European-style warships in China

The VOC ships are there to protect trade. Not to make an eternal war of conquest (unless it's in the company's interests).
Not really. The VOC considered helping the kingdom of Kalangan in Java in 1703, even though this kingdom had very little economic importance. Similarly, the Sultanate of Maguindanao eventually became a Dutch ally, even though the benefits from trade with Maguindanao were far outmatched by the costs of this alliance. Increasingly at this point the VOC was a territorial empire.

China would need a navy to project power in the adjacent seas and act as a deterrent against foreign aggression.
Not really for the Qing. The Qing believed internal Han Chinese rebellion was the primary threat to the security of the empire, which led directly to a temporary trade ban in 1717. By this logic, the point of a blue-water fleet would be to control and supervise the Han Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia. This is why the VOC could well be seen as a threat to Qing China, because until the first decades of the 18th century it was dominated by Ming loyalists (besides Europeans). For projecting power in the coast and deterring pirates, the OTL Qing navy was just fine.
 
Also, consider that Burma (a country with a population a seventieth that of Qing China) was able to make many European-style ships - one was used by the British until 1897, for example.
 
Why wasn't the coast and coastal waters considered in need of territorial security?
What would be needed to defend the coasts?

The SE coast was indeed considered in need of territorial security, especially with regards to the wokou pirates of the 16th Century. And, like darthfanta said, there were plenty of court officials, mercantile backing or no (though merchants could work with the pirates/smugglers as well) who urged the Empire to take a serious look at SE coastal problems.

However, ultimately both the Ming and Qing found solutions to SE security that did not require the construction of expensive fleets. The issue of the wokou was solved in several ways: militarily, Qi Jiguang's strategy of using militias drawn from local men and local funds was deemed enough to solve the security issue; socially, reform of the Ming tax code and the lifting of the ban on oceanic trade lessened the burden of peasants who would otherwise be tempted to piracy. Diplomatically, granting trade rights to Portugal also meant that it now had no reason to support piracy and instead had every reason to suppress it for the Ming. All of these cost the central government little, and largely solved the problems that underlay piracy.

Similarly, the Qing sought ways of dealing with piracy that did not require the construction of massive fleets like the one used to conquer Taiwan (especially given the Qing military finance system). The Canton system again gave foreign ships every incentive to help end - rather than contribute to - piracy for the Qing, and this fact was noted by officials who even memorialized against Qing economic retaliation against the Netherlands in response to the Batavia Massacre.

So the point is while issues of security did pop up on China's coasts from time to time, officials had other ways of dealing with them and did not see the construction of a fleet as the only solution. Same thing with the Mongols - the Chinese did not instinctively decide upon the military solution all the time (though generally when they were on the weaker side).
 
On the other hand, making a European-style fleet is not as expensive as one might imagine. The Qing state annually raised around 15 times more money than the Zheng family at their height, for example. For another Asian state that successfully built many European-style ships, we have Burma. I don't have any handy estimates of the Burmese government's annual income, but considering Burma had less than 2% of China's population and had an official : population ratio far smaller than even in Qing China, I would be surprised if Burma could raise 1% of Qing China's income. If the Qing felt the need it would be easy to finance navies.

E: Additionally, consider that the Qing regularly had surpluses. The Kangxi emperor often exempted provinces from taxation rather than keeping the surpluses (even when there was no need to exempt taxes), but this can be changed fairly easily - the Kangxi emperor was a stubborn man, after all.

The Canton system again gave foreign ships every incentive to help end - rather than contribute to - piracy for the Qing, and this fact was noted by officials who even memorialized against Qing economic retaliation against the Netherlands in response to the Batavia Massacre.
The Canton System postdates the Batavia Massacre by more than fifteen years, and the height of Qing piracy was long after the imposition of the Canton system. Rather, the lack of major piracy in the High Qing is more a testament to economic, societal and political stability, similar to how there were few truly popular rebellions until the 1770s.
 
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Since this is two centuries before Europe became an actual threat to China it is akin to saying "The French and British should have conquered the various German states in the 1700s before they can unite and rise up and threaten them!"
 
Since this is two centuries before Europe became an actual threat to China it is akin to saying "The French and British should have conquered the various German states in the 1700s before they can unite and rise up and threaten them!"
Except the Europeans, specifically the Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese, were already barging into Asian trade networks and capturing territory.
 
Except the Europeans, specifically the Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese, were already barging into Asian trade networks and capturing territory.

Conquests were nothing new. China conquered areas and were conquered for a while themselves by the Mongols. The major threats to the Chinese at the time was by land not by sea.
 
Conquests were nothing new. China conquered areas and were conquered for a while themselves by the Mongols. The major threats to the Chinese at the time was by land not by sea.
Yes, however that doesn't mean that the Europeans weren't a threat, or that the Chinese didn't see them as one.
 
They weren't at that time in history. The Europeans couldn't possibly threaten China for generations at that point.
However, the Europeans were already becoming nuisance, as seen in the Sino-Dutch conflicts of the 1620's and the quite aggressive actions of the Portuguese, who actually tried to set up forts on Chinese territory and began to kidnap Chinese children as slaves as early as the 1520's.
 
On the other hand, making a European-style fleet is not as expensive as one might imagine... Additionally, consider that the Qing regularly had surpluses...

The wealth of the Qing/inexpensiveness of fleets doesn't detract from the fact that the court had other ways of solving the issue other than building a new navy. The Qing system of largely cash-based military financing, along with a system of deployment subsidies, battlefield rewards and paid military labor also meant that surpluses had to be retained in order to meet dramatically increased war expenses during campaigns (Qianlong's 2nd Jinchuan Campaign, admittedly an example of bureaucratic mismanagement, cost 61m taels)

The Canton System postdates the Batavia Massacre by more than fifteen years, and the height of Qing piracy was long after the imposition of the Canton system. Rather, the lack of major piracy in the High Qing is more a testament to economic, societal and political stability, similar to how there were few truly popular rebellions until the 1770s.

True that, and it reinforces the point that the Qing, like the Ming, had other solutions to piracy other than navy-building.
 
The Qing, or particularly the Manchus, never understood naval warfare until it's too late, so it's gonna be difficult to convince them of building a navy. Unless they're willing to let their Han subjects manage that. And that is somewhat dangerous.
 
They weren't at that time in history. The Europeans couldn't possibly threaten China for generations at that point.
In the early 18th century, the Kangxi emperor predicted that Europeans would be a serious threat once the Qing weakened (or alternately, "after a hundred years") and this apprehension contributed directly to a southern trade ban in 1717. The Qing were much more attentive to world matters than you give them credit for.

The wealth of the Qing/inexpensiveness of fleets doesn't detract from the fact that the court had other ways of solving the issue other than building a new navy... (Qianlong's 2nd Jinchuan Campaign, admittedly an example of bureaucratic mismanagement, cost 61m taels)
Well, the existing coastal navy/defenses don't actually address the issue of the Ming-inclined overseas Chinese, who the early Qing cared much about, especially the remnants of the Koxingers who ran away to Nguyen Cochinchina. A large navy would be for that issue, not the negligible piracy.
Second Jinchuan was an anomaly as you say. Even the First Dzungar War (Ulan Batong and Jao Modo, which gave Khalkha Mongolia to the Qing) cost only 3 million taels. With the surplus of just one year (1702, more than 5 million taels) the Qing could theoretically fund two First Dzungar Wars.

Unless they're willing to let their Han subjects manage that. And that is somewhat dangerous.
True that. Manchus and Mongols got seasick, and if Myanmar teaches us anything, they were very susceptible to tropical miasma. Han bannermen would be forced to take a more important role.
 
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