For example, Marche Consulaire itself. OTL in 1807, Napoleon said that he would do anything to prevent war between himself and Russia again. Making him stick by that promise isn't all that hard to do when Napoleon's (most of the time) honorable and honest psychology is taken into account.
At least some modern authors are arguing that Napoleon did not want war with Russia starting from the Second Coalition. He went into rather unusual length to patch relations with Paul: not just released the Russian POWs unconditionally but provided them with new uniforms (as comparing to the Brits who after the failed Holland expeditions kept the allied Russian troops starving and without a proper shelter). According to that point of view the whole thing had been broken by Alexander who was known for his pro-British sympathies. Actually, there was no valid reason for Russia to be a part of the 3rd and 4th coalitions: Napoleon’s actions at that time did not infringe on any Russian interests. So all these wars had been pretty much “subjective” on Russian side.
However, everything did change in 1807 making the lasting peace pretty much impossible without serious reverses of Napoleon’s political course which finally started impacting the Russian interests:
1. The CS, while arguably being beneficial for the development of the Russian manufacturing (mostly in the hands of a merchant class) was hurting the Russian nobility because Britain was a major consumer of the produce of their estates. Taking into an account the fate of his father (to which he contributed), Alexander knew the personal dangers involved. So his reaction was Tariff of 1810 which not just made a mockery of the CS but was a direct slap on Napoleon’s face. While the secret violations of the CS by Holland and the German states could be overlooked, this act could not be ignored without a danger to the whole system.
2. The Duchy of Warsaw was a ticking time bomb taking into an account the Polish lands held by Russia after the partitions. Probably this part of a crisis could be temporarily defused if the Duchy remained relatively demilitarized but on Nappy’s orders Davout kept building up the Duchy’s army up to the numbers which prompted Russian concentration on their side of a border (as I understand by the standards of the time the Duchy’s army was somewhat out of a proportion with the resources of a very poor country). I suspect that even without Duchy’s military buildup Alexander would still consider it a potential danger capable of spreading the “wrong ideas” among the Russian Poles. Anyway, Russian concentration of the forces, prompted Napoleon to increase the French military presence in Prussia, which prompted further Russian concentration, etc. To be fair, even before this escalation Russia launched (starting approximately from 1810) a major military reform to bring its army in line with the “modern” requirements in the terms of size and organization. Which gives some authors a reason to claim that Alexander was looking for an
aggressive war with Napoleon well before 1812. Not sure if this claim is valid but he did issue an ultimatum demanding withdrawal of the French troops beyond the Oder.
There were some relatively minor actions that Napoleon could avoid but which added to escalation of the tensions: annexation of Oldenburg was the most personally offensive to Alexander.
