January 26th, 1941
Alger, Presidency of the Council (ex-HQ of the Governor-General of Algeria) - The Republican Guard is mobilized on September 2nd, 1939 at zero hour*. The French campaign has left some heroic or bitter pages in its history. The battles saw the exploits and deaths of heroes such as Lieutenant Lagathu and the guard Berthoux, killed within the 45th
Combat Tank Battalion.
But on June 13th, most of the Guard was ordered to remain in Paris to maintain order in the capital, which had been declared an open city. Rage at the heart of not being able to fight, the Guards ensured the protection of the deserted palaces of the Republic: Elysée, Palais-Bourbon, Senate, Invalides, Hôtel de Ville, ministries, Bank of France, Military School, barracks... In the stations of Lyon, Austerlitz, Montparnasse, invaded by crowds of women, children and elderly people jostling to catch the last trains, as well as at the southern road exits of Paris, the guard set up a service of order. In addition, in liaison with the municipal police, guards on horseback, bicycle or on foot would patrol the streets to prevent looting.
On June 14th, the Germans entered Paris. The Occupation did not prevent the Guard from continuing its missions, while assisting the many refugees in a thousand ways.
On August 15t, on the orders of the German authorities, the Guard was attached to the Prefecture of Police, to detach it from any military hierarchy. Its new official name became the Garde de Paris.
The whole Guard? No, because two companies accompanied the President of the Republic, the President of the Council and the Speakers of the two Chambers.
At the beginning of 1941, it was better for a guard to be in Algiers: on the orders of Doriot, the Garde de Paris underwent a complete purge. The Special Sections for the Fight against Anti-National Activities accused it of being a nest of spies - that is, of BCRAM agents. This is the the truth. In less than four years, six guards were assassinated by the Special Sections and several dozen will be sent to concentration camps, from which eleven will not return.
In Algiers, on that January 25th, two guards were on duty, as they were every day, at the entrance to the offices of the Presidency of the Council. They rectify their position when the tall silhouette with a discreetly starry kepi, who is now familiar to them, passes by. Both of them exchange words in spite of the instruction a glance full of undertones. At the General's gait, at his even stiffer pace, they both think: "There will be action!" It is true that the Minister of War does not spare anyone in the accomplishment of his mission.
Office of the President of the Council - The two men shake hands before taking their seats at the conference table. There is esteem and respect, but also unspoken, in this singular duo, which has seen the political mentor and his protégé, the fragile head of government who almost gave up and the under-secretary of state who said "No", and now today the irremovable President of the Council and his Minister of Defense and War.
Reynaud watches De Gaulle as he sits down, still looking a little embarrassed by his size. The fate has put several incarnations of the "connétable" in his path: "Colonel Motors" explaining the role of the battleship divisions, the wise "pen" of the deputy Paul Reynaud for the defense, the critic of conformism - "It is true that sometimes the military, exaggerating the relative powerlessness of intelligence, neglect to use it! - the patriot without concession in front of the parliamentary games, the unfailing partisan of the war, the minister but with a sometimes biting language... The man of France's renewal?
At the beginning of 1941, it is time for the first assessments.
The two men are going to analyze a document that is so secret that only two copies exist, for the moment, in their sole possession. Thirty or so pages thick, it is titled soberly "Report on the conduct of the war, 1939-1940"**. To say the least, it attempts to answer a simple question: how, in May-June 1940, in the space of a month, the French army, known and feared throughout Europe since Rocroi at least, suffered the most crushing defeat ever suffered by a nation in modern times? A defeat so total that it almost led the country to the most humiliating capitulation and that only exile overseas allowed the struggle to continue."***
Historians of the Second World War have recently recognized the exceptional character of this analysis, carried out on the spot, without all the sources usually consulted in such cases and based, for the most part, on the collection of testimonies and recent experiences. This document stands out because of the diversity of the aspects covered by the study: military aspects of course****, but also political, technical and economic aspects, it even includes an astonishing analysis of public opinion for the time*****. The result gives a faithful picture of the conduct of the war by France, essential for understanding the orientations of French defense after the war.
Charles de Gaulle does not leave it to anyone to draw up the conclusions.
- This report spares no one, Minister," observes Reynaud. "And your reflections will not be to everyone's taste."
- This examination of conscience was an obligation, Mr. President of the Council. It is necessary to put iron in the wound. We have to accept the fact that many of the actors of our defense, in the Army as well as in the political staff, have failed, more or less seriously, either collectively or individually.
Moreover, it seems to me that this subject is very much on the minds of these gentlemen in the Assembly. According to my sources, some parliamentarians are considering creating a commission of inquiry into what is already known as the French campaign. The Minister of the Interior recently made the point. In the long run, such a commission will undoubtedly be called for and even necessary for the exercise of our democracy, but only on the condition that the outlines and objectives are clearly defined . It seems clear to me that the fact that the government has conducted an analysis before being forced to do so by the national representation may be vital to avoid losing control of the situation and falling back into the political confusion in which our defense has been mired for too long."
Reynaud smiles inwardly. For a novice, the General seems to know about parliamentary tactics like an old hand at politics! It is true that some members of his cabinet must have advised him.
During his first interventions in front of the members of the Assembly, Charles de Gaulle benefits from both the awe that still strikes parliamentarians, but also from a form of respect linked to his action since the beginning of the war. This does not prevent an anonymous deputy of the Republic (at least, the parliamentary minutes do not specify his name) to obtain a frank success in the galleries by commenting on an intervention at the same time skilful and firm of the Minister of Defense and War on the general military situation of the country:
"Today we have had chamber music, tomorrow it is a safe bet that we could have military music!" And tomorrow, some parliamentarians will certainly wake up. But they will find someone to talk to, Reynaud believes.
- As you can see," De Gaulle continues, "the report is divided into three parts: the first deals with the preparation of the war, the second with the failures in the conduct of
operations, and the third deals with our moral rearmament, which marked the fighting from mid-June and until the last day.
In conclusion, I... this report [Reynaud smiles, but this slip of the tongue on the part of the General is not uncommon] recommends certain orientations for the continuation of the war and finally asks the question: is France still a great power?"
There is a brief silence, and Reynaud resumes: "This report contains many explosive subjects, Mr. Minister. But none is as explosive, I think, as the question of a superior authority capable of arbitrating the conflicts of attributions and the divergence of interests in the conduct of the war. This is a subject with which I am familiar. As you know, I tried in vain to replace Gamelin when there was still time."
- I know that. You were only too well inspired! I was at Vincennes in April 40 to meet General Gamelin and I discovered with horror a setting similar to that of a convent and a commander-in-chief who made me feel like a scientist combining in a laboratory the reactions of his strategy.
We must face the facts, Mr. President of the Council: the superior authority necessary in a modern war does not exist at present. The organization being lacking, the importance of personal relationships becomes paramount and the personality of the person or persons who hold the power of decision is essential. Thus, in 1918, Clemenceau's personality enabled him to overcome the difficulties he encountered.
- What do you recommend then? Your report, under the pretext of limiting itself to military matters eludes this point. Unless you have a codicil in reserve?
- The subject is political, Mr. President of the Council, and this report is military. But I do have a proposal, which has only one aim: to ensure the clarity and efficiency of the conduct of the war.
To do this, while respecting the spirit if not the letter of the law of 1938, we need a single authority bringing together all the actors of the war from a civil and military point of view and headed by an arbitrator who effectively exercises his function.
In principle, this is your role, Mr. President of the Council. The evolution that you wish to give to the definition of your function goes in this direction. But your obligations are already heavy enough without adding functions to which, by force of circumstance you could not devote enough time to. This is why you need to delegate this arbitration and the direction of this authority. The holder of this delegation seems to me naturally to be the Minister of National Defense.
- In other words, you yourself, General," observes Reynaud, abandoning the official appellation "Monsieur le ministre".
- Indeed, as long as you honor me with your confidence, Mr. President of the Council. I propose to replace the coordination provided for in the texts of 1938 by the subordination of the Ministries of War, Air, Navy, Armaments and Colonies (for the military part) to the Ministry of National Defense. It is indeed important to give the Minister of Defense a real power of control over the other ministries, which for the moment act autonomously - the current grouping of Defense and War in the same ministry only imperfectly meets this need. The consultative coordination committees will no longer be necessary, which will lighten the decision-making process, and the power of the irremovable secretaries general of the ministries will be reduced, for the better.
Thus, by bringing together under a single authority the various arms managers, will be able to better control and rationalize the effort of designing, building and providing
the resources required by the armed forces.
Similarly, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, appointed by the Minister of National Defense with the agreement of the President of the Council, will be granted full powers to decide on the military conduct of the war, overriding the chiefs of staff of the three arms and the colonies. There would no longer be any need to distinguish between the preparation and the conduct of the war."
Reynaud smiles, unless he is grimacing: "This conception is far from being shared by the political world. By proposing such a centralization, you are going to trigger a great outcry in the Assembly and bring the defenders of the status quo to their feet.
- Yes, those who still claim to fear a military pronunciamiento and believe that the only way to control the armed forces is to sow division in their ranks!
- Do not misunderstand my words, my dear General. I think that anything that can allow the war cabinet to be more efficient must be done. But you can well imagine that certain elected officials of the Republic will not be of the same opinion, including the government.I am thinking in particular of M. Daladier, who was personally inclined to give an interpretation of the powers of the Minister of National Defense and considered that he should have no direct authority over the ministries of the three arms. Even your friend M. Blum, who, despite your book, rejected the professional army, could take umbrage with such a reorganization, giving the Armies too much independence for his taste.
- There is no question of attacking the principle of control of the Army by the civil power," replies De Gaulle. "As a member of the government, I am in practice a civilian, as the fact that, in spite of my rank, I have authority over officers of higher rank. There is no question of reducing the role of the members of the Assembly. In the face of the centralization of the executive power, the regrouping of the standing committees of the Assembly into one would allow the legislative power to exercise all its control.
- I agree with you," says Reynaud. "But there are the possible and the desirable...
- Well, Mr. President of the Council, the desirable is summarized in this note."
The General then gives to Paul Reynaud a note entitled De la direction générale et de la direction militaire de la Défense. This note contains seven short articles which outline the National Defense Council and the creation of the Restricted National Defense Council.
Paul Reynaud quickly scans the document: "As is often the case, it is what is not written that is the most important... Beware, the National Assembly that has been re-established will want to exist and to look into the way the war is being conducted. It will thus be necessary to work on this text to make it acceptable to the Assembly. In the meantime, I will make sure to clarify the situation of the Minister of National Defense in relation to the others. I ask you however, while waiting for the de facto to become de jure, to take the necessary steps.
- No doubt, Mr. President of the Council, but legal coordination has reached its limits and you will, I think, be led to arbitrate more and more often if nothing is done...
- We shall see, Minister...
Reynaud sighs, before saying, in a more relaxed tone, "For the time being, how is the French Army?"
- Its reorganization is proceeding. The reorganization of the War Ministry is almost completed. With the lack of personnel, the numerous branches of arms that existed before the war (infantry, cavalry, fortifications, artillery) were merged into two branches, the Personnel Directorate and the Material Directorate, placed under the authority of the Army Chief of Staff.
I personally ensured that the lessons of 1940, in Norway, France or Libya or in the Dodecanese, were taught to all levels of command. If not, as you know, the necessary measures were taken.
Paul Reynaud knows this: Limoges being by force of circumstance unavailable, certain towns of the Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian desert or even Black Africa, have experienced a record number of people in recent times. Their station managers (when they have a station!) speak of an influx of "dead wood".
- General, I think you said earlier that if organization is lacking, the importance of personal relationships becomes paramount and the personality of the decision makers essential. Do you think that General Huntziger is the right man for the job today?
- General Huntziger did not lose out. His conduct during the terrible weeks of June-July is commendable. He organized with great courage the withdrawal of our forces and his action since then to reorganize our army is exemplary.
- I do not deny it, but in spite of his qualities, he is a man marked by the defeat and who is partly responsible for it. You have allowed him to be the actor of his own redemption, and he has succeeded in doing so, but when it comes time to hope to regain the national territory, he must now hand over the reins. We need new blood to lead our arms in the continuation of the conflict. I am getting to know you well enough to know that you must already have in mind a few names. Who do you have in mind for the position of Chief of the General Staff - that is, if I follow you correctly, Commander-in-Chief of the Army?
Without further ado, De Gaulle nods: "That's right, Mr. President of the Council, I have thought about it. The list is not long."
* Its units, on a war footing, formed an infantry regiment with 3 battalions and a cavalry regiment with 4 squadrons. It was part of the mixed brigade placed under the orders of the general commanding the gendarmerie of the Paris region. Several officers were seconded, or would later be seconded, to the staff oof an army group, with the British army, in the Levant, but also with the Poles (according to the official history of the Guard).
** SHAT Vincennes: series 1P, opened for consultation in 2000. The original of one of the two documents is preserved under series 27N for the archives of the GQG (09/1939-08/1940). The excerpt published as an appendix to this chapter was taken directly from this original.
*** Robert O. Paxton : L’armée de la France en exil, 1940-1944 – Le corps des officiers, p. 485.
**** Cf S. Garçon, thesis of l’Ecole des Chartes 2004 : Le grand quartier général des forces terrestres françaises, 28 août 1939-1er juillet 1940.
***** Pierre Laborie : L’opinion française dans la France occupée – Les faits et la représentation mentale.
