly or quantitativly in 1792.
Furthermore, all, and I mean it, all factions represented were pro-revolution. No one could have presented himself (and would have recieved support) if they weren't.

Regarding Jacobins, again, that's an affiliation rather than a faction. All Montagnards weren't such, and some Girondins could be. Consider it as a both a lobby and a think tank.
It wasn't before late 1793 that it became truly semi-institutional.

And before intimidating, you need to have something intimidating in favor of : you had such, but it was more for general political values (phraseology, support of revolutionnary process, proximity with people, participation to revolution ideological and intellectual life, virtues, etc.) and for individuals rather than semi-existing groups.
It's at the point there was no political campaign to speak of.

The most clear intimidating feature I can think are essentially Parisian ones, and less the fact of Jacobins than Paris Commune (that was a real institution) that imposed a non-secret vote on the Jacobin hall in order to actually watch over them.
Not that some people actually joined up Commune and Jacobins, as Robespierre, but that's more of a factional hegemony tempered by insurrection.

Yes, French Revolution was truly a mess on this regard.
 
Historically French Revolution was controlled by the Jacobins, i.e. Those who want to stamp out regional identities in favour of a national one.

You reasonning have one flaw : The Jacobins were not stricto sensu in favour of stamping out regional identities. It was the feuillants who first proposed French as the only language of the French republic, and the girondins who were federalists, were also Jacobins. No one really wanted regional identities, even the girondins, to exist (except some parts of local royalist movement but even then it was more of a ploy from the aristocrats to associate themselves with the peasantry). The Girondins were federalists because it was the best solution for them to keep their power against the centralizing Montagnards.

What you are thinking of is the modern meaning of Jacobinism.

Also if people would drop their caricatural rightwing/anglosaxon view of the terror it would be great.
 
Also if people would drop their caricatural rightwing/anglosaxon view of the terror it would be great.

I'd like to, but It's like get out of a small cage, thinking that you are free, only to find yourself in a larger cage.

In my case, the smaller cage was a communist education system that glorifies the French Revolution, and the larger cage is what you call "caricatural rightwing/anglosaxon view of the terror".
 
You reasonning have one flaw : The Jacobins were not stricto sensu in favour of stamping out regional identities.
Jacobins having no political program to speak of, as they weren't (far from it) an unified structure, you had different stances on it. Most generally it was a mere continuation of Ancien Régime linguistical policy, as in making french the official language, without actively searching to reduce the other ones (and being forced eventually, to make propaganda and information in other languages than french).

, and the girondins who were federalists, were also Jacobins.
Not exactly, you had roughly, IIRC, around half of Girondins that were either assimilated as Jacobins or part of the club. French Revolution is really about overlapping identities and belongings, explaining why depsite regular institutional and political changes, it's still maintained as a continued feature.

The Girondins were federalists because it was the best solution for them to keep their power against the centralizing Montagnards.
Both the centralism of Montagnards and the federalism of Girondins is to be prooved.
Federalism was an accusation against revolted Girondine-held towns and section, as in they were seen as threatening national unity, unwilling to comply to a national governance to favour their local power.
A modern comparison would be "municipal fiefdom".

But Girondins themselves never really, and the fact they weren't a party or even an unified faction did played fully there, promoted a federalist constitution or governance, but highlighted the most decentralized part of 1791 constitution, making départements being the necessary and immediate political counterpart of citizenship instead of the Assembly for their opponents.

Not that their opponents were much "centralizing". Most of their decisions concerning this were due to the ongoing war and Commune of Paris interventionism, and the institutionalisation of Jacobin clubs in all the territory allowed the appearance of a political decentralisation, that was eventually short-lived.

Both postures were eventually imposed by events : one searching decentralisation as for surviving outside Assembly, the other seeing war as necessiting centralizing features (being supported in that by the center)

What you are thinking of is the modern meaning of Jacobinism.

Also if people would drop their caricatural rightwing/anglosaxon view of the terror it would be great.
Because french school on Terror is so much better, and far less ideologically biased.

All things considered, I consider François Furet work on it more interesting and actually historical (depsite his conclusions) than a pseudo-marxist school making 1793 not only a predecessor of 1917, but it's historical social counterpart (as in a revolution of people rather than elites) and that's in keeping this strict parallelism that Furet makes the more mistakes (identifying 1793 as proto-communist is a leitmotif of both french radical left and radical right-wing)
 
snip the interesting discussion about the politics of revolution, it is far too late for that.

Because french school on Terror is so much better, and far less ideologically biased.

All things considered, I consider François Furet work on it more interesting and actually historical (depsite his conclusions) than a pseudo-marxist school making 1793 not only a predecessor of 1917, but it's historical social counterpart (as in a revolution of people rather than elites) and that's in keeping this strict parallelism that Furet makes the more mistakes (identifying 1793 as proto-communist is a leitmotif of both french radical left and radical right-wing)

Actually i think Vovelle have a far more interesting reading of the Revolution (and he is a quasi-marxist who don't read 1789 as a predecessor of 1917), he actually realize that their wasn't one revolution but several at the same time, that the revolution drifted in several directions due to diverging interest and that while some "revolutions" succeeded and thus their supporters militancy died, other got stuck and never realized their objectives. And there are more than one school of historiography in French concerning the revolution, something that can't really be said about the anglo-saxon historiography which is overwhelmingly on the rightwing side of the debate).
 
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snip the interesting discussion about the politics of revolution, it is far too late for that.
Il n'y a pas d'heure pour les braves. :D

Actually i think Vovelle have a far more interesting reading of the Revolution (and he is a quasi-marxist who don't read 1789 as a predecessor of 1917), he actually realize that their wasn't one revolution but several at the same time, that the revolution drifted in several directions due to diverging interest
Well, François Furet was one of the first contemporary historians to actually "cut" the French Revolution as such rather than distinct entities and events tied up by chronology.

Not to not give Vovelle his own merits, but at the difference of Furet (and searching in an interesting direction) he focus on the ideological and cultural revolutionnary history, when the first was about a social history (and really, there's a before/after Furet that is clearly distinguishable on this regard, whatever we agree on his views or not).
They're not talking of the exact same thing on this regard, even if I think Vovelle represent a newer breath that takes as much from IHRF than revisionist schools would it be only by reaction.

and that while some "revolutions" succeeded and thus their supporters militancy died, other got stuck and never realized their objectives.
I would disagree with the radical end of these "revolutions". Especially in province, the supporters of Terror were the same than Directoire, Napoléon or Louis XVIII.
The complete mess, comparable to the collapse of Russia in WW1, allowed an explosion of political program (more or less half-assed), utopies or pragmatics.
The history of French Revolution could be seed as an history of political compromises in the name of revolutionnaries values (themselves changing depending on the context, thanks to a dialectic twist) between factions and individuals, pointing out the importance of center in revolutionnary policies and eventually the lack of stable institutions (being seen as far less relevant than the values they were based on).

And there are more than one school of historiography in French concerning the revolution, something that can't really be said about the anglo-saxon historiography which is overwhelmingly on the rightwing side of the debate).
That's actually untrue, for several reasons.
There's a tendency in France to call "anglo-saxon school" every thing that was more or less formalized in Britain or America, but really widely supported by french historians more than american or british.
And as there's more than one school of historiography in France, you have more (far more actually, Anglo-American studies being let stuck with school cloisonments and generally less conservative : French historiography basically lives on its reputation) in Anglo-American studies about French Revolution.

The big problem about Anglo-American studies are they're rarely translated, and that they're rarely read in original language. It's easy to depict an "anglo-saxon" school as right-wing led when there's little to none original material avaible, and when this expression is used as an accusation against right-winger (or seen as such) historians.

Who led the revisionist school in the late XXth weren't British or American historians, but Furet. Calling it "anglo-saxon" school is just a cheap attempt at criticism without really caring about studying and answering his position.

I fail to see the common point betwen Alfred Cobban, arguing that French Revolution was a political revolution and not a social one; and say Richard Cobb that was far more close to IHRF positions. Or between Shimon Schama and his half-assed works and Lynn Hunt.
 
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