All right, folks. Once more across the Pacific to check in again on the rest of Japan's space program. I'll be interested to see what people make of this update--this is sort of the last of the Freedom background material, setting the scene on which Freedom was planned. I'll also throw in my usual thanks for taking this to a jumbo-sized 747 comments and 76580 views, which still astounds me considering what this all started as.
Eyes Turned Skyward, Part II: Post #4
The European space program wasn’t the only space program undergoing rapid growth during the decade prior to 1982. Japan was in the middle of a major surge in prosperity, and part of reinventing its national image had been the beginnings of a space program. The process began in 1969, when the 61st session of the national Diet passed laws approving the creation of a National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA). The start was quick--the law was passed in June, and by October they had already established a headquarters and launch site at Tanegashima island, as well as additional subsidiary branches and tracking stations for orbital missions. However, their new national program would need a launcher, and that posed a challenge for Japan unlike the one posed to Europe. Where Europa had been able to build off the proven and capable Blue Streak for early vehicles in the family, Japan had no such independent missile program, and beginning one from scratch posed serious challenges. Thus, NASDA would also build its first vehicle off of a proven launcher, but not a native one. Japan’s first vehicle, as authorized in 1970, would be the N-1, a version of the American Delta rocket. Some assemblies (mostly those covered under arms control regulations) were produced by the original American suppliers, though other components produced in Japan to American specifications, and then integrated into a complete vehicle in Japan. The configuration was essentially a “Long Tank Thor” Delta with three Castor 2 solid rocket boosters, roughly duplicating the Delta M configuration. The plan was that Japan could move to producing more assemblies or entire stages natively, leveraging operational experience with the imported vehicle designs while still having a reliable vehicle available relatively quickly. By 1975, the project had come to fruition, with the N-1 beginning a seven-launch campaign from Tanegashima, which would last through 1982. Included in this were Japan’s first communication satellites, as well as probes to study the ionosphere. The program was reasonably successful, with only two failures--impressive compared to the early records of many other national space programs, and demonstrating the benefits of the Japanese plans to build on the experience of existing programs.
Even as the N-1 launch campaign was ongoing, work began in 1976 on the N-2, following on from N-1 with increased Japanese-built components and a full 9 solid rockets, allowing a payload of 2 tons to LEO or 730 kg to a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). The plan was for the vehicle to be operational by 1981, at which point Japan would focus on its first complete upper stages to be paired with the existing Delta/Thor-based first stage. However, the American ELVRP I program threw a serious wrench into the works. As McDonnell-Douglas focused heavily on its Delta 4000 entrant in the competition, its interest in the older Thor-based Delta was declining. In particular, while McDonnell was willing to supply stages for N-2 under existing contract arrangements, future work would have to involve increased payments by Japan--either to support the Delta lines if McDonnell didn’t win the competition, or to preserve the Thor infrastructure in parallel with the Delta 4000 if (as it happened in 1978) McDonnell won. Japan was faced with a decision: pay the increased fees and continue along the Thor-based direction it had charted previously (which would be costly), move from focusing on native-built upper stages to a new Japanese lower stage (which would require abandoning or at least postponing the focus on upper stages that they had been building towards), or seizing the chance presented to them by the new Delta 4000. Deliberations and exploratory contract negotiations lasted almost three years, from 1978 to early 1981.
In the end, Japan decided to be ambitious, and move to a similarly license-built version of the Delta 4000, with a new Japanese-built upper stage replacing the American Centaur--perhaps motivated by the fact that they would have to spend substantially in any case and this option would offer more dramatic growth potential, perhaps due to the public support resulting from the upcoming flights of Japanese astronauts to the American Spacelab station, or perhaps some of both. Regardless of the motivation, the new vehicle--dubbed “H-1”--began development in 1981 with a planned entry into service in 1986. It will consist of the the new Delta 4000 first stage, with a Japanese-built hydrolox upper stage using natively designed-and-built engines. The roughly 6 ton capability of the vehicle will be sufficient for the Japanese to dual-launch some payloads that were being designed for the originally-planned improved Delta, and also enable larger and more capable satellites and perhaps even deep-space probes. The revised planning also called for an H-II vehicle to fly with a Japanese-built first stage by 1990, with a capability equalling or perhaps even exceeding the Delta 4000’s maximum 13 ton payload to LEO. If so, it would be another major success for the Japanese strategy, reaching near-parity with the basic launch capabilities of countries like the United States and the joint efforts of the European continent in just two short decades.
In addition to their launch vehicle development programs, NASDA was also working to build on its successes to expand its human spaceflight programs. The late 1981 flight of Katsuyama Hideki and the coming flights of two more astronauts to Spacelab seemed to show a natural path for increased Japanese participation in manned spaceflight. Thus, as NASA’s own studies were ongoing for post-Spacelab stations, NASDA also began examining the possibility of launching their own lab to such a station, perhaps on a NASA vehicle, and to negotiate a more long-standing agreement for seats, more like the European “fourth seat” on every Block III+ than the intermittent short-stays allowed by what would come to be the Spaceflight Participation Program. The established practice of barter would have Japan providing some hardware for the station that NASA desired in exchange for the launch of Japan’s own hardware. The question of what Japan might be able to provide was factored into NASA’s planning, much as NASA were factoring in European interest. However, the impetus provided by Vulkan would come to drive many of these plans rapidly from concepts to defined components and contracting.