Fastest Allied victory with a POD AFTER December 7, 1941

[Carl Schwamberger]

So far this thread has discussed Allied decisions, actions, & wanks. What about worse Axis actions. One I've been pondering would be Hitler underestimating the Allied invasion threat in the spring of 1944. Significant mechanized forces are retained in the east & Hitler dictates Rommels strategy of defeating the invasion at the waters edge must be depended on. So, only two panzer corps in Normandy vs the OYL number?

Might be fun to game that one out.

 

[Aber]

One I've been pondering would be Hitler underestimating the Allied invasion threat in the spring of 1944.

Interesting idea. So the Germans don't believe the inflated Fortitude order of battle in the UK, but are concerned about Operation Shingle type operations in the Eastern Med and bringing Turkey into the war?

Panzer Group West is now Panzer Group Vienna, and on 5th June is committed to Italy due to the fall of Rome. Rommel is forced to keep infantry units back from the caost (eg 352nd) to give himself a reserve, thinning out the beach defences, and allowing the original airborne plan. With no Panzer Lehr or 12SS the British rapidly push south, west of the Orne as far as Vire; the US push south of St Lo to the coast. Cherbourg falls slightly quicker.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Interesting idea. So the Germans don't believe the inflated Fortitude order of battle in the UK, but are concerned about Operation Shingle type operations in the Eastern Med and bringing Turkey into the war?

I was thinking the ever erratic Hitler chooses to position & build up the armored forces in the east, to defeat the Soviet spring & summer offensives. He latches onto Rommels idea the invasion in the west can be defeated at the beach, & the defenses at Calais are sufficient.

Panzer Group West is now Panzer Group Vienna, and on 5th June is committed to Italy due to the fall of Rome.

Had not thought of creating a armored corps/army at Vienna, or adding such to Italy. On paper Kesselring already had a high proportion of mechanized units to infantry.

Rommel is forced to keep infantry units back from the caost (eg 352nd) to give himself a reserve, thinning out the beach defences, and allowing the original airborne plan. With no Panzer Lehr or 12SS the British rapidly push south, west of the Orne as far as Vire; the US push south of St Lo to the coast. Cherbourg falls slightly quicker.

However it happens on the coast a couple of Allied Army groups would be executing the strategic plan as originally envisioned. Probably securing Brittany in July & executing Op CHASITY, The interesting part is if this gets the Allies to or across the Rhine in 1944?

 

[Historyrookie]

So far this thread has discussed Allied decisions, actions, & wanks. What about worse Axis actions. One I've been pondering would be Hitler underestimating the Allied invasion threat in the spring of 1944. Significant mechanized forces are retained in the east & Hitler dictates Rommels strategy of defeating the invasion at the waters edge must be depended on. So, only two panzer corps in Normandy vs the OYL number?

Might be fun to game that one out.

there are some in 1939-42 with hitler just listening okh advice like ordering general retreat of agc in december-january 41 that could have deteriorate in total route or going for moscow in 1942 instead of the south. which is what stavka expected.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... or going for moscow in 1942 instead of the south. which is what stavka expected.

That one certainly looks like worse losses for 1942. Cant say if the eventual counter attacks will be worse than OTL.

Then there is the old classic; not adopting the Sickle Cut plan for attacking the west in 1940. Instead a conservative low risk operation that caters to Allied strengths and results in double losses (120,000 dead vs the 58,000 German dead of OTL) and stalemate in Belgium.

 

[McPherson]

Interesting idea. So the Germans don't believe the inflated Fortitude order of battle in the UK, but are concerned about Operation Shingle type operations in the Eastern Med and bringing Turkey into the war?

Panzer Group West is now Panzer Group Vienna, and on 5th June is committed to Italy due to the fall of Rome. Rommel is forced to keep infantry units back from the caost (eg 352nd) to give himself a reserve, thinning out the beach defences, and allowing the original airborne plan. With no Panzer Lehr or 12SS the British rapidly push south, west of the Orne as far as Vire; the US push south of St Lo to the coast. Cherbourg falls slightly quicker.

Not in the cards. The British had supply and organizational chaos on their beaches to sort out that costs them 2 days. CAEN will never be taken in time. That ship, full of British logistics experts the KM killed, that went down, was as critical to explaining CAEN as the usual Montgomery "slows".

21st Army Group (November 1945). The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. Germany: 21st Army Group. pp22-24.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Not in the cards. The British had supply and organizational chaos on their beaches to sort out that costs them 2 days. CAEN will never be taken in time. That ship, full of British logistics experts the KM killed, that went down, was as critical to explaining CAEN as the usual Montgomery "slows".

21st Army Group (November 1945). The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. Germany: 21st Army Group. pp22-24.

No I am afraid that the situation at Caen was totally foreseen - while it was hoped that it could be captured there was a realistic expectation that it would not be

Montgomery's plans for CAEN on 15th May 1944 noted that Caen might not be taken

Bradley Wrote

"The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them into their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to a Paris.When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans.Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.”

I Corps Operation Order No. 1, WO 171/258.

'The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place........Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defenses prove to be strongly organized thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of it’s forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit it’s usefulness and to make it’s retention a costly business’

If anything stopped Caen from being taken it was 3 things

The Germans (damn their eyes) - principly the attack by 2 of the 3 Kampf Groups of 21st Panzer - 1 of which reached the sea (and seeing a billion ships and then seeing the afternoon glider drops begin to land behind them they pulled back) the other smashed into the Leading elements of the Brigade racing to Caen getting badly handled by the Fireflies of the Sherwood Forest Yeomonary

The 4 inland fortifications - Daimler, Hillman, Morris and Rover - which were more extensive than expected and in some cases took units originally intended to make the advance on Caen to reduce them instead.

Admiral King - when the d-day plan was expanded to include Utah and Sword Beaches the number of landing craft allocated was not quite enough (and this included delaying the invasion by a month in order to allow for more) - with King not bending on allowing any landing ships allocated to the Pacific being instead sent to the ETO.

And I know you have this fixation on maps etc and the belief that Monty could not read one (which is quite frankly ridiculous)

So here is a Map of Normandy - note the main rail and road LOC from Paris to Caen (the major hub in the region). And then from Caen out across the rest of the area.

Meaning any reinforcements are likely coming via Paris or from the East to Caen and then out to where ever. But threatening or capturing Caen draws the mobile German forces to it - like moths to a flame.

So while the losses of Logistical experts might have impacted the subsequent build up, the chances of 3 Division / I Corps capturing Caen within the first 24-48 hours - knowing what we know now are virtually zero and the loss of said men had no impact on this.

 

[McPherson]

No I am afraid that the situation at Caen was totally foreseen - while it was hoped that it could be captured there was a realistic expectation that it would not be

Montgomery's plans for CAEN on 15th May 1944 noted that Caen might not be taken

Bradley Wrote

"The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them into their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to a Paris.When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans.Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.”

I Corps Operation Order No. 1, WO 171/258.

'The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place........Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defenses prove to be strongly organized thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of it’s forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit it’s usefulness and to make it’s retention a costly business’

If anything stopped Caen from being taken it was 3 things

The Germans (damn their eyes) - principly the attack by 2 of the 3 Kampf Groups of 21st Panzer - 1 of which reached the sea (and seeing a billion ships and then seeing the afternoon glider drops begin to land behind them they pulled back) the other smashed into the Leading elements of the Brigade racing to Caen getting badly handled by the Fireflies of the Sherwood Forest Yeomonary

The 4 inland fortifications - Daimler, Hillman, Morris and Rover - which were more extensive than expected and in some cases took units originally intended to make the advance on Caen to reduce them instead.

Admiral King - when the d-day plan was expanded to include Utah and Sword Beaches the number of landing craft allocated was not quite enough (and this included delaying the invasion by a month in order to allow for more) - with King not bending on allowing any landing ships allocated to the Pacific being instead sent to the ETO.

And I know you have this fixation on maps etc and the belief that Monty could not read one (which is quite frankly ridiculous)

So here is a Map of Normandy - note the main rail and road LOC from Paris to Caen (the major hub in the region). And then from Caen out across the rest of the area.

Meaning any reinforcements are likely coming via Paris or from the East to Caen and then out to where ever. But threatening or capturing Caen draws the mobile German forces to it - like moths to a flame.

So while the losses of Logistical experts might have impacted the subsequent build up, the chances of 3 Division / I Corps capturing Caen within the first 24-48 hours - knowing what we know now are virtually zero and the loss of said men had no impact on this.

I have one or two maps which frankly shows that the above writings "might" be an incorrect interpretation of a lot post facto alibies for blunders especially by Bradley who deserves a lot of criticism for his own botched work in that first week.

Notice the attack vectors? Montgomery could not read a map or topology. QED.

Map 2 shows this nicely.

Not only did Montgomery and his subordinate commanders fail to weight their Schwerpunkt (main effort) properly and promptly, but the British seem to have not understood the topology involved as their attempted envelopment FUNNELED precisely into the German fire-sacks as the Germans hoped and predicted, not once but multiple times. It is as if British armor learned nothing tactically and the British army staff learned nothing op-art wise since El Alamein. As for the logistics; if the British were not in chaos, due to overcrowding and limited footprint to dump supplies for 3 weeks, why did they not plan for that situation if they had predicted they would have trouble taking CAEN? IOW if the RMAs were supposed to have the elbow room by D+5, someone expected the beachhead would have broken out past CAEN by D+5. That is the glaring contradiction that shows me someone is lying through his teeth in his memoirs.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The above quotes were not memoirs.

They were written before the battle.

 

[Aber]

Not in the cards.

No Panzer Group West means no 12SS Panzer, Panzer Lehr, 1SS Panzer and 17SS Panzergrenadier, which leaves a gaping hole in the centre of the German lines between the Orne and the Vire, and an open door at St Lo.



https://www.loc.gov/item/2004629045/

Not only did Montgomery and his subordinate commanders fail to weight their Schwerpunkt (main effort) properly and promptly, but the British seem to have not understood the topology involved as their attempted envelopment FUNNELED precisely into the German fire-sacks as the Germans hoped and predicted, not once but multiple times.

The fascinating thing about those maps is that they show the Allies holding the initiative, and making successful limited attacks against one of the densest deployments of German armour during the war (which failed to make a serious counterattack).

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The fascinating thing about those maps is that they show the Allies holding the initiative, and making successful limited attacks against one of the densest deployments of German armour during the war (which failed to make a serious counterattack).

Picking though the sequence of events, & the remarks from German leaders it looks like every time they tried to mass the armored divisions for a large scale attack, it was either necessary to disperse again to close gaps with emergency local counter attacks or the assemblies were broken up by Allied air and artillery strikes (including naval gun fire). Leaders who had fought on the eastern front made comparisons that ammounted to: The enemy air and artillery was far worse than anything they had seen in the east. It was much more frequent, in higher volumes, and more precise. Rommel summed up the attitude about the naval gunfire support as, we did not anticipate it and it was devastating.

In contrast 21 AG was able to pull off nearly every attack planned, and planned attacks large and small every week. Every day for the US 1st Army. Bradleys small but continual 'bite & hold' method was different ly in scale from 2d Army larger and frequent attacks. Dwindling ammunition supplies, a sinking stock of equipment, and weak air power meant 7th Army & the panzer group could not reply in kind vs Allied attack preparations. Substituting precision & focus on on the schwehrpunckt with their artillery was not enough to make up for the Allied volume and precision in fire support.

No Panzer Group West means no 12SS Panzer, Panzer Lehr, 1SS Panzer and 17SS Panzergrenadier, which leaves a gaping hole in the centre of the German lines between the Orne and the Vire, and an open door at St Lo ...

My wild guess is they'd ship more infantry formations in from southern France, Brittany, and the Netherlands. Not enough to recreate the 70+ day battle in Normandy, but might keep the fighting there for a extra couple weeks.

 

[Aber]

In contrast 21 AG was able to pull off nearly every attack planned, and planned attacks large and small every week. Every day for the US 1st Army. Bradleys small but continual 'bite & hold' method was different ly in scale from 2d Army larger and frequent attacks.

US 1st Army initially put its weight into VII Corps attacks in the Cotentin to capture Cherbourg. With the gap not filled by Panzer Group West, V Corps should be able to push much further south. If they can cut the Vire-St Lo road then the German defence gets difficult, with a very long (and so thin) North-South defensive line, and the threat of being pocketed by an attack towards Avranches.

On the other flank, the Germans are almost forced into a defensive line along the Orne, and the British position is much simpler as they don't have to plan to defend against German armoured counterattacks.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Trying to remember specifically when the beach defense strategy was choosen. Had assumed the late autum of 1943 when Rommel was transferred from Italy to France. There been a recently published book tracing the decisions of the German commanders in the west from latter 1943 to the Normandy battle. Perhaps I should look that up.

 

[Simon]

So far this thread has discussed Allied decisions, actions, and wanks. What about worse Axis actions?

IIRC the majority of advice Hitler received following the Western Allied invasion of Italy and expectation of Italy dropping out of the war/changing sides was that Italy couldn't be held and that he should order a retreat back to the Po valley, Kesselring instead managed to successfully argue for the creation of a series of defensive lines. If he's not as convincing or isn't able to set out his case then you've effectively advanced the Italian campaign ten months or so. Knock-on effects could include Sardinia and Corsica, perhaps the timing of Operation Dragoon.

Picking though the sequence of events, and the remarks from German leaders it looks like every time they tried to mass the armored divisions for a large scale attack, it was either necessary to disperse again to close gaps with emergency local counter attacks...

That is one of the benefits of reading the other sides communications – you know exactly when their reinforcements are arriving, and therefore the best time to launch a spoiling attack to make them commit the units piecemeal. Even those already in-theatre can be likewise distracted.

 

[Johnrankins]

Dugout Doug is killed/crippled/injured in PI, so can't push for the Philippines Campaign, and thus, material spent there can be put into projects that are more useful, like the Central Pacific Campaign.

With the PI being a US colony , MacArthur or no MacArthur it will be invaded directly. Politically speaking the US can't afford bypassing it.

 

[David Floyd]

Along the lines of worse Axis decisions...

What if all German panzer reserves are released and ordered to repel invasion on 6/6/44, and charge right into massive NGFS after being hit in the open by Allied Tacair? Seems like this could certainly shorten the campaign in France.

Or, the Heer attempts a mobile defense of the Soviet winter offensive post Typhoon, and AGC is ground to bit 2.5 years early?

Or, Germany attempts Operation Felix in August 1940 by going through Spain without a promise from Franco of Spanish assistance?

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Pro-Allied changes immediately after Pearl Harbor:

• North Africa: Rommel is KIA during the CRUSADER battle (could happen 12/8!). Without Rommel, CRUSADER becomes a faster and more decisive Allied victory. Most of the Panzer Armee Afrika is lost during the retreat across eastern Libya. The Deutsches Afrika Korps is largely destroyed in a rear-guard action at Beda Fomm (12/27) when an Italian division guarding the line of retreat collapses. Hitler is disgusted, and vows that not one more German soldier will go to Africa (1/1/42).
• Burma: the British commander doesn't panic and blow up the Sittang River bridge prematurely (2/22/42). The forces fighting east of the Sittang withdraw in good order, and don't have to abandon all their vehicles and artillery. By the time the Japanese attack across the Sittang, British forces have been reinforced from the Middle East (see above).
• Pacific: USN lookout on an escort destroyer spots IJN submarine I-6 crash-diving; TF 14 alters course, so I-6 does not torpedo USS Saratoga (1/11/42). The US has an additional carrier during the next five months. This leads to decisive US victories at Coral Sea and (as OTL) at Midway. Later battles "snowball" in the USN's favor; by the end of 1942, the IJN has lost eight carriers (two more than OTL), while the US has lost three (one fewer then OTL).
• Atlantic: the Admiralty agrees with Rodger Winn when he first says the Germans have broken the BAMS cipher, instead of holding out till 1943. (I can't find any specific dates, but I think it could be six months sooner.) 1M tons of shipping not lost?
• Russian Front: ???? Maybe the Kerch Strait counterattack is cancelled, avoiding about 600,000 Soviet casualties.

 

[McPherson]

The above quotes were not memoirs.

They were written before the battle.

I stand corrected, so the allied generals lied about it before they screwed everything up? That figures. US Civil War generals did a lot of that same thing. (McClellan, Pope, Rosecrans.).

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Interesting idea. So the Germans don't believe the inflated Fortitude order of battle in the UK, but are concerned about Operation Shingle type operations in the Eastern Med and bringing Turkey into the war?

Panzer Group West is now Panzer Group Vienna, and on 5th June is committed to Italy due to the fall of Rome. Rommel is forced to keep infantry units back from the caost (eg 352nd) to give himself a reserve, thinning out the beach defences, and allowing the original airborne plan. With no Panzer Lehr or 12SS the British rapidly push south, west of the Orne as far as Vire; the US push south of St Lo to the coast. Cherbourg falls slightly quicker.

Sat up late and whipped through this one quickly last night. Left two PzGdr & two Pz div in the west, of which only the 21st Pz was full strength. Assumed all the new tanks & other vehicles went to the east for defeating the enemy spring & summer offensive. That included a couple LW Para div that the record shows were elsewhere until very late in the spring.

Getting ashore was little different than OTL. A bad die roll trashed the two US para divisions & the 4th Inf Div. In the second week it became clear the defense was in trouble, Cherborug was captured ahead of schedule, so was Caen, and by the end of the third week the defense of Normandy was a dead letter.

Although the Allied game pieces were romping about the map in July the strategy of sending every available infantry man and messjo=it repairman to the major fortified ports slowed them. Instead of charging off the Paris, Nancy or Antwerp half the invaders were forced to be used in July and August reducing fortresses & securing the larger ports. Still by late August the green and khaki pieces were at the gates of Antwerp & Metz. Weather delayed Operation DRAGOON a week, but Army Group G had been stripped of all but static units defending a few major ports.

At the end of the third week of August the little grey and the black pieces with the SS runes were very thin on the map. Delaying actions resulted in a accelerating decline in the OB. Between full motorization, powerful armored forces, and a aluminum overcast the horse equipped German corps were run down like sheep. The only thing going for the defense was that I'd left the historical air OB in the west. So at their peak the German air pieces are only outnumbered at five or six to one, vs ten to one. Autum weather will help the defense, but it looks like the Seigfried Line is a hollow shell without defenders. With average luck Churchill & Patton should be doing their 'Piss in the Rhine' stunt in November or December.

No Panzer Group West means no 12SS Panzer, Panzer Lehr, 1SS Panzer and 17SS Panzergrenadier, which leaves a gaping hole in the centre of the German lines between the Orne and the Vire, and an open door at St Lo.

This is about the point where the game defense in Normandy gave way from the historical course. Two infantry divisions were wholly insufficient to hold Caen & flanks. To the NE the advance of the 1st Army was 'Fast'.

Aside from numbers the other problem is the relative weakness on the infantry formations compared to motor or mechanized. In this game a average German infantry division rates 50-60 % of the combat power of a German armored division. & half were below average, short men, artillery, AT guns of all sorts. This OTL infantry defense of Normandy fields barely half the combat power the historical 7th Army & Pazer Group West are rated at in the game.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I stand corrected, so the allied generals lied about it before they screwed everything up? That figures. US Civil War generals did a lot of that same thing. (McClellan, Pope, Rosecrans.).

Or...they could actually read a map