Expanded BEF 1914

[allanpcameron]

I finished a TL on ASB Forum that ISOTed the 1940 BEF to August 1914 to attack the flank of the German advance and throw them back behind the Meuse.

In it I speculated on a what if posited by Allan Mallinson in his book 1914: Fight the Good Fight. He argues that the BEF who were thrown onto the left flank of the French at Mons would have been better allowed to grow until September when it would be the 6 home divisions, plus the cavalry division, plus the overseas divisions (India and South Africa) making up 10 infantry divisions and four cavalry divisions. Just under 300000 men, most regular and fresh, giving the reservists time to become fighting fit.

So I'm wondering about a POD in this forum to get the BEF up to fighting strength a bit earlier. The Boer War was an eye-opener for the British, and if it had gone worse in 1900-02 could the British be persuaded that a stronger standing army would be worthwhile?
Could there be a better artillery arm from the experience of South Africa and also the study of the Russo-Japanese war.
Could Britain in 1902-1914 seriously prepare for a continental war, and with a clear strategic vision?
Would the German Naval Law of 1900, coupled with a strong support for the Boers put GB onto an arms race not only at sea but also on land?
Could there be a balance to Henry Wilson's Francophile view so that the BEF could avoid being thrown in piecemeal.
All of which might give the Germans a harder time and shortening the Great War with all the flutters of butterflies that this would create.

 

[allanpcameron]

“Sergeant Smith’s dead!” The cry from behind the boulders to their left was the last straw for the men of the Lancashire Fusiliers. All morning they had been enfiladed by Boer rifles and artillery. The Sergeant had been the last NCO, all the other officers and NCOs were already dead or wounded.

The Boers, just at two o’clock rushed the trenches the Fusiliers were huddled in and captured the remains of two companies. Some men of the South Lancashires attempted to counter-attack but a timely shell burst and dedicated and accurate rifle fire stopped the attack before it got moving.

The remaining Fusiliers, without leadership, low on ammunition and waterless, threw down their rifles and stood to surrender. Thorneycroft, in charge of the defence since the death of Woodgate, rushed up shouting, “You may go to hell. I command here and allow no surrender. Go on with your firing.” But these were his last words, he was silenced by a shot to his heart.

Coke’s Brigade, the Middlesex, the Dorsets and the Somersets, had arrived on the plateau at noon, but they simply added to the growing casualty list. Three thousand rifles could do nothing to silence the Boer artillery. As the shells crashed among them more and more officers fell, cohesion of units was breaking down. All over the Kop men asked, “Where are our guns.” If they fell back the Boer riflemen would capture the position. If they held their ground they must continue to endure the constant bombardment.

More reinforcements arrived, the Scottish Rifles (Cameronians) whose bayonet charge briefly knocked the Boers back. The Kings Royal Rifles attempted to take the twin peaks, but with 100 casualties, including their Colonel all they achieved was dying.

Coke, who had initially not gone with his men to the plateau, was persuaded in the late afternoon to do so, and surveying the carnage around him and decided to order a withdrawal, there were 1300 dead and dying on a very small area. Without the ability to silence the Boer guns, he realised he was throwing away good men for no purpose, “better six battalions safely down the hill” he said. If he had waited to nightfall, the men might have carried it off. But in the full light of day, and under constant fire, discipline broke, and hearing the call to retire, men fought each other to get down the hill as fast as they could. To General Warren at the foot of the hill, the sight of his command being routed was too much to bear. He was apoplexic with rage. Any officers he could find, and especially Major-General Coke, were immediately arrested.

Meanwhile on the ridge the Boers were yelling their defiance and victory.

 

[allanpcameron]

The Morning Post 15 December 1900
From our Correspondent Winston Churchill:
Never in the field of human conflict has so much wrong been done by so few to so many! I stood on the field on Spion Kop. I saw the Corpses lay here and there. Many of the wounds were of a horrible nature. The splinters and fragments of the shells had torn and mutilated them. The shallow trenches were choked with dead and wounded. The bravery of our men under the most terrible fire was not enough to prevent this nadir of the British Army.

What were the causes? Firstly, the inability of our artillery men to counter the weight of the German supplied guns. I argued with Colonel Sim that the need to get our guns emplaced on the plateau. But the gentlemen of the artillery did not believe it possible to haul the guns up the slope. Five batteries of guns we had, a much greater weight of shot than the Boers, but no means of sighting and hitting them.

The second cause was that the German Mausers which took such a toll on our brave men, which they were unable and untrained to return. Our men wear Khaki, but seem to think they still wear the Red and should advance and attack as their forebears did at Inkerman, with volley rather than aimed fire.

The third cause is the lack of communications. If General Warren had the means to communicate swiftly and accurately with the surviving officers on the plateau then the fog of war would not have had such a bearing on the events. Command and control are essential, without these we blunder about lost and losing.

The fourth cause, and perhaps the worst of all is the leadership of our army. Ladysmith has fallen. Mafeking has fallen. Our Generals have strewn the fields of Natal with our dead. Not one single victory, black week has become black year. Now gentle reader you will say, but now Field Marshall Roberts is there, Kitchener is there, Chamberlain is there. Our army now numbers nearly half a million men, with our wonderful Colonial forces. But again and again our training and equipment have let us down. These Boers are not Dervishes or Zulus, but Europeans. Supplied and supported by Europeans, especially the Kaiser. Will Roberts do better in 1901, we can only hope. Will the war be over by 1902, even if Kitchener has to throw every woman and child behind barbed wire, burn every farm and build a Hadrian’s wall of blockhouses on every bridge and road.

We are the laughing stock of Europe. The Germans look at us and think, there is a contemptible little country that cannot best 50000 Teutons. If we want to raise our heads again, we must pour as much treasure and care into our army as we do our Royal Navy.

 

[pedmore1202]

Ooh, very nice.

Interested in seeing how this develops.


I have to say that I agree with the idea of a worse Boer War providing the impetus for a better trained and equipped BEF.

One main question is: Does Britain, realising just how deadly modern weapons are, especially artillery and machine guns, begin to develop tactics to ensure that their troops can survive on the battlefield, and what effect does that have on the initial stages of WW1. Another part of that is, will other European powers take note of Britain's developments (especially in technology) and develop their own?

 

[new statesman]

Just some link's

Nice idea. but the army was one if not the best equiped and trained in the world.
i would look at reforming the indian army early. ala the 1920's as this could be helpfull also look at letting the dominions make there owne weppons, on a free licence! big help


Ok here are the links to some of the more important changes made after the 2bw

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Council_(1904)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esher_Report

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haldane_Reforms

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_and_Reserve_Forces_Act_1907

This one might do with a tweek
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selborne-Fisher_scheme

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:20th-century_history_of_the_British_Army

but you must also look at the changes in weapons that did and almost did happen

wiki wawa!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pattern_1913_Enfield

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.276_Enfield

.256 inch and .276 inch Enfield Experimental Ammunition

http://www.milsurps.com/content.php?r=338-.256-inch-and-.276-inch-Enfield-Experimental-Ammunition

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_I_weapons_of_the_United_Kingdom

 

[allanpcameron]

Thanks New Statesman for the links. My point is that the reforms happened because of the poor showing of the army, especially in the first year of the war. So if the Boer War goes even worse, fall of Ladysmith and Mafeking, other setbacks, would the reforms go deeper i.e. larger standing army and better/heavier artillery? So come 1914 the Contemptibles aren't so contemptible!

Thanks Pedmore, likewise tactics, in some of the books about the BEF at Mons does explicitly talk about lessons learned.
Conan Doyle in his book: The Great Boer War, "At least two years of failure and experience are needed to turn a civilian and commercial nation into a military power." So if is 4 or 5 years of failure and experience would that make GB even more of a military power.

The question is how much better could the Boers be to eke the war successfully. Would they be able to be resupplied from Germany - which brings the Royal Navy into the mix! So many strands!

 

[new statesman]

Thanks New Statesman for the links. My point is that the reforms happened because of the poor showing of the army, especially in the first year of the war. So if the Boer War goes even worse, fall of Ladysmith and Mafeking, other setbacks, would the reforms go deeper i.e. larger standing army and better/heavier artillery? So come 1914 the Contemptibles aren't so contemptible!

Thanks Pedmore, likewise tactics, in some of the books about the BEF at Mons does explicitly talk about lessons learned.
Conan Doyle in his book: The Great Boer War, "At least two years of failure and experience are needed to turn a civilian and commercial nation into a military power." So if is 4 or 5 years of failure and experience would that make GB even more of a military power.

The question is how much better could the Boers be to eke the war successfully. Would they be able to be resupplied from Germany - which brings the Royal Navy into the mix! So many strands!

I was not trying to prove you wrong, but giving you something to work off

here is a few links you might like.
http://www.kaiserscross.com/40184/157701.html

http://ia700304.us.archive.org/26/items/withtheboerforce16462gut/16462-h/16462-h.htm#page257

GERMAN DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS
CHAPTER VI
THE BOER WAR, 1899. PRELIMINARY CORRESPONDENCE
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/dugdale/boer.htm

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=6931

But i would say this. perhaps the best way is have the war last a year longer! but the british take more from the russo japanies war!

also perhaps the brits get a kick in the bum from some comando with a Cei-Rigotti rifle?? and early armoured car, and take that idea and run with it. and a 6.5m round?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cei-Rigotti

http://encyclodesarmes.free.fr/pays/italie/fusil/CEI-RIGOTTI/CEI-RIGOTTI.htm

 

[Riain]

The size of the bef was partly a political thing, prewar it was supposed to be 7 divisions but once faced with war the government held 2 of those at home initially. Perhaps the biggest problem was that there was no real plans to expand the army to 60 divisions. Prewar only 10% of territorial soldiers had volunteered for overseas service but upon war some 70 battalions volunteered , this was as much a shock to the government as the rush to enlist in the new army. If the government had contingency plans to deal with rapid growth of the army the bef could have been deployed in greater numbers and more quickly.

 

[new statesman]

just saw this

Captain Cei-Rigoti, the Italian army, seems to have begun his research on automatic rifles operated gas operated since 1895, when he presented one to his division commander, Crown Prince of Italy. Subsequent work demanded several years, so it was not until 1900 that efforts were made public in a newspaper of Rome who published a laudatory account of his achievements. This article was referring to the use of mounted infantry in the South African conflict,

which probably attracted the attention of British on this new weapon. They bought them a few copies and tested it. The gun was operated with a short displacement piston connected by a rod to the bolt. This rod and the cocking lever to the rear end are clearly visible in the photograph above.

The weapon could fire single shots or automatically. Despite some positive points, the tests were negative in all, the two English boards have focused on the ejection difficulties and the high proportion of failures, although these defects could have for bad origin state munitions themselves, who had suffered during the Italian Transport in Britain. It also claimed that the bolt retreated so far that accurate shooting impossible.

Critics were also advanced against the overall quality of the production, which was probably unfair. It seems obvious, some eighty years later, this rifle had many qualities, so much so that many of its features were copied.

 

[allanpcameron]

I'd be more inclined to waiting for the Lewis gun, if it could be picked up by 1913 and start to arm maybe one per platoon.

Now, if you know anything about artillery...

 

[allanpcameron]

Thanks again New Statesman, the link to the Boer forces book is really helpful, I appreciate your time and effort.

 

[new statesman]

I'd be more inclined to waiting for the Lewis gun, if it could be picked up by 1913 and start to arm maybe one per platoon.

Now, if you know anything about artillery...

Forget the lewis, get some one to see the Berthier Machine Gun, Model 1911

http://www.ar15.com/archive/topic.html?b=3&f=123&t=591363

wich is the Vickers-Berthier


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickers_light_machine_gun

as for arty. not much wrong with that. but having split tails would be nice!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QF_18-pdr

it is a problem of munitions or the lack off some times and the logistics.

The first artillery tractors were designed prior to the outbreak of World War I, often based on agricultural machines such as the Holt tractor. Such vehicles allowed the tactical use of heavier guns to supplement the light horse drawn field guns. "Horseless artillery" available prior to World War I weighed 8 tons, had 70 horsepower and could go 8 mph.[1] For example in the British Army it allowed the heavy guns of the Royal Garrison Artillery to be used flexibly on the battlefield.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_I_artillery_of_the_United_Kingdom

come to think of it. if the ww1 BEF had trucks and lots off them they could be a lot more mobile.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

just saw this

Captain Cei-Rigoti, the Italian army, seems to have begun his research on automatic rifles operated gas operated since 1895, when he presented one to his division commander, Crown Prince of Italy. Subsequent work demanded several years, so it was not until 1900 that efforts were made public ....

which probably attracted the attention of British on this new weapon. They bought them a few copies and tested it. The gun was operated with a short displacement piston connected by a rod to the bolt. This rod and the cocking lever to the rear end are clearly visible in the photograph above.

The weapon could fire single shots or automatically. Despite some positive points, the tests were negative in all, the two English boards have focused on the ejection difficulties and the high proportion of failures, although these defects could have for bad origin state munitions themselves, who had suffered during the Italian Transport in Britain. It also claimed that the bolt retreated so far that accurate shooting impossible.

...

I wonder if any of these people were aware of the Mexican Modrogon gas operated semi automatic or self loading rifle. The original patent came in 1888 & it went through a long slow series of test models over the next 20 years. SiG was contracted for a limited production run, of which 1,200 were completed by 1913 or 1914.

 

[Derwit]

The British army was always quite large as it had to police the empire. The divisions at home serving as depot troupes training before being sent abroad. Without conscription the BEF of 1914 couldn't be much bigger than was actually sent and delaying deployment for more forces to be recalled wasn't an option for political reasons.

As to improving the armament of the BEF it's small size would mean that by the time it had expanded the benefit of improved arms would have been lost due to German countermeasures and copying. Improving training and organisation due to the lessons learned in a more difficult Boar war (more than was done in OTL) would have a small initial benefit, but this would be reduced due the heavy casualties the Old Contemptible's sustained in 1914. It would have a greater impact on the performance of the Territorials of 1915. However by this time lessons where slowly being learnt in the trenches.

IMHO only a Boar war that would heighten antagonism with Germany enough to bring about conscription in the years leading up to WW1 would make any real difference to the fighting in 1914 and reduce the length of the war. Imagine what a BEF comprising 20+ divisions could do on the Marne (assuming that the Germans would get that far).

 

[new statesman]

Room to grow

Looking at this , we could say that yes the army could have been bigger and the also the Territorial Force, and reservists.

In the links that i posted before almost all if not all the lessons of modern trench war were demonstrated. if the army were 50 or 100 k larger and had better logistics it could have made a big impact, a regular is worth more than a conscript. so a division or three could have given the german a harder time early on.

At the outbreak of the war in August 1914, the British regular army was a small professional force. It consisted of 247,432 regular troops organised in four Guards and 68 line infantry regiments, 31 cavalry regiments, artillery and other support arms.

Each infantry regiment had two regular battalions, one of which served at home and provided drafts and reinforcements to the other which was stationed overseas, while also being prepared to be part of the Expeditionary Force.

Almost half of the regular army (74 of the 157 infantry battalions and 12 of the 31 cavalry regiments), was stationed overseas in garrisons throughout the British Empire.
The Royal Flying Corps was part of the Army until 1918. At the outbreak of the war, it consisted of 84 aircraft.

The regularArmy was supported by the Territorial Force, and by reservists. In August 1914, there were three forms of reserves. The Army Reserve of retired soldiers was 145,350 strong. They were paid 3 Shillings and 6 pence a week (17.5 pence) worth about £70 per week in 2013 terms, and had to attend 12 training days per year.

The Special Reserve had another 64,000 men and was a form of part-time soldiering, similar to the Territorial Force. A Special Reservist had an initial six months full-time training and was paid the same as a regular soldier during this period; they had three or four weeks training per year thereafter.[8] The National Reserve had some 215,000 men, who were on a register which was maintained by Territorial Force County Associations; these men had military experience, but no other reserve obligation.

The regulars and reserves—at least on paper—totalled a mobilised force of almost 700,000 men, although only 150,000 men were immediately available to be formed into the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that was sent to the continent. This consisted of six infantry divisions and one of cavalry.

By contrast, the French Army in 1914 mobilized 1,650,000 troops and 62 infantry divisions, while the German Army mobilized 1,850,000 troops and 87 infantry divisions.
Britain, therefore, began the war with six regular and 14 reserve divisions.

After the Great war and the inevitable defence cuts that would follow, the army was reduced in size, and by 1920 had fallen to a strength of 370,000.

At the start of the Second World War the British Army Strength stood at 897,000 men including reserves. By the end of 1939 the strength of the British Army stood at 1.1 million men, and further increased to 1.65 million men during June 1940.

But i will say this. It is france that could have learnt more, there were french men fighting in the 2bw. if only france had learned the same lessons as the uk!

 

[new statesman]

Lessons of war

1 The second boer war

The Second Boer War was the harbinger for a new type of combat which would persevere throughout the twentieth century, guerilla warfare.

After the war was over, the entire British army underwent a period of reform which was focused on lessening the emphasis placed on mounted units in combat.

It was determined that the idea of Cavalry was antiquated and improperly used on the battlefield in the modern warfare of the Boer War, and that the First World War was the final proof that cavalry had no place in twentieth century combat.

Yet some British soldiers held dear to the fact that cavalry was put to better use after the reforms in the theatres of the Middle East and World War I, and that the idea of mounted infantry was useful in the times where the war was more mobile.

An example of this was in the First World War during the battle of Mons where the British cavalry held the Belgian town against an initial German assault.

The number of horses killed in the war was at the time unprecedented in modern warfare. For example, in the Relief of Kimberley, French's cavalry rode 500 horses to their deaths in a single day.

The wastage was particularly heavy among British forces for several reasons: overloading of horses with unnecessary equipment and saddlery, failure to rest and acclimatise horses after long sea voyages and, later in the war, poor management by inexperienced mounted troops and distant control by unsympathetic staffs.

The average life expectancy of a British horse, from the time of its arrival in Port Elizabeth, was around six weeks.

The Horse Memorial in Port Elizabeth is a tribute to the 300,000 horses that died during the conflict.


2 Russo-Japanese War

Military and civilian observers from every major power closely followed the course of the war. Most were able to report on events from the perspective of "embedded" positions within the land and naval forces of both Russia and Japan.

These military attachés and other observers prepared first-hand accounts of the war and analytical papers. In-depth observer narratives of the war and more narrowly focused professional journal articles were written soon after the war; and these post-war reports conclusively illustrated the battlefield destructiveness of this conflict.

This was the first time the tactics of entrenched positions for infantry defended with machine guns and artillery became vitally important, and both were dominant factors in World War I.

Though entrenched positions were a significant part of both the Franco-Prussian War and the American Civil War due to the advent of breech loading rifles, the lessons learned regarding high casualty counts were not taken into account in World War I.

From a 21st-century perspective, it is now apparent that tactical lessons available to observer nations were disregarded in preparations for war in Europe, and during the course of World War I

http://www.russojapanesewar.com/

 

[allanpcameron]

Thanks again for the input.

The lessons learned by the British Army OTL were substantial, paving the way for a BEF that could punch above its weight - to some degree.

I'm hoping to show that one of the lessons that should have been learned was to have a bigger standing army at home - as well as all the other lessons. If I can put the BEF into the line, even if only in early September, with four infantry, one cavalry Corps rather than four infantry and one cavalry division at Mons. I think Von Kluck is going to have a far harder time than he did. Mons and Le Cateau fell mostly on Second Corps, Haig's first Corps was involved mostly on the Marne and the race to the sea.

I don't think conscription is on the cards in this forum, maybe ASB/Magic. But I do think we can make a significant increase in the size of the army by 1912. But that means persuading a peacetime government to increase defence spending - maybe it is ASB after all.

 

[allanpcameron]

The Morning Post. 23 January 1901

VICTORY FOR OUR BOYS!
BOERS DEFEATED BY SUPERIOR TACTICS

From our Correspondent, Winston Churchill in South Africa.

After a year of shame and failure, at last we have bested the Burghers! What a sight, hundreds of ragged, bearded men throwing down their weapons and throwing up their hands in surrender! Field Marshall Roberts’ brilliant plan to bring the Boers to heel was genius in its thought, meticulous in its assembly and victorious in its execution!

After a year in which the Boer artillery played havoc with our attempts to overcome them, the Gunners brought about complete destruction of the Boer battery of German guns! They then supported the attack by the infantry engaging the entrenched Burghers until our lads were almost upon them. The howitzers took the credit this time, shrapnel shells bursting over the enemy trenches keeping their heads down and sometime scything through a group huddled at the bottom of their erstwhile fortifications.

Up until now our artillery have moved up with the infantry, using the direct fire that so devastated the Mahdis but has done nothing against these clever and resourceful Europeans. Now the indirect fire was able to first silence the enemy guns and then, as our boys advanced and the Burghers were forced to engage them, revealing their positions, then our artillery men laid upon them the fire and steel which we so often were the victims of.

A balloon played a crucial role! Among the innovations that the Field Marshall brought to his plan was a balloon, raised on a tether, with a wire to communicate the exact position of the enemy and to correct the fire of the gunners. The bravery of Captain Lloyd-Jones and Sergeant Foster in manning this aerial platform was worthy of the annals of our Great British history. Swung around in the wind it was difficult for them to focus on the enemy, but again and again it was their observations that made the difference.

The infantry, those lions of the Welsh Valleys, stormed the enemy redoubts with bayonets fixed and great guts. But, unlike so often in the past, using the natural cover available. Not in column or shoulder to shoulder that has made their comrades this last year nothing more than targets, but in loose order, one group firing, while another group advanced.

The Boers, as usual, seeing their position was untenable began to withdraw, moving towards their horse line. But the Field Marshall was wiser than to let them ride off as they had so often before. As they attempted to flee they found themselves facing the guns of a dismounted unit of the Natal Mounted Rifles. These had ridden hard the previous day well to the west of the Boer position and had blocked their escape route. Faced with men to their front and rear, the Burghers, after a brave attempt to break through, were left no choice but to surrender en masse!

This battle, this victory, is not the end of the war, it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps, the end of the beginning!

 

[new statesman]

Thanks again for the input.

The lessons learned by the British Army OTL were substantial, paving the way for a BEF that could punch above its weight - to some degree.

I'm hoping to show that one of the lessons that should have been learned was to have a bigger standing army at home - as well as all the other lessons. If I can put the BEF into the line, even if only in early September, with four infantry, one cavalry Corps rather than four infantry and one cavalry division at Mons. I think Von Kluck is going to have a far harder time than he did. Mons and Le Cateau fell mostly on Second Corps, Haig's first Corps was involved mostly on the Marne and the race to the sea.

I don't think conscription is on the cards in this forum, maybe ASB/Magic. But I do think we can make a significant increase in the size of the army by 1912. But that means persuading a peacetime government to increase defence spending - maybe it is ASB after all.

I think that you could get the army up to 350,000 men and with reserve a force of 1000,000. and have perhaps 300,000 ready for action not 150,000.

If the lessons of the beor war and the russo japanies war were taken on.
if the army can do this and also reform the Indian army, which was larger than the british army at the time , and the domnions reform and enlarge there own forces hand in hand with london. up to having the right to manufacture wepons on a free licence and including direct input development of new wepons and tactics , let the IGS be just that A seat for each dominion, then yes you can have all you want

also please get rid of 303 amo asap!!!!! keep the SMLE Mk3/4 bout a new caliber pref the 6.5×50mmSR Arisaka
for British service as the .256-inch (6.5 mm) caliber Mk III/IV
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/6.5×50mm_Arisaka

 

[sonofpegasus]

The Ariska round is semi rimmed, I would advocate the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/6.5×52mm_Mannlicher-Carcano as an alternative. Though due to the British links to Japan and the OTL purchase of Ariska rifles in 1914, plus the setting up of British amunition production the adoption of the Arisca is more plausable.