Expanded Franco-Prussian War

[Gurroruo]

In OTL Tsar Alexander II threatened to go to war should Austria attempt to join the Franco-Prussian War. What if Austria miscalculated this as a bluff and went to war only for Russia to dive into the war soon after them.

How might the war unfold?
Would Italy join in to take land off of France and Austria?
How would the war end? (Independent Hungary, etc.)
With Russia's Armywitnessing a war might they be able to reform better than they did OTL?
Could the result of the war lead to a long lasting Russo-German Alliance?
What be the effect on the Balkans and Russia's role in the Balkans?
Other long term effects?
Anything else important?

 

[Gurroruo]

Bum pity Bump

 

[Richter von Manthofen]

MAybe it was a bluff

 

[Monter]

Austria didn't intervene only because the Russian warning, there were two more reasons:

1 - The Austrians were still salty because 1859 and the French apathy in 1866.
2 - The Hungarians were against any attempt to "regermanize" the Empire

 

[jlk7e]

I'd think Austria also didn't intervene because the Germans had basically won the war within a month. Certainly they're not going to join in after Sedan.

 

[Gurroruo]

MAybe it was a bluff

Alexander II was grateful for Prussian support in 1863 and as later shown with the Three Emperor's League Alexander was friendly towards the idea of s Russo-German Alliance.

Austria didn't intervene only because the Russian warning, there were two more reasons:

1 - The Austrians were still salty because 1859 and the French apathy in 1866.
2 - The Hungarians were against any attempt to "regermanize" the Empire

The Austrians were very clear of their intention until the Russians threatened them.

I'd think Austria also didn't intervene because the Germans had basically won the war within a month. Certainly they're not going to join in after Sedan.

The Austrians would have joined before.

And it's 2.5 months.

 

[Gurroruo]

Bumping it

 

[jlk7e]

Alexander II was grateful for Prussian support in 1863 and as later shown with the Three Emperor's League Alexander was friendly towards the idea of s Russo-German Alliance.



The Austrians were very clear of their intention until the Russians threatened them.



The Austrians would have joined before.

And it's 2.5 months.

Okay, it's certainly not 2.5 months from 19 July to 2 September. Secondly, I'm not seeing where you get this absolute clarity of Austrian intentions. Here's AJP Taylor on Franco-Austrian alliance plans before the war (in 1869):

The real conflict of outlook was between Austria-Hungary and France. Despite sighs for a lost greatness, Habsburg policy was turning away from Germany and concentrating, as Bismarck had advised, on the Balkans. Francis Joseph might still regard himself as 'a German prince'; Beust might still hope to outshine Bismarck; neither could go against Hungarian and German opinion inside the empire. Austria-Hungary would make no attempt to undo the treaty of Prague or even to confine Prussia within its limits. In fact the only Austrian interest in the alliance so far as Germany was concerned was as insurance against a French victory: they wanted to make sure of their share if France defeated Prussia. As Francis Joseph put it rather piously: 'If the Emperor Napoleon entered southern Germany not as enemy but as liberator, I should be forced to make common cause with him.'...The French wanted an ally against Prussia; the Austrians against Russia--and the two wishes could not be combined.

Later, Gramont becomes foreign minister:

Thus Gramont arrived in Paris at the beginning of June, believing that an Austro-French alliance existed and resolved to humiliate Prussia at the first opportunity. This suited the need for prestige on which Napoleon's personal supporters were insisting. A French general, Lebrun, was sent to Vienna to translate the alliance into practical terms; and though he achieved nothing practical, he returned convinced that Austria-Hungary would at once mobilize and tie down a large part of the Prussian army, if France invaded southern Germany

Here he is on Russian policy after the war began:

The Russians expected a French victory and would tolerate it; what they dreaded was a French victory in co-operation with Austria-Hungary. With Prussia out of the way, this alliance would inevitably raise the Polish question, and would raise it more successfully than in 1863. The Russians aimed to 'localize' the war: to keep Austria-Hungary neutral, not for Prussia's sake, but for their own. Gorchakov happened to be in Berlin on 13 July [1870]. He refused to give Bismarck any binding promise of support against Austria-Hungary, merely saying that he 'doubted whether it would be possible for Austria to fling herself into such adventures'; and in fact there was no formal agreement between Russia and Prussia at any time of the war. Though the Russians welcomed rumours of their military preparations, in reality they made none. All they did was make their neutrality conditional on that of Austria-Hungary; and this condition suited Beust's policy. On 23 July Alexander II told the Austro-Hungarian ambassador that he would stay neutral so long as Austria-Hungary did not mobilize or stir up trouble in Poland; moreover he guaranteed Austria's frontiers in the name of the king of Prussia.

And here on Austro-Hungarian policy:

It did not need the threat from Russia to keep Austria-Hungary neutral; she remained neutral from calculation. Beust insisted from the first that the crisis had nothing to do with Austria-Hungary. The French had started it without consulting him; they were provoking German opinion instead of isolating Prussia from Germany as he had always advised; they would not even tell him their military plans. He complained to [Austrian ambassador in Paris] Metternich: 'When I look at what is happening I ask myself whether I have become an imbecile. Like the Russians, Beust expected a French victory; but he intended to exploit this French victory, not to aid it. He would enter the war only when the decisive battle had been fought; and he would then restore the Habsburg protectorate over south Germany (which the tsar had also offered to recognize) as much against France as against Prussia. His immediate object was to keep French favour without committing himself to their side.

I'm not sure where you're getting the idea that Alexander threatened war with Austria-Hungary, that Austria-Hungary was preparing to join the war imminently until said Russian threat occurred, or that the beginning of the war, rather than the end, was the most likely time for Austro-Hungarian intervention. All of your premises here seem to clearly be wrong.

 

[Gurroruo]

snip

Bismarck in his cautiousness approached the Russia's on the topic of joining the war if the Austrians attacked Prussia as a result of the Prussians getting bogged down in France. Russia offered 100,000 men on its own volition and later increased that number to 300,000 men.

Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878 & Drei Jahrhunderte russischer Geschichte

I can't find the Russian and Austrian diplomatic correspondence in which the Russians told the Austrians should they mobilize for war against the Prussians then Russia would mobilize for war against them right now. I'll find that later.


Russia was very much friendly towards Prussia and had several agreements with them that they intended to respect. They still remembered the Austria betrayal with the Crimean War and how everyone but Prussia condemned them during the 1863 revolt.

Though I can't remember the date of the diplomatic correspondence I would imagine that it occurred before Sedan which is why I'm assuming the Austrians considered a very early joining of the war. But I could be wrong on the date.

 

[Halagaz]

If Austria-Hungary actually did join the war...well, it's toast.

Interestingly, back in 1866 Bismarck established ties to Serbia, Romania, the Czech revolutionaries and IIRC the Hungarians as well, in case it became useful for Prussia to relieve Austria of its empire. Now he would only need to revive these old plots and negotiations and the Habsburg would suddenly be facing several new enemies outside and inside. Of course, this wouldn't change too much as A-H would just be crushed by Prussia and (maybe) Russia anyway.

The implications for Russo-German relations and the future of Europe as a whole are intriguing. Bismarck preferred to rely on the smaller nations in his plans to break up A-H, not on Russia; he wished to establish a loose association of central European and Balkan states in former A-H where German influence would be dominant and Russia's influence as low as possible. To that end, he might try to buy Russia off with some smaller gains, or elsewhere.

In any case, Italy, Romania and Serbia grow, Hungary becomes independent, Czech lands become an autonomous kingdom within Germany; and the region is dominated by a German-Russian alliance, but also a slight rivalry.

I wonder if Germany's gains in Austria and its new south-eastern sphere of influence would distract it enough to makes its demands to France less severe (not demand all or most of Alsace-Lorraine). If so, then France wouldn't necessarily be an enemy to Germany and Russia's new order.

 

[jlk7e]

Bismarck in his cautiousness approached the Russia's on the topic of joining the war if the Austrians attacked Prussia as a result of the Prussians getting bogged down in France. Russia offered 100,000 men on its own volition and later increased that number to 300,000 men.

Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878 & Drei Jahrhunderte russischer Geschichte

I can't find the Russian and Austrian diplomatic correspondence in which the Russians told the Austrians should they mobilize for war against the Prussians then Russia would mobilize for war against them right now. I'll find that later.


Russia was very much friendly towards Prussia and had several agreements with them that they intended to respect. They still remembered the Austria betrayal with the Crimean War and how everyone but Prussia condemned them during the 1863 revolt.

Though I can't remember the date of the diplomatic correspondence I would imagine that it occurred before Sedan which is why I'm assuming the Austrians considered a very early joining of the war. But I could be wrong on the date.

Taylor certainly seems fairly categorical that Franz Joseph and Beust had little interest in joining the war at that point. Whatever the Russians intentions may have been (and Taylor certainly is someone who makes errors every once in a while), I don't think you've prevented any evidence that "the Austrians were very clear on their intention until the Russians threatened them." Taylor says pretty much the opposite.

 

[jlk7e]

Found the Jelavich passage you're referring to on Google Books. It doesn't actually contradict Taylor:

On July 16 Alexander II gave Bismarck additional assurances of his attitude in case of a war; he told the Prussian representative, Pfuel, that if Austria declared war on Prussia, Russia would concentrate an army of 300,000 on the Habsburg border and, if necessary, occupy Galicia

So this is stronger than what Taylor says, but note that this is just Alexander talking to the Prussians, not a formal agreement, and not a threat to the Austrians. He didn't tell the Austrians he would do this.

On July 23 the tsar informed the Habsburg government that Russia would remain neutral only if the monarchy adopted a similar attitude.

This is what Taylor says, too:

All they did was make their neutrality conditional on that of Austria-Hungary; and this condition suited Beust's policy.

Taylor is obviously referring to the same dispatch as Jelavich, though he puts a different spin on it. But it seems clear that a) Russia never gave anything like an ultimatum to Austria; and b) Austria did not actually take any clear steps to aid France, before or after Russia warned it of its attitude towards neutrality.