Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL

I don't think the Allies will have the ability to begin a major attack in July. A tactical attack in a limited front as a show of support - e.g. seize a few hills and better secure a pass, then yes. Their immediate target will be the Dodecanese Islands- the RN will demand it as they threaten the supply lines. Their first priority in OTL planning was to be defensive in the mainland and attack the islands. If I may make a suggestion, I find it more plausible as a show of support to engage in a limited attack in the mainland while they seize the Dodecanese in summer 1941.

Maybe with an early Mincemeat style deception to convince the Axis that the main thrust is to be on the Mainland.
 
How did AFVs cope - were they transported train etc., or on their tracks - if the latter how many broke down en-route.
They would have to go by train, so I haven't assumed that very many got away - many might have tried to get to the south but been needed to fight delaying actions. Enough would get to North Africa in working order to defeat Italian 5th Army, but they'd have little useful life left after that. Going forward they will depend on US production.
As the evacuation gathered pace, I imagine French fighters based in the south would have done well - the Luftwaffe likely to have had problems with the range of the Me-109 until new airfields were set-up.
Certainly, and this would be one of the major factors making the evacuation possible.
Lastly, the British in TTL have no reason to keep the greek order of 30 P-40s for themselves. So, the Greek Air Force will have 30 more modern fighters compared to OTL - when they were basically out of machines.
Also I think there would be around 30 de-navalised Grumman F4Fs the Greeks ordered which the RAF took over. As time goes on the Greek Air Force will use a lot of P-40s - I take it Greece will be added to the list of Allies entitled to Lend-Lease aid. As you say the French don't have a huge aircrew pool available for Greece, though they will make their presence felt. The main Allied air effort in Greece will have to be RAF and RAAF.
I don't think the Allies will have the ability to begin a major attack in July. A tactical attack in a limited front as a show of support - e.g. seize a few hills and better secure a pass, then yes. Their immediate target will be the Dodecanese Islands- the RN will demand it as they threaten the supply lines. Their first priority in OTL planning was to be defensive in the mainland and attack the islands. If I may make a suggestion, I find it more plausible as a show of support to engage in a limited attack in the mainland while they seize the Dodecanese in summer 1941.
The Allies won't have the ability to make a major attack, but Stalin will scream for one, and the Allies might have to attack before they are ready, for political reasons. That said, the Allies can sell the idea of the islands offensive as a way of approaching the Straits. Turkey will stay out - but the hope of bringing them in might be a chimera that engages a lot of attention for a time.

I've been doing a bit of rewriting, though not actually as much as I thought. Although it has great intrinsic interest, a prolonged campaign in mainland Greece won't have major immediate strategic effects. Everyone concerned will remember the Salonika sideshow of WW1. Time for an update.
 
Part 4.1
Part 4. Quem deus vult perdere

Memorandum from Prime Minister to Admiralty, 31st March 1941

2. Despite previous instructions the Navy is still using code-names that the French cannot possibly use. Latest proposed operation was called LATCHSPRING. What Frenchman wants to pronounce that? Pray rename any proposed operations in accordance with the Council's decision, all codenames must be words that have the same meaning and spelling (if not pronunciation) in both languages. The French are doing the same, there will be no more Garcons and Coquelicots.
3. The recent events in the Mediterranean and Atlantic are most gratifying and bring naval proportions to a highly favourable scale of values. I am concerned therefore by the comments of several officers that no major offensive can be contemplated this year…
4. The air factor has shown itself to be of the first importance in all operations of this war so far. Naturally we are building up a vast air power in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless we should not go to excessive lengths. We cannot allow naval operations to be checkmated by the mere presence of enemy Air, especially when we have naval air power on the other side.
5. Of still greater concern are the comments regarding the provision of landing-craft. Upon what basis was it decided to have such anaemic production of these vessels this year? The explanation given is the need to strengthen our escorting flotillas. This was needful, but we have every reason to hope the worst of the U-boat menace will be over this year as our strength builds. Pray have this looked into and revision made. The Council believe we must take offensive action in the Mediterranean during 1941, over and above the efforts we are making to aid Greece.
6. The latest Japanese provocations distress us in themselves and complicate our thinking. However they also influence the American attitude which continues to improve. The Lend-Lease Bill, once passed, will greatly ease our supply concerns. We have discussed the allocation of the new American aircraft for this year, which must mostly go to the French.
7. The Council have agreed to make an exception where naval and coastal aircraft are concerned. Therefore, the French will have first call on land-based types, but we will have first choice of naval and coastal types. The French have spoken well of the Grumman naval fighters and we have added to our own order for these. You asked regarding the de-navalised Brewster fighters; the French will take these. We shall have priority for the big American flying-boats, though the French must also have some for their areas of anti-U-boat patrols. They have done well with their airships, but they are too prone to accidents, the recent crashes show the need for modern aircraft.
8. Pray let me have a revised view of what naval force can be sent to Singapore and when. The French have proposed a substantial reinforcement to be based at Cam Ranh. Our present intentions I consider inadequate. The enemy have suffered serious reverses, and we can spare capital ships for the East, even with the Hood to undergo her major refit. We know the rate of the enemy's building. At no point will we have less than a two for one advantage in both the Mediterranean and Atlantic. This is surely sufficient margin especially given the supplementary power of naval Air. Our Eastern force, as and when we send one, must have at least one modern aircraft-carrier of its own, I strongly prefer two.
9. The French Admirals have expressed dismay over the rate at which we are supplying their ships with RDF equipment. The Provence and Bretagne will not be equipped until October on the present schedule. The Council cannot accept this. British cruisers and destroyers cannot have superior detection equipment to French capital ships. As always, bras dessus, bras dessous.
 

Driftless

Donor
Part 4. Quem deus vult perdere

Memorandum from Prime Minister to Admiralty, 31st March 1941

2. Despite previous instructions the Navy is still using code-names that the French cannot possibly use. Latest proposed operation was called LATCHSPRING. What Frenchman wants to pronounce that? Pray rename any proposed operations in accordance with the Council's decision, all codenames must be words that have the same meaning and spelling (if not pronunciation) in both languages. The French are doing the same, there will be no more Garcons and Coquelicots.
3. The recent events in the Mediterranean and Atlantic are most gratifying and bring naval proportions to a highly favourable scale of values. I am concerned therefore by the comments of several officers that no major offensive can be contemplated this year…
4. The air factor has shown itself to be of the first importance in all operations of this war so far. Naturally we are building up a vast air power in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless we should not go to excessive lengths. We cannot allow naval operations to be checkmated by the mere presence of enemy Air, especially when we have naval air power on the other side.
5. Of still greater concern are the comments regarding the provision of landing-craft. Upon what basis was it decided to have such anaemic production of these vessels this year? The explanation given is the need to strengthen our escorting flotillas. This was needful, but we have every reason to hope the worst of the U-boat menace will be over this year as our strength builds. Pray have this looked into and revision made. The Council believe we must take offensive action in the Mediterranean during 1941, over and above the efforts we are making to aid Greece.
6. The latest Japanese provocations distress us in themselves and complicate our thinking. However they also influence the American attitude which continues to improve. The Lend-Lease Bill, once passed, will greatly ease our supply concerns. We have discussed the allocation of the new American aircraft for this year, which must mostly go to the French.
7. The Council have agreed to make an exception where naval and coastal aircraft are concerned. Therefore, the French will have first call on land-based types, but we will have first choice of naval and coastal types. The French have spoken well of the Grumman naval fighters and we have added to our own order for these. You asked regarding the de-navalised Brewster fighters; the French will take these. We shall have priority for the big American flying-boats, though the French must also have some for their areas of anti-U-boat patrols. They have done well with their airships, but they are too prone to accidents, the recent crashes show the need for modern aircraft.
8. Pray let me have a revised view of what naval force can be sent to Singapore and when. The French have proposed a substantial reinforcement to be based at Cam Ranh. Our present intentions I consider inadequate. The enemy have suffered serious reverses, and we can spare capital ships for the East, even with the Hood to undergo her major refit. We know the rate of the enemy's building. At no point will we have less than a two for one advantage in both the Mediterranean and Atlantic. This is surely sufficient margin especially given the supplementary power of naval Air. Our Eastern force, as and when we send one, must have at least one modern aircraft-carrier of its own, I strongly prefer two.
9. The French Admirals have expressed dismay over the rate at which we are supplying their ships with RDF equipment. The Provence and Bretagne will not be equipped until October on the present schedule. The Council cannot accept this. British cruisers and destroyers cannot have superior detection equipment to French capital ships. As always, bras dessus, bras dessous.
How much of that passage is historic? It reads true to Churchill's common phrasing in his memos and minutes from the war.
 
The Allies won't have the ability to make a major attack, but Stalin will scream for one, and the Allies might have to attack before they are ready, for political reasons. That said, the Allies can sell the idea of the islands offensive as a way of approaching the Straits. Turkey will stay out - but the hope of bringing them in might be a chimera that engages a lot of attention for a time.

I've been doing a bit of rewriting, though not actually as much as I thought. Although it has great intrinsic interest, a prolonged campaign in mainland Greece won't have major immediate strategic effects. Everyone concerned will remember the Salonika sideshow of WW1. Time for an update.
This is sound analysis!

Perhaps a recapture of Lemnos that controls the exit of the Straits and offers terrain suitable for airfields can be sold as such, along with the Dodecanese. Indeed, brining Turkey in would be chimera, but with an active Balkan Front, perhaps the Turks can be persuaded to significantly reduce chrome exports to Germany.

The only strategic effects of a Balkan Front I can think of is an earlier bombing of Ploesti and mining of the Danube, along with rotating divisions to get actual combat experience. Heavy bomber airfields can be developed in Attica and forward fighter bases in Thessaly and Lemnos.

I agree that the frontline won't change that much compared to the WW1 front. The Allies will bump against the Germans once, twice, three times while gaining experience. I expect some time in 1942 to break through the Olympus-Pindus Line. Then, the only viable german position would be across the greco-yugoslav frontier where the Axios/Vardar valley becomes a gorge and a great defensive position. After that, it is stalemate in a backwater, while the Allies prepare to invade Italy and then western Europe.


Despite previous instructions the Navy is still using code-names that the French cannot possibly use. Latest proposed operation was called LATCHSPRING. What Frenchman wants to pronounce that?
I was grinning broadly when I read that!

Overall, it is realy nice to read about the details of cooperation between the two allies. They work hard to establish a close relationship if they give importance to cultural/linguistic differences.
 
How much of that passage is historic? It reads true to Churchill's common phrasing in his memos and minutes from the war.
I made it up, but I have spent a lot of time reading and re-reading Churchill's history of WW2, in which his memos feature prominently.
The only strategic effects of a Balkan Front I can think of is an earlier bombing of Ploesti
Yes, though any attempt in 1941 or even 1942 is unlikely to go well.
I agree that the frontline won't change that much compared to the WW1 front.
Agreed. Longer term there might be interesting effects, if the Allies can hang on this butterflies the Civil War, but that is getting ahead of ourselves.
 

Driftless

Donor
I made it up, but I have spent a lot of time reading and re-reading Churchill's history of WW2, in which his memos feature prominently.
In American parlance: "you nailed it!" I honestly caught myself re-reading the passage and thinking that I don't remember seeing those Churchill comments before, and it has to be written for this TL, but it has the structure, vocabulary, and cadence of most Churchillian everyday working documents. Those were much more succinct than the soaring rhetoric of the public addresses.
 
In American parlance: "you nailed it!" I honestly caught myself re-reading the passage and thinking that I don't remember seeing those Churchill comments before, and it has to be written for this TL, but it has the structure, vocabulary, and cadence of most Churchillian everyday working documents. Those were much more succinct than the soaring rhetoric of the public addresses.
Seconding this. It's honestly a joy to read.
 
In American parlance: "you nailed it!" I honestly caught myself re-reading the passage and thinking that I don't remember seeing those Churchill comments before, and it has to be written for this TL, but it has the structure, vocabulary, and cadence of most Churchillian everyday working documents. Those were much more succinct than the soaring rhetoric of the public addresses.
It’s one of the most delightful features of spkaca’s work. It sounds real and like you’d expect it to.
 
I also agree.....I could hear Churchill in my head as I read it....Excellent work.

Really enjoying this and looking forward to more..
 
A three Australian division deployment to Greece should see a 1 Australian Corps establishment under Lavarack, with Berryman as his artillery commander, This would ensure a 1918/late 1942 artillery preparation plus night infantry assaults. Australian casualties won't be light, but the Germans in the beaten zone are dead/POW. Not good for morale for the rest of them. Excellent work as always.
 
Another butterfly of the POD is that French Somaliland and its 8,000 troops are added in the Allied OOB. I wonder what effect they would have. In the original FFO, the Battle of Keren is fought earlier compared to OTL. As I see it, the French garrison can tie down an equal number of Italians that otherwise would be in Eritrea. A somewhat easier and quicker advance to Keren and then to Massawa is plausible. Capturing Massawa a few weeks earlier would mean that the Red Sea is open for american shipping even earlier. At the same time, the 4th Indian Division can be sent back ar the Mediterranean a bit earlier than in OTL. At a later stage, the same applies for the 5th Indian Division - if it is needed.

By the way, I realized that in June the 50th British Division is arriving in Egypt. At the same time, the 1st South African Division will be available as well. I think its use in Europe may be a thorny issue. I think even if it is not allowed to be sent in Europe, it can get garrison duties so as to release other formations for Greece or Malaya. I don't know of south african politics to comment more than that.

Regarding the increase of the OTL RAF strength in the Middle East, to quote Hyperwar:
Nevertheless steady progress was made both in the number of squadrons and in their rearming with modern types. In the middle of June the Middle East Air Force (excluding Malta) comprised 34½ formed squadrons, which together with various detachments had a total number of 549 aircraft, of which 419 were of up-to-date types. By mid-August there were 49 squadrons formed and forming, with a strength of 722, of which 550 were of up-to-date types. By mid-October the corresponding figures were 52 squadrons, and 846 aircraft of which no less than 780 were of up-to-date types.
 
A three Australian division deployment to Greece should see a 1 Australian Corps establishment under Lavarack, with Berryman as his artillery commander, This would ensure a 1918/late 1942 artillery preparation plus night infantry assaults. Australian casualties won't be light, but the Germans in the beaten zone are dead/POW. Not good for morale for the rest of them. Excellent work as always.
I would take it as virtually certain that if the Anzacs can arrive in force and have a little time to dig in, nothing will shift them.
Another butterfly of the POD is that French Somaliland and its 8,000 troops are added in the Allied OOB. I wonder what effect they would have.
Probably a source of replacements given the shallow French manpower pool. But in the short term they will as you say make the Italian position in East Africa even more hopeless, though I don't propose to explore this.
Capturing Massawa a few weeks earlier would mean that the Red Sea is open for american shipping even earlier. At the same time, the 4th Indian Division can be sent back ar the Mediterranean a bit earlier than in OTL. At a later stage, the same applies for the 5th Indian Division - if it is needed
Yet another way in which the shipping stranglehold is eased in the ATL. Quite possible that 4th Indian won't be needed in mainland Greece?
By the way, I realized that in June the 50th British Division is arriving in Egypt. At the same time, the 1st South African Division will be available as well. I think its use in Europe may be a thorny issue. I think even if it is not allowed to be sent in Europe, it can get garrison duties so as to release other formations for Greece or Malaya. I don't know of south african politics to comment more than that.
50th will probably go to Greece. 1st SA was restricted to service within Africa for political reasons, though later in the war this eased and 6th SA Armoured served in Italy.
Regarding the increase of the OTL RAF strength
Those numbers imply a tipping point in air strength probably in the late summer, after the withdrawal of Luftwaffe units for Barbarossa. They Allies might play it cautiously mounting any offensives, but something should become possible in the islands from August onwards (assuming as I do that there will be some kind of effort on the mainland in July, which won't go far). By that time the French will have P-40s/H81s as well.
Re-reading Churchill's memoirs again, he was keen to employ British 6th Division to take Rhodes, because of its air power, but I think they'll be needed on the mainland in the short term.
 
Part 4.2
Extract from War in the Middle Sea by James Gleeson, ch.4

A steady stream of RAF aircraft, particularly Hurricanes, flowed into Malta via Tunisia in late 1940 and the early months of 1941, keeping the three fighter squadrons on the island up to strength despite heavy losses in combat. The RAF brass initially resisted French offers to assist with the air defence of the island, citing concerns over the logistical arrangements needed to keep multiple types of aircraft flying from austere bases. However, after further heavy losses in early March the RAF felt forced to accept the assistance, at least as a temporary measure. Initially a single escadrille of H-75s were employed, but by late March a full Groupe de Chasse had begun to operate. The AdA took the decision to revive GC12, Les Cicognes, the ‘Storks’, who had earned such a reputation in WW1, as the name of this unit. Facilities were poor - ‘we thought Tunisia was bad,’ commented their commander, Constantin Rozanoff. ‘Malta meant dust, air raids, constant combat against the odds, and worst of all, British food. Our nerves were much tested.’
The Storks entered combat in March and achieved a notable success on April 1st, when they intercepted a raid by German bombers of KG30 and mauled it, shooting down five bombers for the loss of two. ‘I had to use all my skill in bringing down one particularly dashing target,’ wrote Rozanoff. ‘When we landed, some British soldiers brought us the men we had shot down for our inspection. “Fancy meeting Hermann the German?” they asked. It was indeed a Boche called Hermann, which gave us much merriment. A weak joke, but it was a time when opportunities for amusement were rare.’ GC12 indeed took heavy losses itself, losing twelve pilots and over twenty aircraft in a few weeks, mostly to the German veterans of JG26. ‘The H75 won a place in our hearts, but all of us felt the H81 could not come soon enough,’ commented Rozanoff. ‘We knew they were coming, the Lend-Lease Act gave us confidence of that. We only hoped we would live long enough to see them.’
 
Part 4.3
Extract from ch.4 of To the stars the hard way: a history of 50 Wing RAF by Bertram Owen

...following the route that was already becoming familiar to the RAF, the two squadrons flew from Exeter to Gibraltar on the 25th March, then along the North African coast, making several refuelling stops, to Libya. The war diary of Squadron Leader Fife records:

“30th. From El Adem airfield to Maleme, in Crete, with 10 Blenheims. Others to follow once serviceable. Many rumours regarding intentions. Talk of raiding Ploesti - not currently possible. Difficult to sleep - v.poor living arrangements.
31st. Rest of squadron joined us at Maleme. Moore’s boys due to arrive tomorrow. Concerned at shortage of spares and bombs here.
April 1st. Dicky and Roy up to their usual jokes. Orders came through at 1400 - prepare for shipping strike off Albania. Orders cancelled at 1600 just as we were warming up. Sure to be a show tomorrow?
2nd. Our first mission in the theatre. Flew fifty miles NW of Corfu looking for Italian ships - none found. Sighted unknown aircraft in distance - ours? Theirs?
3rd. Orders to transfer to mainland. Accompanied by some 30 French fighters, both our squadrons landed at airfield near Athens. Billeted in usual type of hole, vermin everywhere. Met French Captain called Montgolfier, like the balloonist; seems keen.
5th. Finally some action. Raided Italian position at Vlore in Albania. Return fire uncomfortably heavy - three planes damaged. Udall’s gunner, Harry B, took a fragment in the leg - big legs we always said.
6th. Big news today - Germans are in for keeps. They raided Piraeus - our lads got stuck in to them. We need more planes.
7th. Belgrade took a pasting. Len says we are to help the Yugos. Don’t see much future in that.
8th. Flew over Mount Olympus today. No sign of Huns yet. Three Italian biplanes sighted in distance - they came closer, gunners drove them off.
9th. Terrible news - Germans have Salonika. Worse, the kitchens have run out of spuds.
12th. Two ops yesterday. First was a wash-out, couldn't find target. Three crates u/s because of lack of spares. Took 9 Blenheims to raid German supply lines near Salonika. Attacked 10-15 M.T. and some hits scored, but bounced by 110s on withdrawal. Freeman and Pascoe shot down, two others damaged. Roy badly hurt, will need new gunner - hope to get him evac’d.
13th. Unlucky for some. Escorted by French fighters, to Salonika again, saw 20-30 M.T. on the move and attacked, think we scored some hits. Big dog-fight between French and 110s. Montgolfier says he lost 2 and shot down 4. He certainly kept them off us, only 2 damaged. Word is the Army is falling back to Olympus.
15th. Pretty bad day. Poor Farrell crashed on take-off, no survivors. All our crates are showing the strain - three more u/s this morning, mechanical or electrical faults. Took the Sqn to attack German tanks near Mt. Olympus, our arty. was to lay down smoke, but couldn’t see it. Saw M.T. convoy moving south and bombed it instead, but enemy flak heavy, Yellow section caught a packet - 1 shot down, other 2 u/s on return to base.
17th. Len says the game is up, says some Army units already pulling back. Not sure if that’s right, he’s inclined to see a glass half empty. But it is true that about Greeks falling back from Albania. German planes overhead in afternoon - French got one or two. We saw big explosions N of Olympus - looks like the Sappers carrying out demolitions.
20th. Not had much time to write last few days. Constant flying. Only 3 Blenheims serviceable in our sqn - Moore’s boys no better. Ten crates sat like pork for lack of spares. Also only enough bombs for 2-3 more ops.
23rd. Anzacs making a stand on the coast, sounds hot down there. Hot for us too. (afternoon) 20-30 German bombers raided us, 6 of our planes wrecked - mostly the lame ducks. Poor Benji killed. We put up a show in the evening, had a go at Sedes airfield. V. bad flak, lost Brodie, but think we got some hits.
24th. Ordered back to Crete for the time being. Between us Moore & I have only 7 serviceable. Montgolfier now commanding French fighter group, his C.O. gone - he has less than 10. Saw another German raid on our base as we left it behind - hope the new boys have an easier time of it, but somehow I doubt it.”

50 Wing had taken a hammering, but their efforts undoubtedly contributed to the standstill on the Olympus line as April closed. By early May the Allied air forces had built up to several hundred machines in the theatre. They had mostly Hurricanes and Curtiss 81s operating from the mainland, the robustness of these types being severely tested. The main challenge they faced was defending their own airfields from incessant hit-and-run raids by Me110s and Ju88s now operating from airfields in Bulgaria and inside Greece. As for the Blenheims of 63 Wing who now arrived to replace 50 Wing outside Athens, Squadron Leader Fife guessed correctly, and they lost half their number in a few weeks.

*​

Extract from ch.8, A Song at the Sacrifice by Theogenes Barker

...of course no-one wished to hear my opinion. Having realised that my advice had fallen on deaf ears, I made what arrangements I could for the safety of Eleni and the children, and sent them to her relatives in Alexandria. My colleagues at the Embassy had begun to follow this example.
We had several meetings with General Wilson, who put a brave face on things. ‘We’ll have a full division of armour,’ he said in confidence, ‘and the French have a corps on our flank.’ Still, somewhat pessimistically, I felt the situation looked decidedly sticky even before the Germans invaded. The Yugoslav revolution briefly gave us hope, but Bulgaria’s attitude and the swift collapse of Yugoslav resistance made me fear the worst. The Greeks had made me proud of them, and I longed to have their mighty struggle better rewarded. However they were running low on supplies even before the Germans attacked. I had my hands full negotiating over the scale of support, since we could not provide as much assistance as they needed. One ray of hope came on the 5th, when we heard that the first big shipment of food from the US would arrive later in the month, aboard the freighter Murchison.
...Many have complained since regarding the French attitude, claiming it doomed the hopes of holding the Germans further north, and that had they sent their corps immediately after the fall of Tripoli, the situation could have been saved. I disagree, and did so at the time. There was no hope of holding Salonika once Bulgaria was in, and Winston’s notion of forming a front with the Yugoslavs was a pipe dream. Anyway, in the event the French divisions, not to forget the Poles, did sterling service, often overlooked in English-language accounts of the campaign, I have to say.
‘The overriding factor is the air,’ Wilson said to us in early April, ‘It might be the Germans could maintain and reinforce their squadrons more quickly than we could.’ All the events of that momentous spring were under this shadow. My heart moved to see the gallantry of the Allied fliers, always outnumbered, operating from rough airstrips with little protection. In my diary I recorded one air-fight:
“7th April. To Piraeus on business; as I arrived there was a tremendous hubbub and a wave of aircraft approached, I think from the north, large planes with a different engine note to the Italian machines we have heard before. German, I guessed, they were attacking the port. As I watched I saw three French fighters zoom overhead and attack the enemy, scattering them, so that the bombs missed the port but landed close to where I stood. I retreated quickly. One of the fighters got too close to one of the bombers, they collided and both went down.”
Despite such courage, the Allied planes could not be everywhere. On another day, I think the 16th though my diary is unclear, I was caught in an air raid with some bombs landing not far away, though the actual target, we realised later, was one of our airfields.
The hardest fighting started on the 21st, and in one or two places it looked like the Germans might break through - I think Jumbo came close to ordering a fall back to Thermopylae. The rumour mill said the French were cracking, and we set to work burning sensitive papers. All the hundreds of hours we had slaved over our exquisitely crafted memos, now up in smoke! It helped restore some perspective.
Luckily we had the Anzacs and 2nd Armoured in place to counter-attack, but it was a close-run thing. Later I heard that some of our batteries had run out of ammunition entirely by the 26th, and if the enemy could have made one more push, they’d have broken through. I suppose they had exhausted themselves too. Some of us saw significance in the Germans halting at the feet of Olympus, as though the Gods themselves had intervened: I felt that nothing less would have stopped them at that point.
On the 27th the higher-ups ordered an evacuation of non-essential personnel. I and many others, including Bingo and Carton de Wiart, left from Piraeus on the 27th aboard the Clan Fraser. We suffered two or three air attacks, one of which hit the ship but mercifully did not explode. Another ship near to us, heading into the port, was less lucky. As bad luck would have it, it was the Murchison. I saw it sink, but we could not stop to rescue the survivors - a horrid mess. A synecdoche, one might say, for the whole Greek campaign.
Amid my feelings of distress there was an incident that gave me much cause for reflection later. Carton de Wiart could not be persuaded to take cover. He stood by the rail, cursing the enemy. ‘Aren’t there any guns on this tub?’ he shouted. ‘Show me a Lewis, I want a pop at those villains.’ Eventually we reached Crete and got ashore…
We civilians felt rather surplus to requirements, and somewhat ashamed of ourselves. The Army seemed to feel the same way, and we had rather Spartan living arrangements. We saw tremendous activity everywhere, French troops digging in, our engineers preparing defences and improving the airfields, RA gunners setting up their batteries. One night, sitting by a camp-fire outside our tent, Bingo and I discussed the prospects. He was evidently feeling mellow with the warm evening and the retsina.
‘Theo, I don’t fancy their chances now,’ he said, ‘blitzkrieg in open country is one thing, but this is another. They missed the bus.’
I was still pretty shaky after our experiences. ‘What if they come by air?’ I asked. ‘They have paratroopers, and they conquered Holland and Corsica quickly enough.’
‘They got cut up badly though,’ he said. ‘Paratroopers can’t do it all by themselves. I doubt they’ll use them at all.’
‘The poor Greeks are exhausted,’ I said, ‘they’ve still got to hold their line.’
He sought to calm my fears. ‘‘The Italians would have to break through, which I doubt. No, I don’t think they’ll take Athens any time soon.’
‘They have to try,’ I replied. ‘The bad man can read a map. You know as well as I do where he gets his oil. Our planes can reach Roumania from Attica, and if bombs hit those wells it’s goodnight Mr. Chips.’ He looked sceptical. ‘I think they have to try. They’ll throw the kitchen sink at us, and they’ll have enough planes to win.’
As it turned out, we were both wrong, so you could say that there was no change there…
 
There were plans to produce the B1Bis and the S35 in Savannah, Georgia. I can find the source if you need me to.
I would very much like to see some sources for that. I have never seen any reports of that. There was a Souma brought to the U.S. as a development object but that was used by U.S. Army Ordnance to compare to projected American designs. It survived the war and was part of tours I used to give at the U.S. Army Ordnance Museum at Aberdeen. I believe it is now at the Ordnance Training Support Facility at Ft Lee VA (not open to the public.) I don't think there was any American tank production at Savannah. Industrial capacity in most coastal cities was considered a navy resource to support shipbuilding. I would very much like to see anything you have.
 
Part 4.4
Extract from ch.5, War in the Middle Sea by James Gleeson

Postwar discoveries indicate that OKH initially opposed MANFRED, the second assault on the Olympus line, but Hitler overrode their concerns, citing fears for the Ploesti oil-fields. General Halder confided his gloom to his diary on May 10th. ‘Only six divisions, plus one airborne division, against all those Anzacs and French, not to mention the Greeks, who we must expect to fight fanatically,’ he said, ‘it’s enough to make one weep. Even if we had the Sturmregiment available it would be a gambler’s throw. To do it now, with crucial operations impending elsewhere, makes me think the Greek gods have sent us an attack of madness.’
...and in the event Halder’s pessimism was borne out. The attack on the Olympus position hit in an area now fortified heavily by the Australian 7th and New Zealand 2nd Divisions, who held, as did the French V Corps further west, near Grevena. OKH minuted that ‘in future no attacks should be mounted on any position held by significant numbers of “Anzac” forces.’ A subsidiary Italian attack, mounted essentially as a diversion, achieved little.
The German airborne assaults also failed, thanks to the presence of Allied reserves close to the front, notably British 2nd Armoured Division, 7th Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment (RI), and the Polish Carpathian Brigade. Despite some dangerous moments, the airborne forces lacked the strength to overcome the defenders unaided, and the disruption to Allied rear areas proved insufficient to permit the main attacks to break through. Perhaps the most critical point was the fighting near Kalabaka, where the 7th RI and 1st Assault Regiment fought a ferocious battle near a new airstrip. At one point the French were ordered to withdraw, but owing to signals difficulties and mutual incomprehension, the order never arrived, luckily as it turned out. The 7th RI took fifty percent casualties, but denied the airstrip to the enemy, who then ran out of ammunition. Most of the German regiment was thus forced to surrender on 22nd May.
The other airborne attacks also ended in fiasco. An initial success by Student’s force near Mount Ossa on the 21st May could not be supported, after which the paratroopers were overrun by a counter-attack of British 2nd Armoured Division. ‘The Light 6B does not look like much,’ noted one British officer, ‘but it looms a veritable beast of doom against men with only small arms. They were like long-spear hoplites against the short-spear Persians.’ The phrase caught on, journalists began to call 2nd Armoured the 'Hoplites', and before long it became an official unit badge.
The fighting of the 22nd-25th proved to be the last gasp of the attack… the Luftwaffe’s attempts to drop supplies to the paratroopers proved unavailing, with many supplies landing in the sea or falling into Allied hands. Short of ammunition, food and water, most of the German paras surrendered on the 25th, after which day German air activity suddenly reduced. ‘I think we’ve given them a bloody nose,’ commented Air Marshal Longmore, ‘it’s just as well, our piggy bank is empty.’ On that day the RAF squadrons in Greece managed less than twenty sorties in total, and the AdA even fewer.
As for the German high command, OKH concluded, ‘With hindsight, we should have concentrated our forces (especially our airborne forces) better, instead of dispersing our effort… we will mask the Greek front with a few infantry divisions, they do not need to be the best. If the mountains aid the defender, then let us defend. We can mop up easily once we have settled matters in the East.’
These developments proved a great relief to Admiral Cunningham. The enemy had been mounting air attacks on Allied shipping from the Dodecanese, including the island of Scarpanto, and consequently he had ordered the fleet to attack the airfield there, a risky operation that would bring them into the range of land-based bombers. In the small hours of the 27th he cancelled this, and the first phase of the campaign was over. On the night of 31st May, a flight of Blenheims operating from Athens flew over Salonika and dropped thousands of leaflets, headed: “o vasiliás paraménei sto édafos mas méchri ti níki”.
 
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That's a huge coup for the Allies. Maintaining a foothold on the European mainland is a massive propaganda win. Defending "the birthplace of democracy" its an even bigger one. It's almost impossible to break out from, sure, but it's the principle of the thing. There is still a pocket of mainland Europe that is not bowing to the totalitarian hordes, and they can report it as such in the US. Expect Churchillian bluster about no swastikas over the acropolis and the Greeks of Thermopylae and Marathon being reborn.
 
That's a huge coup for the Allies. Maintaining a foothold on the European mainland is a massive propaganda win. Defending "the birthplace of democracy" its an even bigger one. It's almost impossible to break out from, sure, but it's the principle of the thing. There is still a pocket of mainland Europe that is not bowing to the totalitarian hordes, and they can report it as such in the US. Expect Churchillian bluster about no swastikas over the acropolis and the Greeks of Thermopylae and Marathon being reborn.
It butterflies the worst of the terrible dearth suffered by Greece (Athens at any rate will receive adequate supplies, maybe from the US, as hinted in the update), and therefore the immediate cause for the creation of Oxfam - though doubtless famine will appear elsewhere so I suspect Oxfam, or something very like it, will appear anyway.
I must admit I skimped the research relating to the Greek campaign, and I must give a big thank you to @X Oristos for the guidance. The crucial differences to OTL, as I see them:
1. OTL General Wilson ordered the retreat from the Olympus line because he felt his left flank was open. Here French V Corps are plugging that gap.
2. He must also have been anxious about his line of supply given the destruction of Piraeus - which has been butterflied.
3. In the ATL the air situation is not quite so desperate.
4. Finally, Wilson also has ATL a stronger armoured reserve, in the shape of 2nd Armoured Division (which is not quite full strength and its tanks keep breaking down, but they are good enough for the moment).
This only works because the Germans lack real interest in the theatre and have bigger fish to fry, hence their effort dissipates by the end of May.
I like the point about the wave of Hellenophilia about to wash over the Allies. Probably 2nd Armoured will get some catchy nickname in the way 7th Armoured did OTL. I might edit the update to include this.
 
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