July 18th, 1941
The lessons of the Balkan campaign
(February 19th to July 18th 1941)
Excerpts from Maurice Héninger's book "L'épreuve du feu - L'évolution des outils militaires durant la Seconde guerre mondiale" (Plon Ed., Paris, 1985), with the kind permission of the author.
I - The land battle
A - Forces deployed [apart from the Italian and Yugoslavian land forces, mainly or only deployed in Albania and Yugoslavia].
- The Greek army, commanded by General Papagos, numbered 600,000 men, including more than 400,000 in combat units (20 divisions) and could rely in the north on the very effective defense system of the Metaxas Line.
- The Commonwealth forces engaged in this campaign (British Expeditionary Force In Greece, BEFIG, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir H. Maitland Wilson) were five infantry divisions (6th Australian Division, 4th and 5th Indian Divisions, 2nd New Zealand Division, 6th British Division), one armored division (7th Armoured Division) and three armoured brigades or regiments (7th RTR and elements of the 2nd Armoured Division), plus various independent artillery units*.
- The French Army, reluctant at first, eventually sent an armored division (1st DC), a good part of another (3rd Brigade of the 2nd DC) and three infantry divisions (86th and 191st African Infantry Division, 4th Moroccan Mountain Division) plus a fourth in the Dodecanese (192nd African Infantry Division) and a fifth deployed mainly in Crete (Polish Carpathian Brigade), all under the name of "Armée d'Orient", commanded by Army General Henri Giraud, assisted by Lieutenant General Henri Dentz.
The Allies thus deployed in continental Greece the equivalent of twelve divisions, i.e. 220,000 men, including 180,000 combatants and 750 to 800 tanks (at the beginning, General Papagos, commander-in-chief, had requested nine divisions).
Part of the BEFIG was on the western front (in Albania), thus allowing the Greek army to free up reinforcements for the Metaxas Line, on the Bulgarian border. The Metaxas line was thus held by 120,000 men**.
The French troops were able to move to the north-east. They were thus in a position to oppose a rapid German advance, avoiding a catastrophic envelopment of the right wing and the surrender of the 2nd Greek Army.
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Against these troops, at the end of the campaign, the Heer engaged thirteen infantry divisions (including one light) and eight Panzerdivisions (including one light)***. Several of them (including three Panzerdivisions) suffered very severe losses. Three other Panzerdivisions were only engaged in Yugoslavia. Two of the divisions engaged in Greece (the 15. PzD and the 5. Leichte PzD) had first been deployed in Albania to help the Italians, under the name Skandenberg Korps.
B - Geographical and logistical constraints
If the Allies had to cross the Mediterranean, the Germans saw their deployment severely restricted by other geographical constraints.
- Launching more divisions into the Balkans did not automatically translate into more combat power, because it meant making greater demands on a very mediocre communications system. The fresh troops were competing with supply convoys on roads that were congested and often in abominable condition (after two weeks, 35% of the trucks in the German logistics fleet were broken down due to the condition of the roads****).
Moreover, most of the roads winded through narrow valleys and could be blocked easily. By ordering more units into battle, Hitler only exacerbated the traffic problems, creating traffic jams that made good targets for the British and French bombers. In addition, Allied heavy bombers based in Crete pounded the marshalling yards and embarkation points, while British engineers did an excellent job of demolition*****.
- In addition, the question of aviation fuel, which was to prove critical during the Battle of Crete, began to take on greater importance during the Greek campaign, because of the massive participation of the Luftwaffe in the operations.
The railroad was the only way to transport fuel to Greece overland. But Greece is at the end of a long railway network coming from the north, and whose various branches of which mostly converge at Skoplje. However, the lines had been destroyed in Yugoslavia and in Greece, south of Skoplje and between Salonika and Athens. The complete reconstruction of the railway network was to take more than three months******, starting with an intermediate stage, the reconstruction of the Skoplje-Salonica track, allowing fuel to be transported by ship to Athens.
Before the end of the work on the rail network, it was thus necessary to pass by the sea to supply the Luftwaffe: either from Constantza by the Bosphorus, or from Venice by the Adriatic Sea and the Corinth Canal. Therefore, both the Adriatic and the north of the Aegean Sea became essential for German logistics until September 1941 (and even longer since the Rhodos runways, once extended, allowed the Allied Stirlings and Consolidated 32 to attack the tracks and stations with their maximum bomb load).
The land campaign, then the air campaign, was then coupled with a naval campaign focused on Franco-British efforts to prevent the Axis from transporting fuel through the Adriatic and the northern Aegean Sea, while controlling the southern Aegean and the Mediterranean.
In both camps, logistics thus imposed its law on deployment, and therefore on strategy.
C - Tactical aspects
Because of the tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht and its overall air superiority, the Greek campaign ended in a German success, but at a huge cost in men, equipment and time.
The German commander-in-chief, Field Marshal List, was handicapped by the lack of mountain troops (who were severely tested in February-March 1941 during "Merkur" in Corsica and Sardinia). The mountain troops would have facilitated on many occasions the German advance through the mountainous terrain. Similarly, an invasion of Crete was practically excluded because of the heavy losses suffered by the airborne troops, also during "Merkur".
The slow German advance allowed the Allied forces to build several strong defensive lines. Unable to bypass them, the Wehrmacht had no other choice than to fight a costly breakthrough battle each time, in very bad topographical conditions. The deployment of the Skandenberg Korps in Albania could have represented an asset if the Italian navy had had sufficient means to launch successive amphibious attacks on the west coast to overwhelm the fierce Greek resistance. But the Regia Marina had suffered such heavy losses since August 1940 and the Allied naval superiority was so great that the contribution of the Skandenberg Korps was limited. Moreover, at that time, neither the Germans nor the Italians had any specialized landing craft at their disposal. Such equipment was developed later (the MFP and other tank and infantry landing craft), but they did not appear until 1942.
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For their part, the Allied forces were in a transitional stage. Some of the lessons of the Blitzkrieg had been learned, but not all. Defensive tactics had improved considerably. Troops no longer panicked at the sight (or even the thought) of an armored vehicle, and anti-tank weapons were reasonably effective. On the other hand, offensive tactics were still far inferior to those of the Germans, inter-army cooperation was difficult to implement and the combat skills of the large units were hesitant, even if, on the ground, the men fought with energy. Generally speaking, the defensive successes could not be exploited in an attack in time to regain the initiative. The counterattacks lacked the punch and support necessary to achieve more than local and limited results.
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Finally, the prolonged fighting and Luftwaffe attacks on Greek cities consolidated the Greek government by stimulating the population's will to fight. A quick military defeat would certainly have caused a political collapse, facilitated the control of the country by the Axis and created a breeding ground for communist influence, which could have led to a civil war situation.
D - Losses [including those from the fighting in Albania and Yugoslavia].
The losses of this five-month campaign were very high*******.
(i) Allied losses
- The Franco-British forces left in the Balkans nearly 70,000 men (killed, wounded and prisoners).
The heaviest losses were suffered in the terrible fighting on the Alyakmon Line and in the retreating battles that followed, where the 86th DIA, 191st DIA, 4th DMM on the one hand and the 6th AIF and 2nd New Zealand on the other hand suffered a lot, while the "April 1st blow" cost many prisoners amongst the XIII Corps and that the withdrawal from Epirus caused heavy losses to the 6th Infantry Division. Among the losses were general officers, with the death of General Welvert and the capture of Major General Evetts.
In addition, the evacuation of the Allied troops was carried out leaving behind a large quantity of equipment, more or less sabotaged. In total, nearly 900 tanks (about 550 British and 350 French), 13,000 trucks and other vehicles (10,000 British, 3,000 French) and several hundred pieces of artillery were destroyed or captured, not to mention thousands of individual weapons and thousands of tons of various materials. In addition to the human losses, the large allied units engaged in Greece had to be completely re-equipped and could not be operational again for many months.
- The Yugoslav army was largely destroyed, but not annihilated, as 120,000 men were evacuated and were able to be re-equipped.
- The Greek army lost 270,000 men (120,000 killed and wounded, 150,000 prisoners). The 330,000 evacuated men had lost most of their heavy equipment.********
The losses in the Greek civilian population were also very heavy. The systematic aerial bombardments of Salonika, Volos, Larissa, Lamia and Athens-Piraeus resulted in the death of about 80,000 dead and seriously injured civilians, causing the birth of an anti-German sentiment in Greece.
(ii) Axis losses
On the Axis side, due to the succession of breakthrough battles fought in very poor tactical conditions, the losses were very heavy despite the final victory.
The Wehrmacht left in the operations "Marita" and "25" nearly 120 000 men, including 26,000 killed and missing and 94,000 seriously wounded. The PanzerWaffe lost 600 tanks, of which 300 were irreparable.
The losses of the Regio Esercito, mainly suffered in Albania, can be estimated at 45,000 men (killed, missing, seriously wounded and prisoners).*********
E - Consequences
After the Battle of France, the Battle of Greece taught the allied armies some useful lessons of mobile warfare. Nevertheless, for reasons of system and culture, the French army assimilated these lessons more easily than the British army, according to a mechanism already apparent during the First World War.
- In the French Army, the "Division Cuirassée" evolved into the Division Blindée: a fully mechanized unit with fully integrated mechanized infantry and artillery, organically attached to the brigades, in accordance with the organization described by the works of De Gaulle. The infantry divisions became fully motorized units, capable of supporting armored units on the move and equipped with their own armored and anti-tank formations.
- For the British, the adaptation process was slower. Their armoured divisions evolved into powerful but unbalanced units due to a too high proportion of tanks. The artillerymen resisted the introduction of self-propelled guns. Engaging tanks in night actions continued to seem unimaginable**********. On the contrary, the French units, perhaps because of their almost continuous engagement since May 1940, adapted much more flexibly, not hesitating to carry out night attacks in support of the infantry***********.
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- On the German side, only rare lessons were drawn from this campaign, because the final success favored a certain complacency. The difficulties were attributed to the geographical situation. To a certain extent, this was true, but the very difficult topography of the Balkans had only had such an impact because logistics had been deliberately neglected in the German army in favor of firepower. This imbalance between "teeth and tail" already existed before, but it had not been brought to light because the Polish campaign had been too short and because, during the French campaign, the tactical superiority and the magnitude of the final success had made one neglect the problems encountered on several occasions*************.
The German armoured weapon (Panzerwaffe) having met in Greece only lightly armed Allied tanks (the British tanks engaged used the 2 pounds and the French tanks made in USA were equipped with the M6, of 37 mm), the lessons sometimes inflicted in France by the B1bis, or even by the Matilda, were forgotten.
In fact, the main factor responsible for the technical evolution of the German armor had to be the shock felt in Russia in front of the technical superiority of the T-34 and the KV-1. Improve the armament of the Pz-IV, stop the production of the Pz-III and the Czech Pz-38(t), develop tank hunters on Pz-38(t) and Pz-II************** chassis, push the development of the Panzer VI Tiger and then launch that of the Panzer VII Panther will be decisions closely linked to the "T-34 shock".
But after the Greek campaign, tank production continued at the same pace as in early 1941 and few technical modifications were made. The only new models to appear between the Balkan campaign and the invasion of the USSR were new Panzer IV types and the first Panzer V Leopards. The improvement of the Pz-III with the 50 mm/L60 gun, decided at the beginning of 1942, was mainly due to the data on the Sav-41 obtained thanks to the Japanese (who had dearly paid for them!).
II - The air battle
The air aspect of the Balkan campaign took an unexpected magnitude, with very important important consequences, especially since the three weeks of the battle of Crete (from July 20th to August 13th) only accentuated the phenomena observed over Greece.
A - The allied forces
1) Tactical deployment
The Allies accepted the German challenge and deployed a large air contingent, despite difficult conditions.
* The RAF (British Air Force in Greece, BAFG, commanded by Air Commodore D'Albiac) deployed 19 squadrons:
- 9 fighter squadrons (4 on Hurricanes, 3 on Tomahawks and two on Blenheims)
- 7 light bombing squadrons (on Blenheim)
- 1 medium bombardment (on Wellington)
- 2 of cooperation with the army (on Lysander and Hurricane).
We must add the units based in Crete, as well as those operating from Egypt and Libya, in particular three other squadrons on Wellington.
* The Armée de l'Ir deployed 21 groups in the region, under the command of General Bouscat:
- 2 Fighter Squadrons (6 groups) on Hawk-81 A2
- 3 independent fighter groups (2 on D-520M/523 in the Dodecanese and one on Maryland modified into long-range fighters)
- 2 Medium Bombardment Wings (4 groups, all based in Crete) on LeO-451
- 6 Light bombing groups based in continental Greece on Martin-167 Maryland
- 2 light bomber groups based in the Dodecanese, one on Martin-167 Maryland and the other on Potez 63/11.
The theoretical Franco-British total was 360 fighters (including 40 in the Dodecanese), 320 light bombers (including 40 in the Dodecanese), 100 medium bombers (including 80 in Crete) and about 40 cooperation aircraft. That is to say 820 combat aircraft (80 of which in the Dodecanese and 80 in Crete).
During the campaign, the engaged units received a certain number of reinforcements, because Malta was not seriously threatened and all fighting had ceased in Africa.
- The RAF was able to transfer 50 Hurricanes, 15 Tomahawks, 40 Blenheims (including 10 IVFs), 10 Wellingtons and 15 Stirlings, i.e. 130 combat aircraft.
- The Armée de l'Air was able to transfer 100 Hawk 81-A2s and 40 Marylands, i.e. 140 combat aircraft.
* To these forces should be added the Greek Air Force, whose fighters were re-equipped at the beginning of the campaign with 36 Grumman G-36A (F4F-3), which replaced or added to its PZL-24 and its few Bloch MB-151/155 and Gladiator. The Greeks also put in line some Potez 63s (9 delivered in 1939 and a few others, coming from the French surplus, in March-April 1941), Fairey Battles and Bristol Blenheims.
* Finally, the remains of the Yugoslav air force (some Bf 109 E and Hurricane I, and Blenheim I and Do 17 bombers) joined the Allied air force in mid-May 1941.
* The overall total of the Allied tactical air forces involved was thus about 1,150 aircraft.
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2) Strategic deployment - Operation Coronation (in Crete)
- 2 reinforced squadrons of the RAF on Short Stirling heavy bombers (60 aircraft)
- an Armée de l'Air Heavy Bombardment Wing (3 groups) with 60 Consolidated Model-32 (or B-24 Liberator).
The objective of this force was to attack the Ploesti oil fields and the Romanian railway network. As the situation deteriorated rapidly, the heavy bombers were used against logistic centers such as the Plovdiv marshalling yard and against other targets of opportunity.
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3) Naval air deployment
The air groups of HMS Formidable and HMS Eagle, which intervened in some episodes of the campaign, had gained in balance and efficiency thanks to the contribution of the fighter and bomber flotillas of the Aéronavale, widows of their Béarn. In addition, two squadrons of heavy seaplanes from the RAF and two French flotillas of seaplanes were deployed from Crete and the Dodecanese.
With these aircraft, the overall total of the Allied air forces involved reached nearly 1,300 combat aircraft***************.
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4) Logistical support
No precise accounting could be made. A rough estimate gives a total of 200 RAF and Armée de l'Air aircraft: transport (DC-3, DC-2, Lockheed Mod.14 and Mod.18, Bristol Bombay, Vickers Valentia, Dewoitine 338 and Bloch MB-220) and liaison aircraft (including some very old Potez 25 TOE and Hawker biplanes such as Harts).
B - The Axis air forces
The Luftwaffe eventually deployed in the Balkans the equivalent of four FliegerKorps (IInd, IVth, Vth and VIIIth FK), to which one must add the Xth FK operating from Italy and most of the aircraft of the Regia Aeronautica. The main constraints it encountered were the number and capacity of the available airfields, as well as the lack of fuel, which we have already mentioned. Only the control of the Corinthian canal was able to allow the transport of enough ful to launch operation Ikarus against Crete.
In total, the Axis engaged 1,500 German combat aircraft (47% of the total strength of the Luftwaffe in June 1941) and 550 Italians, i.e. 2,050 aircraft. However, a FliegerKorps wasn't deployed until early June.
It was much easier for the Axis than for the Allies to receive reinforcements: in the front line, the balance of power tilted more and more in favor of the Axis over time. Taking losses into account, the air force ratio, which was a little less than 2 to 1 in favor of the Axis at the beginning of the campaign, gradually increased to exceed 2 to 1 by the end****************. This relatively moderate imbalance favored the extension of the campaign on the ground.
C - Losses
At the end of the Greek campaign, on July 18th, the allied losses were 695 planes for the tactical forces and 40 for the strategic ones (the "Coronation" force). A significant part of these losses were due to the flak. In addition, 25 naval fighters and 10 naval bombers were destroyed.
On the eve of the Ikarus operation, the Allies had 320 fighter planes in Crete, including 140 fighters, to which it was necessary to add 60 planes deployed in the Dodecanese and 95 bombers of "Coronation" (for the majority redeployed in Rhodes). However, until the first days of August, the rate of aircraft in flying condition did not exceed 50 % because of the problems linked to the evacuation of the continent.*****************
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At this same date, the Axis losses in combat were 990 aircraft, including 760 for the Luftwaffe alone, plus 640 damaged aircraft, 480 of which belonged to the Luftwaffe. The
imbalance in favor of the Allies was obviously linked to the offensive posture adopted by the Axis forces against well-organized defensive forces. Even worse: most of the Axis losses occurred over enemy-held territory or over the sea. The loss of crews was therefore much higher than that of the Allies.
D - Consequences
1) For the Luftwaffe
After the losses suffered during the battles of France and England in 1940 (4,897 aircraft******************), the Malta-Tunis Blitz and the Merkur operation from January to March 1941 (1 256 combat aircraft, including 775 German and 481 Italian, plus 198 transports), the losses of the Luftwaffe during the Greek campaign were particularly difficult to bear.
For the first six months of 1941, if one adds to the losses suffered in the Mediterranean those suffered against the RAF in continental Europe, the Luftwaffe's combat losses amounted to nearly 2,900 combat aircraft. During the same period, the Luftwaffe lost 1,987 aircraft outside of combat (training, convoying...).
This high figure is explained by the disorganization of the training caused by the launch of the Balkan offensive just after the Merkur operation, which had required to bring instructor pilots to the front line.
In total, Luftwaffe losses from January to June (damaged or destroyed aircraft) reached 4,873 aircraft*******************, of which about 900 could be repaired. And the battle of Crete was going to add to these figures!
Of course, aircraft production could compensate for these losses. During the same period, the German factories manufactured 3,500 fighter, bomber, reconnaissance and ground support aircraft. However, the most serious consequences affected the crews. It is much more difficult to replace trained crews than aircraft. TheLuftwaffe was a relatively young weapon, which had already faced a massive expansion between 1935 and 1940. The "old generation", including the crews of the Condor Legion, had suffered a lot: its losses from September 1939 to the end of June 1941 reached 24,200 men, killed, seriously wounded, missing or prisoners********************. The new generation, trained in 1940-1941 and arriving in operational units in the spring of 1942, was to suffer from a shortened training cycle and the disappearance of a large number of "old hands" capable of guiding its first steps in combat. In the course of 1942, a dichotomy appeared between the "blue" and "Experten*********************".
Moreover, on the tactical level, the confidence given to the Ju 87 Stuka had been destroyed by the vulnerability of this dive bomber as soon as a serious opposition from the opposing fighters. But its replacement was long in coming. The Ju 87 F/Ju 187 never left the drawing board and the project was cancelled in 1943 due to insufficient performance and complexity, which would have made maintenance difficult in operations. The Ju 87D was the only solution, but it was only a stopgap measure. The production of this variant was however increased to compensate for the losses of the first half of 1941.
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2) For the Regia Aeronautica
The situation of the Regia Aeronautica was much worse than that of the Luftwaffe. The Italian aeronautical industry was unable to compensate for its losses. The bottleneck of the engines was all the more catastrophic that, despite Hitler's promises to Mussolini, German deliveries were very limited due to the needs of the Luftwaffe!
At the end of the summer of 1941, the Regia Aeronautica was seriously weakened. The delivery of more modern aircraft than those which equipped it at the beginning of the year, such as the Re.2001 and the MC.202, could not be accelerated: the Reggiane fighter only entered the unit at the end of 1941 and the Macchi fighter only in spring 1942.
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3) For the RAF and the Armée de l'Air
The losses of the RAF and the Armée de l'Air were high. Nevertheless, the proportion of recovered crews had been higher than for the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica, and the British and American aeronautical production could easily compensate for the losses in equipment.
Tactically, operational experience had led to rapid changes due to the intensity of operations. The French Air Force was already adapting to the new tactics at the end of the Battle of France: in June 1940, the double patrol of two elements of three aircraft had given way to three elements of two aircraft. Less efficient than the German system, this organization was far superior to the old V formation used by the French in 1939, and still kept during the summer 1940 by the RAF. After a transitional period during
Merkur, the Armée de l'Air switched to the so-called "four-finger" formation in Greece. The RAF followed, in the Mediterranean and then in England, with the Finger Four.
Radar guidance of shipborne fighters had become commonplace, and with better aircraft and more pilots, carrier air groups became much more effective. The availability in large numbers of Grumman G-36A (F4F-3), purchased by France in early 1940, greatly increased the potential of the aircraft carriers' fighters.
In summary, if the decline in quality of the Luftwaffe was not yet visible, it was already inescapable in front of better and better equipped and organized Allied air forces.
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4) And for the Americans...
The diffusion of the combat experience acquired by the Franco-British towards the units of the USAAC/USAAF (and the US Navy and Marines) was considerably accelerated by the infiltration system in the French units, to the great benefit of the Americans.
Each French fighter group engaged in Greece was home to at least three American pilots.
During the campaign, 20 of these pilots gained combat experience. Three of them were killed and two seriously wounded, but three became "aces". The bomber crews gained a similar experience. The lessons learned from May to July 1941 gave birth to new tactical instructions, issued by USAAC in September-October 1941. Reade Tilley's seminal article "Hints on Hun Hunting" was published in September 1941**********************. The participation of American pilots and aircrews in the French operational training centers in North Africa provided a core of trained personnel capable of disseminating new combat tactics among the newly formed American units during the spectacular rise of the American air force in 1942.
III - The Allied Command
The organization of the Allied Command was a concern that marked all the accounts written at the end of the operations by the Allied commanders. The cases of the three were quite different, but the need for the evolution of command structures was a constant.
1) For the land forces
The organisation put in place in Greece was praised insofar as it allowed operations to be conducted in a satisfactory manner: a designated allied commander-in-chief (Greek General Papagos) to whom the commanders of the expeditionary corps reported, respectively General Wilson (for the BEFIG) and General Giraud (for the Armée d'Orient). However, this organization reached its limits insofar as two recognized leaders had to accept the authority of a general who was barely as senior and much less experienced than experienced as they were, but most of the decisions were taken in consultation between the three men and the conduct of operations did not suffer.
At the strategic level, however, the Allied system was too heavy and inefficient. For requests for reinforcements or major decisions (such as the withdrawal to the Peloponnese or the retreat), Wilson and Giraud did not depend on the same leader (a hypothetical theater commander) but to their national theater commanders, respectively Wavell and Frère. Hence the complex circuits responsible for numerous telephone and radio exchanges between Athens, Alexandria and Beirut, as well as several trips by Wavell and Frère to the field. However, if this complexity was an embarrassment for the staffs, it was not perceived by the lower echelons and, as the campaign was relatively short, and had no concrete effect on its outcome.
After the evacuation of Greece, the interallied organization became similar to that in place at the end of 1940, with "national" commands by zone: Lieutenant-General O'Connor, who remained to organize the defense of Crete, was confirmed as "Crete and Aegean, Commanding", while the French troops remained under the command of General Beynet, head of the Dodecanese Army Detachment. O'Connor and Beynet were each in charge of a separate geographical area and reported to a separate commander, respectively Wavell (later Auchinleck) and Frère.
It was obvious that future operations would require a simplification of the command structure - a requirement that would only become more apparent with the arrival of American forces.
2) For the air forces
The organization of the air force was probably the most criticized point in the end-of-campaign reports. No inter-allied organization had been set up. The coordination between D'Albiac's BAFG, the Aegean Air Force of Bouscat and the Royal Greek Air Force (placed under operational control of the army after mobilization) remained based on the work of the liaison officers and the meetings between officers.
At first, while the RAF was operating over Albania and only French forces were concentrated in Crete, with separate missions and areas of operations, this organization did not pose any problems. Similarly, Operation Coronation, managed separately, went well.
However, from June onwards, when the three air forces intervened together over continental Greece, coordination was more difficult, in spite of the good will of each, and D'Albiac as well as Bouscat mentioned these difficulties in their reports.
3) For the naval forces
Cunningham's report, by contrast, had perhaps the most weight. Indeed, since the agreements of 1939, the operational command of the Allied fleets in the Eastern Mediterranean was devolved to the Royal Navy. In the wake of these agreements and with the training provided by almost eighteen months of practice marked by major combined operations (Cordite and Accolade), Cunningham was able to organize his forces by harmoniously mixing according to their qualities, French and British ships (and divisions), and to implement his operations by directly piloting all these means.
He congratulated himself in his report on the good results obtained with this organization. It is only if he agreed to mention the only question that arose: should the place of a commander-in-chief of such important combined naval forces, in such a vast and varied theater of operations be at sea or in a shore-based headquarters?
* OTL, General Wilson came to the rescue of Greece with 57,000 men, 35,000 of whom were combatants, all of whom arrived late and in a very disorganized way, while the Greek front was already collapsing, especially in the north-east.
** Against 70,000 OTL.
*** Four PzDiv OTL.
**** As in OTL.
***** As in OTL.
****** Three months OTL, with lower priority, but less destructions and no opposition in the air.
******* OTL, 11,000 men for the British, 11,000 dead and 4,000 seriously wounded on the German side. The civilian population also suffered much more than OTL.
******** OTL the Yugoslavs barely evacuated anyone (about 300 men), the Greeks suffered around 15,000 dead, 270,000 captured and only evacuated about 10,000 men.
********* OTL the Germans lost barely over 5,000 men (only 2,000 killed, the rest wounded) while the Italians lost between 35 and 40,000 men (killed and missing, much more wounded).
********** As in OTL.
*********** OTL, in 1944, during the battle for Hill 112 near Caen, the armored brigades abandoned the infantry after sunset.
************ As in OTL.
************* OTL, this imbalance did not appear until the winter of 1941-1942, when the Wehrmacht was for the first time confronted with a powerful enemy in a prolonged campaign.
************** OTL, German tank hunters were mostly equipped with captured Soviet 76mm guns... which will be missing from this historical narrative.
*************** OTL, the RAF had only been able to deploy 200 combat aircraft. The difference is explained by the French participation in the war: direct (620 combat aircraft in total) or indirect (the disappearance of the Italian presence in Africa, allowing the RAF to free up many squadrons).
**************** This is a far cry from the OTL 5 to 1.
***************** OTL, the figures were 40 aircraft, including 24 fighters (including the 8 Fulmar of the Formidable), and half were not in flying condition.
****************** That is 30% more than the OTL 3,745.
******************* Against 3,150 OTL.
******************** Against 18,533 OTL, as of June 22nd, 1941.
********************* Which OTL only manifested itself from the end of 1943.
********************** Instead of the end of 1942 OTL.
