European Pagans and their Survival...

Skallagrim

Banned
I'm not convinced that Monotheism is necessarily superior I don't think a monotheistic faith takes precedence over a polytheistic one. However agreeing with many of the sentiments expressed on this thread I do think a faith is a bankable asset for the ruling elite and the central tenet of many monotheistic religions IMHO is one of obedience and acquiescence. Whether this obedience is to an ideology or to a ruling caste the successful faiths tend to be organised and centralised. Religious evolution in both faith and practice is again IMHO not necessarily triggered by the move from polytheism to monotheism. Hinduism has survived and even thrived to the point that it is a major world religion even after pressure from Islam and Buddhism. I do agree again with some comments here that an organised and centralised polytheistic faith could have survived for longer in an alternative time line without the need for some kind of mass butterfly murder. The faith of Zalmoxis may have been the first monotheistic religion in Europe but once Rome had manoeuvred it's military juggernaut the cult declined.

Exactly this. A religion that has organising capacity and state backing has a great advantage. The weakness of various pagan religions compared to their monotheistic comparisons was a distinct lack of clear, all-encompassing doctrine and organisation. For this very reason, Julian the Apostate tried to re-organise his own religion into something that was structurally a lot more like Christianity. He wanted an all-ecompassing, organised priesthood. His own version of definitive religious texts. State sponsoring of his religion.

Those are ultimately the things that can make a huge difference.

(Of course, a question one mat raise at that point is: how much may one 'reform' a pagan religion, and still say that it has survived? At some point, you change it so much that it's completely different from its orginal form. Does that still count as survival?)
 
That said, we are in clear disagreement about that premise. I maintain that your claims there are utterly incorrect, and completely overestimate the Frankish influence. Basically said, you take every historical claim of Frankish authority over the region and treat it as if it's a factual description of the historical reality 'on the ground'.
If I took every Frankish claim seriously, I'd have added the whole of Anglo-Saxon England (which was boasted in the VIth century to be under Merovingian dominance, which is of course false, altough you certainly had a strong Frankish influence on Kent, maybe less so on East-Anglia and Wessex), Jutland, parts of Spain (such as the region between Pyrenees and Ebre, you can still see on some modern maps as part of Carolingia or as tributary when they had trouble enough to secure Catalonia, and unable to curb down Vascons of Pampelune even in the early 810's), Asturias, etc. without even mentioning the Trojan origin of Franks, or Francia as the new Israel.

I must point, tough, that these claims (even outlandish) weren't unconsequential : they introduced and followed a certain Frankish presence outside their actual sphere of influence. For exemple, while Merovingians had little effective dominance in Britain in the VIth century exception made of Kent, Frankish claims and "reputation" so to speak helped deepening this presence. It worked similarily in Germania, except more practically : the general claims over German polities or chiefdoms was there followed by an actual hegemony. To dismiss Frankish claims as "just claims" would be already a mistake to understand early medieval Western Europe, as it would be by ignoring Roman claims as just claims in Eastern Europe.

That being said, if I really wanted to point all Frankish claims of dominance between the Vth and the IXth century, it would go awry really quickly : what I call a Frankish sphere of influence was the effective region of political/economical/cultural interventionism of Frankish kings.
I think the disagreement might arise from your conception of sphere of influence as an admitted and exclusive dominance : it's not really what I consider there, tough. The relations of Franks with Germanic polities and tribes was complex, and two-sided. When Franks considered the battles against Saxons, Thuringians or Bavarians as battle against revolted dukes, they were right to consider it so, because it's how they considered and effectively dominated the region. Conversly, these peoples regularily considered their rules as kings, which at the first sign of decline in Francia, tried to re-establish their autonomy. On this regard, regardless from a Frankish point of view or a German point of view, the difference between Saxons and Thuringians, Bretons and Aquitains, was minimal.

I'll quote again Ian Wood there.
[The] use of word "hegemony", to describe power structures in the Early Middle-Ages, can be no more than the exploitation of a single concept to cover a variety of untidy relationship, each of which can be seen in a number of ways. It is a shorthand which needs to be illustrated in a concrete form: the two most obvious being tribute and marriage.
Again, my point isn't that Saxons were under Frankish control in the same way than Alemania, and a fortiori Gaul, was : but that it was a complex relationship on which readiness to fight back dominance didn't meant it was superficial or even that there wasn't already a certain dependency at work, caused by a direct policy.
I mean, I don't think anybody really denies that Brittany and Kent were under the political influence of Francia in the VIth and VIIth centuries : it seems to me that the main reason we don't think of Saxony this way is because of the brutal Carolingian conquest which wasn't really normative of the relations at work (a bit like we'd consider the relations between France and Britain only under the scope of Hundred Years War, all proportions kept)

They proclaimed themselves lord and master of the Saxon lands, but the reality was otherwise.
I tried to point in the above post why I, and why the leading specialists of the period tended to say that there was a Frankish influence and lax control of Saxony. I tried to give several, sourced, exemples of the realities of the relation : I can see you're convinced it was not the case, but you didn't gave me much to consider apart a sounding "no", and I think the discussion deserves a bit more than this, to be honest : I mean what I tried to point for the 620's can easily be checked, especially as it's one of the best known Franko-Saxons relations.


On the other hand, there are several things that compel me to reconsider that wish. For instance, your—rather offending—claim that you are "the only one bothering to carry facts there". That is not exactly a statement that encourages others to engage in debate, especially when it's not at all true (not to mention condescending). You basically tell everyone here that you are the only one whose statements have value.
It could have been worded better (and believe me, I did rewrote a lot of sentences from this point onwards), but from my point of view I gave sourced, dated and descriptive mentions that you dismissed with generalizations whom I don't really see the relation with the point develloped : for exemple, I'm a bit at loss how Aighina's presence and dismissal of the Austrasian court is related to "Franks having led an expedition in Saxony once".
I'm not pickish : what I'd want is a refutation or an alternative explanation of what I describe.

You follow that up by an ad hominem, and indicate that such criticism are causing you to withdraw from the board ever more.
Which is true : there's a tendency that grows these days, out of the idea that arguments, no matter how elaborated or detailed, are less important than finding a logical gap : and when you search this, you always find one. Not to say logical gaps doesn't exist, but it's becoming an extremely easy way out of an argumented discussion and I must admit I don't really try to distinguish there.

When I said I passed hours on writing a post, you're mistaken to understand it as a disallowance of criticism : I tried to explain it, but I'll do it again and maybe more plainly.
Out of respect of people I'm discussing with, when they make a claims or affirm something that I find doubtful or wrong, I generally check nevertheless. Because I know I can be wrong or ignoring, no matter how I know the subject or think I know it. Again, I don't claim any special treatment for this (but I said this a lot of time already on this thread) but I don't think asking for a similar level of toughtfulness and search in the answer (would it be a critic or not) is uncalled for.
Out of respect of peoples that might be interested on the topic, without having a special knowledge on this (and I'm the first to agree that the question of Merovingian influence on Saxony is pretty much an ultra-niche subject), I try to take also time to explain the best I can a situation, double-checking what I put (in another hand, it's part of my secondary job) tying to provide ground for people to discuss even if it means in disagreement.
Again, it's not about special treatment, but asking to acknowledge a bit this, by answering points rather than putting generalized answers, isn't something monstruous from me.

And, yes, it's one of the reason I wonder "Why do I bother?". Because, honestly, I could have pulled a series of quotes of specialists instead and said something along "renowed historians > your opinion; period". But as said, it's not my idea of a respectful discussion : I check what I'm being told, I check what I tell others. So when it's answered by "you ought to" or "this is silly" without further explanation, yes it's annoying., and yes this is my problem : but I've an hard time accepting it devolving at this point, because it could be a source for a truly enriching discussion.

When I point out that there is rather a difference between a) the Saxons living the Saxon lands (beyond Austrasia) since time immemorial and b) the Saxons who travelled away from there with the Lombardics, then moved roughly back via a long way around to ultimately settle mainly in Austrasia...
Searching about this, you'd see that this migration was sort of a circle around Europe : a group of Saxons left Saxony joining with Lombards, then settled in Italy for a short-while, then raided Francia and were displaced in Austrasia, possibly further. All of this in less than 5 years. We're not talking of two different groups, or a migrations taking ages, but a rather short displacement, akin to what existed in Romania between the IIIrd and the Vth century.

and you begin ranting about "the way I'm going" with the discussion? You act as if I insulted you, when I did nothing of the sort.
You don't tell me what I'm ought to do or not in such discussions, especially with the particularily dismissive answer you did about "oh well, refugees today are such and such, so argument is silly". This was the problem to me.

To be completely honest, given the factors mentioned above, I have an unpleasant notion of the way this discussion is going to go if we continue it.
I apologize is my answer was too brutal. On the other hand, this brutality doesn't remove IMO what I think is an issue.
I gladly do such posts not only out of respect of people reading such threads but out of pleasure to exchange a topic that I'm interested on (and that, false modesty apart, know better than the average Joe, even if it's always the occasion to check up what I know, and to learn more), I do think it could deserve more than an automated-looking answer, or being treated as a silly thing that I just pulled out of my bottom. Rather than acceptance or submission (the fantasy of intellectually crushing people doesn't really interest me, it's moronic and I prefer by far the thrill of confronting my points and, on this board, to turn them on uchronic concepts).

Basically, not "what" is being criticized but "how" it is done.

as far as I can tell, we both agree that a weakening of the Franks would mean that the conquest of other peoples (such as the Saxons) is hardly inevitable anymore, while too much weakening of the Franks may well leave such peoples too disunited (since the Frankish threat inspired them to gain more coherence anyway).
It's hard to weaken Franks without having another competitor taking their place as the Gallic-based hegemon. It's not impossible, of course, and there's at least two possibilities coming in mind (Early death of Chilperic, Merovingian dynasty ending early and Franks pulling an anti-dynastic kingship as Goths did).

i'd even say that if you prevent the crisis of the VIIth century (a no-Islam TL seems the obvious way to do so), keeping the Merovingian network in Germania relatively intact would lead to a continuous structuration of Saxony into something more akin to early medieval Bavaria (maybe at the cost of replacing a purely Saxon duke by a Franko-Saxon, but this is of little incidence), while a more Mediterranean-driven Francia (especially in Spain, IMO) would be more disinterested on Saxony that at the first opportunity (meaning crisis) would pull a Radulf.
Saxony, on this regard, strikes me as part of an "outer" sphere of influence (compared to parts generally considered within the regnum: altough making a distinction is legit, it's still essentially historiographical), as were Brittany or Kent, being understood that I mean by SoI a region where Merovingians intervened directly on a regular basis.
I stress this a lot, but we can really see the evolution of Late Roman geopolitical relationship into something new but still reckognizable to me. Carolingians really were there, like on several other matters, an historical rupture rather than continuation.
 
If I took every Frankish claim seriously, I'd have added the whole of Anglo-Saxon England (which was boasted in the VIth century to be under Merovingian dominance, which is of course false, altough you certainly had a strong Frankish influence on Kent, maybe less so on East-Anglia and Wessex), Jutland, parts of Spain (such as the region between Pyrenees and Ebre, you can still see on some modern maps as part of Carolingia or as tributary when they had trouble enough to secure Catalonia, and unable to curb down Vascons of Pampelune even in the early 810's), Asturias, etc. without even mentioning the Trojan origin of Franks, or Francia as the new Israel.

I must point, tough, that these claims (even outlandish) weren't unconsequential : they introduced and followed a certain Frankish presence outside their actual sphere of influence. For exemple, while Merovingians had little effective dominance in Britain in the VIth century exception made of Kent, Frankish claims and "reputation" so to speak helped deepening this presence. It worked similarily in Germania, except more practically : the general claims over German polities or chiefdoms was there followed by an actual hegemony. To dismiss Frankish claims as "just claims" would be already a mistake to understand early medieval Western Europe, as it would be by ignoring Roman claims as just claims in Eastern Europe.

That being said, if I really wanted to point all Frankish claims of dominance between the Vth and the IXth century, it would go awry really quickly : what I call a Frankish sphere of influence was the effective region of political/economical/cultural interventionism of Frankish kings.
I think the disagreement might arise from your conception of sphere of influence as an admitted and exclusive dominance : it's not really what I consider there, tough. The relations of Franks with Germanic polities and tribes was complex, and two-sided. When Franks considered the battles against Saxons, Thuringians or Bavarians as battle against revolted dukes, they were right to consider it so, because it's how they considered and effectively dominated the region. Conversly, these peoples regularily considered their rules as kings, which at the first sign of decline in Francia, tried to re-establish their autonomy. On this regard, regardless from a Frankish point of view or a German point of view, the difference between Saxons and Thuringians, Bretons and Aquitains, was minimal.

I'll quote again Ian Wood there.
[The] use of word "hegemony", to describe power structures in the Early Middle-Ages, can be no more than the exploitation of a single concept to cover a variety of untidy relationship, each of which can be seen in a number of ways. It is a shorthand which needs to be illustrated in a concrete form: the two most obvious being tribute and marriage.
Again, my point isn't that Saxons were under Frankish control in the same way than Alemania, and a fortiori Gaul, was : but that it was a complex relationship on which readiness to fight back dominance didn't meant it was superficial or even that there wasn't already a certain dependency at work, caused by a direct policy.
I mean, I don't think anybody really denies that Brittany and Kent were under the political influence of Francia in the VIth and VIIth centuries : it seems to me that the main reason we don't think of Saxony this way is because of the brutal Carolingian conquest which wasn't really normative of the relations at work (a bit like we'd consider the relations between France and Britain only under the scope of Hundred Years War, all proportions kept)


I tried to point in the above post why I, and why the leading specialists of the period tended to say that there was a Frankish influence and lax control of Saxony. I tried to give several, sourced, exemples of the realities of the relation : I can see you're convinced it was not the case, but you didn't gave me much to consider apart a sounding "no", and I think the discussion deserves a bit more than this, to be honest : I mean what I tried to point for the 620's can easily be checked, especially as it's one of the best known Franko-Saxons relations.



It could have been worded better (and believe me, I did rewrote a lot of sentences from this point onwards), but from my point of view I gave sourced, dated and descriptive mentions that you dismissed with generalizations whom I don't really see the relation with the point develloped : for exemple, I'm a bit at loss how Aighina's presence and dismissal of the Austrasian court is related to "Franks having led an expedition in Saxony once".
I'm not pickish : what I'd want is a refutation or an alternative explanation of what I describe.


Which is true : there's a tendency that grows these days, out of the idea that arguments, no matter how elaborated or detailed, are less important than finding a logical gap : and when you search this, you always find one. Not to say logical gaps doesn't exist, but it's becoming an extremely easy way out of an argumented discussion and I must admit I don't really try to distinguish there.

When I said I passed hours on writing a post, you're mistaken to understand it as a disallowance of criticism : I tried to explain it, but I'll do it again and maybe more plainly.
Out of respect of people I'm discussing with, when they make a claims or affirm something that I find doubtful or wrong, I generally check nevertheless. Because I know I can be wrong or ignoring, no matter how I know the subject or think I know it. Again, I don't claim any special treatment for this (but I said this a lot of time already on this thread) but I don't think asking for a similar level of toughtfulness and search in the answer (would it be a critic or not) is uncalled for.
Out of respect of peoples that might be interested on the topic, without having a special knowledge on this (and I'm the first to agree that the question of Merovingian influence on Saxony is pretty much an ultra-niche subject), I try to take also time to explain the best I can a situation, double-checking what I put (in another hand, it's part of my secondary job) tying to provide ground for people to discuss even if it means in disagreement.
Again, it's not about special treatment, but asking to acknowledge a bit this, by answering points rather than putting generalized answers, isn't something monstruous from me.

And, yes, it's one of the reason I wonder "Why do I bother?". Because, honestly, I could have pulled a series of quotes of specialists instead and said something along "renowed historians > your opinion; period". But as said, it's not my idea of a respectful discussion : I check what I'm being told, I check what I tell others. So when it's answered by "you ought to" or "this is silly" without further explanation, yes it's annoying., and yes this is my problem : but I've an hard time accepting it devolving at this point, because it could be a source for a truly enriching discussion.


Searching about this, you'd see that this migration was sort of a circle around Europe : a group of Saxons left Saxony joining with Lombards, then settled in Italy for a short-while, then raided Francia and were displaced in Austrasia, possibly further. All of this in less than 5 years. We're not talking of two different groups, or a migrations taking ages, but a rather short displacement, akin to what existed in Romania between the IIIrd and the Vth century.


You don't tell me what I'm ought to do or not in such discussions, especially with the particularily dismissive answer you did about "oh well, refugees today are such and such, so argument is silly". This was the problem to me.


I apologize is my answer was too brutal. On the other hand, this brutality doesn't remove IMO what I think is an issue.
I gladly do such posts not only out of respect of people reading such threads but out of pleasure to exchange a topic that I'm interested on (and that, false modesty apart, know better than the average Joe, even if it's always the occasion to check up what I know, and to learn more), I do think it could deserve more than an automated-looking answer, or being treated as a silly thing that I just pulled out of my bottom. Rather than acceptance or submission (the fantasy of intellectually crushing people doesn't really interest me, it's moronic and I prefer by far the thrill of confronting my points and, on this board, to turn them on uchronic concepts).

Basically, not "what" is being criticized but "how" it is done.


It's hard to weaken Franks without having another competitor taking their place as the Gallic-based hegemon. It's not impossible, of course, and there's at least two possibilities coming in mind (Early death of Chilperic, Merovingian dynasty ending early and Franks pulling an anti-dynastic kingship as Goths did).

i'd even say that if you prevent the crisis of the VIIth century (a no-Islam TL seems the obvious way to do so), keeping the Merovingian network in Germania relatively intact would lead to a continuous structuration of Saxony into something more akin to early medieval Bavaria (maybe at the cost of replacing a purely Saxon duke by a Franko-Saxon, but this is of little incidence), while a more Mediterranean-driven Francia (especially in Spain, IMO) would be more disinterested on Saxony that at the first opportunity (meaning crisis) would pull a Radulf.
Saxony, on this regard, strikes me as part of an "outer" sphere of influence (compared to parts generally considered within the regnum: altough making a distinction is legit, it's still essentially historiographical), as were Brittany or Kent, being understood that I mean by SoI a region where Merovingians intervened directly on a regular basis.
I stress this a lot, but we can really see the evolution of Late Roman geopolitical relationship into something new but still reckognizable to me. Carolingians really were there, like on several other matters, an historical rupture rather than continuation.


I think the general point is that individuals such as myself love history and it is a hobby - I am an art teacher not a History teacher. So detailed responses/contributions from yourself, Skallagrim and others are very appreciated. I would never profess to have the knowledge that many people on this forum seem to have. Indeed I feel I am learning a great deal when I read some posts. So I would like to continue this thread and further understand how paganism could have survived or why we think it ultimately died out?
 
So I would like to continue this thread and further understand how paganism could have survived or why we think it ultimately died out?
We have basically three regions in the world where polytheistic traditions, which show some similarities to "European paganism" (arguably in some cases more than in others) have survived into the present day: India, China, and equatorial Africa.
These three georegions show us three different paths of resistance against proselytising monotheistic world religions:
a) Being at the cultural heart of a strong and very old empire with a very large population (China)
b) Being an inaccessible backwater (equatorial Africa) or
c) Being a far-reaching, age-honored synthesis of the traditions of very diverse and, taken together, very large populations with often-adapted institutions and close ties to the core of the social structures which range high in all these people`s identities (India)

THe problem boils down to the OP´s requirement that the PoD be after 500 CE. At this point in time, routes a) and c) are no longer accessible, for the only civilizational centre who could have achieved them either through a continuous pagan empire, or through a European equivalent of the "Hindu synthesis" had gone staunchly Christian, and paganism was only the faith of the marginal periphery. Option b) is geographically unavailable in Europe, except for its Northernmost polar reaches, where pagan traditions did indeed hold out longest among the Sami, Komi et al.

I believe a European plus Mediterranean religious synthesis akin to the Hindu Synthesis was well within the realm of possibilities, had the Greco-Roman synthesis taken on a number of additional features which would have rendered it less susceptible to the challenges of Christianity et al. But that`s all before 500 CE.
 
I think we're all in agreement that a PoD in 500 is less about butterflying Christianisation of Europe, than what could be susceptible to delay it as much as possible. So, maybe it's better to just get rid of it.

One of the main problems is, eventually, cultural : Greco-Roman civilization did produced a fair deal of spiritually attractible beliefs and cults, something susceptible to enthusiast both the intellectual and the spiritual needs of the time, but in dispersed order and within a civilization that tended to saw massive displays of beliefs not that favourably.
It's telling that an awful lot of dynamic religions in Rome were coming from eastern regions (altough largely romanized) : Christianism, Mithraism, cult of Isis, Cybele, etc. and eventually both blossomed and limited for the same reasons. Christianism didn't have that much particular differences (except, maybe, a stronger social vibe) and that's really Constantine adoption that made it what it was.

While something akin to the development of Hinduism might be an interesting development, I'd rather see it happening within Hellenistic kingdoms than in Rome, whom cultural/spiritual background was maybe less open to something this holistic to appear within its own frames.

Maybe an interesting development would be something akin to Confuceanism and Taoism. Stoicism was almost a "state philosophy" with a fairly strong popular access, trough "street philosophers" (of dubious probity and knowledge, but still present). To be honest, I wonder what prevented it to become a western equivalent to Confucianism. The obvious reason is "Christianism happened" but it doesn't explain why it blossomed since the hellenistic period and still never get the same structuration : I suspect that if we answer this, even after the development of Judeo-Nazoreism, we'd find a way to make it happen.

That being said, if the problems arise from the nature of Stoicism IOTL, then maybe replacing it with a generalized Epicurism might help, driving a more legalist approach (altough this is going to make it look more Legalist than Confucean)

By Taoism I mean the possibility of various influences (oriental religion, neo-Pythagoricism, Stoicism, Epicurism) being gathered in a proper philosophical/spiritual school. It could have the benefit of making a mix with everyone being able to recognize something in it, and I think that having something akin to it that still carries its quietist approach would make it attractible for the same middle-class that embraced Christianism IOTL.
 
I say have it where Rome and the likes of Charlemagne get less power and the ability to push their own traditions upon everyone then we can have Celtic Christianity stick around, as well as spread to the Scandinavians. May be that without the successors of the Eastern and Western Roman Empires each trying to force religious conformity or submission upon other Christians (though admittedly at some points people were rather badly informed on matters of the Bible) we could get some branches of Christianity within pagan ruled areas. Going to be an issue with the recording of pagan traditions though, as there were a lot of changes made to the Norse ones when monks got to writing some of them down. There were various traditions about Celtic and Norse gods moving aside for the comic of JEsus, so it may be that some kingdoms have it where their old deities are seen as angels or Prophets, while throwing in stuff about the Lost Tribes of Israel, and they are fused in part. MEaning you would get Christians, Pagans, and those who mix it or see it as a transition.
 
I think we're all in agreement that a PoD in 500 is less about butterflying Christianisation of Europe, than what could be susceptible to delay it as much as possible.

I don't really think we are. The entire discussion you've had with Skallagrim has been about the influence of an already existing Merovingian juggernaut. If you play a little bit loose with '500', you can nip it in the bud entirely by dealing with Clovis in some way. You can still imagine some kind of Merovingia screw that breaks his empire -- either in his lifetime or immediately after it -- if you want to be a little stricter about the limit. The central importance of Clovis' conversion to the conversion of Northern Europe is something that is obvious from the whole discussion that has just been had. Imagining a thorough, complete, and universal conversion of Northern Europe without a Catholic empire camping the demographic heart of Europe north of the Alps and Pyrenees is actually kind of difficult, I think. Without the ability to use force to accomplish conversion to a specific sect on a universal scale, I would think the conversion of Northern Europe would look a lot like the conversion of the Roman Empire before Constantine: halting, incomplete, and shattered amongst a variety of sects.
 
I don't really think we are. The entire discussion you've had with Skallagrim has been about the influence of an already existing Merovingian juggernaut. If you play a little bit loose with '500', you can nip it in the bud entirely by dealing with Clovis in some way. You can still imagine some kind of Merovingia screw that breaks his empire -- either in his lifetime or immediately after it -- if you want to be a little stricter about the limit. The central importance of Clovis' conversion to the conversion of Northern Europe is something that is obvious from the whole discussion that has just been had. Imagining a thorough, complete, and universal conversion of Northern Europe without a Catholic empire camping the demographic heart of Europe north of the Alps and Pyrenees is actually kind of difficult, I think. Without the ability to use force to accomplish conversion to a specific sect on a universal scale, I would think the conversion of Northern Europe would look a lot like the conversion of the Roman Empire before Constantine: halting, incomplete, and shattered amongst a variety of sects.
Halting and divided, yes, but wouldn't that merely bring a delay? Or do you think northern Europe would take on a powerful global role befor being Christianised of sorts??? While the northern Med and even Russia is christian?
 

Skallagrim

Banned
Russia, @Salvador79? While likely, that's not exactly a given, either. This is a (pretty rough) map of Christianity's extent around 500 AD:

500-ad.jpg


In light of this, one may note that Clovis may well have converted because he extended his realm south, into Christian lands. His baptism gained him legitimacy there. In the north, Christianity has not yet moved beyond the 'Roman world' in any meaningful way. Certainly, it will likely make inroads... but with the right POD, I rather think large parts of Northern Europe can be kept pagan. Mind you, it's not the likeliest scenario or something. The problem is that the lack of a strong Christian polity to force German peoples 'into shape' will mean that Christianity can spead piecemeal. The existence of such a strong polity (like the Frankish kingdom) means that its power will eventually be used to try and force (or enforce) conversion-- likely with success.

Removing Clovis and trying to destroy Frankish power altogether removes the latter of those dangers, but risks introducing the first. This is why I proposed a disastrous defeat for Charles Martel, resulting in his death and a Frankish kingdom thrown into chaos for some time. This gives the Muslims time to gain a position of considerable strength (more than in OTL), so when the Franks get their act together, they'll be forced to turn their attentions south for quite some time (at the expense of doing anything up north). From there, we may derive a scenario wherein the conversion of the Frisians is prevented, and any Frankish attempts to gain control in Frisian lands or Saxon lands become hopeless (they have no strength for it, being forced to look south exclusively). At the same time, other German peoples (Alemannians, Thuringians) shake loose from whatever hold the Franks could hope to have over them.

The fact that the Franks are still more powerful than any other German people, however, forces all the aforementioned peoples to remain on their toes. The gradual development of coherence within their societies continues, in the face of a constant push-and-pull with the Franks. (The key difference is that unlike in OTL, the Franks lack the strength to win that conflict.) The increasing power of such German polities makes them greater threats to the Slavic neighbours, who undergo a similar reaction to their neighbours as those neighbours had to the Franks. This, in turn, affects the fate of the Baltic peoples, who must similarly strengthen themselves or be overrun by the Slavs.

While this happens, Christianity, locked in a far bigger conflict with its Islamic rivals, remains mostly a Southern European affair (excepting the British Isles, which still end up Christianised). By the time Christianity is again in a position to cast its gaze north, well... it will likely have the same history in Hughary as in OTL. Spreading into Bohemia may well prove more difficult than in OTL, though. The Czechs will be one of the Slavic people affected by the aforementioned 'cycle' of strengthening.

Russia may well end up being converted via Byzantium, in the end. Yet I see possibilities for an amalgation of German, Slavic and Baltic pagins (and Finns, to the north), stretching from the Frisians, Saxons, Thuringians and Alemannians, via the Czechs and Poles (and West Slavs in general), to the Baltic peoples, ultimately stretching to include Scandinavia in the north. These peoples do not adhere to the same forms of paganism, but they will all be threatened by Christianity. To align with each other against this surrounding threat would only be sensible...
 
If you play a little bit loose with '500', you can nip it in the bud entirely by dealing with Clovis in some way. You can still imagine some kind of Merovingia screw that breaks his empire -- either in his lifetime or immediately after it -- if you want to be a little stricter about the limit.
The problem isn't that Merovingian power can't be killed in the crib, altough it's not as easy as you make it IMO. The problem is that whoever rules in post-imperial Gaul will rule over an objective regional powerhouse. Even a divided Gaul (see the PoD with Chilperic dying in the mid470's) would be a pretty obvious and unavoidable political/economical/cultural center. Focusing on Clovis or Charlemagne's death seems to me overly political and superficial, when you had large tendencies at work.

without a Catholic empire camping the demographic heart of Europe north of the Alps and Pyrenees is actually kind of difficult, I think.
Thing is, Germania wasn't really a demographic powerhouse : at the contrary, a lot of what happen there in the VIth comes from how dust settle in a demographical and political vaacum that Ostrogoths, then Franks, manage trough a clientelist network. If we take in account the sheer demographical balance (which is arguably fair), the "worthwhile" core of Europe until the VIIth century, that is former western Romania and eastern Romania, is definitely dwarfing and influencing what happens there.

the ability to use force to accomplish conversion to a specific sect on a universal scale, I would think the conversion of Northern Europe would look a lot like the conversion of the Roman Empire before Constantine: halting, incomplete, and shattered amongst a variety of sects.
Thing is, before Constantine, you didn't really had a structural conversion of Romania. It's really the choice of Constantine that made Christianism what it was. The situation greatly changed on this regard : Christianism wasn't let to itself, scattering into various sects and more about social advancement than geopolitical. At the contrary, we have something that quickly integrated itself to the political and institutional structures of Romania (imperial and post-imperial), with a political appartus that controlled its development.

For instance, I don't see a real ground for a multitude of sects to really appear in Gaul in the Vth century : Niceanism clearly dominated, and if Homeism was present among a significant part of Barbarians it was essentially a political choice (Burgundians, for exemple, first converted to Nicean Christianity, then to Homeism) which was largely unconsequential socially. Even with the rise of an Homeist Barbarian rule in Gaul (let's say Goths continue their expension as Franks diminish up as proposed above), the sheer (concious and willed) vagueness of Homeism and its compatibility with a social Niceanism (see the religious policy of Alaric II on this regard, it was aborted by the Frankkish conquest but...) from one hand, and its institutional role would prevent a double set of conversion outside Francia.

You'd argue about Paulicianism in Spain, and the possibility of seeing something similar or inspired arising in Gaul, but Priscillianism depended of a network to transmit its doctrines, and this network was the state apparatus of Late Antiquity. I don't say it couldn't have an influence on whichever orthodoxy rules in Gaul (Homeism and Niceanism being really similar in the Vth and VIth century, safe identity-wise), but I'm really doubtful about it forming a third branch, would it be minor.

I tried to point how Carolingian politics was particularily brutal compared to what Merovingians underwent, for a series of historical reasons. Not that baptism wasn't an important feature of Merovingian influence over Germania, but it wasn't a key feature (at least, for the greater period) which (as Ian Wood argued) was more focused on marriages and tributes.
You don't really need to curb down Merovingians there : just avoid the crisis of the VIIth century and you'd end up with a more gradual Christianisation, with delayments (or accelerations) that wouldn't be as quick as Carolingians did (but for the same reasons, maybe more rooted on the long term among Slavs or Scandinavians).

Rather than looking like IIIrd century Romania, I'd rather say we'd be looking at a situation closer to IVth century Romania.
 

In light of this, one may note that Clovis may well have converted because he extended his realm south, into Christian lands. [/QUOTE]
I disagree : most of what Franks held in the late Vth century was already Christianized, and was considered a legitim rule by the Gallo-Roman aristocracy, especially present in ecclesiastical and episcopal administration (which tended to rule conjointly, or even almost alone, the urban network).
I'd even go further, the legalist and legitimist acceptence of bishops of the Frankish rule (see the letters from St Remi to Clovis) was something that benefitted neither Alaric (seen as an heretic) or Gallo-Romans aristocrats as Syagrius (possibly seen as an usurper/warlord, and too conciliant with Goths).

If it was only about legitimacy, not only Clovis could have been spared conversion (and he did delayed it as much as he could), but other Barbarians would have tried to pull the same trick (as said above, it doesn't makes much sense in this perspective to understand why Burgundians switched from their original Niceanism to Homeism, then back to Niceanism).
It was clearly a political move directed against Homeists and the perspective of a Gothic hegemony (altough this is more a later explanation) : see, some Franks already converted to Christianism, and the sister of Clovis was an Homean practicionner.

Geopolitically, Homean powers as Wisigoths and especially Ostrogoths seemed to dominate western Romania (Theoderic's geopolitical network extended from Saxony to Illyria), and Clovis represented a clear alternative for everyone involved. That his baptism took place either before, during or shortly after the conquest of Aquitaine (altough i'd rather consider the first possibility as more likely historically) really highlights this. It doesn't mean, of course, it didn't gave him a certain legitimacy, but it was less about the conquest of Aquitaine, than about a leadership in western Romania that he contested to Theoderic (partially unsucessfully).

This is why I proposed a disastrous defeat for Charles Martel, resulting in his death and a Frankish kingdom thrown into chaos for some time.
This wouldn't really work : the civil war that happened in 714-718 wasn't as much a Frankish civil war, than it was a succession crisis between two branches of Arnulfids-Peppinids after the death of Peppin II. By the early 720's, virtually all known families in Neustria-Burgundy and Austrasia were either allies, clients or obligés of Arnulfids-Peppinids.
You could see yet another succession crisis, arguably, but as it happened in 714, it wouldn't put in question the unicity of Francia under an Arnulfid-Peppinid direction : that's far too late for this.

This gives the Muslims time to gain a position of considerable strength (more than in OTL)
Here we have three issues.
The first is that Arabo-Berbers always had a shortage of men, and had trouble maintaining a military presence outside Narbonne (they called it Arbûna). They did invested Carcasonne/Karkashûna in 725 and Avignon (Djibril al-something) in 735 but it wasn't a particularily strong presence : they relied heavily on the local Gothic nobility, similarily on what happened in an awully big part of Spain.
They simply didn't have enough men to occupy significantly more (their traditional pool was the Maghrib, as for all the history of al-Andalus).
It's telling that Arabs actually considered to evacuate Spain in the late 720's. They wouldn't have, of course, but they did considered it.

The reliance over Berbers was aggravated by a poor consideration of a population that represented 90% of the Islamic army by a really reduced Arab nobility (at best 5,000 men, women and children and that's after the reinforcements of the mid VIIIth century). Eventually, it went the way of a full-fledged revolt (the Great Berber Revolt of 739-740) in both Maghrib and Ifriqiya, but as well in al-Andalus which resulted with a large scale abandonement of northern marches, and a stop on raids in Gaul until the 760's.

Eventually, it's really debatable you had an actual will of conquest. The raids of 725-726 in Gaul went further North, and did entered in Francia proper (see map) without any reaction of Charles Martel, then campaigning in Bavaria (again, for Carolingians, asserting their dominance on transrhenan peoples was always the priority). Arabo-Berbers litterally wintered in Gaul, and returned unharmed. Still, there wasn't any real reinforcement of their position in Gaul.

I strongly advise there Les Carolingiens et Al-Andalus by Philippe Sénac (a former teacher of mine, may I add). I won't go too much about the historical importance of Tours, but if you're interested, may I suggest this thread where I did detailed a bit more?
 
@Skallagrim that declares the highly proselytising Irish as meaningless? Your equilibrium theory is exciting but labile. How would you envision modernization, state building etc. without church functions in education, centralization etc.?
 

Skallagrim

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@Skallagrim that declares the highly proselytising Irish as meaningless? Your equilibrium theory is exciting but labile. How would you envision modernization, state building etc. without church functions in education, centralization etc.?

My understanding is that missionaries from both Ireland and Anglo-Saxon England relied rather heavily on the backing of established continental powers, such as the Frankish kings. Without that backing, their ability to project their influence on the continent would be reduced to a considerable extent. That said, I recognise that what I proposed is not automatically going to work-- and the obstacles to the scenario pointed out by @LSCatilina seem quite sound to me. (That is not to say that a POD resulting in a threatening-but-not-all-powerful Frankish realm, somewhere between Clovis I and Charles Martel, cannot be found. I'm sure such a thing can be orchestrated. If Clovis I is too early and Charles Martel is too late, we can always look for a fitting moment somewhere between their times.)

I do not see how state building is impossible without the Christian church, to be honest. Certainly, Christianity played a key role in creating an all-encompassing identity for the West later on -- i.e. "Christendom" -- but as far as I see it, the development of national identities, cultural and social coherence, increased political structurisation and the move towards more centralised power are all primarily the result of a threat-and-response interplay. The church was part of the structural framework in OTL, but it is not a part that cannot be replaced by something else, I think.
 
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My understanding is that missionaries from both Ireland and Anglo-Saxon England relied rather heavily on the backing of established continental powers, such as the Frankish kings.
More or less this, altough I'd give a stress onto the possibilities it opened for Franko-Roman society as a whole. It's not to say that these missions, especially in the VI and VIIth centuries didn't have a real influence or even autonomy, but it really finds a meaning into the political structure of Francia not only as background, but as motivation.

It's hard to overestimate the religious and political influence of Gallic bishops, but as well (contrary to what existed in imperial Romania) the rejection of strong archbishops at the benefit of royal management of their churches (England and Germany had some osrt of middle ground, being missionary lands with a need of someone being in charge).
It does helps that Gallic bishops were almost systematically members of the local aristocracy (in fact, when they weren't, it was deemed noteworthy to point it), and as such were both representative of the ecclesiastical but as well urban authority (by the VIth, the figure of the urban count becomes largely secondary to the bishop's), but of firmly rooted families that patronized as well religious experiments (such as monasteries).

Colomban monasteries were interesting, less because of their regulation (which tended to be gallicized and benedictized rather quickly), but because they represented a more (politically) independent-minded stance from bishops and local politics, something which was a real attraction for the Christnian aristocracy and not only Franko-Romans from the North, but as well the still firmly Roman aristocracy of Aquitaine and Provence that realized the Colomban rules had more in common with their own practices (such as Lérins) and Mediterranean influence than what followed St Martin's exemple.
Of course, Frankish kings as managers of their own church, saw in independent -minded monasteries a good network they maybe couldn't control entierly (they couldn't so with the episcopalian network either, mind you) but that could be remarkably efficient in regions where the bishops were less present, because it was less Christianized, less Romanized, or usually both such as in Frisia.

On this regard, it really looks like an antecessor of Clunisian revolution, both as a spiritual and social alternative; and a political opportunity which really blossomed structurally because of this, while having to mud a bit tis water in the process : the exemple of Charles Martel does points that never, at any point, Frankish rulers intended to make these independent structures.

I'm sure such a thing can be orchestrated.
Certainly : I already mentioned above how an early death of Chilperic could cripple Franks efficiently. Now, they were firmly rooted in Late Antiquity Gaul, so you can't just make it disappear; but a forced association with Alemani making a come-back is a possibility.

An untimely death of Clovis, before he goes for Aquitaine maybe as he's undergoing the gradual takeover of northern Gaul (giving that Syagrius' "kingdom" was at the very best a tiny territory between Noyon and Soissons; the Frankish takeover of the whole region up to Armorica and Loire wasn't immediate). I'm not sure how deep the effects would be (and it would certainly not, IMO, cripple Frankish presence and potential in the middle-term), but it could give room for Alaric II's reform to advance, to an Homeisation of Franks, etc.

Then there's the dynastical matter : Merovingian dynasty was remarkably stable and profilic for the standards of the time, and really was considered as a particularily blessed dynasty. Peppinids really had an hard time getting over it and it asked for Merovingian dynasty going almost extinct to convince everyone that maybe it was more of a mercy-killing than an usurpation (which, of course, was what it was).
There's nothing really preventing an earlier dynastical quasi-extinction or extinction to happen as such, and Franks being deprived of a central dynasty the same way Visigoths were in the VIth century : in Spain it provoked the rise of an anti-dynastic kingship where no family (as a rule of thumb, which was largely respected) could monopolize royal benefices and power more than three generations. I doubt it would have the same effects in Francia, but it would certainly have deep structural effects (maybe something along what happened in Lombardia? I'm expecting at least some sort of confederal looking ensemble, not dissimilar to what happened de facto in the late VIIth century).

I'm in fact quite concinved that the dynastic PoD is both the more likely, and the more interesting in long-term changes (politically and culturally), altough the aformentioned PoDs could be as well (maybe less so structurally and in likelyness). There's other possibilities, but they're overly political generally, and not that efficient in terms, IMO.

I do not see how state building is impossible without the Christian church, to be honest.
It's not litterally impossible, but in the conditions of the era, there's not much alternative : the state apparatus, as far as people could see, was Roman or Roman in inspiration, and therefore Christian or Christian in inspiration. It's quite interesting with the sophistication of the Kingdom of Kent, which was flourishing onto monopolization of trade and other control whom inspiration can be either Frankish, either from what remain of Britto-Roman structures, probably both and certainly coming from a post-Imperial Roman outlook on both.

It's no big surprize that Francia went all the way to be described and describe itself as a New Israel (tm), something that would characterize France deep into the Middle-Ages (in the lines of "when God is pissed, he send Franks to deal with the mess"). The idea of an universal Christiendom did existed (and only grew out from the Carolingian world), but it didn't collided with the idea of a specific identity but was pervasive enough to be associated with, and so tied to the concept itself of a state apparatus that it's hard to root it out entierly.

You'd argue that Danes underwent a significant unification trend until the VIIth, forming 3 to 5 kingdoms out of the network of chiefdoms, without being Christianized or significantly Romanized thanks you very much. And, indeed, they were.
They kind of tended to be the exception, tough, and it passed trough a strong connection (commercially notably, and we do know its importance into structurating societies) with western Europe.

It was furthermore, a relatively unstable unification, not unlike what existed with Northumbrian or Mercian hegemonies : I'd point tough, that it's indeed trough such rise/collapse that cyclical chiefdoms got more structurated with time and there's nothing to say that Danes couldn't with time and enough room, form a Lithuania of sort. My point is more that such cyclical process takes time and was really hastened in Britain by the remaining post-imperial structures from one hand, and the Frankish/Latin church influence (altough less importantly so, and essentially in the South) from another.

So, it's not that it was impossible. It was very possible, actually. It' just that post-imperial Romania really got an advantage and represented an obvious model when it came in contact with the series of early states in Scandinavia and Slavonia.
 
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