Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL
- Thread starter spkaca
- Start date
Gradually the Germans will build up their logistics, they have the means. I can think they can reach a 12-division army in the frontline, while having the Bulgarians occupy a bigger part of greek Macedonia in order to avoid having to garrison the long coast from Thessaloniki to the turkish border. But by that time, the position of the Allies in Greece will be even stronger.
Overall, I think the concept the author has decided, ie a stalemate is the most plausible case. At least until the Allies have completely re-equip the Greek Army and have build-up the infrastructure in greek mainland. That would take at least 2 years.
I think both Britain and France will start looking at Sicily with covetous eyes. When did the Allies land in Sicily in the original FFO? Is it doable in 1942?
Overall, I think the concept the author has decided, ie a stalemate is the most plausible case. At least until the Allies have completely re-equip the Greek Army and have build-up the infrastructure in greek mainland. That would take at least 2 years.
I think both Britain and France will start looking at Sicily with covetous eyes. When did the Allies land in Sicily in the original FFO? Is it doable in 1942?
The Allied position in Greece will tend to strengthen over time, but there are outside factors that might cause problems. They're not out of the woods yet, we will have more to hear from Theo.
Two years sounds reasonable for creating the infrastructure needed for the kind of machine-heavy war the Allies want to fight. Lend-Lease will help.
I think in original FFO it was 1942; I believe that the lower attrition the Allies suffer in the Med overall should make this possible. They will already have started planning - but they have to learn the tricks of amphibious warfare on a smaller scale first.
On the down side Greece has to be fed. The Germans not stealing everything in sight obviously helps but that's still ~5 million people with the country not being self sufficient in food. To use my notes from here https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...keys-and-broken-vehicles.494608/post-21145762 Greece in 1939 produced ~1,045,000 tons of wheat and imported ~450,000. Here it has lost Macedonia, Thrace and Epirus, roughly 40% of total territory (and likely somewhat more of the agricultural land, due to the loss of Macedonia and Thrace, lets call it half) and ~2.48 million out of 7.344 million. So she likely needs about 450,000 tons of wheat imported per year. Oh well... not often that farming tractors become strategically important.
Part 4.5
Extract from ch.9, Marianne and John by Charles Montague
Meetings of the Supreme War Council had fallen into a routine. Every two months, the meeting-place would shift, with Algiers and Casablanca being used by the French, Gibraltar and London by the British. This involved much travel, most of it necessarily by air, and inevitably there was eventually a calamity. On June 2nd the plane carrying Mr. Eden to Gibraltar went missing. No trace was ever found. Naturally there was speculation that the Germans had shot it down, but the Germans were just as mystified. ‘A great loss, but we must carry on,’ commented Mr. Churchill. ‘We must review our arrangements.’ To reduce the amount of travel required, the Council extended the interval between movements to six months, and made Algiers and London the default meeting-places. Mr. Churchill appointed Mr. Lyttleton as his deputy for the Algiers meetings.
...On 13th June came the unfolding of the bizarre plot known as the ‘Cagoulard Affair’. The Council were due to meet that afternoon. That morning the Algiers police arrested ten men, including several known close associates of Jacques Doriot and other members of the Paris Quisling regime. A large number of Italian bombers appeared over the city at 3 pm. This was a surprise, as there had been no attacks for several months. However, a radar station had recently been set up near the city, and this gave enough warning to allow interception by the Brewster fighters of GC13 (13th Fighter Group), who shot down several of the unescorted bombers. Little damage was done in the city. Damage, however, had not been the intention.
The arrested men confessed the whole scheme. The idea had been to drive the members of the War Council to an air-raid shelter - a new and improved shelter had recently been constructed. There they were to be attacked by the plotters, who had disguised themselves as Arabs, and carried pistols and hand-grenades. Having assassinated the Council, they planned to hide out in the Casbah and then get picked up by an Italian submarine. However, almost inevitably, one of the plotters informed on the rest. ‘A mad, but dangerous scheme,’ noted de Gaulle, ‘we must count ourselves fortunate.’
The meeting in the event went ahead more or less undisturbed. They took important decisions that day, including the scale of proposed reinforcement for the Far East, the line to take in response to the recent Japanese provocations, the expected tightening of the American embargoes on Japan, and the timing of operation ROBERT, which was driven by the availability of landing-craft. All these decisions, however, were overshadowed a week later by the news of the German invasion of Russia. ‘A whole new war impends,’ noted M. Mandel, ‘and we must consider the implications.’ ROBERT was put on hold, and the Council re-examined the plans for CONCAVE.
Meetings of the Supreme War Council had fallen into a routine. Every two months, the meeting-place would shift, with Algiers and Casablanca being used by the French, Gibraltar and London by the British. This involved much travel, most of it necessarily by air, and inevitably there was eventually a calamity. On June 2nd the plane carrying Mr. Eden to Gibraltar went missing. No trace was ever found. Naturally there was speculation that the Germans had shot it down, but the Germans were just as mystified. ‘A great loss, but we must carry on,’ commented Mr. Churchill. ‘We must review our arrangements.’ To reduce the amount of travel required, the Council extended the interval between movements to six months, and made Algiers and London the default meeting-places. Mr. Churchill appointed Mr. Lyttleton as his deputy for the Algiers meetings.
...On 13th June came the unfolding of the bizarre plot known as the ‘Cagoulard Affair’. The Council were due to meet that afternoon. That morning the Algiers police arrested ten men, including several known close associates of Jacques Doriot and other members of the Paris Quisling regime. A large number of Italian bombers appeared over the city at 3 pm. This was a surprise, as there had been no attacks for several months. However, a radar station had recently been set up near the city, and this gave enough warning to allow interception by the Brewster fighters of GC13 (13th Fighter Group), who shot down several of the unescorted bombers. Little damage was done in the city. Damage, however, had not been the intention.
The arrested men confessed the whole scheme. The idea had been to drive the members of the War Council to an air-raid shelter - a new and improved shelter had recently been constructed. There they were to be attacked by the plotters, who had disguised themselves as Arabs, and carried pistols and hand-grenades. Having assassinated the Council, they planned to hide out in the Casbah and then get picked up by an Italian submarine. However, almost inevitably, one of the plotters informed on the rest. ‘A mad, but dangerous scheme,’ noted de Gaulle, ‘we must count ourselves fortunate.’
The meeting in the event went ahead more or less undisturbed. They took important decisions that day, including the scale of proposed reinforcement for the Far East, the line to take in response to the recent Japanese provocations, the expected tightening of the American embargoes on Japan, and the timing of operation ROBERT, which was driven by the availability of landing-craft. All these decisions, however, were overshadowed a week later by the news of the German invasion of Russia. ‘A whole new war impends,’ noted M. Mandel, ‘and we must consider the implications.’ ROBERT was put on hold, and the Council re-examined the plans for CONCAVE.
Paternas
Donor
To be honest I doubt they would attack Sicily first in this timeline. OTL Churchill and Brooke thought Sicily was necessary to push convoys through the Med. However after taking Tunisia they were able to push convoys through in May with Allied air superiority, before the July invasion. ITTL they should discover this fact much earlier. I suspect the logical invasion order then would be Rhodes, Sardinia, Corsica. This puts the whole of Italy in Allied air range.
May I humbly suggest Spartans? I think Churchill will like the idea of doughty outnumbered men holding off hordes of uncultured heathens.
Whether this is an accurate representation of either 1941 or the classical campaign is less important than the historiography of the time and the ability of Churchill to coin a phrase. I'm not a classicist, so others may have something to say on the former idea, but Winnie, despite his many faults, could write a speech.
I seem to recall that Hitler had decided that Jumbo Wilson was a brilliant General, so he was posted a head of the fictional British 4th Army for Op Bodyguard. I might be misremembering, it's ten years since I read up on it, but if I'm right, then this could be amplified in TTL.
Of course, we know that the Germans could have taken Greece if it wasn't for Barbarossa, but propaganda is a powerful tool.
One of the massive strengths of a place like this is the varied experience and expertise available. Just through reading the comments of @X Oristos and @Lascaris (on this thread and John Valentine Carden Survives, I've learned an awful lot about the Greek campaign.
I am not so sure about it. The Allies enjoyed greater air supremacy in July 1943 compared to 1941 or 1942. It would have been much tougher in TTL to push through convoys without suffering serious losses. Of course in TTL, there is AdA added in the Allied OOB. But the French have a limited number of aircrew. I guess they are currently trying their best to expand the pilot reserves, but such a scheme takes time. In the meantime, they cannot hope to expand if there is serious attrition over the Sicilian Narrows.
The Mediterranean route is of greater importance now, since there is an active Greek Front. Greece can be fed by the Commonwealth (aus and nz grain and meat) at least until the Japanese throw a wrench in Indian Ocean logistics. But the Allied needs in military supplies have to be supplied mostly from Britain. An early capture of Sicily would allow that from e.g. summer 1942 onwards.
Well, thank you for the kind words. That's the beauty of an international community of history enthousiasts. Greeks come and share what they know about the Greek Campaign and French provide their own expertise on the personalities of French naval commanders for Lascaris' own timeline.
The moment Hitler attacks the USSR, the Luftwaffe simply won't be able to bring enough force to bear to close off the Med. They simply won't have the planes. Between them, the RAF and the ADA should be able to grind down the X. Fliegerkorps (or whatever else gets held back in Italy) and the Italian Air Force, or at least hold them back once the Japanese start to pitch in.
marathag
Banned
France Fighting on has a small chance of changing US Fighter output in unexpected ways.
They were really happy with the Curtiss product line, and would likely continue with it, possibly in not being interested in what North American Aviation saying they had a paper project that would be worlds better, they would want more H75 and H81, -Now-.
'Shut up and build the stuff we want to pay for', in a way, not the stuff that would be better for them in the long run.
So a chance that NAA builds Curtiss designs under license, along with somebody besides Martin would have to make more Marylands, as the RAF wasn't as enthusiastic about the type as the French were as with the earlier Curtiss types above.
Customer is always right, who pays the piper calls the tune, etc.
They were really happy with the Curtiss product line, and would likely continue with it, possibly in not being interested in what North American Aviation saying they had a paper project that would be worlds better, they would want more H75 and H81, -Now-.
'Shut up and build the stuff we want to pay for', in a way, not the stuff that would be better for them in the long run.
So a chance that NAA builds Curtiss designs under license, along with somebody besides Martin would have to make more Marylands, as the RAF wasn't as enthusiastic about the type as the French were as with the earlier Curtiss types above.
Customer is always right, who pays the piper calls the tune, etc.
The Allies will certainly make Rhodes a priority. It's a major air threat to their SLOC to Greece and a tempting target being so exposed. However, Sicily has other things going for it besides its value in interdicting (or assisting) transit through the Med. It is closer to Allied air bases than Sardinia, it probably has more suitable landing sites (my impression of Sardinia is that its coast is rockier overall), and taking it brings the Allies within sight of the mainland - possibly a significant political calculation - losing Sicily hurts the Fascist regime more than losing Sardinia. So tentatively I favour Sicily first, though it wouldn't be a straightforward call.
I don't mean that to occur here! I have already posted nearly a quarter of what I've written, which I have sketched out to 1945, though I expect to write more as we go along.
I considered that, but have gone for Hoplites, which might be an easier sell as propaganda.
Ditto - I need to read the Carden timeline, I've been put off before now by its size.
Although the Commonwealth could cover Greek food requirements, the Greek government, the Allies and President Roosevelt all have good political reasons for wanting US supplies to go through also, hence my emphasis on this theme in the text. One further consideration though - the Sicilian civil population must have been much bigger than the Sardinian - today it is three times bigger and probably similar in the 1940s. And they will also need feeding once the Allies conquer the place - I think Sicily's agricultural production collapsed during WW2, like in most of Europe. That would weigh on the side of Sardinia first. But I expect the fighter radius issue will dominate thinking.
Agreed - though early 1942 will bring a moment of vulnerability for the Allies, as the Luftwaffe can't do much in Russia at that point, so they might plan some kind of offensive action at that point.
That implies possibly butterflying away the development of the P-51 Mustang. NOOOO! :-( The Mustang prototype had already flown in 1940, and series production got started in May 1941, but I could see a scenario in which the demand for NAA to build more H81s leads somehow to the cancellation of the project. Say NAA get told to stop before beginning series production; or maybe they stop after the initial British order, and by the time the RAF put the Merlin in it, NAA are already committed to licence-building H81s for the AdA.
On the one hand, a tragedy, but on the other, what else might have been developed instead?
marathag
Banned
It's definitely a different take for any TL, not just a FFO
For everyone, here is the early history of how the Mustang came to be
In 1938, the British government established a purchasing commission in the United States, headed by Sir Henry Self.[13][14] Self was given overall responsibility for RAF production, research, and development, and also served with Sir Wilfrid Freeman, the Air Member for Development and Production. Self also sat on the British Air Council Sub-committee on Supply (or "Supply Committee") and one of his tasks was to organize the manufacturing and supply of American fighter aircraft for the RAF. At the time, the choice was very limited, as no U.S. aircraft then in production or flying met European standards, with only the Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk coming close. The Curtiss-Wright plant was running at capacity, so P-40s were in short supply.[15]
North American Aviation (NAA) was already supplying its T-6 Texan (known in British service as the "Harvard") trainer to the RAF, but was otherwise underused. NAA President "Dutch" Kindelberger approached Self to sell a new medium bomber, the North American B-25 Mitchell. Instead, Self asked if NAA could manufacture P-40s under license from Curtiss. Kindelberger said NAA could have a better aircraft with the same Allison V-1710 engine in the air sooner than establishing a production line for the P-40.
John Attwood of North American spent much time from January to April 1940 at the British Purchasing Commission's offices in New York discussing the British specifications of the proposed aircraft with British engineers. The discussions consisted of free-hand conceptual drawings of an aircraft with the British officials. Sir Henry Self was concerned that North American had not ever designed a fighter, insisting they obtain the drawings and study the Curtiss XP-46 experimental aircraft and the wind tunnel test results for the P-40, before presenting them with detailed design drawings based on the agreed concept. North American purchased the drawings and data from Curtiss for £56,000,[verification needed] confirming the purchase with the Purchasing Commission. The Purchasing Commission approved the resulting detailed design drawings, signing the commencement of the Mustang project on 4 May 1940, firmly ordering 320 on 29 May 1940. Prior to this, North American only had a draft letter for an order of 320 aircraft. Curtiss engineers accused North American of plagiarism.[16]
The British Purchasing Commission stipulated armament of four .303 in (7.7 mm) machine guns (as used on the Tomahawk), a unit cost of no more than $40,000, and delivery of the first production aircraft by January 1941.[17] In March 1940, 320 aircraft were ordered by Freeman, who had become the executive head of the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) and the contract was promulgated on 24 April
Not bad for Wiki
So you would see 320 Allison Mustang I
The difference is now you have the French actively vying for floor space for aircraft production, following up of the order of 230 H81A-1/2 previously placed with Curtiss, and the British will never get the Tomahawk I or II models that were close to what the USAAC called the P-40B
OTL you just had British interests at play, here you have both French and British, which will mix things up
Driftless
Donor
With additional French purchases, along with historic British purchases, there's likely even more constraints on both Curtis and North American..... Who's the most likely candidate(s) to backfill backlogged orders - at that point in time?
marathag
Banned
FCM secretly made up plans for a larger turret on the S-35 up to 1435mm ring with a real turret basket, and 3 men squeezed in, while under German Occupation
same 47mm gun
Note the British got three men turrets with a 1370mm ring. The French Tanks didn't lose that interior volume from the Christie Coilsprings
the british would still be very interested in the mustang and it would still be the prefered fighter for the americans themselves . Altough the production numbers might be diffrent than in otl is the point i guess.
I dont see how the germans dont kick the france and british of the continent before doing the soviet invasion even if hitler was obsessed with the soviet invasion. Hell delaying the soviet invasion for a week or two wouldnt be a horrible idea.
I dont see how the germans dont kick the france and british of the continent before doing the soviet invasion even if hitler was obsessed with the soviet invasion. Hell delaying the soviet invasion for a week or two wouldnt be a horrible idea.
The original Marita called for capturing northern Greece (as happened in TTL) and have the Italians and Bulgarians finishing off the Allies with small german contribution. If the Axis failed to do so, then the Germans would return in 1942 to finish the job. After all, it was expected that the USSR would fall in a matter of months. So, overall it resonates with the OTL german strategic thinking.
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