FAA attack on Brest 1941 or 1942

If the FAA had been able to mount a successful carrier attack on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau while they were at Brest and sunk both at their moorings, what effect would that have?

Edited to allow for an attack in 1942.
 
Last edited:
If the FAA had been able to mount a successful carrier attack on Scharnhorst and Gneisenau while they were at Brest and sunk both at their moorings, what effect would that have?

It would have freed up X number of Home fleet ships for duties elsewhere that OTL would have been tied down waiting for them to make a raid into the Atlantic.

Basically it would leave just the Tirpitz as a threat

Force Z would be a lot larger, the Home fleet a lot smaller.
 
It would have freed up X number of Home fleet ships for duties elsewhere that OTL would have been tied down waiting for them to make a raid into the Atlantic.

Basically it would leave just the Tirpitz as a threat

Force Z would be a lot larger, the Home fleet a lot smaller.

Well assuming its done before say August 41 to give time for redeployments......

Any way, what about the implications of a successful attack before December 7th 1941...that's two attacks by carrier aircraft causing a lot of damage.......
 
Last edited:
What about the implications of a successful attack before December 7th 1941...that's two attacks by carrier aircraft causing a lot of damage.......

Are you suggesting that Kimmel and Short Might take more notice? ;)

I think the understanding that Pearl was too far away from Japan for such an attack would be the main belief to shatter.

The USN had after all convincingly 'attacked' Pearl Harbour during previous carrier exercises (one of the 'Problems' they exercised pre war).

So it wasn't like they were unaware of the threat.

They just did not believe that it could happen to them - shatter that misconception and yes 7th Dec or what ever date it now occurs on may very well be different
 
Are there any more suitable pods out there?
Maybe, a HMS Courageous surviving timeline with the Graf Zeppelin completed as a result, HMS Courageous lost and Ark Royal not being able to intercept Bismarck due to butterflies might do the trick.
 
Are you suggesting that Kimmel and Short Might take more notice? ;)

I think the understanding that Pearl was too far away from Japan for such an attack would be the main belief to shatter.

The USN had after all convincingly 'attacked' Pearl Harbour during previous carrier exercises (one of the 'Problems' they exercised pre war).

So it wasn't like they were unaware of the threat.

They just did not believe that it could happen to them - shatter that misconception and yes 7th Dec or what ever date it now occurs on may very well be different

And the general belief that the primary threat to Hawaii was from for want of a better term terrorists. That's why the fighter planes were lined up wing to wing out on the ramps. So they could be easily guarded against guys trying to attack the base. You also have to deal with what was in essence a peacetime mentality in the US military in Hawaii. This was not a fleet or army at war or even on a war footing. Everyone knew war was probably coming at some date in the future but they were still at peace.
 
I wonder why you would employ a carrierforce against Brest, while the distance is easily covered from ground territory of the UK as well? Sending carriers in submarine and luftwaffe invested waters is asking for trouble, so don't do such a thing in the first place, when there is an easily available option.

Historically the FAA could deploy landbased strikes with the twin engined Bristol Beaufort and comparable strike aircraft, which it actually did in the OTL, but under RAF Coastal Command.
 
I wonder why you would employ a carrierforce against Brest, while the distance is easily covered from ground territory of the UK as well? Sending carriers in submarine and luftwaffe invested waters is asking for trouble, so don't do such a thing in the first place, when there is an easily available option.

Historically the FAA could deploy landbased strikes with the twin engined Bristol Beaufort and comparable strike aircraft, which it actually did in the OTL, but under RAF Coastal Command.

Catch them form a direction they are not looking...:)
 
I wonder why you would employ a carrierforce against Brest, while the distance is easily covered from ground territory of the UK as well? Sending carriers in submarine and luftwaffe invested waters is asking for trouble, so don't do such a thing in the first place, when there is an easily available option.

Historically the FAA could deploy landbased strikes with the twin engined Bristol Beaufort and comparable strike aircraft, which it actually did in the OTL, but under RAF Coastal Command.

Yeah this is the real problem. Plus the RN didn't have anything like the strike capability of IJN? But the real problem would be u-boats, I think. Especially for recovery of the strike.
 
Didn't the RAF get its ass handed to it in costly fashion when it tried to operate over France in 1941-42ish?

The Germans unlike the Italians were completely aware of being within range of the enemy air attack and had been fighting an air campaign for a year or so by the point this comes about. Its hardly unlikely that the most strategic location in France (for the Germans) will not have plenty of AA and some fighters allocated to it. The FAA going in alone would probably be in for the fight of their life.
 
Nothing to stop them doing a night raid. Also, have to check what Radar the Germans actually had near Brest.
 
Nothing to stop them doing a night raid. Also, have to check what Radar the Germans actually had near Brest.

German night defences against airstrikes already were using radar and fighter direction techniques, sending in normal single engined fighters in at night in combat zones, directed from the ground. Radar equiped twin engined fighters were not long in the making either, as the first appeared in the spring of 1942, making it quite possible to have Luftwaffe Nachtjagtgruppe hunting actively for allied aircraft at night.

Again, the lack of modern equipment for the FAA in 1941/1942 and the availablity of modern electronics and capable aircraft for the Luftwaffe, as well as radar controlled FLAK, would make any strike of the FAA in this period against a well fortified German target almost suicidal. Even the more advanced warplanes of the RAF barely stood a change at this time in history, given their rate of losses in night attacks in this same period.
 
Yeah this is the real problem. Plus the RN didn't have anything like the strike capability of IJN? But the real problem would be u-boats, I think. Especially for recovery of the strike.

Given the distance they could fly north after the strike & stop over in the UK. Return to the carriers could occur later when in a safer area. This techniques opens the possibility of using other aircraft, something like what the US did in the Tokyo raid. The FAA could use aircraft capable of launch, but not recovery.

Didn't the RAF get its ass handed to it in costly fashion when it tried to operate over France in 1941-42ish?

Yes and no. The loss rate of the Circus & Rodeo operations were unfavorable to the RAF, but not as bad as the popular narrative has it. That was based on bad wartime data & German propaganda claims. The problem with the Circus/Rodeo ops was a combination of bad intel analysis, some bad assumptions, leading to less than optimal planning. All that put the raid air crew in difficult situations. Part of this is the raid plans allowed the Germans to pick and choose their interceptions. they usually could avoid combat if the situation was not highly favorable. The raid plans gave the RAF pilots less flexibility in this. However a key point to remember is; at the end of 1942 the German operational strength in France had fallen to the vicinity of 300 usable aircraft, and they were having difficulty using airfields anywhere near the Channel. To keep their own losses at a managable level they were having to keep most aircraft based east of Paris or well to the south. At the end of the day the RAF did dominate over the north western western edge of France.

The Germans unlike the Italians were completely aware of being within range of the enemy air attack and had been fighting an air campaign for a year or so by the point this comes about. Its hardly unlikely that the most strategic location in France (for the Germans) will not have plenty of AA and some fighters allocated to it. The FAA going in alone would probably be in for the fight of their life.

This depends on the German warning system to the west, and what techniques the Fleet used to dodge it. I know in 1943 the RAF & USAAF had consistent sucess in sending raids in at extreme low level - under the German radar. There are other problems with that approach, but in 43 the Germans could be suprised that way by raids approaching from the sea. If the FAA had this technique in 1941 or 42 it helps.
 
Are there any more suitable pods out there?
Maybe, a HMS Courageous surviving timeline with the Graf Zeppelin completed as a result, HMS Courageous lost and Ark Royal not being able to intercept Bismarck due to butterflies might do the trick.

I'm writing one of those. I might incorporate that.

I've not checked the statistics, but IIRC Bomber Command was bombing Brest regularly and Coastal Command made at least one raid. They did do some damage that prevented at least Scharnhorst from coming out to support Bismarck's sortie and delayed the Channel Dash until February 1942.

I suspect that a raid by the FAA would be slaughtered.

However, if they got lucky and sank the entire force or damaged the ships beyond the Germans ability to repair them it would mean the Home Fleet could be weakened and other fronts reinforced.
 
Top