Fate of a daughter of Pompey and Julia

You make a reasonable point. However, would he disavow Caesar in this scenario? Thats a sharp divide.
Of course he wouldn't, as he didn't IOTL until faced with no other choice. The immediate events that led to the civil war was a comedy of errors of judgement from both sides, pushed past a breaking point by the independent machinations of Curio once he realized he could use the brinkmanship to further his own political career. It wouldn't take much to avert civil war and have Caesar return to Rome peacefully as neither full ally nor political opponent of Pompey.
 
If anything I think Caesar and Pompey would try and use her as a marriage tool to designate a potential successor (if not in name then at least in practice) by giving her hand to a political ally (e.g. Publius Clodius, Quintus Cicero, or Domitius Ahenobarbus). I think the history of the late Republic shows that political equilibrium is impossible when multiple powerful men hold sway in Rome at the same time. Ever since the rivalry between the Gracchi and Scipio Nasica, there was never a stable political situation in Rome until after Actium. One possible exception is the relationship between Octavian and Agrippa, but I'd view this as the exception rather than the rule. Since Pompey and Caesar had independent bases of support (read: different legions and clients loyal to each other), it wouldn't be possible to reconcile them with something as simple as a daughter.

But for the sake of argument, let's assume that it does make a difference. By the time of Julia's death in 54 BCE, Crassus had left Rome and Caesar was busy in Britain, so Pompey was well-positioned to make the most of his situation. Cicero was back in Rome, and all our written records indicate that Pompey and Cicero were close allies for much of the period from 58 BCE to Pompey's death in 48 BCE. With a powerful ally like Cicero and a daughter as political capital, Pompey would likely attempt a marriage between this new daughter (Pompeia from here on out) and either Cicero's brother Quintus (in an attempt to win over his support from Caesar's camp), or a family relation of one of his other senatorial allies such as Metellus Scipio, Domitius Ahenobarbus, Marcus Bibulus, or even Marcus Brutus. Brutus would be an interesting pick since Brutus himself hated Pompey, but the marriage of Pompeia could be used as a tool to either expand his political clientele or to solidify the cohesion of his existing clientele. Assuming the Civil War was not inevitable, and that Pompey was not actively trying to undermine Caesar, Brutus or Quintus Cicero would be natural choices (or even Publius Crassus if his early death is avoided), since both men had good relationships with Caesar. The TL would unfold depending on which choice Pompey makes so I'll propose two solutions depending on which course of action he takes.

Pompey becomes sole ruler of Rome:
With a POD at 54 BCE, Caesar is at the current high point of his career (having "won victories" in Britain and Germany), but Pompey's star is also rising, given his consulship in the previous year and upcoming consulship in 51 BCE (assuming that Clodius dies at the same time). Even if events play out slightly differently, Pompey's urgent goal is to remove Publius Clodius and Titus Milo from power, and to that end, Pompey begins to raise troops in Italy, perhaps even bringing some over from Spain or Greece. The events between 54 and 50 BCE play out the same (Crassus dies at Carrhae, Caesar wins at Alesia, the senate orders Caesar to stand down his army). The real critical juncture comes in 49 BCE. The only difference between TTL and OTL is that Pompey has custody over Caesar's granddaughter. Pompey still marries Metellus Scipio's daughter ITTL, and therefore his ties to Caesar are minimal. If anything, Pompeia's status in Rome as Caesar's only descendant could jeopardize Caesar's own dynastic plans, so Pompey (or the senate if you like) is holding all the cards in this scenario (just like IOTL). Pompey has total control of the senate and Caesar has bribed the tribunes, so politics are broken. The only real variable here is what Caesar does when his proconsular term expires. If he views his granddaughter as vital to his future political plans, then he has virtually no choice but to step down from power, since she could be killed if any open violence breaks out. Of course, IOTL he had "no choice" but to step down, and he didn't, so it's possible that he may march on Rome ITTL regardless. Maybe Pompey wins some political points since Caesar is marching on Rome with his granddaughter in the city, "Can you believe that? What utter disregard for his own family! What a monster!" but ultimately probably very few effects from this development. So maybe Pompey is able to win over some marginal senators with promises of a future marriage to his daughter, but I have my doubts. In this new civil war, Caesar loses and is either executed or banished, leaving Pompey in sole control of Rome. Does he establish a dictatorship? Unlikely, since he was already powerful in the senate and had few rivals for power besides Caesar and Crassus, and they're both gone. Maybe Cato complains a bunch ITTL, but that wouldn't really be a stretch from IOTL. The Republic survives a bit longer, but eventually it's probable that the same rivalries will emerge one generation down the road (this time perhaps Sextus Pompey will fight against Brutus and Cassius), or the eventual husband of Pompeia will himself become a man of influence in opposition to the Catonians. Either way, the civil wars will likely continue, and eventually either a descendant of Pompey or another powerful demagogue is finally able to become emperor (or the Roman state falls apart).

Pompey creates the second triumvirate:

Same POD as above, except we assume that the senate is the manipulative faction, and Pompey holds no animosity towards or fear of Caesar. In this scenario, Pompey will marry Octavia (sister of Octavian) which is what Caesar offered IOTL after Julia's death. With their marriage ties reinforced, Pompey would be faced with a problem. Clodius was an ally of Caesar at the time (at least implicitly when Caesar supported Clodius' brother for the consulship in 54 BCE), and Pompey was marginally an ally of Cicero at the time (given Pompey's role in the ending of Cicero's banishment). However Clodius and Cicero were bitter enemies, and they were both powerful men in the city of Rome. So Pompey would have to either pick a side or marginalize both of them. IOTL he sided with Cicero, which is probably what he would do ITTL. However, to sell that proposition to Caesar, he would have to guarantee that the new Pompey-Cicero coalition wouldn't turn against him. To do that, he may marry Sextus or Pompeia to allies of Caesar (perhaps betrothing Sextus to Octavia and Pompeia to Marc Antony or any of Caesar's other legates). There are honestly way too many factors at play here for me to speculate much further, since (in my view at least) the years 54 to 49 BCE are pretty much defined by Pompey's maneuvering against Caesar, and imho every event would be completely different. However, since both the 1st and 2nd triumvirates IOTL ended in civil war, I doubt that this hypothetical Caesar-Pompey-Cicero triumvirate would be any more stable.

Well, Pompey could have gone on his own military adventure while Crassus was invading Parthia, but he chose to remain in Rome. It seems to me that he had the opportunity to make quite a bit out of his situation, and simply didn’t.

I take issue with this. Pompey already had a credible military career including a war against Cilician pirates, the Third Mithridatic War, ending the Spartacus revolt, and the Sertorian War (among others). He probably saw more military conquests as a dead end since after the Third Mithridatic War he ended up being unable to pay his veterans anyways and needed the help of Crassus and Caesar to resolve his veterans' discontent. If anything, by remaining in Rome, Pompey was able to increase his power exponentially, and this is what eventually caused the Civil War of 49 BCE, rather than the senate doing anything to manipulate Pompey. The time Pompey spent in Rome during Caesar's absence was very productive from his POV. He was able to dislodge both Publius Clodius and Titus Milo from their demagogue-like statuses, recall Cicero from exile (who would then become a major ally of his in the senate), ally himself with numerous powerful senators including his eventual father-in-law Metellus Scipio, rig several consecutive consular elections, and even become elected as the sole consul in 51 BCE (which is effectively a dictatorship).

Pompey failed because he was simply a bad politician but his underlying calculus-that the triumvirate had only seen his political fortunes further deteriorate- was correct.

I'd say he rather failed simply because Caesar ended up being a better general, winning a decisive victory at Pharsalus. Our sources portray Pompey as a bit of a bumbling fool, but we should keep in mind that history is written by the victors, and the next 500 years of history are written by people who basically believed that Caesar was a god. If you read between the lines, Pompey was a deft politician that was simply in over his head, much like another competent politician/general from earlier in history: Cinna. Both Pompey and Cinna were excellent generals, popular and able politicians, but they lost because they weren't *quite* as good at being generals or *quite* as magnetic or charismatic as Sulla or Caesar. Sometimes history is decided by chance after all, and it's easy to say that either the victory of Sulla or Caesar was inevitable (hindsight is 20/20 after all), but we shouldn't write off Pompey as an idiot just because he was only the 2nd most powerful man in the world and lost to the 1st most powerful.
 
Pompey always struck me as a surprisingly unambitious man (compared to contemporaries) when it came to politics. Unless Caesar gets paranoid and tries to push Pompey out I think Pompey will be quite satisfied seeking glory in foreign lands and/or in quiet domestic life with Julia (probably also in some foreign land if Julius gets his way). In this situation there's little reason for Caesar to not work within the system as he's virtually unopposed.[/QUOTE]

It’s not that he wasn’t ambitious, he just didn’t know how to set things in motion to realize his ambitions. Everything the man ever achieved was served upon him on a silver platter, Sulla gave him the task to destroy Carbo’s army, child’s play. The Sertorian war, he never truly won it. The Lex Gabinia, which he didn’t even promote, gave him the war against the pirates, with immense authority on everything, again, child’s play. The lex Manilia gave him the war against Mithirdates, whom Lucullus has already beaten up, one quick battle and it was done with. After that, he became the instrument of people stronger than him, namely Caesar and then Cato. Let’s say Julia lives, and has a child. Caesar will hold the reins, Pompey will be pushed out of actual power more and more, he’ll grow resentful and get under Cato’s wing. What I think is, once Caesar is done with his war in Parthia, cause he’ll have the chance to do that, things will go exactly as in OTL, only this time Caesar will have a new power base, he’ll win anyway, cause come on, Caesar vs Pompey is still a no brainer, even if they’re aged up a little, Julia’s child will be used to reconcile Caesar’s party with Pompey’s party once the dust is settled. If it’s a daughter, she’s marrying Octavian, if it’s a son, he’s marrying Octavia Minor, whether she likes it or not.
 
Some interesting points on both sides. I find Quintus Cicero an unlikely match for Pompeia - age gaps were fine for these things, but thats a five decade gap, and she’s not of marriageable age until, at least, 43 BC.

Marcus Minor, Cicero’s son, could be a decent fit.
 
Some interesting points on both sides. I find Quintus Cicero an unlikely match for Pompeia - age gaps were fine for these things, but thats a five decade gap, and she’s not of marriageable age until, at least, 43 BC.

Marcus Minor, Cicero’s son, could be a decent fit.

Just a throwaway suggestion, not really that serious since Quintus Cicero was a marginal politician anyways. Plus age gaps like that were nothing to the Romans, Pompey himself married Cornelia Metella when he was 34 years older. Purely hypothetical though, and personally I'd love to see a TL where she marries Publius Crassus, since he had such a promising career.
 
I'd say he rather failed simply because Caesar ended up being a better general, winning a decisive victory at Pharsalus.
Getting into a civil war in the first place was a failure because it's something neither Pompey nor Caesar wanted.
Our sources portray Pompey as a bit of a bumbling fool, but we should keep in mind that history is written by the victors, and the next 500 years of history are written by people who basically believed that Caesar was a god.
Pompey was not a bumbling fool but he was also not a good politician. This should not be surprising-he came to prominence in the middle of a civil war as a military man. He skipped the entire cursus honorum, and was immediately given the job of saving the republican position against Sertorious in Spain, and then followed it up with being granted extraordinary powers to rid the sea of piracy, following that up by stealing the glory from Lucullus in the conclusion of the Mithradatic War. He achieved all of this without having to get himself too involved in any domestic politics. If he ever had any intention of following in Sulla's footsteps, he would have done so at this point.

But he didn't. And this is a key misunderstanding of late republican politics that often gets lost in these debates. He didn't, because like any aristocratic Roman, he didn't want absolute dictatorial power, he wanted to amass power within the system, and become the most important man in the system. No Roman senatorial aristocrat, even at this time, wanted to end the rule of the Senate. Sulla marched on Rome as a last resort, but in his view, he was marching on Rome to save the oligarchic system. He never wanted to be dictator-and resigned the post once he believed that job was complete. The same went for Caesar-dictator for life was never his goal and he went to great lengths to avoid a civil war-as did Pompey, I might add. He may have rationalized staying in power indefinitely, but that was after the fact.

It's important to emphasize how truly radical Augustus's move was-it took 20 years of virtually non-stop civil war, 20 years of the power of the senate being virtually obsolete, before he was able to move towards establishing permanent semi-dynastic rule. And crucially, for this idea to even be in the cards, Augustus had to grow up in a world where the Senate was never functioning. Augustus was entering his teens when the civil war started-he was 10 when the gang war between Clodius and Milo was at its peak, resulting in Clodius's death and Pompey's emergency dictatorship. His first serious involvement in politics was in the aftermath of Caesar's assassination. That context is crucial for understanding why Augustus could even consider taking that step that nobody before him had tried. He didn't have any attachment to the traditional republican system because he never saw it function.
 
Getting into a civil war in the first place was a failure because it's something neither Pompey nor Caesar wanted.

Pompey was not a bumbling fool but he was also not a good politician. This should not be surprising-he came to prominence in the middle of a civil war as a military man. He skipped the entire cursus honorum, and was immediately given the job of saving the republican position against Sertorious in Spain, and then followed it up with being granted extraordinary powers to rid the sea of piracy, following that up by stealing the glory from Lucullus in the conclusion of the Mithradatic War. He achieved all of this without having to get himself too involved in any domestic politics. If he ever had any intention of following in Sulla's footsteps, he would have done so at this point.

But he didn't. And this is a key misunderstanding of late republican politics that often gets lost in these debates. He didn't, because like any aristocratic Roman, he didn't want absolute dictatorial power, he wanted to amass power within the system, and become the most important man in the system. No Roman senatorial aristocrat, even at this time, wanted to end the rule of the Senate. Sulla marched on Rome as a last resort, but in his view, he was marching on Rome to save the oligarchic system. He never wanted to be dictator-and resigned the post once he believed that job was complete. The same went for Caesar-dictator for life was never his goal and he went to great lengths to avoid a civil war-as did Pompey, I might add. He may have rationalized staying in power indefinitely, but that was after the fact.

It's important to emphasize how truly radical Augustus's move was-it took 20 years of virtually non-stop civil war, 20 years of the power of the senate being virtually obsolete, before he was able to move towards establishing permanent semi-dynastic rule. And crucially, for this idea to even be in the cards, Augustus had to grow up in a world where the Senate was never functioning. Augustus was entering his teens when the civil war started-he was 10 when the gang war between Clodius and Milo was at its peak, resulting in Clodius's death and Pompey's emergency dictatorship. His first serious involvement in politics was in the aftermath of Caesar's assassination. That context is crucial for understanding why Augustus could even consider taking that step that nobody before him had tried. He didn't have any attachment to the traditional republican system because he never saw it function.

Not sure we actually disagree at all. I guess I'd give Pompey more credit in being a good politician, even if he was also very lucky in his early career. Although I would also like to add one thing. Sulla marched on Rome as a "last resort" in 81 BCE after the takeover of the city by Cinna during the First Mithridatic War, but he also marched on Rome as a first resort in 88 BCE after having his command in Greece revoked with no attempt at negotiation with Marius. Although to be fair that's just a matter of semantics.
 
Not sure we actually disagree at all. I guess I'd give Pompey more credit in being a good politician, even if he was also very lucky in his early career. Although I would also like to add one thing. Sulla marched on Rome as a "last resort" in 81 BCE after the takeover of the city by Cinna during the First Mithridatic War, but he also marched on Rome as a first resort in 88 BCE after having his command in Greece revoked with no attempt at negotiation with Marius. Although to be fair that's just a matter of semantics.
I don't think Pompey was a completely inept politician-he knew the value of spectacle and the importance of optics over effort (stealing the glory for Spartacus from Crassus being a prime example). He also knew how to deal with client kingdoms, and was particularly adept at administration. He was just way out of his element in the traditional horse trading and coalition building of classic Republican politics, and yet he really wanted to succeed at it. Which is how you get him making a series of blunders that left him with no good options when he formed the triumvirate. By the late 50s I think he had finally figured the game out, but by then events moved beyond his control.
 
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