extending the maginot line

if in ww2 france extended the line to be on the belgam border would they be able to defeat germany? the line would be weaker than in otl but its still formidible. could france even pay for the upgrade?
 
if in ww2 france extended the line to be on the belgam border would they be able to defeat germany? the line would be weaker than in otl but its still formidible. could france even pay for the upgrade?

Probably impossible to pay for it. Besides, there was absolutely no reason to, at least in their minds, as Belgium was an allied country, and Germany's vastly reduced military meant it would not be able to get all the way to France through Belgium.
 
Even if the line is extended the Germans didn't have much trouble getting Leebs Army Group C to breach the line when they got around to taking it. It would slow the German advance but not stop it if extended.

Michael
 
THE MAGINOT LINE AND STRATEGIC PLANNING IN 1940


Often overlooked, fixed defenses had an important role in World War II. Of the many fortified positions that influenced the course of the war (from the Gustav Line in Italy to the numerous fortified islands in the Pacific) none was so extensive as France's Maginot Line. Nor have any
been so misunderstood in the popular imagination.

The seeds of the Maginot Line were sown in the trench slaughter of World War I. After much debate, in the late 1920s the French began to develop an elaborate system of fortifications on their frontier with Germany. Named after a war minister who had lost an arm at Verdun,
the Maginot Line was designed to prevent a direct German invasion of France by making such an attempt prohibitively costly in lives and time, permitting the French to husband their resources in the rear for a decisive counterstroke with mobile forces.

The basic concept was by no means as absurd as it would appear in retrospect. Among the greatest fortification experts in the world since the seventeenth century, the French were fully aware that their pro posed new fortified zone (it was not a "line" at all) was not impregnable.
But it would be so difficult to break that it would deter a German offensive into northeastern France. Unable to deliver a swift, decisive blow against it, the Germans would have to give up all thought of war with France, or accept a protracted war of attrition, or find an alternative
way to carry on the war. It was this last that French policymakers perceived as the most likely eventuality, specifically a German thrust into Belgium. And such an undertaking by a revitalized Germany would inevitably bring Great Britain into the war on the side of France, a necessity given France's manpower inferiority vis-A-vis Germany's.

So the principal function of the Maginot Line was to canalize a German offensive into Belgium, where it could be met by motorized French armies supported by British resources. This plan had the added (if unspoken) advantage of having the horrors of war visited upon Belgium rather than on France.

As built, the Maginot Line was a wonder to behold (as, indeed, its remains still are). It consisted of a loose belt of fortifications starting a few miles inside France. The defensive zone varied from five to ten miles in depth, liberally seasoned with sunken forts, redoubts, pillboxes, observation towers, tank traps, and other works. These works were designed to make maximum use of available ground, which already favored the defense, as northeastern France (Alsace and, Lorraine) is rather mountainous, often heavily forested, and occasionally marshy. Most positions (which were all gastight) were mutually supporting, and all were capable of holding out independently for extended periods if necessary. In some of the more densely fortified areas the principal works were linked together by underground railroads to permit the rapid movement of reinforcements and munitions.

Actually only about eighty-seven miles of the Franco-German frontier were covered by permanent works, at the extraordinary cost of 80.5 million francs per mile (about $20 million in 1930s dollars and 360 million in 2008 dollars). These works covered the most vulnerable areas. Less vulnerable areas (such as the thirty-mile Sarre Gap) were to be protected in time of war by demolitions, waterlines (such as the Rhine itself), and inundations, covered by combat troops
in field fortifications. Despite the enormous expenditure, over 7 billion francs (nearly $30 billion in today's dollars), the system was not fully complete by 1940, but sufficiently so to have precisely the deterrent effect for which the French had hoped.

There seems little doubt that the Maginot Line was more or less impenetrable from a frontal attack, at least at a price the Germans were willing to pay. Certainly German war planners proposed nothing more than demonstrations against the line in the event of war, preferring instead
to go into Belgium, precisely as the French expected. French planning for the anticipated German offensive into Belgium presumed that the Germans would come more or less as they had in 1914, a massive wheeling drive across the northern Belgian plain and then southward into France. To meet this, the French allocated the best part of their army (about thirty divisions, including virtually all of their dozen motorized and light armored divisions) to their left flank, from whence, in company with the fully motorized British, they would boldly advance into Belgium
in the event of a German invasion, to meet the enemy along the Dyle River, east of Brussels for a decisive battle.

In their initial planning for their 1940 offensive against France, the Germans actually came up with a plan that more or less was what the French expected of them, a holding action against the Maginot Line with a straightforward drive across the Belgian plain, taking advantage of the
superior mobility and effectiveness of their seventeen armored and motorized divisions. The objective was to secure as much of the country as possible in anticipation of future offensives. Although this plan met with the approval of the General Staff, Hitler was dissatisfied. The fiihrer
wanted a quick win to maintain his popularity, and the plan suggested a protracted struggle. A relatively junior officer, Erich von Manstein, thereupon came up with a more complex, bolder, and riskier plan.

Under the new plan, a portion of the army, including some armored and motorized formations supported by airborne troops, would attack directly into Belgium and the Netherlands as a feint to draw Allied reserves northward. Meanwhile the bulk of the army would attack through the Ardennes, a rugged, heavily forested region covering most of Luxembourg plus adjacent portions of France and Belgium.

The idea was to slice through the Allied forces, creating an enormous pocket in Belgium, perhaps winning the war in one grand offensive. This new plan appealed to Hitler's sense of grandeur, despite the risks which were considerable. Many years earlier Marshal Philippe Petain, hero of World War I, had been asked about the possibilities of a German offensive in this very area, to which he replied, "The Ardennes are impenetrable, if adequately defended." He was right, for
the Ardennes are traversed by few roads, and those are narrow and easily blocked by light forces, provided there were enough of them.

When, on the morning of May 10, 1940, the French General Staff learned that the Germans had launched their long-anticipated offensive, one officer said to Chief of Staff Maurice Gamelin, "So it is the Dyle Plan, no?" Gamelin looked up and replied, "What else can we do?"

And, indeed, everything went according to plan, the German plan. At the first sign of the German offensive (the feint into the Netherlands and northern Belgium) the French and British leapt forward into Belgium. Elements of the French Seventh Army, on the extreme left, advanced something like 150 miles in the first forty-eight hours, one of the most impressive motor marches by a large force to that time. By nightfall on May 12 the Allied spearheads were well into the
Netherlands and Belgium. And at that same moment the German main blow fell. Nearly a dozen armored and motorized divisions emerged from the Ardennes to fall upon second-line French forces near Sedan. The German movement had not only been undetected but virtually unimpeded, for the Ardennes had hardly been "adequately defended."

Allied strength in the region consisted of two Belgian light infantry divisions and some French cavalry, who despite heroic efforts only managed to slow the Germans down by a few hours.
The French defenses at Sedan crumbled quickly under the extraordinary strength and violence of the German offensive. Within a day the Germans were across the Meuse and heading west through a fifty-mile gap they had torn in the French front. A few days more and the Germans were halfway across France despite often heroic attempts to impede them. And late on May 20 the Germans reached the English Channel near Abbeville, effectively pocketing nearly forty British, French, and Belgian divisions.

Then came the high drama of Dunkirk, the German offensive southward, the fall of Paris, and the surrender of France. And through it all the Maginot Line remained virtually unscathed. So the Maginot Line had worked, "worked" in the sense that it had canalized the German offensive into Belgium. Despite this "success" one somehow suspects that the French might have spent their money better elsewhere.

Article from Dirty Little Secrets of WWII.
 
Probably impossible to pay for it. Besides, there was absolutely no reason to, at least in their minds, as Belgium was an allied country, and Germany's vastly reduced military meant it would not be able to get all the way to France through Belgium.

Belgium was an absolutely, definitely, resolutely, necessarily neutral country, not an allied country of anybody - until forced by the attack of the other anybody.
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
Belgium was an absolutely, definitely, resolutely, necessarily neutral country, not an allied country of anybody - until forced by the attack of the other anybody.

Nevertheless, one of the reasons the Line wasn't extended was because it would be seen as abandoning the Benelux countries.
 
Nevertheless, one of the reasons the Line wasn't extended was because it would be seen as abandoning the Benelux countries.

I disagree. The line wasn't extended not only for economic considerations but also for foreign policy ones, as you say. But it would have been seen as defining them as enemies. It's different. If both sides had "abandoned" the Belgians to neutrality, the Belgians would have been very happy.
 
Extending the line?

Has anyone ever considered the option of assisting the Belgians to build their own extension to the line on the Belgian-German border? It might not be politically possible...but if the Belgians can start to get nervous about Germany, perhaps?
What would that do? Make The Netherlands into the invasion route?
 

Markus

Banned
So the principal function of the Maginot Line was to canalize a German offensive into Belgium, where it could be met by motorized French armies supported by British resources. This plan had the added (if unspoken) advantage of having the horrors of war visited upon Belgium rather than on France.


IIRC the M-line was supposed to be extended into Belgium as the two nations had a military alliance until 1935 or so, when Belgium cancelled it.



And at that same moment the German main blow fell. Nearly a dozen armored and motorized divisions emerged from the Ardennes to fall upon second-line French forces near Sedan. The German movement had not only been undetected but virtually unimpeded, for the Ardennes had hardly been "adequately defended."

Allied strength in the region consisted of two Belgian light infantry divisions and some French cavalry, who despite heroic efforts only managed to slow the Germans down by a few hours.
That´s not entirely correct. The Belgians had two crack infantry divisions defending the area. Both had been there since Sept. 39, knew every square foot of the terrain and were occupying well fortified positions*.
The Germans attacked them with five armoured and three motorized divisions. No more than three divisions could move abreast, so the assault had three waves of three armoured, two armoured and one motorized and two motorized divisions.

The French did actually prepare for a German attack as one had succeeded in WW1 in this very region. They anticipated the Germans could reach the Meuse in 7 days, so the had reserves that could be there in 5 and to ensure the Germans would be sufficiently delayed they assembled a “quick reaction force” to reinforce the Belgians. A cavalry brigade and a division were to advance into Luxembourg from the south, thereby threading the 10.AD´s flank. Two more divisions and two brigades were to take pu positions right in front of the German advance.

So the opposing forces number 5 divisions and 3 brigades vs. 8 eight divisions. But actually the situation is less favourable to the attacker. German armoured divisions did have little infantry and the Ardennes with their few, narrow roads, step, densely forested hills and many small streams are definitely no terrain for armoured warfare. That favours the Belgian infantry and the French cavalry units( light armour + horse cavalry).

The problem was the Belgians** just pulled out to the north, abandoning an easily defensible area without a fight and in the process they blew up roads and bridges on the German and the French side. That ensured the swiftly advancing French units were critically delayed and could not occupy solid defensive positions. As a result the first german units crossed the Meuse just four days after the offensive had begun, beating the French reinforcements by 12 hours.

*The best "fortifications" were ordinary farmhouses with 3 to 5 feet thick walls of rock. Anything short of an 88mm AA-gun was not having much of an effect. AT and tank guns were totally useless.

**One reinforced Belgian company did not get the order to withdraw. In the village of Bodange, it stopped the advance of the best trained and equipped german armoured division for eight hours.
 
THE MAGINOT LINE AND STRATEGIC PLANNING IN 1940


Often overlooked, fixed defenses had an important role in World War II. Of the many fortified positions that influenced the course of the war (from the Gustav Line in Italy to the numerous fortified islands in the Pacific) none was so extensive as France's Maginot Line. Nor have any
been so misunderstood in the popular imagination.
´

Then came the high drama of Dunkirk, the German offensive southward, the fall of Paris, and the surrender of France. And through it all the Maginot Line remained virtually unscathed. So the Maginot Line had worked, "worked" in the sense that it had canalized the German offensive into Belgium. Despite this "success" one somehow suspects that the French might have spent their money better elsewhere.

Article from Dirty Little Secrets of WWII.

Well put, where'd you find this (surely you didn't type it from a book yourself...)
 

Well... if by "crack infantry divisions" you mean the Chausseurs Ardenais, then yes, they were crack... but still also light infanrty in no way equipped to fight armour. And the Belgians weren't the main ones at fault: the Meuse was always intended to be the french line of defence. The fact that some french divisions on the Meuse basically routed when the saw German armour, the fact that the French tried to bottle up the German bridgeheads rather than crush them immediately, and the way that the french reinforcements (3rd Armoured especially) were run back and forth, never being able to mount a coherent counterattack, are a bit more significant than the fact the the Belgians tried to retreat to their defence lines rather than fighting tanks they couldn't beat in the forest.
 

Markus

Banned
Well... if by "crack infantry divisions" you mean the Chausseurs Ardenais, then yes, they were crack... but still also light infanrty in no way equipped to fight armour.

As long as German armour is even less equipped to fight them, they are ok as Bodange underlines.


And the Belgians weren't the main ones at fault: the Meuse was always intended to be the french line of defence.
Yep, but the Germans could not be allowed to reach it in less than five days. Which they did as a result of the unilateral and unannounced Belgian withdrawal.

The fact that some french divisions on the Meuse basically routed when the saw German armour, the fact that the French tried to bottle up the German bridgeheads rather than crush them immediately, and the way that the french reinforcements (3rd Armoured especially) were run back and forth, never being able to mount a coherent counterattack,...
True, but meaningless. If the Belgain had not scewed up the plan, first rate troops would have reinfoced the Sedan sector in time. Ohh, and it was just the service troops and artillery of one (2nd rate) french division that broke and ran. The infantry was still fighting at that time.


are a bit more significant than the fact the the Belgians tried to retreat to their defence lines rather than fighting tanks they couldn't beat in the forest.
Again, they did beat the tanks in the forest, because tanks can´t fight in a forest. Andconsideable reinfocements with armour were racing towards them.
 
Grrr... got to wait til I get home, find Collapse of the Third Republic. Wiki goes in to no detail. Still:

As long as German armour is even less equipped to fight them, they are ok as Bodange underlines.

Yep, but the Germans could not be allowed to reach it in less than five days. Which they did as a result of the unilateral and unannounced Belgian withdrawal.

The French troops in the Ardennes retreated too. Which sugests that it was less of a problem with the Belgian High command than with the stopping of an entire army group with three divisions.

True, but meaningless. If the Belgain had not scewed up the plan, first rate troops would have reinfoced the Sedan sector in time. Ohh, and it was just the service troops and artillery of one (2nd rate) french division that broke and ran. The infantry was still fighting at that time.

The first-rate troops were all in Belgium; with the exception of 3rd Armour (see below) all the troops coming up were second rate at best. And the fact that not all the division - not even most of the divisions - broke on contact doesn't change the fact that some did.

Again, they did beat the tanks in the forest, because tanks can´t fight in a forest. Andconsideable reinfocements with armour were racing towards them.

No, one company held them up (for a day? it only took the Germans four to get from the border to the far side of the Meuse) and was gutted in the process. And the 3rd Armor, as I mentioned above, was deployed around the entire perimiter of the southernmost bridgehead and then ordered to attack, with the predictable result that the assault got nowhere. Are you suggesting that if the French had had another day, Gamelin, Huntzinger and Corap would have become better generals, with a better strategic doctrine?
 

Markus

Banned
Grrr... got to wait til I get home, find Collapse of the Third Republic. Wiki goes in to no detail. Still:

I see your Collapse of the Third Republic and raise you a Blitzkrieg-Legend.

The French troops in the Ardennes retreated too. Which sugests that it was less of a problem with the Belgian High command than with the stopping of an entire army group with three divisions.
The French had to conduct a fighting retreat because the Belgians had abandoned the are without a fight.


The first-rate troops were all in Belgium; with the exception of 3rd Armour (see below) all the troops coming up were second rate at best. And the fact that not all the division - not even most of the divisions - broke on contact doesn't change the fact that some did.
IIRC the cavalry units were 1st rate too. They certainly moved fast, very unusual for allied units in 1940.


No, one company held them up (for a day? it only took the Germans four to get from the border to the far side of the Meuse) and was gutted in the process.
Nobody expects a sacrifice here, just a delaying action:
Ok, one company stops an entire division for 8 hours. So two divisions should stop three divisions long enough for the cavalry to arrive without getting destroyed in the process, whose arrival in turn delays the german arrival at Sedan until after at least one French armoured, one motorized, one cavalry and one infantry division arrive there.

Since the success of the whole offensive depended on speed and surprise a 24 to 48 hour delay would have been got enough to doom it.
 
If I remember correctly, it has been said in this forum that there was an international treaty from the Nineteenth Century forbidding France to fortify its border with Belgium.
In any case, the line was extended to the Channel in our timeline in 1936, after Belgium ended its alliance with France, according to this wikipedia article about the Maginot Line , although this extension was not as heavily fortified as other sectors of the line. Of course, the Belgians had heavy fortifications themselves, the best known being the fort of Eben Emael. On top of that, the British Expeditionary Forces built quite a number of pillboxes on the sector of the French / Belgian border they were assigned. Some of the remains of these fortifications can be seen here http://www.pillbox-study-group.org.uk/britishpbinfrancepage.htm and here
http://www.pillbox-study-group.org.uk/lillepillboxespage.htm
I have the impression that the Allies did not lose the Battle for France due to a lack of bunkers!
 
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