European Borders Post-Operation Unthinkable

Let's say that in mid-to-late 1945, relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies so severely that a full-scale war breaks out. A year or two of fighting in Europe and a couple of atomic bombs dropped on major Russian cities later, the USSR surrenders to the United States and Britain.

So, what does the postwar map of Europe look like in this world, given that the Western Allies will be free to draw it almost however they see fit? Could we expect significantly different Borders for Poland? Germany? Romania? Finland? Any other central or Eastern European states? With respect to the Soviet Union (though in all likelihood the postwar Russian government won't be communist), will the Americans and British insist upon independence for only the Baltic and perhaps the Caucasus, or would they go as far as trying to secure independence for Belarus, Ukraine, the Central Asian states, and perhaps even other parts of Russia that aren't even independent in OTL 2017?

Finally, whatever the map ends up being, what would be the long-term implications of it?
 
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I couldn't see Moscow or St. Petersburg being bombed, at least not this early. Maybe Novgorod or Smolensk, famous, historic cities with smaller populations and less importance, this with the understanding that the next few bombs will fall on Moscow and St. Petersburg.

If the Soviet Union is defeated before 1953 Ukraine will be independent. Even by 1953 the UPA was still fighting activly against the Soviet Union. If the war takes place in the late 40s you would see UPA forces being much bolder in trying to secure independence, this 1st UNA (former 14th Waffen SS division) would also be incorporated into the allied armes. IOTL they were the only German military unit who were albeit briefly re-armed/allowed to keep some of their arms if I'm remembering correctly. This, plus the acknowledgement of the Holodomer in the context of the post-holocaust world of the late 40s would heavily encourage the allies to seek Ukrainian independence, aswell as independence for all the other SSRs.
 
If the Soviet Union is defeated before 1953 Ukraine will be independent. Even by 1953 the UPA was still fighting activly against the Soviet Union. If the war takes place in the late 40s you would see UPA forces being much bolder in trying to secure independence, this 1st UNA (former 14th Waffen SS division) would also be incorporated into the allied armes. IOTL they were the only German military unit who were albeit briefly re-armed/allowed to keep some of their arms if I'm remembering correctly. This, plus the acknowledgement of the Holodomer in the context of the post-holocaust world of the late 40s would heavily encourage the allies to seek Ukrainian independence, aswell as independence for all the other SSRs.

Including those in Central Asia? Additionally, if the Soviet Union had decisively lost the Cold War, might the Allies insist upon independence for groups like the Chechens, Kalmyks, Volga Germans, etc?
 
Including those in Central Asia? Additionally, if the Soviet Union had decisively lost the Cold War, might the Allies insist upon independence for groups like the Chechens, Kalmyks, Volga Germans, etc?

I would assume so, the weaker Russia is, the better. Especially once the scale of ethnic cleansing that took place under Stalin becomes public knowledge (or when people start caring about it).
 
You'd expect the Polish borders to move back east to their pre-1939 positions, or thereabouts. Would this then mean an enlarged Germany akin to Weimar Germany? Or would this prompt the Wallies to break Germany up into a number of smaller states, as was one of their draft plans towards the end of the war?

Most likely, they'd look to break up the USSR and have the eastern European SSRs independent.
 
You'd expect the Polish borders to move back east to their pre-1939 positions, or thereabouts. Would this then mean an enlarged Germany akin to Weimar Germany? Or would this prompt the Wallies to break Germany up into a number of smaller states, as was one of their draft plans towards the end of the war?

The two aren't mutually exclusive. For instance, here was FDR's proposed postwar map of Germany:

IMG_2141.jpg


My understanding is that the Western Allies wanted to divide Germany into several states after the war, but weren't as enthusiastic about moving Poland's borders so far west. However, with the Soviets occupying East Germany and Poland, there was little they could do to stop them. However, if the Soviets are pushed out of Central and Eastern Europe immediately after WWII, we could end up seeing something like what is depicted above. However, no matter what happens, I feel like Poland will probably end up annexing East Prussia - ALL of East Prussia, with obviously no Kaliningrad Oblast.

Though this raises the questions of Poland's postwar borders in the east. What more could they possibly gain, beyond restoring their pre-1939 borders there?
 
I'm generally less convinced of some of the wholesale changes being proposed.

"A Year or Two of fighting in Europe" - obvious question, where ? Do we assume the Soviet forces attacked west across the Elbe in which case we'd be dealing with rubble building on rubble in the case of much of Germany and eastern France ? A big shift of refugees west into France parts of which were heavily damaged in the fighting with Germany (and parts of which weren't so much). If we follow the scenario, it seems possible the Soviet advance was halted somewhere (the Rhine ?) and turned back east perhaps re-crossing the 1945 demarcation line and allowing western allied forces to reach Prague, Budapest, Vienna and perhaps further before the two atomic bombs dropped on Smolensk (?) and Tula (?) ended hostilities with an internal upheaval in Moscow.

Attitudes toward Germany and the Germans would soften and those toward Russia and the Russians would harden in the west. The dominant European power after this war would be the United States and its leading allies on the ground would be Britain (bankrupt) and France. There would be no NATO as we know it and no American military presence in central Europe. Would there still be a Marshall Plan or would the fall of the USSR obviate the need for such reconstruction ? Indeed, it might serve American purposes to keep Europe under the economic thumb as it were.

In terms of borders and countries, the disasters of the 20th Century would be blamed on a strong Germany and a strong Russia. There would be a move to keep these states territorially weak and strengthen the powers around them so a greater Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria and perhaps Yugoslavia breaking into constituent parts so an independent Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia to begin with.

Would a Belorussian state come into being ? A Ukrainian state is likely, the Baltic States returning to independence a certainty. I suppose it depends on what kind of Russia emerges from the wreckage of Communism - would it be an anarchy, a weak democracy or a non-Communist authoritarian state (historically more likely) ?

Over time, I think, a new spirit of pan-Europeanism would emerge as promulagated by the likes of Monnet and Schumann and the nations of Europe would create their own union over a 50-60 year period but economically it would lag behind America whose attention would be increasingly drawn to managing affairs in the Pacific.
 
You'd expect the Polish borders to move back east to their pre-1939 positions, or thereabouts.
Depends how much USSR is beaten. If Soviet Union is reduced to size of modern Russia+Central Asia then Poles would take back northern part of Kresy (Vilnius, Grodno) and Lviv, which was still majority Polish untill end of ww2. Other parts of Southern Kresy are less certain, especially Volhynia, where half of Poles were slaughtered by Ukrainian nationalists and other half escaped. There will be Polish-Ukrainian armed conflict because finding peaceful solution in this case is real "Operation Unthinkable".
But most likely WAllies would not repeat Barbarossa, Churchil just wanted to drive Soviets out of Central/Eastern European countries they occupied.
 
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Return of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth?
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I actually would believe that Lithuania could get Vilnius in this scenario. Much of the Poles living there had been expatriated in 1945 and 1946, so there isn't as much of an ethnic foundation for Polish claims on Vilnius. And since it would still be the Western Allies calling the shots, they might just decide to give this relatively backwater part of Poland back to Lithuania to prevent future conflicts.

After all, Poland can definitely live without Vilnius, it was a periphery in the Second Polish Republic, while a Lithuania without Vilnius is like a France without Paris or an Italy without Rome.
 

James G

Gone Fishin'
I couldn't see Moscow or St. Petersburg being bombed, at least not this early. Maybe Novgorod or Smolensk, famous, historic cities with smaller populations and less importance, this with the understanding that the next few bombs will fall on Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Moscow wouldn't be A-bombed for there would be no one left to do a deal with, one that could be enforced too.
However, I would think Leningrad eats an A-bomb. Major communications and manufacturing hub. Their second city. The SU's window to the West. Named after their founder. Sorry, but I think that is a prime early target especially as the Soviets can't hit back.
 
DELET
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I actually would believe that Lithuania could get Vilnius in this scenario. Much of the Poles living there had been expatriated in 1945 and 1946, so there isn't as much of an ethnic foundation for Polish claims on Vilnius. And since it would still be the Western Allies calling the shots, they might just decide to give this relatively backwater part of Poland back to Lithuania to prevent future conflicts.

After all, Poland can definitely live without Vilnius, it was a periphery in the Second Polish Republic, while a Lithuania without Vilnius is like a France without Paris or an Italy without Rome.
Vilnius was one of 5 most important cities for pre-ww2 Poland. Poland would not gave up Vilnius and WAllies have no interest to force Poles, who were first to face Hitler's and Stalin's invasion to do it.
 
Vilnius was one of 5 most important cities for pre-ww2 Poland. Poland would not gave up Vilnius and WAllies have no interest to force Poles, who were first to face Hitler's and Stalin's invasion to do it.
Vilnius was a large city in of itself, yes, but it was surrounded by sparsely inhabited, poor, agricultural and resource lacking territory, which was also separated from the rest of Poland in a large enclave - one which was hardly defensible.

Sure, it was an important cultural and education center, hosted a considerable population and it's acquisition was a source of national pride, but I believe I'm right by saying that Poland would still be able to exist and thrive without it. Lithuania - not so much.

And if the Western Allies recognized that, it would be in their interest to let Lithuania have Vilnius just to prevent further conflicts between these two nations.
 
Vilnius was a large city in of itself, yes, but it was surrounded by sparsely inhabited, poor, agricultural and resource lacking territory, which was also separated from the rest of Poland in a large enclave - one which was hardly defensible.

Sure, it was an important cultural and education center, hosted a considerable population and it's acquisition was a source of national pride, but I believe I'm right by saying that Poland would still be able to exist and thrive without it. Lithuania - not so much.

And if the Western Allies recognized that, it would be in their interest to let Lithuania have Vilnius just to prevent further conflicts between these two nations.
Most of pre-ww2 Poland was underdeveloped rural country so Vilnius region was not different than Lublin or Białystok. Conflict would still exist no matter who takes Vilnius because either Poles or Lithuanians would want it. Polish government in exile definitely wanted it. And Poland had several advantages over Lithuania-large army in the West and circa 10 times bigger population, plus millions of Polish-Americans who would vote in US elections. Poland is just still more important for WAllies as shield against Russia so WAllies would preffer Poland over Lithuania.
Politics works that way, it is not about justice or unjustice but simple calculation.
 
Some of th prior comments about competing territorial claims in Eastern Europe raise an interesting question. Assuming the USSR is decisively defeated, exactly how much incentive would the US and/or UK have to prevent conflicts between the Poles and Lithuanians, or Poles and Ukrainians, in the (post-)postwar world?
 
Some of th prior comments about competing territorial claims in Eastern Europe raise an interesting question. Assuming the USSR is decisively defeated, exactly how much incentive would the US and/or UK have to prevent conflicts between the Poles and Lithuanians, or Poles and Ukrainians, in the (post-)postwar world?
As I've mentioned Poles, who have hunderts thousands soldiers in the West who were planned to be incorporated in "Operation Unthinkable" and internationally recognized Government In Exile have big advantage in these conflicts, although I doubt Riga borders would be fully restored in southern part.
 
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