Eyes Turned Skywards

[e of pi]

I've been refining my Timberwind-based evil plan for the Single-Stage-to-orbit thread (BTW, I think if those things work, and no one worries about the various potentials for disaster, they could serve as bases for a real SSTO vehicle--but I still think that overall it would still prove far more sensible to use the same technologies to put payloads into orbit much more efficiently using disposable stages--however, recovering the nuclear engines, at least for reprocessing and waste disposal purposes!)

However I can't find my calculator, so I've been learning to estimate exponentials in my head. Typically I have neither scrap paper, reliable pens, nor time to even write things down--and when I do much of it is literally on the backs of envelopes! Then my pens die, this seems to be either a consequence of living in a high semidesert (Washoe County Nevada) or a personal jinx.

Google has a pretty nice calculator built in (due to rocket equation calculations, I now get about a hundred "you recently searched for e^((4000km/s)/(421 s* 9.81 m/s^2))" things when I start one...), and Excel's can handle it as well. Excel's is nice because you can then use formulas to do multistage or multiburn missions (like a lunar mission: what do you need to get back to Lunar Orbit, so what does you descent stage carry as payload other than that ascent stage and fuel).

I really believe chemical TSTO makes more sense than nuclear SSTO, especially since chemical TSTO can be done with large margins, while getting any payload out of a nuclear SSTO is kind of marginal, especially with thrust levels.

I believe your Skylab missions that correspond to ours OTL had the same crews; Garriot presumably had his good times on your second mission.

Garriot did fly on Skylab 3 as OTL, though it was a few months later than OTL due to Apollo 18. He's likely to fly to Spacelab, since OTL he stuck on until STS-9 to fly again in '83.

With more astronauts kicking around Skylab, do you suppose there'd be more insight into the nature of human mental adaptation to zero G?

Well, there's only been 2 more missions than OTL to date in the TL: Apollo 18 and Skylab 5. The real differences in US flight rates are still to come in about '78, since the Saturn IC first stage is taking its sweet time in development. However, it may interest you that Rusty Schweickart was the commander of the Skylab 5 mission (as backup commander of Skylab 2, he rotated into the slot) and he was sort of the prime guinea pig for space sickness OTL which is why he didn't get a chance to fly again in Apollo, they basically stole him for ground research during prime training periods.

For that matter in 1978 of OTL, when I believe Stardance was evolving from a short story to a novel, while a number of Soviet space stations (all smaller than Skylab) had flown and some cosmonaut missions had been extended to many months, information from those missions would not have flowed freely, and with less space to kick around in in any of the Salyuts I suppose the Russians had fewer chances to observe variations in human adaptation, and were focused on the obviously crucial questions of physical adaptation (and for the most part, how to stop it!) But in this timeline, a few more missions of US astronauts made it to Skylab and shared its spaces, most of which had been designed to provide a particular vertical reference. So they'd know more by the late 70s than we did.

So OTL with Mir and the ISS, have there been signs of this diversity of human response, with some people like poor Schweickart having an especially hard time, a norm of people who can handle it as long as there are visual cues that there is still some sort of up and down, and more cases like Garriot showing up who sometime in the course of the mission find they can do just fine without pretending some direction is up and are mentally at ease?

As I said, the real differences in US flights won't come until Spacelab in '78, so it'll be the early 80s before we really know a ton more than OTL. However, I feel some need to defend Rusty: in my understanding it wasn't that he was unusually susceptible so much as that he made some bad decisions that delayed his adaption period. In an attempt to minimize the symptoms, he avoided rapid head movements (which read differently to the inner ear in space, and essentially have to be re-adapted to) and avoided the LEM (with its local down at 180 degrees to the CSM). Then, they go to get the LEM ready, he gets busy and starts moving his head around a lot and all of a sudden the fact that avoiding the symptoms also delays adaption comes to bite him on the butt and he gets sick. By the next day, he was feeling much better and the mission could go ahead, but he'd gotten a reputation he never had a chance OTL to fix since he missed Apollo missions spending time with the docs working out stuff to mitigate space sickness in the future.

As to your question about whether there are different "tribes" of people in terms of adaption to zero-g...I don't know. If you're interested, you might try looking around the NASA Technical Reports Server and reading up on zero-g adapation research yourself.

It seems to me that the modular nature of Mir and ISS tends to make it easy and automatic to design in local verticals--for one thing, the modules are not only designed but assembled on the surface of the Earth, where just for practical reasons of layout during construction we'd impose the actual vertical on the module. Then, when the modules get linked up, there may well be a deliberate policy of lining up the visual verticals of each module so that as much as possible, any line of sight even through several (and from footage I've seen, one can typically only see two or three at once--the one you are in plus the next ones up and down the chain) would be consistent. People would tend to think of the ISS as a flat array of modules laid out on the "ground" on pretty much one level--kind of like Bag End--"no going upstairs for the hobbit!"

Well, the Russian segment is largely in one plane, but it's actually the vertical plane: modules stretch up and down from a central line of modules. the US segment is more horizontal, but there are modules that stretch above and below the plan: Kibo's storage module goes up, and the PMM and Cupola stretch below Node 1 and Node 3 respectively. However, Node 3 was altered from the originally planned location on Node 1 Nadir (down) to the installed location of Node 1 port because of issues with verticals, especially since it was going to see a lot of travel. It limits the usefulness of the module for future expansion, but since the other modules that were to berth to it were cancelled, it was done anyway.

With I forget how many men and women spending some time up there, what has been the verdict? (1) Do people tend to evolve out of the spacesick phase at least into comfortable-as-long-as-it-looks-Ok phase, given time, and (2) given time do some of that middle majority get more adventurous and comfortable with orienting any which way that happens to be momentarily convenient?

(1) Roughly, that is my understanding. Space sickness is more technically known these days as Space Adaption Syndrome specifically because it goes away after a few days of letting your body re-orient.

(2) As I understand, yes, but if you're really interested you should dig into the NTRS I linked to earlier and look for more detailed information from people who spend their careers studying this for real, not just the off-the-cuff impressions of an engineer in progress.

Just like to let you guys know I am following the timeline and liking its direction. I'm not too science/math-savvy and the space race is not my forte, so, sorry if I can't give more constructive criticism.

Glad to hear you like it.

So, sorry to go a little off-topic with this, but is there any situation in which building a nuclear thermal rocket would be cost-effective? Or is it really just a waste of investment? Is there any way the space race could have seen them?

Even Winchell Chung (the Atomic rockets webmaster) thinks solid-core NTR is pretty marginal in terms of being a "good trade-off" for chemical, and especially for launch from the ground. You really have to get to liquid or gas-core reactors before the ISP advantages can consistently outweigh the issues of added mass in reactor and shielding. So...my off-the-cuff answer would be "No and no."

 

[Gridley]

So, sorry to go a little off-topic with this, but is there any situation in which building a nuclear thermal rocket would be cost-effective? Or is it really just a waste of investment? Is there any way the space race could have seen them?

I'm quite sure there could be some situation somewhere where they'd be cost effective. However, under the present bias against nuclear anything and the limited scale of launches I suspect there is no present or near future application where it would be cost effective.

Now once we really get out into space in a big way and are looking at interplanetary missions (with ships which are orbit-to-orbit only) I think we'll see nuclear power systems.

A side note: RTGs (radio-thermal generators) are 'nuclear' by some definitions but not others. They have a long history in satellites and probes and are quite cost-effective for such operations. As a way to launch a ship out of a gravity well, however, they're about as practical as flapping your arms.

 

[e of pi]

I'm quite sure there could be some situation somewhere where they'd be cost effective. However, under the present bias against nuclear anything and the limited scale of launches I suspect there is no present or near future application where it would be cost effective.

Now once we really get out into space in a big way and are looking at interplanetary missions (with ships which are orbit-to-orbit only) I think we'll see nuclear power systems.

This is roughly my read, presuming that by "nuclear power systems" you are referring to things like nuclear-electric propulsion (nuclear-power ion, ect). It especially works well with depots placed at strategic locations like L2, lunar orbit, Mars orbit, whatever. Place and fill them with NEP tanker/tug "slow boats," then your crew make the trips on "fast" chemically-propelled rockets that tank up at each depot instead of leaving stages all over the place.

I do find it kind of funny that there's all this discussion of nuclear rockets and nuclear power when to my knowledge neither has even been mentioned in the actual TL .

 

[Bahamut-255]

I do find it kind of funny that there's all this discussion of nuclear rockets and nuclear power when to my knowledge neither has even been mentioned in the actual TL .

That's likely down to the fact the the sexy shuttle is out. So the sexy NTR is all that's really left. Unless you can get a sexy Manned Mars Mission in here - and I''ll apologise now if it's already been mentioned. Though given it horrendous T/M ratio of an NTR engine - never more than 5:1 against 30-130:1 for chemical engines if my understanding is correct - and the very high dry mass of the system required for radiation shielding and systems to prevent a backwash of heat to the stored LH2. You're looking at a vacuum ISP of at least 2,000s before a payload advantage can be properly seen. Especially one to justify the costs!

As for Mars itself. One advantage this TL has in respect to OTL is that NASA is able to build up some serious long-term space duration experience and data a hell of a lot sooner. One thing they really will need for such a task. Another is that with at least some of the Saturn V tech still around - and increase maturity of the systems as a whole - they have a considerably better starting point to get such a mission at all.

One word of warning though. You will absolutely require - there are no two ways about it - a much more mature and competent management running NASA than we've seen at time OTL - which at those key points in history would not have looked out of place at the Enron Executive Board. I'm sure you know exactly which points I refer to.

 

[Hnau]

I do find it kind of funny that there's all this discussion of nuclear rockets and nuclear power when to my knowledge neither has even been mentioned in the actual TL .

I think I just mentioned it because I recognized you were such a good source to inquire of other spacetech questions.

 

[Shevek23]

...
I do find it kind of funny that there's all this discussion of nuclear rockets and nuclear power when to my knowledge neither has even been mentioned in the actual TL .

And I'm afraid I may have mixed up you and Truth Is Life with Asnys. Y'all often look like some kind of triumvirate to me. Sorry about that! Again.

Because I'm the one who dragged the things into this thread, not Hnau.

 

[e of pi]

Well, it appears once again the continued motion of the Earth has turned it into Wednesday, so here comes this week's installment of Eyes Turned Skyward. This week, we take a look a little behind the ate of the earlier posts and across the Atlantic at the rocket that failed to fail: Europa.

Eyes Turned Skyward, Post #9

From Europa: The Rocket That Almost Wasn’t (Hilbert, 1985)

Even though it was the home of many early rocket pioneers, the aftermath of World War II and the destruction it had caused, especially in Germany, caused Europe to fall behind in the space age. European rocket scientists were left to watch the United States and the Soviet Union take the lead in exploring space. As the long boom set in, however, the practical benefits of space became more apparent, with American weather and communications satellites showing that space was not just a place for national competition. By the early 1960s, a desire for a certain degree of independence from the United States began to manifest and European governments became more willing to spend money on frivolities such as space, starting their own native space programs. However, even as the French became only the third nation to launch their own satellite in 1965, it had become clear that alone, no single nation’s program could match the funding of their American or Soviet counterparts. After discussion, a solution was decided on: the European nations would form two organizations to co-operate on the development of their own space research program and the development of their own native launch system, although the British continued work on their native Black Arrow system in parallel. The European Space Research Organization (ESRO) was founded in 1962, to begin development on native European satellites and scientific observations. ELDO, the European Launcher Development Organization, was founded in 1964 with the goal of creating a native European launch vehicle to carry those payloads and break the American and Soviet monopoly on spaceflight.

ELDO focused its development on a vehicle called Europa, based on the modified Blue Streak missile originally developed by the UK for its previous work on a native launch system. Under the auspices of ELDO, Blue Streak was to be leveraged into a 3-stage launcher capable of placing a 1-ton payload into Earth orbit, allowing a 360 kilogram payload to be placed into a geostationary transfer orbit. Britain would provide the Blue Streak first stage, France would provide the Coralie second stage, and Germany the Astris upper stage. Italy worked on payload interfaces and other payload development, while the Netherlands and Belgium worked on tracking and telemetry. Australia was to provide the initial launch site, Woomera.

The test program was divided into three phases. The first phase was to consist of proving the Blue Streak first stage. This began in 1964, and consisted of three launches from Woomera. All were successful, and ELDO moved forward with the second phase, which consisted of suborbital launches of the three-stage configuration, with the upper stages inactive on the early flights (serving only as aerodynamic dummies). With successive flights, additional stages would be made active until the entire vehicle was proven. Finally, phase three would see four test launches into orbit, with the goal of reaching operational status in 1970.

The best-laid plans can easily go awry, but the issues Europa encountered were particularly spectacular. The program’s early history is sometimes forgotten by the general public, but in 1967 the program seemed on the verge of total collapse. Three consecutive flight attempts ended in failures due to issues in the second and third stages. Despite its lead role in the project, British interest was waning, and it seemed like the failure of ELDO was all but assured. However, the seventh test flight, the second with an active Coralie stage, finally succeeded completely on December 5, 1967 following a complete re-design of the electronics associated with the rocket’s flight sequencer, determined to be the cause of the flight 6 failure. A review of the electronics of the other stages also revealed other dangerous issues, like a lack of insulation on critical third-stage components. The vital good news of the flight 7 success helped revitalize the project’s flagging British support and greatly boosted the morale of the engineering teams involved, promoting a new feeling of having finally gotten ahead of the rocket’s issues. Eleven months of analysis and rework followed, but the result was a successful first flight of the complete Europa configuration on November 26th, 1968. The successful flight of a native-launched European payload into orbit would have to wait until the 10th test flight in 1969, but ELDO would prove it could match the achievements of the Americans and Soviet Union.

With the successes, though, there also came changes. Changing requirements lead the program to shift operations to the Kourou launch site in French Guiana, effectively eliminating Australian participation. A four-stage variant, Europa 2 (boasting a slightly improved payload), was the first to fly from this site in 1971, proving that the success of Europa 1 was not a fluke. In a commitment to the project, the British government established the British Space Agency to co-ordinate their involvement in ESRO and ELDO.

At the same time, the European space program as a whole was driven into something of a crisis. With its own success, it had proven it could play the game of the superpowers, but now it had to make use of those capabilities. There were calls for ESRO to examine its goals in light of the native launch capability of Europa, for the exploration of European-developed telecommunications systems (not originally part of the ESRO charter, but clearly an up-and-coming technology), for improved launchers, and possibly even for a manned spaceflight program. For any of this to be possible, better cooperation and coordination would be needed. Indeed, the issues ELDO had faced largely stemmed from a lack of co-ordination among the national engineering teams. Thus, in 1972, the ESRO and ELDO member nations agreed to merge the two organizations into the new European Space Agency, or ESA. ESA was directed to continue launcher development under a new unified program, continue research and telecommunications programs begun under its predecessors, as well as to explore the potential for European manned flights via cooperation with the United States.

 

[Bahamut-255]

From Europa: The Rocket That Almost Wasn’t (Hilbert, 1985)

In this TL at least.

The test program was divided into three phases. The first phase was to consist of proving the Blue Streak first stage. This began in 1964, and consisted of three launches from Woomera. All were successful, and ELDO moved forward with the second phase, which consisted of suborbital launches of the three-stage configuration, with the upper stages inactive on the early flights (serving only as aerodynamic dummies). With successive flights, additional stages would be made active until the entire vehicle was proven. Finally, phase three would see four test launches into orbit, with the goal of reaching operational status in 1970.

So this follows OTL for a time then. I wonder which site has better launch trajectory windows? Woomera or Kourou? Based on what will be in the stages impact zones.

The best-laid plans can easily go awry, but the issues Europa encountered were particularly spectacular. <-snip-> The successful flight of a native-launched European payload into orbit would have to wait until the 10th test flight in 1969, but ELDO would prove it could match the achievements of the Americans and Soviet Union.

With the successes, though, there also came changes. Changing requirements lead the program to shift operations to the Kourou launch site in French Guiana, effectively eliminating Australian participation. A four-stage variant, Europa 2 (boasting a slightly improved payload), was the first to fly from this site in 1971, proving that the success of Europa 1 was not a fluke. In a commitment to the project, the British government established the British Space Agency to co-ordinate their involvement in ESRO and ELDO.

IIRC, Europa 2 differed only in that it had a tiny solid upper stage for a tiny increase in payload. But at least future upgrade options are actually available. And it looks like British involvement has been saved at the eleventh hour - and the fifty-ninth minute, and the fifty-ninth second. This should allow for some more funding, and perhaps see more done. Not to mentioned allow something of British Industry to not only survive, but maybe even prosper. Guess we'll see.

At the same time, the European space program as a whole was driven into something of a crisis. With its own success, it had proven it could play the game of the superpowers, but now it had to make use of those capabilities. <-snip-> ESA was directed to continue launcher development under a new unified program, continue research and telecommunications programs begun under its predecessors, as well as to explore the potential for European manned flights via cooperation with the United States.

So like OTL, they get a proper structure, but that's only to be expected, considering what they had before. But the real problem here is - as I've already mentioned - the lack of good info on Europa. But at least there's plenty on the ESA itself to go with.

Another issue I've identified though, and it may not be a particularly good one. STS had seven seats, so NASA could allow ESA astronauts on with some ease on the scientific missions - one reason that Hermes failed IMHO. But ITTL, they are sticking with Apollo, which only has three seats, so space will be at a premium, this will likely make NASA more reluctant to allow other personnel on board IMO. As a result, ESA may be more willing to fund an Independant European Manned Launch System - though I fully expect it to be capsule design. Possibly launched on a modified Europa III/IV - that is, Common Core Boosters, Constant Diameter Stages, a lot more safety sysems.

As for USSR. Well, guess I gotta wait for the Earth to spin on it's axis at least seven more times for that.

 

[Shevek23]

So, is the divergence here largely technical? That is, different decisions made by the engineers of the 3 primary countries? Mainly apparently different decisions by the French and Germans, as the British Blue Streak booster stage was already developed and there is little mention of any modification of it technically, the main British divergence being to stay the course.

Or is it mainly a political divergence, a set of decisions to persevere and to raise the level of commitment, that freed up engineers to go for something a bit more ambitious and keep working on it until it worked?

I've been glancing over the early posts again to try to pin down just when and what the POD of this timeline is. Clearly the major effective and obvious divergence in the USA was the decision to shelve Shuttle plans and seek funding for pointy-unreused classic rockets for orbital follow-on missions, which seems to have been made early in the Nixon administration. So, apparent POD is in the late 1960s, but for Europa to be on a different track already by the time Low was announcing the non-OTL plans, the real POD had to be earlier.

I extended my scan though it didn't cover the last page of posts before this one; I don't think y'all authors ever stepped out of character enough to point out just what POD we are working with here.

So if it isn't nailed down yet, perhaps whatever divergences in the European program that let them persist and reap these successes somehow led, by whatever mix of butterflies and direct cause and effect chains works best, to the alternate NASA decisions downstream post Apollo-11?

 

[Bahamut-255]

I've been glancing over the early posts again to try to pin down just when and what the POD of this timeline is. Clearly the major effective and obvious divergence in the USA was the decision to shelve Shuttle plans and seek funding for pointy-unreused classic rockets for orbital follow-on missions, which seems to have been made early in the Nixon administration. So, apparent POD is in the late 1960s, but for Europa to be on a different track already by the time Low was announcing the non-OTL plans, the real POD had to be earlier.

I extended my scan though it didn't cover the last page of posts before this one; I don't think y'all authors ever stepped out of character enough to point out just what POD we are working with here.

NASA and ESA were, ultimately, two entirely seperate programmes. Each with their own inception, and purpose. Meaning that although the NASA POD came earlier, it wouldn't really affect ESA until they started moving - as they are now ITTL. And now that ESA is up and running, the butterflies can kick in, and do their stuff.

 

[e of pi]

So, is the divergence here largely technical? That is, different decisions made by the engineers of the 3 primary countries? Mainly apparently different decisions by the French and Germans, as the British Blue Streak booster stage was already developed and there is little mention of any modification of it technically, the main British divergence being to stay the course.

Or is it mainly a political divergence, a set of decisions to persevere and to raise the level of commitment, that freed up engineers to go for something a bit more ambitious and keep working on it until it worked?

Essentially the PoD for Europa is technical: the post-Flight 6 review is more in depth and involves the entire vehicle. This has implications for how the design teams work together, and the mutual review results in them catching and correcting issues that would cause failures in later flights (including things like insufficient insulation of wires in the flight sequencer leading to the triggering of the staging pyros also activating the flight termination system). This places the Europa PoD in 1967. This does precede our NASA PoD (1968, Low appointed as administrator) but does not cause it.

As Bahamut notes (though I will point out that it's actually the Europa PoD that comes first by a year or so):

NASA and ESA were, ultimately, two entirely seperate programmes. Each with their own inception, and purpose. Meaning that although the NASA POD came earlier, it wouldn't really affect ESA until they started moving - as they are now ITTL. And now that ESA is up and running, the butterflies can kick in, and do their stuff.

IIRC, Europa 2 differed only in that it had a tiny solid upper stage for a tiny increase in payload. But at least future upgrade options are actually available. And it looks like British involvement has been saved at the eleventh hour - and the fifty-ninth minute, and the fifty-ninth second. This should allow for some more funding, and perhaps see more done. Not to mentioned allow something of British Industry to not only survive, but maybe even prosper. Guess we'll see.

Indeed. Continued British involvement in ELDO and ESRO will obviously have some butterflies in their descendant, ESA. One of the biggest will be a little extra money rattling around, but the extra capabilities of British space industry will play a role in what ESA gets up to later in this TL.

Another issue I've identified though, and it may not be a particularly good one. STS had seven seats, so NASA could allow ESA astronauts on with some ease on the scientific missions - one reason that Hermes failed IMHO. But ITTL, they are sticking with Apollo, which only has three seats, so space will be at a premium, this will likely make NASA more reluctant to allow other personnel on board IMO. As a result, ESA may be more willing to fund an Independant European Manned Launch System - though I fully expect it to be capsule design. Possibly launched on a modified Europa III/IV - that is, Common Core Boosters, Constant Diameter Stages, a lot more safety sysems.

Yeah, the three seats in Apollo will play a major role in how NASA and ESA get along in this TL. The major issue for ESA is that even with a working Europa and potentially evolved versions, finding a way to put together a native crew launch capability is tricky. NASA is willing to play ball with ESA as it helps provide additional political cover for Spacelab and future stations, but the limit to three seats is one that NASA and ESA are both very aware of and that will play a role in future plans on both sides of the Atlantic.

As for USSR. Well, guess I gotta wait for the Earth to spin on it's axis at least seven more times for that.

It might be a tad longer than that, sorry.

 

[Shevek23]

...This places the Europa PoD in 1967. This does precede our NASA PoD (1968, Low appointed as administrator) but does not cause it.

I'm not at all married to the idea that there has to be some rigid cause and effect sequence (even one involving "butterflies," that is apparently trivial, contingent sequences unpredictable by any reasonable model of the situation human beings would assume in advance, though the "Connections" as that Burke fellow had it back in the 1970s might be quite obvious in retrospect) that accounts for every divergence after some specified POD. I'm quite the champion of timelines that tightly follow ours in some respects and diverge spectacularly in others; all I ask is that the obvious cause-and-effect links be respected, and we can assume what I've rather loosely and misleadingly called "anti-butterflies;" that is, insofar as we have Lorenz-butterfly type events to account for, we can pick the timeline where these happen not to have effects we don't like.

But just because the programs were unrelated on paper doesn't mean they'd have been totally decoupled in political reality. The USA probably would on the whole welcome independent enterprise from Europe but the desire to stay "ahead" of not only the Russians but them would still be in play. At first blush I might think this would make Americans more ambitious to strike out in some bold new direction, like fewer-staged advanced reusuable spaceplanes for instance. But then again, someone might suggest the main thing is for the USA to maintain a lead in capability in terms of mass to orbit per year while keeping abreast of rivals' advances. One could argue that committing to some kind of reusuable system might not only require big up front development costs and delays in operation while it gets developed, but also lock in US tech to whatever year the thing gets operational, while if the US continues to use one-shot or only moderately reusable systems (concentrate on recovering just the engines, for instance, while devising means to turn out the fuel tankage/structural elements cheaply and efficiently on a mass basis) then advances including those made elsewhere can be incrementally incorporated in each new rocket assembly.

So that's one scenario for ELDO having a direct causal relation to NASA's decisions ITTL; both agencies are of course completely independent and answerable to different governments and populations, but the shared international culture of aerospace and the subtext of healthy competition means NASA and the President and the US aerospace establishment are all looking over their shoulders at not one but two viable competitors and decide to "play it safe."

As I say I'm not married to the idea and no one ever seeing any direct or even contingent connection is perfectly reasonable too.

Yeah, the three seats in Apollo will play a major role in how NASA and ESA get along in this TL. The major issue for ESA is that even with a working Europa and potentially evolved versions, finding a way to put together a native crew launch capability is tricky. NASA is willing to play ball with ESA as it helps provide additional political cover for Spacelab and future stations, but the limit to three seats is one that NASA and ESA are both very aware of and that will play a role in future plans on both sides of the Atlantic.

But in line with NASA's incrementalism ITTL, can't they borrow a page from the Gemini applications thought up OTL (and since they were before TTL's "American POD" and contemporary with, and presumably even prior to, its Euro-POD) like Big Gemini and the MOL? Something like "Big Apollo," an upgraded bigger Apollo-like CM with a Service Module designed mainly to allow the bigger load to dock and later deorbit from a space station?

Big Gemini, off the shelf from the mid-1960s projections, could already I think match the Shuttle's passenger roster, certainly if the launch was devoted solely to sending just people up, and other vehicles took up the stuff they'd want to deliver to orbit or work with there. It might not be necessary to redo the work even just to the extent of paralleling the same steps in expanding an Apollo base concept; just take advantage of the most appropriate of the new engines and systems coming out of the post-Apollo designs and use it to boost BG straight out of the 1960s blueprints. But personally I think it should be Big Apollo just for the coolness!

For that matter, if the CM were stripped for a strict straight human-to-station mission, with just minimal supplies (including survival kits, in case they get stranded in the middle of the ocean or Sahara somewhere by an abort) and nothing but acceleration couches for each person, could they not cram in one or two more people, even people wearing full pressure suits, while remaining within the mass budget of a 3-astronaut Lunar mission CM? They'd need so much less stuff per person, if the duration of their total stay in the capsule from launch to landing is sure to be only something like 1 hour.

Well, I guess they might get stuck in some orbit by the wrong kind of malfunction, unable even to deorbit. Was there ever any thought given to retaining the escape tower for partial orbital insertion, so that this emergency backup mass would always serve in one role or another in every mission? I'd think the orbit sequence would be, start up the CM or final boost stage as the case may be, once it is known to be thrusting OK nominally, use the delta-v from the escape rocket as another parallel stage with the controlled liquid fuel rocket's sequence assuming its fixed thrust in the calculations; then one knows that the CM rocket is good for fine maneuvering and re-entry--but if it fails, then reorient for an abort re-entry again using the escape tower rocket, which ought to be sufficient for that job if the service module is immediately abandoned upon failure. Assuming all goes well, the cost of boosting the additional mass of the escape tower system is somewhat offset by needing less fuel in the Service Module. (Not fully, I suppose, since the solid-fuel escape rocket is less efficient than the SM main engine I guess plus all its extra infrastructure of tower and so forth, so it might always make more sense to treat it strictly as a launch safety feature and get rid of it once its use for that purpose is no longer potentially necessary; certainly that's what was done OTL!)

Anyway between the options of lightening the infrastructure for a more limited mission allowing more human payload in a given mass, and the option of upgrading the CM/reentry module's mass, I don't think they need to be stuck strictly with the limits of the Apollo CM.

But if that's what it takes to encourage the Europeans to develop their own human-to-orbit systems, so be it!

 

[e of pi]

But in line with NASA's incrementalism ITTL, can't they borrow a page from the Gemini applications thought up OTL (and since they were before TTL's "American POD" and contemporary with, and presumably even prior to, its Euro-POD) like Big Gemini and the MOL? Something like "Big Apollo," an upgraded bigger Apollo-like CM with a Service Module designed mainly to allow the bigger load to dock and later deorbit from a space station?

*snipped*

For that matter, if the CM were stripped for a strict straight human-to-station mission, with just minimal supplies (including survival kits, in case they get stranded in the middle of the ocean or Sahara somewhere by an abort) and nothing but acceleration couches for each person, could they not cram in one or two more people, even people wearing full pressure suits, while remaining within the mass budget of a 3-astronaut Lunar mission CM? They'd need so much less stuff per person, if the duration of their total stay in the capsule from launch to landing is sure to be only something like 1 hour.

The major issue is that they don't have the capability to launch the mass of a lunar-equipped CSM. A lunar-mission CSM massed 30 metric tons. The Saturn 1B (and the new-in-this-TL and yet-to-fly Saturn 1C) max out at about 20 metric tons. This was okay for LEO-only flights OTL and ITTL by offloading fuel (since the delta-v needed for the flights was much less than the 2.8 km/s needed for TEI on a lunar flight), but even so the Apollo already takes up much of the mass available just because of structure and supplies.

Anyway between the options of lightening the infrastructure for a more limited mission allowing more human payload in a given mass, and the option of upgrading the CM/reentry module's mass, I don't think they need to be stuck strictly with the limits of the Apollo CM.

They don't necessarily, and options for using the mass savings in the Block III to expand the crew (potentially by making use of something like the Rescue Skylab concept) are being explored and studied but for the moment they're mostly concerned with getting Saturn 1C and Spacelab flying. Maybe in the future.

 

[Bahamut-255]

The major issue is that they don't have the capability to launch the mass of a lunar-equipped CSM. A lunar-mission CSM massed 30 metric tons. The Saturn 1B (and the new-in-this-TL and yet-to-fly Saturn 1C) max out at about 20 metric tons. This was okay for LEO-only flights OTL and ITTL by offloading fuel (since the delta-v needed for the flights was much less than the 2.8 km/s needed for TEI on a lunar flight), but even so the Apollo already takes up much of the mass available just because of structure and supplies.

The peak mass of the Lunar CSM was about 30,300Kg, of which about 18,500Kg was N2O4/A50 propellant - giving you up to 2700 m/s delta-v based on the 314s Isp of the 10,000Kgf SPS engine. Far more than would really be needed for an LEO flight. OTL Soyuz manages - just - with 390 m/s. I'd say you only really need about 1,000 m/s tops for an LEO Apollo once it's in orbit.

One thing that could be considered is using Apollo as it's own third stage, where the Saturn 1C puts it into a ballistic profile where SPS failure sends it straight towards safe reentry. That could allow for some increase in payload. Although, I only see this happening for high inclination and/or high altitude orbits. i.e. 800 Km at 51.6 degrees.

 

[Bahamut-255]

Bumping back up. Must be somebody else who has something to add to this.

 

[Bahamut-255]

Questions about Skylab Program

This concerns the Skylab B Station that is going to be launched later in this TimeLine - and to an extent, it's predecessor.

You already mentioned that - as in OTL - one of the meteoriod/thermal shields was torn off at Mach 1, resulting in the loss of one Solar Panel and jamming the other one. As I recall, it did far more damage than that. Before it cleared the Saturn INT-20, it struck the S-IVB/S-II Interstage, then the S-IC/S-II Interstage, punching holes in them. On top of that, the S-IC/S-II Interstage was dislodged, past the critical 0.5-inch mark that would have triggered the auxillary seperation explosive bolts to free it, meaning it remained attached throughout the S-II burn. The result was a dangerous temperature buildup by the J2 Engines since they couldn't properly radiate the heat away from themselves and the thrust structure began to melt later on. The only thing that saved the S-II - and with it, Skylab A - was that S-II cutout occured on time. Just ten seconds more and it would've failed, massively.

Seeing that the rest of Skylab ITTL occured as OTL, I wonder if the same thing happened here - though you've made no mention of it, not surprising as it took a lot of years for what I described to come out OTL - and if so, what this means for Skylab B. Since it's going up, I'm guessing only one of two things can be the case:

A) What I descibed did not happen ITTL, they dodged one serious bullet there.

B) It happened and was not reported at large. They make a few design tweaks to make sure it can't happen. i.e. Manual Control Interstage Seperation System.

I'd add the link if I could find it again. Hoping to hear your response(s).

 

[e of pi]

Well, it's Wednesday once again, and that means a new post. This week we're covering more about the science aspect of Skylab, and some of the lessons learned that will carry forward into Spacelab

Eyes Turned Skywards, Post #10

There were three main areas of research on Skylab. First, there were the solar observations. The heart of the scientific agenda for the station, these were the most important, most valuable, and most spectacularly successful of the experiments on board, recording a hitherto unheard of amount of data about solar behavior over a surprisingly active period of time. Having astronauts controlling the telescopes proved to offer significant advances over the automated OSO telescopes that proceeded Skylab, exemplified by the second crew discovering and acting upon a warning signal of flare activity, allowing them to capture a flare from its birth to its fiery eruption from the Sun. Solar astronomers who participated in Skylab experiments were virtually unanimous in expressing their delight in the quality of the data recorded, and in the value of astronauts for collecting that data. In fact, the quality of the data was so high, and the causes of solar behavior so important and unknown, that it was briefly suggested that the backup ATM fly on Spacelab to allow observations during the next solar maximum, when activity was expected to be even higher. While the idea was quickly quashed, and a satellite incorporating some ATM instruments flown instead, the incident goes to show the high regard astronomers had for Skylab data.

Second, there were the Earth observations. While astronauts had reported seeing astonishing levels of detail from their orbits, and hand-held cameras had been in use since the Mercury flights to record these details, Skylab was the first crewed spacecraft that contained a dedicated battery of sensors for observing the Earth from space. While the conceptually similar MOL missions had been canceled due to advancements in spy satellite technology, for civilian purposes Skylab again proved the value of astronaut-operated instruments, although it was not as successful in doing so as the solar observations. The third and fourth missions in particular showed that a "spontaneous" program, with astronauts instructed broadly on areas and items of interest but allowed to follow their own judgment on what precisely to image, was of great value. The more rigorously planned programs of the first and second missions, by contrast, were less successful, and showed little superiority over Landsat work. Indeed, in some respects Earth observations from Skylab were much less useful than Landsat observations. As with prior missions, too, astronauts enjoyed observing the Earth when they were not otherwise occupied, using binoculars, sketch pads, and hand-held cameras to further augment the Earth observations data. The Spacelab design effort took into account these lessons learned, and provided a large amount of useful data that helped refine our understanding of a wide variety of geological, meteorological, and oceanographic phenomena.

Last but far from least, there were the biomedical experiments. In some ways, these were the most crucial experiments of all. It may sound absurd now, with record zero-g durations by both American and Russian spacefarers of over a year, but at the time there was real doubt in the medical community that humans could even survive more than a few weeks in space, doubt amplified by the deaths of the Soyuz 11 astronauts after a 23 day flight, and the collapse and death of Bonnie, a macaque monkey flown on Biosatellite 3, after just 8 days in space. Further, there had been some alarming incidents during the Apollo flights, particularly irregular heartbeats in several crewmembers during Apollo 15 and Rusty Schweickart's severe space sickness during Apollo 9. All of this combined to fuel pessimism over the ability of astronauts to function during long spaceflights. Given NASA's new emphasis on space station operations, it was crucial to establish that they could, indeed, do so. To that end, a highly comprehensive biomedical program was established, with never before or since seen controls on virtually every activity the astronauts were expected to regularly perform. Everything from their diet to their exercise was studied and regulated, and they were subjected to unpleasant and sometimes humiliating medical tests, most importantly one essentially designed to induce motion sickness. In all probability, the four Skylab crews have been more closely and heavily studied than any other group of men in history. Despite that, the astronauts were able to enjoy some surprising luxuries. Everything from sugar cookies (well-liked by all four crews) to filet mignon was on the menu, even if they had to carefully track exactly what they ate. The results, happily for NASA, showed that the effects of microgravity could be significantly countered by exercise, while surprisingly microgravity appeared to confer some degree of protection from motion sickness after an initial adaptation period. Combined with the efforts the first and second crews made to repair the station, Skylab proved that astronauts were indeed capable of functioning, and functioning at an extremely high level, during long-duration spaceflights.

In addition to the three major research areas, there were several other research activities carried out during the flight. The two most important of these for future activities were NASA studies on space station, and by extension microgravity, design principles, and the student experiments program. Most of the NASA studies were passive in nature, simply recording crew impressions of how well or poorly different areas of the station worked, and how much or little they facilitated the astronauts' tasks on orbit, providing valuable feedback for Spacelab interior design. However, there were two "experiments" which had direct bearing on future space station projects. The first was the testing of several designs of maneuvering units that could allow future astronauts to conduct untethered EVAs from future stations, possibly for assembly or maintenance purposes. Skylab 5 was the second of these, proving the concept of resupplying a space station while in use, a vital capability for future space stations and one that would in the future allow for much more flexibility for station operations. The student experiments had a more elusive importance and impact. While they did not generally do much useful science, they were successful in engaging public and in particular student interest, especially the well-known "spider" experiments, and the utility of small supplemental experiments was not lost on NASA. Using their experience from these experiments, a similar program was planned for Spacelab. Unlike Skylab, however, not just student projects but also corporate, government, and foreign payloads were flown, provided they did not require much crew attention and time.

 

[Bahamut-255]

Very good update. Going a long way to show how TTL NASA is able to justify their course of action. Using what they learn from previous missions to build the new ones. And capturing quite a few minds as well. Now they just need to get Saturn 1C man-rated and SpaceLab up, then, figure out what they gotta do next.

And at least when they decide to head for Mars - likely under Reagan - they will have a wealth of real data to draw on for designing it.

BTW. The two previous posts where I raised issues - the SkayLab launch error you appeared to miss and Apollo. What are your repsonses to that?

 

[e of pi]

BTW. The two previous posts where I raised issues - the SkayLab launch error you appeared to miss and Apollo. What are your repsonses to that?

My responses are coming, but I have been busy with school and have a co-op interview today, so it'll be later today at the earliest. Sorry.

 

[Talwar]

Good stuff.

Question, though - did Soyuz 11 end as OTL? The citation seems to imply a different accident...