July 24th, 1940
London - As a sober commemorative plaque today reminds us, it is in a historic but unofficial building, located at No. 4 Carlton Gardens, where, for the sake of discretion, a Supreme Inter-allied council to decide definitively on the actions to be undertaken against Italy and the timetable for their implementation. The French delegation, which came by plane via Gibraltar, is led by De Gaulle, because Reynaud, in the middle of the Déménagement, is overworked. Churchill, sympathetic to the situation, understands this very well. Huntziger, Darlan and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, General Houdemon, accompany the Minister of War. On the British side, an agreement having already been reached on the operations that concerned it, there is no representative of the Royal Air Force. On the other hand, we note the presence of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, recently appointed Director of Combined Operations.
Churchill opens the meeting at 9:30 and gives the floor over to Admiral Dudley Pound. The latter informs the French of the progress of the planned attack on Taranto. Since he had talked to Darlan on June 14th for the first time, the operation, now called Judgment, had become a daytime attack, with the help of the Béarn (which had joined
Alexandria during operation Ventail), its dive bombers and its ex-Belgian fighters. The operation can be launched as soon as the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious has joined
Alexandria (operation Hats, scheduled for the second week of August). Pound asks if the French could not accentuate the effects of the raid by then engaging, from Malta, bombers based on land. Darlan gives his agreement for the land-based bombers of the Aéronavale. Houdemon does the same for the Armée de l'Air, subject to the evolution of the fighting in Libya and other tasks that might arise, and asks if a code name is being considered. De Gaulle then says, "After the judgment, the punishment!"
Agreement is reached immediately: it would be Operation Punishment.
De Gaulle is given the floor. After paying tribute to the speed with which his offices had worked while preparing the move to Algiers, the Minister of War reminds the audience that there would be three operations. If one is already firmly decided (Marignan, the conquest of Sardinia), two must be decided upon: Cervantes, recently renamed Cordite [1], the conquest of the Dodecanese; Ravenne, the conquest of Pantelleria and the Pelagos Islands. Each operation will be presented in turn by a rapporteur, also speaking on behalf of his colleagues from the other Arms: general Huntziger for Marignan, General Houdemon for Cordite and Admiral Darlan for Ravenne [2]. Before handing the floor over to them, De Gaulle insists on two general points. The strength of the Allied navies in the two basins of the Mediterranean is calculated to be able to face, independently, a massive reaction from the Regia Marina. This should make it possible to act even if Judgment could not be executed or failed. But, even if the Italian fleet were to be put out of action, it would be too late to make anything other than minor adjustments. On the other hand, the Armée de l'Air will continue its efforts, already well underway, to gain control of the air over Sardinia and Sicily - on the other hand, in the Dodecanese, it could easily intervene only once it had conquered the Karpathos and Kasos airfields, or at least one of them. The first shock would rest on the embarked aviations. If they were to be too weakened by Judgment, it would be necessary to be able to reinforce the forces deployed in Cyprus beyond what is currently planned before being able to launch Cordite.
As far as Marignan is concerned, Huntziger's presentation clearly confirms the feasibility of the operation, which is considered good to very good. It will be launched at the beginning of September (on the 3rd or 4th) and, without stopping fighting in Libya, the Army will be able to devote 20 to 25,000 men to it. It has become more complex over the weeks. The initial plan was to carry out two simultaneous landings: one in the north of the island, starting from Corsica and the other in the south, starting from Algeria. However, not knowing the precise deployment of the Italian forces, a third landing is decided in the central-western part of the island, using a fraction of the expeditionary corps set up in Corsica. If any of the three landings were to fail, its forces would be immediately transferred to one of the other two points. The French Navy estimates that, barring major losses between now and D-Day, it will be able to face the three simultaneous operations. Nevertheless, in the hypothesis that it would be necessary to also to execute Cordite and Ravenne, it hopes to be able to count on British support in terms of support and transport escort, and in particular on the presence of an aircraft carrier to cover the southern landing, considered the most exposed to the reactions of the Regia
Aeronautica.
As for Cordite, the report read by Houdemon also demonstrates its feasibility, provided that the ambition was limited. Indeed, once the forces of the Levant have been deducted from the support of the British offensive planned in Cyrenaica in mid-August, there would still be enough to consider, reasonably, a partial conquest of the Dodecanese. Namely the southernmost islands, Kasos, Karpathos (the capture of which would provide a base for close operations for the Armée de l'Air) and especially Rhodes. It would then be necessary to reorganize the landing forces to conquer the other islands. However, even for a two-stage conquest, the French would feel more comfortable if they could count on a British reinforcements in mechanized elements, infantrymen and artillery. Finally, the naval part of the operation would require a reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet and the small French squadron in the eastern Mediterranean, so that they could confront the Regia Marina.
That leaves Ravenne. Its feasibility is uncertain. Indeed, Darlan deplores, the Army considers that it would be necessary to have a complete infantry division to take Pantelleria. A division that it does not have, unless it was withdrawn from Morocco. This, given the still ambiguous attitude of Spain, is seen as taking an excessive risk. And Darlan himself has to acknowledge that, once the manpower required for Marignan and Cordite had been deducted, the French Navy would have great difficulty in finding the necessary escort and support ships, except to risk its most precious units in Marignan, which would not be very wise. In short, as it stands, the scope of Ravenne should be reduced to the sole conquest of the Pelagie Islands.
With Churchill's approval, Sir Roger Keyes immediately intervenes in Darlan's presentation. He declares in substance that the French do not need to commit an entire division to the adventure. At the Prime Minister's behest, he carefully studied the topography of Pantelleria. There are hardly any places suitable for a landing, except the port itself. But a division cannot be thrown in at the drop of a hat and would be more of a hindrance than an asset. On the other hand, to strike quickly, it would be sufficient, in his opinion, to throw by surprise on the docks 2,000 elite troops. Against such a force, the probable numerical superiority of the enemy would be of no help to him. Part of the garrison holds fixed positions. As for the mobile part, "naval and, hmm, aerial bombardments, will pin it down and it can be defeated in detail. It would only be appropriate to employ fast transports for the operation. For example, liners or Channel ferries "like those of our Belgian friends," Keyes says. The opinion of a man known to have conceived and often led, during his already long career, a number of daring operations [3], will carry a great deal of weight. Since Huntziger can hardly bargain for 2,000 men, Operation Ravenne, warmly supported once again by Churchill, is adopted in its version revised by Sir Keyes. At the same time, the Allied Council also decides on the principle of a lighter Operation Cordite.
After a quick lunch, the afternoon sees the board deal with the practical issues that have been raised by the morning's choices. The date of Marignan being already fixed, give or take a day, it remains to plan those of Cordite and Ravenna. For Cordite, wisdom advises to place it at a date when one will be certain of the results of the offensive in Cyrenaica. The choice is finally made on the beginning of the second week of September. It is finally Ravenne which will be triggered first. Taking into account the phases of the moon, the assault on the port of Pantelleria is planned for dawn on August 31st. Another suggestion of Admiral Keyes is retained: it seems useful, both militarily and politically, that the Belgians be asked to provide all or part of the necessary fast transports.
In a very good mood, since "his" conquest of the Dodecanese is on the right track, just like that of Pantelleria, which he made his own, Churchill weighs in so that satisfaction would be given to the French demands. First of all, the sailors. With the exception of sending a battleship for Marignan, all are accepted. The Royal Navy even goes so far as to provide half of the support for Ravenne. In total, it temporarily commits to the western Mediterranean, one aircraft carrier, five cruisers (two heavy and three light) and a dozen destroyers. As for the request for ground reinforcements for Cordite, it is not possible to send any from Great Britain, but instructions will be given to General Wavell to do everything possible to provide the French with what they lack.
In short, the results of this day justify that the commemorative plaque already mentioned proclaims (in English and French): “Here, in the dark hours of summer 1940, the Allies started to forge the nails for the coffin of Fascist Italy." [4]
[1] Change that he justifies by the greater discretion of the new name chosen.
[2] Ravenne is not the operation where there should be the most ships, nor Cordite the one with the most land-based aircraft involved. But Ravenne was particularly close to Darlan's heart. Houdemon therefore inherited the presentation on Cordite.
[3] From the boarding of the Chinese flotilla of Taku in 1900 to the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1918.
[4] FR: "Ici, aux heures sombres de l’été 1940, les Alliés commencèrent à forger les clous du cercueil de l’Italie fasciste."
