Falaise and Beveland - What's Its Got in Its Nassty Little Pocketses?

Germans! Lots and lots of Germans. Please forgive the Hobbit reference, went to see it the other day and reading about pockets keeps making me read it in a Gollum voice. :) But anyway. I've recently been looking at a couple of incidents that turned into missed opportunities for the Allies immediately after the invasion and during the fighting in France, the fighting around Falaise and the South Beveland Peninsula, and was wondering what might of happened if both of them went the Allies way.

In Falaise the main failing seems to of been troops simply being exhausted and the rather confused command with both side looking to each other, and even then Army Group B was badly mauled fighting their way out and had to leave most of their heavy equipment behind. So suppose the Canadians do a little better and are able to advance somewhat faster, Patton's orders aren't overridden and so the gap is sealed. The Germans are still likely to get a number of troops out and it takes some time to grind down resistance in the pocket by continually hitting it with massed air attacks, artillery and troops but in the end an entire German army surrenders and walks into captivity.

For the South Beveland Peninsula perhaps instead of Market Garden they go for the peninsula instead. Several weeks prior to the plan taking shape the British had captured Antwerp with its vital port facilities intact. This was important as it would greatly shorten supply lines for the push into Germany and had the opportunity of trapping General Gustav-Adolf von Zangen's 15th Army of 80,000 men on the south side of the Scheldt Estuary. Instead however von Zangen's men were able to escape by boat to the South Beveland peninsula with most of their heavy equipment and artillery. In September the peninsula could have been sealed by a short advance of only 15 miles past Antwerp, but because priority on supplies went to Market Garden the First Canadian Army paused at Antwerp and then fought the Battle of the Scheldt in October instead. So in this case with Market Garden not taking up a large amount of the supplies, listening to the Navy and seeing the urgency of controlling both banks the 11th Armoured Division under General Roberts is urged on just a little farther and they manage to cut off the peninsula. The Allies move up more troops and from this point von Zangen has the two options of trying to retreat and fight his way out as he was ordered to do, which would of been suicidal considering the balance of forces, or dig in and try and tie up as many troops as possible which he decides to do. Again it takes time but with the advantage more units and the absolute mass of air support they can call on the Germans are slowly ground down and after a couple of weeks the last of von Zangen's man have surrendered.

So what do these two events do to things? The Allies have just captured two German armies in practically as many months and are going to have a functioning port in Antwerp up and running in fairly short order. Do the Germans really have much in the way of other large organised formations left in France after this? It's going to be a race between the Allies consolidating and re-equipping their troops and the Germans trying to reinforce their Siegfried Line with what troops they can pull together which on balance I'm not sure who would win. You can forget about a Battle of the Bulge since IIRC a significant number of the troops used in our timeline would be sitting in Allied POW camps. Are there any major obstacles that would completely bar either of these two events from happening?
 
Falaise pocket closed perhaps extends the pocket cleanup by a few more days, and means 50,000 more German soldiers in PoW camps. Since a high portion of the escapes were officers & NCOs or nazi fanatics the 50,000 are more important than their numbers suggest. The less motivared leaders, & the bulk of the lower ranks caught in the Falise pocket tended to give up rahter than run the guantlet of fire eastwards. Eyewitness accounts from those who did escape in the last four or five days are fairly horrific on the subject of passing through the corridor. Capturing the the extra 50,000 hurts the Wehrmacht in the longer run, but wont lead to a inability to form a new front on Germanys western frontier. The bulk of that came from other armies than those in the pocket, and from the sizable number of replacement units in Germany.

The Beveland/Walchern/15th Army thing is a bit more complex it seems. In OTL it took the better part of a month to clear the mines and blocks from the Scheldt navigation channel. The first Allied ship did not dock in Antwerp until 19 November & the first convoy did not start unloading until around the 25th Nov. Even if the 15ht Army falls apart in short order in September, & there are fewer mines & blocks in place it is still going to be mid October before the cargo discharge starts. odds are the Allies only gain a month in therms of supply capacity.

It appears the US Army had delayed the schdule for landing new divisions & corps support units in Europe precisely because of the port/supply issue. I dont have the exact changes at hand, but from memory another three to six divisions and two additional corps HQ/spt groups would have been in France/Belgium by mid September. If nothing else that thickens up the Allied front and makes the German winter offensive even less sucessfull.
 
Carl Schwamberger said:
The Beveland/Walchern/15th Army thing is a bit more complex it seems. In OTL it took the better part of a month to clear the mines and blocks from the Scheldt navigation channel. The first Allied ship did not dock in Antwerp until 19 November & the first convoy did not start unloading until around the 25th Nov. Even if the 15ht Army falls apart in short order in September, & there are fewer mines & blocks in place it is still going to be mid October before the cargo discharge starts. odds are the Allies only gain a month in therms of supply capacity.
I've seen it suggested the additional pressure on the Germans in this area, rather than a pause which gave them a chance to reorganize, would have had significant benefits for future operations, even if Antwerp took just as long to get open. If it did nothing but free Canadians from clearing every damn port on the Channel coast,:mad: it would have put more men in the front line.
 
My 'hindsight' strategy would be to use the airborne to disrupt the 15th Army along the Scheldt. The Canadians would be directed to close to the Scheldt & coast to push in the retreating elements of the 15th army still south of the Scheldt. the AB would be directed to sieze the ferry loading sites on both side of the estuary. Horrocks XXX Corps would be directed on through Antwerp to the neck & then to hook left & try to advance into the area. With the Canadians gassed up and pushing north the AB op, would be executed the day after the XXX Corps reports it has crossed the river & is north of Antwerp.

Between the pressure from the Candian, the disruption of the ferry ops, and the closing of the neck the unprepared 15th Army might fall apart in a few days & a extended reduction of a entrenched Beveland/Walchern defense be avoided.
 
Germans! Lots and lots of Germans.

ITYM "Germanses".

For the South Beveland Peninsula perhaps instead of Market Garden they go for the peninsula instead. Several weeks prior to the plan taking shape the British had captured Antwerp with its vital port facilities intact.

British forces entered Antwerp on 4 September.

The decision to proceed with MARKET-GARDEN was on 10 September, and the first airborne drops were on 17 September.

I don't see how six days is "several weeks".
 
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