Fairey Fulmar based single seat fighter.
- Thread starter Peg Leg Pom
- Start date
The Game changer was the advent of RDF (radar) and the coded 'pips squeak' IFF system that then provided the basis for a coded homing vhf homing beacon IIRC.
Not quite, but it would have the advantage of the RN not having to fight the RAF for, or make do with the RAF's cast offs.
A couple of design philosophies of the RN/FAA in the 1930s are often criticized but you could argue that they were ahead of their time and that aircraft technology (particularly engines) was not yet up to snuff:
One is the two seat fighter. The idea that the workload in a naval fighter is more than one crew member can handle goes back and forth. Yes in the 1930s and 1940s (especially the early 40s) the engines were not powerful enough to do this without sacrificing performance but look at some of the premier naval fighters of the jet age - F-4 Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, and even the F/A-18F. All two seat fighters and in the case of the Phantom and the Tomcat, the fighters the carrier air wing was built around. I realize this is not an apples to apples comparison but you get my point.
The second is the idea that since a carrier can only handle a limited number of aircraft, the aircraft should be multi-role. In the 1930s this led to the Skua - a nice dive bomber and a well below average fighter and unfortunately everybody remembers it as a fighter. The USN went for specialized VF, VB/VS, and VT squadrons but as the war progressed and fighters got bigger and more powerful and were combined with new munitions like rockets, US carriers carried more fighters and fewer dedicated attack aircraft because the fighters could handle attack duties as well. Fast forward to today and a USN carrier air group is composed of four squadrons (five if you include the EA-18Gs) of variants of the multi-role F/A-18. You could argue that a USN carrier air group today is more or less based on an idea of air group composition that the RN had in the 1930s.
Just some thoughts on a Saturday...
One is the two seat fighter. The idea that the workload in a naval fighter is more than one crew member can handle goes back and forth. Yes in the 1930s and 1940s (especially the early 40s) the engines were not powerful enough to do this without sacrificing performance but look at some of the premier naval fighters of the jet age - F-4 Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, and even the F/A-18F. All two seat fighters and in the case of the Phantom and the Tomcat, the fighters the carrier air wing was built around. I realize this is not an apples to apples comparison but you get my point.
The second is the idea that since a carrier can only handle a limited number of aircraft, the aircraft should be multi-role. In the 1930s this led to the Skua - a nice dive bomber and a well below average fighter and unfortunately everybody remembers it as a fighter. The USN went for specialized VF, VB/VS, and VT squadrons but as the war progressed and fighters got bigger and more powerful and were combined with new munitions like rockets, US carriers carried more fighters and fewer dedicated attack aircraft because the fighters could handle attack duties as well. Fast forward to today and a USN carrier air group is composed of four squadrons (five if you include the EA-18Gs) of variants of the multi-role F/A-18. You could argue that a USN carrier air group today is more or less based on an idea of air group composition that the RN had in the 1930s.
Just some thoughts on a Saturday...
hipper
Banned
actually during the FAA air strikes on Kirkenes (Norway) and Petsamo (Finland) Fulmars carried bombs,
it just about counts as operational use
CAB 106/341, is toveys dispatch on the affair but it's not digitised.
Only six were used and they hit a port devoid of useful targets. Hard to draw many conclusions one way or the other from that mission.
hipper
Banned
A ha the whole report on the raid is in the London Gazette, the fulmars were bombed up in order to strike Ground targets, perhaps in an AA suppression role
, it was I think the first multi carrier attack against a ground target.
Interestingly a few days later a strike on tromso was planned a few days later and a small strike comprising only fulmars attacked an A/S trawler near that location.
https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/38300/page/3169
The FAA second seat in fighters (and Skua and Firefly) comes up frequently and was on the forum only weeks ago. USN and IJNAF fighter pilots could navigate to an approximate position for an estimate of where the carrier would be on returning from a flight. They still needed to make visual contact and the carrier was limited to the preplanned movement. In good daylight the carrier could be seen at a fair distance. In poor weather or at night it meant the fighters had to be guided to their carrier by radio transmissions or lights. This limited the carrier's choice of movement and security and fighters could not be used in poor weather or at night without some losses. RDF solved this problem and combined it with early warning of approaching attacks. But this was not known when the Skua and Fulmar were designed.
What the FAA had was a rotating beacon that could be used securely to locate the carrier from the fighter using a variable rotation of the transmission. This required care in timing and direction. The user was normally a Telegraphist Air Gunner not a trained navigator but navigators were also used for longer flights and to guide groups as the seat existed.
It gave the FAA a very decided edge in operations. Once it had launched it's aeroplanes the carrier could manoeuvre at will free from a pre planned rendezvous with it's aeroplanes. It could operate them in poor weather and at night as they could locate the carrier wherever it was and land them with only the small lights for the deck not a bright beacon. The transmissions were difficult for an enemy to notice, to identify and locate and the directions they gave were secure. The extra weight was negligible in terms of the loaded aeroplane's weight. It was a brilliant idea and gratefully received by all the aircrews throughout the war. What could not have been reasonably foreseen was the role that RDF could play and which superceded the FAA beacons. Had shipboard RDF not developed then the FAA would have been able to launch actions against any fleet with relative impunity at night or in bad weather. It also allowed long reconnaissance flights and ASW patrols in the same conditions. The second seat was a very wise choice at the time it was made.
Incidentally the Fulmar proved valuable as a high speed long range reconnaissance resource and reducing it's size would impact upon the load it could lift off the deck and hence it's range. There is a danger in confusing the role of the Fulmar with the role of the fleet defence fighter which operated so close to the carrier that it needed no special navigation aids. The Fulmar developed into the long range strike/reconnaissance fighter Firefly and the fleet fighter Sea Gladiator eventually became the Seafire that the FAA had wanted pre war and were refused. With no Seafire pre war the Fulmar had to act as the fighter in both roles but, had the FAA got the Seafire when they wanted it, then the Fulmar would have been a reasonable Skua replacement.
Before anyone mentions giving the TAG a gun. Fairey's experience with the Battle had taught them that at high speeds a manual gun was so difficult to bring to bear and so little likely to hit anything that the extra speed of the smooth shape of the Fulmar rear fuselage was more likely to save the aeroplane than a Vickers K being blown about in the wind and 30 knots knocked off the speed by opening a gunners position.
A single seat Fulmar could only be for the fleet defence fighter role for which it would be easier to follow OTL with the Sea Hurricane and Seafire. The Fulmar is a very big beast by comparison and cries out for a bigger engine rather than a smaller airframe. Then you have the Firefly.
What the FAA had was a rotating beacon that could be used securely to locate the carrier from the fighter using a variable rotation of the transmission. This required care in timing and direction. The user was normally a Telegraphist Air Gunner not a trained navigator but navigators were also used for longer flights and to guide groups as the seat existed.
It gave the FAA a very decided edge in operations. Once it had launched it's aeroplanes the carrier could manoeuvre at will free from a pre planned rendezvous with it's aeroplanes. It could operate them in poor weather and at night as they could locate the carrier wherever it was and land them with only the small lights for the deck not a bright beacon. The transmissions were difficult for an enemy to notice, to identify and locate and the directions they gave were secure. The extra weight was negligible in terms of the loaded aeroplane's weight. It was a brilliant idea and gratefully received by all the aircrews throughout the war. What could not have been reasonably foreseen was the role that RDF could play and which superceded the FAA beacons. Had shipboard RDF not developed then the FAA would have been able to launch actions against any fleet with relative impunity at night or in bad weather. It also allowed long reconnaissance flights and ASW patrols in the same conditions. The second seat was a very wise choice at the time it was made.
Incidentally the Fulmar proved valuable as a high speed long range reconnaissance resource and reducing it's size would impact upon the load it could lift off the deck and hence it's range. There is a danger in confusing the role of the Fulmar with the role of the fleet defence fighter which operated so close to the carrier that it needed no special navigation aids. The Fulmar developed into the long range strike/reconnaissance fighter Firefly and the fleet fighter Sea Gladiator eventually became the Seafire that the FAA had wanted pre war and were refused. With no Seafire pre war the Fulmar had to act as the fighter in both roles but, had the FAA got the Seafire when they wanted it, then the Fulmar would have been a reasonable Skua replacement.
Before anyone mentions giving the TAG a gun. Fairey's experience with the Battle had taught them that at high speeds a manual gun was so difficult to bring to bear and so little likely to hit anything that the extra speed of the smooth shape of the Fulmar rear fuselage was more likely to save the aeroplane than a Vickers K being blown about in the wind and 30 knots knocked off the speed by opening a gunners position.
A single seat Fulmar could only be for the fleet defence fighter role for which it would be easier to follow OTL with the Sea Hurricane and Seafire. The Fulmar is a very big beast by comparison and cries out for a bigger engine rather than a smaller airframe. Then you have the Firefly.
In 1940 the USNs main fighter was the Grumman F3F
The Japanese Navys main fighter was the Mitsubishi A5M
Which would you like to fly in a dirty northern European day
The Japanese Navys main fighter was the Mitsubishi A5M
Which would you like to fly in a dirty northern European day
With airborne RDF being developed rapidly in 1938 for the RAF perhaps the Navy should have twigged that it would change the viability of a single seat fleet defence fighter.
If that connection is made and with Dowding fighting to get every modern fighter he can to reach his target of 56 frontline squadrons what is the FAA going to order and from whom? IMHO you need to adapt an existing single seat fighter rather than a two seat light bomber. The choices in 1938 are limited but my ATTL favourite is to build a single seat FAA based on the existing Defiant airframe. Having both sea Defiant and Fulmars available in mid to late 1940 would have been very useful.
If that connection is made and with Dowding fighting to get every modern fighter he can to reach his target of 56 frontline squadrons what is the FAA going to order and from whom? IMHO you need to adapt an existing single seat fighter rather than a two seat light bomber. The choices in 1938 are limited but my ATTL favourite is to build a single seat FAA based on the existing Defiant airframe. Having both sea Defiant and Fulmars available in mid to late 1940 would have been very useful.
The Firefly was not developed from the Fulmar, it was a completely fresh design to a later specification, N5/40. Curiously, it was also offered to the RAF under Spec F.18/40 for a turret fighter, but didn't have the turret and was to be equipped with radar from the outset.
The Fairey submission to N8/39 looks like a Fulmar, their submission to NAD925/39 looks more like a Firefly - it certainly has a similar wing but a single seat fuselage.
The Fairey submission to N8/39 looks like a Fulmar, their submission to NAD925/39 looks more like a Firefly - it certainly has a similar wing but a single seat fuselage.
The Fulmar was designed by Marcel Lobelle, and the first proposal for the Firefly was produced by him. The Admiralty called for resubmissions, with considerable specification dithering, and Lobelle left Fairey to join Malcolm. Herbert "Charlie" Chaplin took over the revised plan, which was a large single-seater adapted to two seats. By that time, the Roc had demonstrated its capabilities, and the turret was gone. Production was initiated largely off the drawing board, but considerably delayed by the need to obtain specific tooling for manufacture. At various times in the proposal process, the Admiralty expressed a desire for a single-seat fighter, but somehow, Blackburn's Firebrand was the one that ended up with a sole crewman, after the war.
I was going off "British Secret Projects 3: Fighters & Bombers 1935-1950" by Tony Buttler, an author whose work I have followed for quite some time.
Just to clarify Their Lordships thinking by the end of 1939:
NOTES BY FIFTH SEA LORD OF FLEET AIR ARM MEETING HELD ON 4 JANUARY 1940
[ADM 1/ 10752] 22 JANUARY 1940
A. LONG TERM POLICY:
It was agreed that Fleet Air Arm Fighters were required for the following duties:–
(1) To destroy enemy shadowers.
(2) To intercept enemy striking forces.
(3) To destroy enemy spotters and to protect our own.
(4) To escort our own striking forces to their objectives.
2. Functions 1, 2 and 3 could be met by a Single Seater using the homing beacon as a navigational aid. Function 4 was considered to be problematical but apart from this it was agreed that there would be many occasions when fighters would be required to fly over the sea outside beacon range of their parent ship. It was therefore considered to be a sound policy to develop a 2 Seater fighter having navigational facilities, provided this did not entail a serious reduction in performance compared to a Single Seater.
3. It was, however, agreed that the provision for the second member of the Fighter’s crew should be kept to a minimum of essentials. It appeared feasible to keep the additional structural weight down to 400 lbs., making, with the Observer (200 lbs.), a total additional weight of some 600 lbs.
4. It was agreed that the experience of the present war had shown that Fleet Air Arm Fighters must have sufficient speed to cope with German Aircraft of the following types, which were likely to attack the Fleet in the North Sea:–
(1) Shore Based Anti-Ship Bombers. The most modern German antiship bomber in quantity production likely to be encountered is the Junkers 88 with a top speed in level flight of 285 m.p.h.
(2) Long Range Fighters escorting striking forces. The new Messerschmidt 110 which was likely to be used for this purpose is reputed to have a top speed of 350 m.p.h.
5. It was considered reasonable to suppose that by the time any new Fleet Air Arm Fighter comes into service, which may be a matter of two to three years, the speeds of enemy aircraft which might be encountered will have risen. Speeds of over 300 miles an hour for shore base bombers and 400 miles an hour or more for fighters, were mentioned as being within the realms of possibility.
6. The Director of Air Materiel outlined the tender designs which had been received from various firms to the revised N. 8 (two-seater front gun) specification. These included aircraft with top speeds, as estimated by the firms, of around 380 miles an hour, which compared very favourably with the estimated top speeds of the single seater designs which had also been received; the differences varied between 2 and 25 miles/ hour.
B. SHORT TERM POLICY:
8. (1) Fulmar. D.A.M. stated that the Fulmar was three months behind time, and quantity production would not begin before April, 1940. He was satisfied that it could not be accelerated.
9. It was agreed that this Aircraft with its large endurance, powerful armament and speed of 260– 270 m.p.h. should prove a valuable weapon. It could be used for reconnaissance and for the maintenance of patrols at sea which would give it opportunities of attacking faster aircraft.
10. (2) Spitfires or Hurricanes. The meeting took note of the fact that the Fleet Air Arm was now faced with ‘shore based’ tasks not previously envisaged, e.g. the defence of Scapa. Moreover, the Fleet Air Arm might be called upon at any time to undertake the responsibility for the Air protection of other Naval Bases, whether at home or abroad.
11. It was agreed that these new tasks made it desirable to reinforce the weapons of the Fleet Air Arm with a number of high speed single-seater Fighters of the most modern types, if practicable. The use of such Fighters would offer the following advantages.
(1) They would constitute a mobile Fleet Fighter force suitable for shore-based work which could be moved rapidly to any point required, and enable the Navy to undertake the air defence of its bases overseas, months before such defence was likely to be provided by the Royal Air Force.
(2) They could also, if necessary, be used at sea to supplement the Fulmars; the Fulmars carrying out the patrols and these singleseaters being flown off when attack was imminent. Since they would not have W/T, they could not be directed once air-borne, and they could not navigate. They would, therefore, have to rely on themselves sighting the enemy close to the Fleet for making contacts. Within these limitations, their speed should enable them to force combat on a proportion of attackers, and they would have sufficient petrol for a short pursuit.
12. The problems of using either Spitfires or Hurricanes for this purpose were discussed. The main difficulty was that of the embarkation of these types in Carriers. Without folding wings they could be embarked in the GLORIOUS and FURIOUS, owing to the wide lifts fitted in these Carriers, but they could not be embarked in the later Carriers, which had narrower lifts, unless their wings were made to fold. The Firms concerned were already working on designs for modified wings for this purpose and they hoped to be in a position to report upon the possibilities very shortly. It was expected that it would be at least nine months before Aircraft of these types with folding wings would come into production. It had been contemplated that if the designs of folding wings were successful, some 50 Aircraft might be obtained.
13. The meeting argued that a force of this kind would be valuable to the Fleet Air Arm, and they recommend that the possibilities should be pursued with all despatch.
14. (3) Possible use of Foreign Types. This in practice meant U.S.A. Aircraft. The meeting considered that the types available and the possibilities of obtaining them offered no advantages over the Spitfires or Hurricanes, and that there was nothing to be gained by pursuing this suggestion further.
LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF ADMIRALTY1 TO UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, AIR MINISTRY
[AIR 2/ 4255] 29 FEBRUARY 1940
ORDERS FOR ALBACORE, FIREFLY, FULMAR AND WALRUS AIRCRAFT
4. While appreciating that the Fulmar should prove a valuable weapon for the Fleet Air Arm, My Lords are anxious that a Fighter of higher performance should be brought into service as early as practicable. To this end, they propose that production of the two-seater front gun Fighter to revised Specification N. 8/391 (Firefly) should be undertaken without going through the full prototype procedure.
6. My Lords wish to take this opportunity to inform the Air Council that for operational reasons they consider it important that a number of high speed single seater Fighters should be made available for the Fleet Air Arm in the very near future. My Lords are informed that the possibility of providing some 50 Spitfires with folding wings and arrester hook has already been discussed informally between representatives of the two Departments and by the Technical Sub Committee of the Fleet Air Arm Advisory Committee, and that the matter is being investigated with a view to placing the proposal before the Air Council. My Lords would be grateful if the Air Council would give it favourable consideration. They hope that it may be possible for at least some modified Spitfires to be available by July next.
NOTES BY FIFTH SEA LORD OF FLEET AIR ARM MEETING HELD ON 4 JANUARY 1940
[ADM 1/ 10752] 22 JANUARY 1940
A. LONG TERM POLICY:
It was agreed that Fleet Air Arm Fighters were required for the following duties:–
(1) To destroy enemy shadowers.
(2) To intercept enemy striking forces.
(3) To destroy enemy spotters and to protect our own.
(4) To escort our own striking forces to their objectives.
2. Functions 1, 2 and 3 could be met by a Single Seater using the homing beacon as a navigational aid. Function 4 was considered to be problematical but apart from this it was agreed that there would be many occasions when fighters would be required to fly over the sea outside beacon range of their parent ship. It was therefore considered to be a sound policy to develop a 2 Seater fighter having navigational facilities, provided this did not entail a serious reduction in performance compared to a Single Seater.
3. It was, however, agreed that the provision for the second member of the Fighter’s crew should be kept to a minimum of essentials. It appeared feasible to keep the additional structural weight down to 400 lbs., making, with the Observer (200 lbs.), a total additional weight of some 600 lbs.
4. It was agreed that the experience of the present war had shown that Fleet Air Arm Fighters must have sufficient speed to cope with German Aircraft of the following types, which were likely to attack the Fleet in the North Sea:–
(1) Shore Based Anti-Ship Bombers. The most modern German antiship bomber in quantity production likely to be encountered is the Junkers 88 with a top speed in level flight of 285 m.p.h.
(2) Long Range Fighters escorting striking forces. The new Messerschmidt 110 which was likely to be used for this purpose is reputed to have a top speed of 350 m.p.h.
5. It was considered reasonable to suppose that by the time any new Fleet Air Arm Fighter comes into service, which may be a matter of two to three years, the speeds of enemy aircraft which might be encountered will have risen. Speeds of over 300 miles an hour for shore base bombers and 400 miles an hour or more for fighters, were mentioned as being within the realms of possibility.
6. The Director of Air Materiel outlined the tender designs which had been received from various firms to the revised N. 8 (two-seater front gun) specification. These included aircraft with top speeds, as estimated by the firms, of around 380 miles an hour, which compared very favourably with the estimated top speeds of the single seater designs which had also been received; the differences varied between 2 and 25 miles/ hour.
B. SHORT TERM POLICY:
8. (1) Fulmar. D.A.M. stated that the Fulmar was three months behind time, and quantity production would not begin before April, 1940. He was satisfied that it could not be accelerated.
9. It was agreed that this Aircraft with its large endurance, powerful armament and speed of 260– 270 m.p.h. should prove a valuable weapon. It could be used for reconnaissance and for the maintenance of patrols at sea which would give it opportunities of attacking faster aircraft.
10. (2) Spitfires or Hurricanes. The meeting took note of the fact that the Fleet Air Arm was now faced with ‘shore based’ tasks not previously envisaged, e.g. the defence of Scapa. Moreover, the Fleet Air Arm might be called upon at any time to undertake the responsibility for the Air protection of other Naval Bases, whether at home or abroad.
11. It was agreed that these new tasks made it desirable to reinforce the weapons of the Fleet Air Arm with a number of high speed single-seater Fighters of the most modern types, if practicable. The use of such Fighters would offer the following advantages.
(1) They would constitute a mobile Fleet Fighter force suitable for shore-based work which could be moved rapidly to any point required, and enable the Navy to undertake the air defence of its bases overseas, months before such defence was likely to be provided by the Royal Air Force.
(2) They could also, if necessary, be used at sea to supplement the Fulmars; the Fulmars carrying out the patrols and these singleseaters being flown off when attack was imminent. Since they would not have W/T, they could not be directed once air-borne, and they could not navigate. They would, therefore, have to rely on themselves sighting the enemy close to the Fleet for making contacts. Within these limitations, their speed should enable them to force combat on a proportion of attackers, and they would have sufficient petrol for a short pursuit.
12. The problems of using either Spitfires or Hurricanes for this purpose were discussed. The main difficulty was that of the embarkation of these types in Carriers. Without folding wings they could be embarked in the GLORIOUS and FURIOUS, owing to the wide lifts fitted in these Carriers, but they could not be embarked in the later Carriers, which had narrower lifts, unless their wings were made to fold. The Firms concerned were already working on designs for modified wings for this purpose and they hoped to be in a position to report upon the possibilities very shortly. It was expected that it would be at least nine months before Aircraft of these types with folding wings would come into production. It had been contemplated that if the designs of folding wings were successful, some 50 Aircraft might be obtained.
13. The meeting argued that a force of this kind would be valuable to the Fleet Air Arm, and they recommend that the possibilities should be pursued with all despatch.
14. (3) Possible use of Foreign Types. This in practice meant U.S.A. Aircraft. The meeting considered that the types available and the possibilities of obtaining them offered no advantages over the Spitfires or Hurricanes, and that there was nothing to be gained by pursuing this suggestion further.
LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF ADMIRALTY1 TO UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, AIR MINISTRY
[AIR 2/ 4255] 29 FEBRUARY 1940
ORDERS FOR ALBACORE, FIREFLY, FULMAR AND WALRUS AIRCRAFT
4. While appreciating that the Fulmar should prove a valuable weapon for the Fleet Air Arm, My Lords are anxious that a Fighter of higher performance should be brought into service as early as practicable. To this end, they propose that production of the two-seater front gun Fighter to revised Specification N. 8/391 (Firefly) should be undertaken without going through the full prototype procedure.
6. My Lords wish to take this opportunity to inform the Air Council that for operational reasons they consider it important that a number of high speed single seater Fighters should be made available for the Fleet Air Arm in the very near future. My Lords are informed that the possibility of providing some 50 Spitfires with folding wings and arrester hook has already been discussed informally between representatives of the two Departments and by the Technical Sub Committee of the Fleet Air Arm Advisory Committee, and that the matter is being investigated with a view to placing the proposal before the Air Council. My Lords would be grateful if the Air Council would give it favourable consideration. They hope that it may be possible for at least some modified Spitfires to be available by July next.