Probably wouldn't be as bad- it's not like crossing a land border from Syria into Turkey, one has to cross the Mediterranean instead.
Exocet - the Effects of a different Falklands
- Thread starter Nevran
- Start date
A good point, but a fair few did/do that anyway
Main reason for certain events in the Italian political scene - but that’s getting too recent for this site
Yeah, there would be less migration than that caused by the Syrian Civil War but it would probably be more politically sensitive both because it would be seen as an own-goal and there'd unfortunately probably be more tragedies from boats crossing the Mediterranean.
Don't worry about it.
2003 German federal election
The Scharping government left office in 1999 deeply unpopular, having both stymied the process of European integration, lost the ECB to Britain and overseen a continued economic recession, with half-baked measures which did little to help. Tensions within the SPD also harmed the party’s reputation, with Scharping having to contend with ambitious upcomers and ideological enemies such as Oskar Lafontaine and Gerhard Schröder. Rumours of a party coup against Scharping to boost the SPD’s polling just prior to the 1999 election derailed the attempts to portray the SPD as a responsible government and blew any chance of a political comeback for either Scharping or the SPD.
In their place, Germany elected Edmund Stoiber, a member of the Catholic and socially conservative Christian Social Union, the junior and sister partner of the CDU. Stoiber, who had largely avoided the bloodletting of the Kohl/Späth, managed to become the Chancellor candidate through some bloodletting of his own. Stoiber, relatively successful as CSU leader, with rumours and media reports on a funding scandal dogging senior CDU insiders including the incumbent leader Wolfgang Schäuble. Having come from the more conservative CSU, Stoiber was widely regarded as more conservative and less charismatic than Schäuble, but was still regarded as more electable than the scandal-laden Schäuble.
It would turn that the rumours of a funding scandal would be proven true and would eventually engulf the CDU, alongside destroying Schäuble's career in 2000, with him being forced out of cabinet and resigning the CDU’s leadership. The scandal would reach the upper echelons of European politics, with the European Parliament lodging a sanction against Helmut Kohl, the EU Commission President. Stoiber, largely above the affair, relished his internal rivals fall and deprived the CDU of a potential candidate to challenge Stoiber for the position of Chancellor, who still retained the overwhelming support of the CSU. With the controversial nature of his government, Stoiber would need all the lucky breaks he could get.
One lucky break would be the troubles the SPD faced in opposition. In a tense leadership review after Scharping’s resignation as SPD leader, Hans-Ulrich Klose a long time party heavyweight (on the left of the party) beat the right-leaning Gesine Schwan to become the SPD’s leader in the Bundestag. Expected to be a temporary leader of the party, Klose proved to be an effective leader (if not particularly charismatic) in the Bundestag. He would later go to become SPD’s official Chancellor candidate in 2003, not through his own strength but the weakness of his rivals. The brutal internal power struggle between Oskar Lafontaine and Gerhard Schröder (who had by this point spent almost a decade in ideological and personal conflict with the other) tarred both their candidacies and saw Klose take the crown.
Stoiber iniated a controversial series of welfare and labor reforms, designed to make the German economy more competitive and fit for the 21st century. Opposition to the reforms, from the SPD, Alliance and the PDS alongside a large amount of direct action from protestors and unions saw the government under significant pressure to change course. The day prior to the Bundestag vote, tens of thousands of students broke out in spontaneous protest in almost every major German city, to rally opposition.
Stoiber, pushing ahead with these labor reforms, stretched his perilously thin majority in the Bundestag to a breaking point. A forceful condemnation from the SPD, now led by the originally temporary Hans-Ulrich Klose united the SPD in opposition to the reforms. Alongside the Alliance (which had dropped Citizens’ from its title) forcefully condemning the reforms, if the vote failed, it would be expected that the government would fall and early elections would be required, such was the (unusually) fevered atmosphere of the time.
Stoiber could not back down. Using every tool at his disposal, and with the backing of the market liberal FDP, Stoiber forced through the reforms.. What came afterwards was the necessary economic turbulence caused by both the reforms and the introduction of the ecu. Germans, always lukewarm about the common currency, would struggle to embrace the ecu especially after the economy entered a slight recession with the menu costs of switching over and a less favourable exchange rate for German exports. The economy however, would return to growth, and significant growth, by the next election in 2003.
It would be under Stoiber that Germany’s capital city finally moved from Bonn to Berlin. After a vote in 1991 which kept the capital in Bonn, Stoiber and Scharping both campaigned in 1999 to move the capital to Berlin, pending a further free vote in the Bundestag. With the support of both main parties, overwhelmingly, the Bundestag chose to relocate to Berlin, and by 2003 the move was seen through.
The election was thus a competition between two unpopular leaders who only remained in their position because of internal divisions within their respective parties. The smaller parties, in contrast, had a far more successful election. The liberal FDP led by the charismatic (the incumbent Foreign Minister) Guido Westerwelle went from strength-to-strength, using the leader effectively and by highlighting the work done in government and the ability of Westerwelle to act as a socially liberal check on the more socially conservative Stoiber. The Alliance, maintained its position as a green and human rights orientated option for the other parties, and maintained its support in the East whilst enjoying success in Berlin, where the party had just won the mayoralty with Renate Künast. Meanwhile, the PDS, which had been at the forefront of the campaign against the labor reforms instituted, saw a dramatic rise in their popularity complemented by their new more moderate leader, Petra Pau. The PDS, for the first time since German unification cleared the 5% threshold needed for proportional seats and saw a large increase in their numbers in the Bundestag.
However, it was clear on election night that while the CDU/CSU had lost seats, the FDP (their coalition partners) had gained them at their expense. Again the two parties were able continue the governing coalition again, this time with the FDP having a larger say on government policy.
In their place, Germany elected Edmund Stoiber, a member of the Catholic and socially conservative Christian Social Union, the junior and sister partner of the CDU. Stoiber, who had largely avoided the bloodletting of the Kohl/Späth, managed to become the Chancellor candidate through some bloodletting of his own. Stoiber, relatively successful as CSU leader, with rumours and media reports on a funding scandal dogging senior CDU insiders including the incumbent leader Wolfgang Schäuble. Having come from the more conservative CSU, Stoiber was widely regarded as more conservative and less charismatic than Schäuble, but was still regarded as more electable than the scandal-laden Schäuble.
It would turn that the rumours of a funding scandal would be proven true and would eventually engulf the CDU, alongside destroying Schäuble's career in 2000, with him being forced out of cabinet and resigning the CDU’s leadership. The scandal would reach the upper echelons of European politics, with the European Parliament lodging a sanction against Helmut Kohl, the EU Commission President. Stoiber, largely above the affair, relished his internal rivals fall and deprived the CDU of a potential candidate to challenge Stoiber for the position of Chancellor, who still retained the overwhelming support of the CSU. With the controversial nature of his government, Stoiber would need all the lucky breaks he could get.
One lucky break would be the troubles the SPD faced in opposition. In a tense leadership review after Scharping’s resignation as SPD leader, Hans-Ulrich Klose a long time party heavyweight (on the left of the party) beat the right-leaning Gesine Schwan to become the SPD’s leader in the Bundestag. Expected to be a temporary leader of the party, Klose proved to be an effective leader (if not particularly charismatic) in the Bundestag. He would later go to become SPD’s official Chancellor candidate in 2003, not through his own strength but the weakness of his rivals. The brutal internal power struggle between Oskar Lafontaine and Gerhard Schröder (who had by this point spent almost a decade in ideological and personal conflict with the other) tarred both their candidacies and saw Klose take the crown.
Stoiber iniated a controversial series of welfare and labor reforms, designed to make the German economy more competitive and fit for the 21st century. Opposition to the reforms, from the SPD, Alliance and the PDS alongside a large amount of direct action from protestors and unions saw the government under significant pressure to change course. The day prior to the Bundestag vote, tens of thousands of students broke out in spontaneous protest in almost every major German city, to rally opposition.
Stoiber, pushing ahead with these labor reforms, stretched his perilously thin majority in the Bundestag to a breaking point. A forceful condemnation from the SPD, now led by the originally temporary Hans-Ulrich Klose united the SPD in opposition to the reforms. Alongside the Alliance (which had dropped Citizens’ from its title) forcefully condemning the reforms, if the vote failed, it would be expected that the government would fall and early elections would be required, such was the (unusually) fevered atmosphere of the time.
Stoiber could not back down. Using every tool at his disposal, and with the backing of the market liberal FDP, Stoiber forced through the reforms.. What came afterwards was the necessary economic turbulence caused by both the reforms and the introduction of the ecu. Germans, always lukewarm about the common currency, would struggle to embrace the ecu especially after the economy entered a slight recession with the menu costs of switching over and a less favourable exchange rate for German exports. The economy however, would return to growth, and significant growth, by the next election in 2003.
It would be under Stoiber that Germany’s capital city finally moved from Bonn to Berlin. After a vote in 1991 which kept the capital in Bonn, Stoiber and Scharping both campaigned in 1999 to move the capital to Berlin, pending a further free vote in the Bundestag. With the support of both main parties, overwhelmingly, the Bundestag chose to relocate to Berlin, and by 2003 the move was seen through.
The election was thus a competition between two unpopular leaders who only remained in their position because of internal divisions within their respective parties. The smaller parties, in contrast, had a far more successful election. The liberal FDP led by the charismatic (the incumbent Foreign Minister) Guido Westerwelle went from strength-to-strength, using the leader effectively and by highlighting the work done in government and the ability of Westerwelle to act as a socially liberal check on the more socially conservative Stoiber. The Alliance, maintained its position as a green and human rights orientated option for the other parties, and maintained its support in the East whilst enjoying success in Berlin, where the party had just won the mayoralty with Renate Künast. Meanwhile, the PDS, which had been at the forefront of the campaign against the labor reforms instituted, saw a dramatic rise in their popularity complemented by their new more moderate leader, Petra Pau. The PDS, for the first time since German unification cleared the 5% threshold needed for proportional seats and saw a large increase in their numbers in the Bundestag.
However, it was clear on election night that while the CDU/CSU had lost seats, the FDP (their coalition partners) had gained them at their expense. Again the two parties were able continue the governing coalition again, this time with the FDP having a larger say on government policy.
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Guido Westervelle has that right hair/glasses combo that just oozes “guten tag I’m a German politician”
Germany's always interesting, both in OTL and ITTL. I would do a bit more for them, but I'm only doing an update once every two elections for Germany, because their electoral system is so convoluted and difficult to understand. Yet, somehow, works perfectly.
Hehehe, I know what you mean
. That, and he looks the epitome of the upper class free market liberal politician.
👀👀👀
Yet to see a TL really do Lebed true justice, so I’m excited to see where this goes
Yet to see a TL really do Lebed true justice, so I’m excited to see where this goes
2004 Russian presidential election
A.N. Just a quick thing to say thank you to everyone, as this TL hit 50k views this week, which is just incredible. So, err thanks. And hope you enjoy this update, which for some reason meant a lot of playing around with Photoshop…
Alexander Lebed was a different sort of President to those who preceded him. While he dealt with many of the same challenges they faced, including an intransigent legislature (an anachronism, with it still being called the Soviet), economic turmoil and persistent corruption, Lebed would become the first President to be re-elected in Russia’s modern history.
Boris Yeltsin, the martyred democratic reformer and Ruslan Khasbulatov the man who oversaw the painful transition from the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation would often find themselves praised by Lebed, even if he governed in a way which undermined the work both men had done to make Russia more democratic. Both men according to Lebed were, first and foremost reformers and patriots.
Khasbulatov enjoyed his return to the political limelight and found himself highly influential in the highest echelon’s of government. Lebed would come to enjoy a close political relationship with Khasbulatov, with Khasbulatov becoming one of Lebed’s closest political confidante’s, often outlasting Lebed’s soon to be famous fair-wind friends and advisors.
Anatoly Sobchak another one of Lebed’s predecessors, after his unfortunate death at the 1998 G8 Summit was looked on less favourably by Russians, as his reputation had been tarnished by allegations of corruption. Far-right provocateur Vladimir Zhirinovsky would perhaps sum up the Russian public’s opinion on Sobchak, saying that “even if [Sobchak] was a corrupt dog, he didn’t deserve to get put down”.
The spurious rumours that the now unpopular Sobchak had been assassinated on foreign soil refused to die. The rise of the interweb saw thousands of Russians pour over falsified evidence that not only was Sobchak ill for multiple days before his death, but that Western secret services had both bugged the Russian presidential plane and his hotel room.
Lebed, who would prove to be far more politically astute than his critics made him out to be, saw the potential to play into the public’s paranoia about Sobchak’s death. Lebed would often refer to Sobchak’s death seemingly as a way to accrue political capital, with surrogates and friendly media using his death to say why Russia needed a “strong and independent leader”. In essence, martyring Sobchak as a victim of Western aggression, meant Lebed could extend his power in order to combat the West. While such words and statements would never come directly from Lebed, at least during his first presidential term, he would benefit greatly from their discussion.
So much so, in a significant diplomatic breach of protocol Lebed would temporarily suspend diplomatic relations with the UK in order to demand further investigations and Russian access into new investigations. Patten would be forced to acquiesce, but this would come with a significant worsening of bilateral relations. Domestically, however, this move was seen as Russia ‘standing up’ to the West and saw Lebed’s approval ratings shoot up, as all the while the Soviet/legislature remained deadlocked.
Chernomyrdin, Lebed’s immediate successor would be the man who would come to represent the antithesis of Lebed’s ideology and personality. Chernomyrdin, in 2003, would actually leave Russia for Switzerland, fearing for his safety (and the safety of his significant wealth, which he gained during Khasbulatov’s presidency as chair of Gazprom).
It would be Lebed would harness the populist anger of the population and would popularize the term “Kleptocrat”, and would wage a rhetorical war against those who had made their riches in the disorganized marketisation of Russia. Beefing up the anti-corruption police, Lebed would turn them against both those most corrupt and, with his re-election campaign kicking into gear, those who politically opposed him. These anti-corruption units, colloquially known as “Special Branch” would become seen as a form of secret police force within Russia, often acting above the law and without legislative oversight thanks to the ambiguous position the Special Branch enjoyed.
By 2004 however, it was clear that the Special Branch had become similar to a paramilitary police force and would be used to target kleptocrats whose main crime was being politically and personally opposed to Lebed. While Special Branch did bring down those such as Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who had legitimately engaged in corruptive practices, others would be targeted and arrested. Kleptocrats who were seen to lean liberal and had publicly supported Sobchak and Chernomyrdin, such as Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky soon found themselves on the wrong side of the law.
Lebed would relish the role of being a “man of the people” and would make fiery speeches against whatever he believed was the “people’s enemy”, whether they be kleptocrats or the media. In this power struggle, executive proclamations which were seen to be at best ‘bending’ the constitution, saw independent news organisations forced to toe an pro-government line. Organisations which didn’t would soon find themselves under threat of raid from Special Branch. These threats proved true with the almost overnight collapse of Gusinsky’s media empire after his arrest in 2003 simultaneously silencing a significant proportion of the media which opposed Lebed.
Perhaps the greatest threat which Lebed saw, was the steadily growing EU and NATO blocs to Russia’s West. The ascension of multiple former Warsaw Pact nations into NATO, while a crowning achievement for the American-led international order, provoked significant anger in Russia. Lebed, who had once been seen as favourable to the West during his presidential campaign, was now seen as erratic and not to be trusted. This reputation which was cemented after a widely panned speech to the United Nations which saw the Russian president rambling and go off script multiple times.
President Alexander Lebed speaking at the 2002 UN General Assembly
What remained constant about Lebed however, throughout his time as President, was his determination and often hyper-nationalistic focus on protecting Russian speaking minorities in neighbouring nations. His nationalism informed and led to the brutal campaign in the rebellious Grozny in 2002, which led to the deaths of almost all of the Chechen leadership and signalled the end of the Chechen War.
But what would be the most profound and lasting legacy of Lebed’s first term would the accession of Belarus into the Russian Federation, through likely fraudulent methods. The concept of a “Union State” between the two nations of Russia and Belarus had been a long term policy goal for both nations, and was largely seen to be the natural end for the increasing economic, political and defensive co-operation Belarus and Russia enjoyed. Championed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, perhaps with a hint of Soviet nostalgia, he worked with a negotiated this supranational state between the two in 1995 which was strengthened by both Sobchak and Chernomyrdin in the following years.
Lebed, in tandem with Belarussian president/dictator Alexander Lukashenko moved to greatly deepen this Union State into a formal union between the two. Lukashenko, seeing an opportunity to gain significant political power and Lebed, seeking to spite both the West and strike a blow to the post-Cold War order which had governed Europe moved forward. “One Russia, two nations” became the tagline of both Lebed and Lukashenko, and both invested significant political capital to make this tagline into a reality. Lebed, went a step further than anyone predicted, and made clear his desire for Belarus to become a member state of the Russian Federation which in essence meant the annexation of Belarus.
So, a deeply controversial referendum was held in Belarus in October 2003 which proposed that Belarus would become incorporated into the Russian Federation, with Belarus (soon-to-be the Autonomous Republic of Byelorussia and the Autonomous Region of Minsk) going to polling stations. As part of the referendum, Lebed granted significant autonomy and financial incentives to Belarus and Belarussian politicians, to sweeten the deal.
While a majority of Belarussian’s supported joining the Russian Federation, the official results which saw over 90% of voters back joining Russia was seen both as an exaggeration and an exercise in vote rigging. Election observers noted significant irregularities at polling stations, on top of the record and unprecedented turnout across Belarus, making the results that much more fraudulent. However, despite the concerns raised by the referendum and its legality, the positive vote in favour of joining the Russian Federation would see Belarus join Russia on January 1, 2004.
The West looked on with nervous apprehension towards the referendum and it’s at best, exaggerated result. However, the West was experiencing a retrenchment, with the winding down of Western involvement in both the Korean and North African wars, saw that the Western response would be minimal at best, outside of diplomatic censure. A rather cynical, but prevalent view, and the view taken by many Western nations was that with the expansion of NATO and the EU eastwards, Russia had responded like-with-like. The West could grumble, but ultimately, grumbling was all that would be done.
Whilst the annexation/integration of Belarus into the Russian Federation was largely overlooked by the West, Russia’s immediate neighbours, especially those in Eastern Europe saw the referendum as a clear and present danger. Eastern Europeans, including both politicians and the public, saw the referendum as the return of a belligerent Russia to the world stage. This would naturally have major ramifications for the politics of these nations. So much so, elections in neighbouring nations soon began to swing away from pro-Russian candidates and towards pro-European one’s.
The most dramatic example of this would be in Ukraine. The incumbent, Russophile Leonid Kuchma and his Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych were already in electoral trouble as Kuchma’s term in office had been marred by protests, corruption scandals and lackluster economic growth. The expansion of Russia westwards also seemingly confirmed the arguments of much of the pro-European opposition, led by former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, in that Russia was a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty.
Yushchenko, the front-runner, was assassinated in September 2004 after he ingested a poisonous substance while dining with members of the Ukrainian secret service. His death, in the middle of the 2004 presidential campaign, saw Yulia Tymoshenko become the leader of the opposition bloc and the main figure of the pro-European opposition. Ukrainians, rightly, were horrified by the assassination and would rally behind Tymoshenko’s campaign in unprecedented numbers.
Tymoshenko would win the election, but with widespread voter fraud in pro-Russian areas in the East, saw her only narrowly prevail. As protests broke out across the country both in favour of Tymoshenko and those against Tymoshenko, what was clear was that Russia had lost a key ally in the process.
Despite such setbacks, as the 2004 Russian presidential election kicked off, Lebed had a significant list of achievements behind him. A scattered opposition, a strong domestic record and a return to Russia to the world stage all worked in favour of Lebed. His main rival, the Communist Gennadiy Seleznyov (with former two-time nominee Gennady Zyuganov having sat out the election, at the behest of Lebed) who wanted to lessen tensions with the West, was an easy opponent to beat.
An impressive re-election aside, also on the ballot was multiple referendums on the status of the Russian constitution and of the position of the President and the length of a President’s term. Lebed’s endorsed answers (usually Yes) were overwhelming approved by voters, which saw the abolition of term limits for the Presidency and most importantly constrained the power of the legislative branch, the Russian Soviet, which was transformed into the inferior Russian Duma.
Lebed was here to stay.
Alexander Lebed was a different sort of President to those who preceded him. While he dealt with many of the same challenges they faced, including an intransigent legislature (an anachronism, with it still being called the Soviet), economic turmoil and persistent corruption, Lebed would become the first President to be re-elected in Russia’s modern history.
Boris Yeltsin, the martyred democratic reformer and Ruslan Khasbulatov the man who oversaw the painful transition from the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation would often find themselves praised by Lebed, even if he governed in a way which undermined the work both men had done to make Russia more democratic. Both men according to Lebed were, first and foremost reformers and patriots.
Khasbulatov enjoyed his return to the political limelight and found himself highly influential in the highest echelon’s of government. Lebed would come to enjoy a close political relationship with Khasbulatov, with Khasbulatov becoming one of Lebed’s closest political confidante’s, often outlasting Lebed’s soon to be famous fair-wind friends and advisors.
Anatoly Sobchak another one of Lebed’s predecessors, after his unfortunate death at the 1998 G8 Summit was looked on less favourably by Russians, as his reputation had been tarnished by allegations of corruption. Far-right provocateur Vladimir Zhirinovsky would perhaps sum up the Russian public’s opinion on Sobchak, saying that “even if [Sobchak] was a corrupt dog, he didn’t deserve to get put down”.
The spurious rumours that the now unpopular Sobchak had been assassinated on foreign soil refused to die. The rise of the interweb saw thousands of Russians pour over falsified evidence that not only was Sobchak ill for multiple days before his death, but that Western secret services had both bugged the Russian presidential plane and his hotel room.
Lebed, who would prove to be far more politically astute than his critics made him out to be, saw the potential to play into the public’s paranoia about Sobchak’s death. Lebed would often refer to Sobchak’s death seemingly as a way to accrue political capital, with surrogates and friendly media using his death to say why Russia needed a “strong and independent leader”. In essence, martyring Sobchak as a victim of Western aggression, meant Lebed could extend his power in order to combat the West. While such words and statements would never come directly from Lebed, at least during his first presidential term, he would benefit greatly from their discussion.
So much so, in a significant diplomatic breach of protocol Lebed would temporarily suspend diplomatic relations with the UK in order to demand further investigations and Russian access into new investigations. Patten would be forced to acquiesce, but this would come with a significant worsening of bilateral relations. Domestically, however, this move was seen as Russia ‘standing up’ to the West and saw Lebed’s approval ratings shoot up, as all the while the Soviet/legislature remained deadlocked.
Chernomyrdin, Lebed’s immediate successor would be the man who would come to represent the antithesis of Lebed’s ideology and personality. Chernomyrdin, in 2003, would actually leave Russia for Switzerland, fearing for his safety (and the safety of his significant wealth, which he gained during Khasbulatov’s presidency as chair of Gazprom).
It would be Lebed would harness the populist anger of the population and would popularize the term “Kleptocrat”, and would wage a rhetorical war against those who had made their riches in the disorganized marketisation of Russia. Beefing up the anti-corruption police, Lebed would turn them against both those most corrupt and, with his re-election campaign kicking into gear, those who politically opposed him. These anti-corruption units, colloquially known as “Special Branch” would become seen as a form of secret police force within Russia, often acting above the law and without legislative oversight thanks to the ambiguous position the Special Branch enjoyed.
By 2004 however, it was clear that the Special Branch had become similar to a paramilitary police force and would be used to target kleptocrats whose main crime was being politically and personally opposed to Lebed. While Special Branch did bring down those such as Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, who had legitimately engaged in corruptive practices, others would be targeted and arrested. Kleptocrats who were seen to lean liberal and had publicly supported Sobchak and Chernomyrdin, such as Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky soon found themselves on the wrong side of the law.
Lebed would relish the role of being a “man of the people” and would make fiery speeches against whatever he believed was the “people’s enemy”, whether they be kleptocrats or the media. In this power struggle, executive proclamations which were seen to be at best ‘bending’ the constitution, saw independent news organisations forced to toe an pro-government line. Organisations which didn’t would soon find themselves under threat of raid from Special Branch. These threats proved true with the almost overnight collapse of Gusinsky’s media empire after his arrest in 2003 simultaneously silencing a significant proportion of the media which opposed Lebed.
Perhaps the greatest threat which Lebed saw, was the steadily growing EU and NATO blocs to Russia’s West. The ascension of multiple former Warsaw Pact nations into NATO, while a crowning achievement for the American-led international order, provoked significant anger in Russia. Lebed, who had once been seen as favourable to the West during his presidential campaign, was now seen as erratic and not to be trusted. This reputation which was cemented after a widely panned speech to the United Nations which saw the Russian president rambling and go off script multiple times.
President Alexander Lebed speaking at the 2002 UN General Assembly
What remained constant about Lebed however, throughout his time as President, was his determination and often hyper-nationalistic focus on protecting Russian speaking minorities in neighbouring nations. His nationalism informed and led to the brutal campaign in the rebellious Grozny in 2002, which led to the deaths of almost all of the Chechen leadership and signalled the end of the Chechen War.
But what would be the most profound and lasting legacy of Lebed’s first term would the accession of Belarus into the Russian Federation, through likely fraudulent methods. The concept of a “Union State” between the two nations of Russia and Belarus had been a long term policy goal for both nations, and was largely seen to be the natural end for the increasing economic, political and defensive co-operation Belarus and Russia enjoyed. Championed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, perhaps with a hint of Soviet nostalgia, he worked with a negotiated this supranational state between the two in 1995 which was strengthened by both Sobchak and Chernomyrdin in the following years.
Lebed, in tandem with Belarussian president/dictator Alexander Lukashenko moved to greatly deepen this Union State into a formal union between the two. Lukashenko, seeing an opportunity to gain significant political power and Lebed, seeking to spite both the West and strike a blow to the post-Cold War order which had governed Europe moved forward. “One Russia, two nations” became the tagline of both Lebed and Lukashenko, and both invested significant political capital to make this tagline into a reality. Lebed, went a step further than anyone predicted, and made clear his desire for Belarus to become a member state of the Russian Federation which in essence meant the annexation of Belarus.
So, a deeply controversial referendum was held in Belarus in October 2003 which proposed that Belarus would become incorporated into the Russian Federation, with Belarus (soon-to-be the Autonomous Republic of Byelorussia and the Autonomous Region of Minsk) going to polling stations. As part of the referendum, Lebed granted significant autonomy and financial incentives to Belarus and Belarussian politicians, to sweeten the deal.
While a majority of Belarussian’s supported joining the Russian Federation, the official results which saw over 90% of voters back joining Russia was seen both as an exaggeration and an exercise in vote rigging. Election observers noted significant irregularities at polling stations, on top of the record and unprecedented turnout across Belarus, making the results that much more fraudulent. However, despite the concerns raised by the referendum and its legality, the positive vote in favour of joining the Russian Federation would see Belarus join Russia on January 1, 2004.
The West looked on with nervous apprehension towards the referendum and it’s at best, exaggerated result. However, the West was experiencing a retrenchment, with the winding down of Western involvement in both the Korean and North African wars, saw that the Western response would be minimal at best, outside of diplomatic censure. A rather cynical, but prevalent view, and the view taken by many Western nations was that with the expansion of NATO and the EU eastwards, Russia had responded like-with-like. The West could grumble, but ultimately, grumbling was all that would be done.
Whilst the annexation/integration of Belarus into the Russian Federation was largely overlooked by the West, Russia’s immediate neighbours, especially those in Eastern Europe saw the referendum as a clear and present danger. Eastern Europeans, including both politicians and the public, saw the referendum as the return of a belligerent Russia to the world stage. This would naturally have major ramifications for the politics of these nations. So much so, elections in neighbouring nations soon began to swing away from pro-Russian candidates and towards pro-European one’s.
The most dramatic example of this would be in Ukraine. The incumbent, Russophile Leonid Kuchma and his Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych were already in electoral trouble as Kuchma’s term in office had been marred by protests, corruption scandals and lackluster economic growth. The expansion of Russia westwards also seemingly confirmed the arguments of much of the pro-European opposition, led by former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, in that Russia was a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty.
Yushchenko, the front-runner, was assassinated in September 2004 after he ingested a poisonous substance while dining with members of the Ukrainian secret service. His death, in the middle of the 2004 presidential campaign, saw Yulia Tymoshenko become the leader of the opposition bloc and the main figure of the pro-European opposition. Ukrainians, rightly, were horrified by the assassination and would rally behind Tymoshenko’s campaign in unprecedented numbers.
Tymoshenko would win the election, but with widespread voter fraud in pro-Russian areas in the East, saw her only narrowly prevail. As protests broke out across the country both in favour of Tymoshenko and those against Tymoshenko, what was clear was that Russia had lost a key ally in the process.
Despite such setbacks, as the 2004 Russian presidential election kicked off, Lebed had a significant list of achievements behind him. A scattered opposition, a strong domestic record and a return to Russia to the world stage all worked in favour of Lebed. His main rival, the Communist Gennadiy Seleznyov (with former two-time nominee Gennady Zyuganov having sat out the election, at the behest of Lebed) who wanted to lessen tensions with the West, was an easy opponent to beat.
An impressive re-election aside, also on the ballot was multiple referendums on the status of the Russian constitution and of the position of the President and the length of a President’s term. Lebed’s endorsed answers (usually Yes) were overwhelming approved by voters, which saw the abolition of term limits for the Presidency and most importantly constrained the power of the legislative branch, the Russian Soviet, which was transformed into the inferior Russian Duma.
Lebed was here to stay.
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*Cut to Poland nervously wiping its brow*
An accurate but unfortunate truth of TTL's Russia...
Ukraine holding elections in 2007 doesn't look very auspicious, and Lebed seems significantly more hot-headed than Putin, so one has to wonder how he would react to something similar to the Maidan Revolution.
Does lead me to wonder what Putin, as a protege of the late Sobchak, is up to
I'll eventually get onto Ukraine later, but Tymoshenko is not going to have a good time as President. A mixture of corruption scandals, Russian influence and a disorganized executive all lead to an attempted impeachment and her resignation in 2007.
I've put a little something on my test thread to try and show what his fate has been in Exocet.
Someone said a while back that the TL is showing the events of the 2000s in the Nineties and the events of the 2010s happen in the Noughties and that's a brilliant summary of what's happening here.
2004 European Council Summit
EDIT Small retconn with Anna Lindh being replaced with Per Westerberg as Sweden's PM.
As a teaser for the mega-Ireland update coming soon, here's a list of every EU leader attending the June 2004 Irish Council Summit in Dublin.
Held on the 17–18 June in Dublin, attending a European Council summit for the first time would be the leaders of nine other European nations, representing member states who joined during the so-called "eastern expansion" of the EU. The summit would also be Commission President Helmut Kohl's penultimate summit, before his retirement in the summer of 2004. Issues discussed included the environment, the realities of the recent EU expansion and globalisation.
As a teaser for the mega-Ireland update coming soon, here's a list of every EU leader attending the June 2004 Irish Council Summit in Dublin.
Held on the 17–18 June in Dublin, attending a European Council summit for the first time would be the leaders of nine other European nations, representing member states who joined during the so-called "eastern expansion" of the EU. The summit would also be Commission President Helmut Kohl's penultimate summit, before his retirement in the summer of 2004. Issues discussed included the environment, the realities of the recent EU expansion and globalisation.
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