Part 13.1
Part 13. Nullum magnum ingenium
Extract from ch.10, The Fall of the Rising Sun, Brendan Green
During late 1942 the south-east Asian theatre had temporarily become a backwater. During the summer the Japanese had turned their attention to the Pacific, with disastrous results at Midway Island. After a destructive sea battle, the Japanese attempted an amphibious landing, which the US Marine garrison bloodily repulsed. The loss of men and ships gave such a blow to Japanese amphibious capabilities as to deter any further seaborne assaults. A proposed thrust into the Solomon Islands was cancelled, with efforts going instead into the unavailing campaign in New Guinea and the small-scale but savage fighting in the Indies theatre. ‘Borneo remains the pivotal theatre of the war,’ wrote General Imamura, ‘how much we need our sole source of oil! We must hold it at all costs, and make renewed efforts to take Sumatra.’
However, the Japanese never managed to assemble the necessary assets for a second attempt on Sumatra. The growing strength of China, nourished by American supplies via the Burma Road, consumed Japanese attention from the summer onwards. ‘We cannot contemplate any further transfers of air units from China,’ noted Tojo in August, ‘the enemy’s strength grows there.’ By the end of the year the American 'Flying Tigers' had been joined in China by a British fighter wing, nicknamed 'the Red Dragons'. Some Chinese and American officers opposed this, but London insisted, for propaganda and morale reasons. Meanwhile the Allies continued to build up their land-based air power in the Malaya-Sumatra region, so that by the time of the East Indies monsoon, in the autumn, the Allies had gained air superiority over the waters within two hundred miles of Singapore, and the Eastern Fleet could return there.
By the winter Allied decision-makers knew that the phase of Japanese strategic offensives had concluded. General Wavell, having returned to the theatre after extended leave, wrote to the War Council at Christmas 1942: ‘We have stopped the enemy, but no offensive possible by us for some months. Weather alone prevents it currently. If successes in Mediterranean permit transfer of aircraft and landing craft, we envisage taking offensive in April or more probably May.’
Allied commanders had difficult decisions to make this winter, and the challenges of alliance warfare raised their heads. Each of the three theatre commanders for the war against Japan, Nimitz, Macarthur and Wavell, had strong views, and moreover had political masters with strong views of their own. The French, Australian and Dutch had placed their forces under command of the theatre commanders, but retained their own views about their best employments, and retained the right to veto participation in operations in extremis. Finally, Wavell in particular suffered from a complex command structure beneath him. Admiral Cunningham gave steady cooperation, but the same could not be said for his Army and RAF subordinates. General Montgomery in particular made no secret of his belief that he ought to have the supreme command...
All could agree that the liberation of Timor would make a useful first step, relieving Canberra of any anxiety in that quarter, distracting and attriting the Japanese, and giving a base for further operations. US Marines and Australian troops made their landings in March and by the end of April secured most of the key points on the island, including its airfields, though Japanese resistance continued for months in the mountains. Small sea actions were numerous, in which the Allied forces gradually gained the upper hand, especially once USMC aircraft began operating from the island itself, and the Japanese suffered further heavy attrition in the air. ‘They are down to their second squad,’ said one USMC pilot, ‘we shoot them down six or seven to one.’
The main campaign though had to occur further west, making use of the facilities available at Singapore. ‘Borneo or Java - really that is the only question,’ said Admiral Esteva at the Darwin Conference. Many voices, not least the Dutch, argued for an invasion of Java, in order to restore easy sea and air communications with Australia, liberate the capital of the DEI, and free the population from a harsh military rule. ‘We understand Java,’ said Admiral Doorman, ‘we understand the fragility of its economy. We think our Allies under-rate the risk of famine there.’ Fears of famine were a constant undercurrent in Allied debates at this time. Timely shipments of food from Burma averted mass hunger in Bengal, while the Allies struggled to feed Sumatra…
With regard to Java, most Allied governments took the legalistic view that the feeding of the Javanese civil population was, under international law, the responsibility of the occupying power. ‘We can accept no responsibility for the Javanese civil population while Japan occupies the island,’ wrote Churchill, and the French and Americans concurred. Several decision-makers expressed the view that the Javanese had broadly welcomed the Japanese, and should now face the consequences. ‘They did everything they could to hinder our troops last year,’ noted one Australian general. ‘They made their bed…’
Taking the military view, most commanders preferred Borneo. ‘Java is just a political target,’ commented Wavell. ‘Borneo is the key.’ The Japanese, as noted, certainly regarded Borneo as more essential, as it contained the all-important oil. General Macarthur also preferred Borneo as a possible stepping stone to the Philippines, and the French saw it as heading in at least roughly the right direction towards Indochina. Against this, Dutch concerns over Java had little weight. This might have been the right military judgement, but was to have terrible consequences, and led to lasting post-war controversy.
Extract from ch.10, The Fall of the Rising Sun, Brendan Green
During late 1942 the south-east Asian theatre had temporarily become a backwater. During the summer the Japanese had turned their attention to the Pacific, with disastrous results at Midway Island. After a destructive sea battle, the Japanese attempted an amphibious landing, which the US Marine garrison bloodily repulsed. The loss of men and ships gave such a blow to Japanese amphibious capabilities as to deter any further seaborne assaults. A proposed thrust into the Solomon Islands was cancelled, with efforts going instead into the unavailing campaign in New Guinea and the small-scale but savage fighting in the Indies theatre. ‘Borneo remains the pivotal theatre of the war,’ wrote General Imamura, ‘how much we need our sole source of oil! We must hold it at all costs, and make renewed efforts to take Sumatra.’
However, the Japanese never managed to assemble the necessary assets for a second attempt on Sumatra. The growing strength of China, nourished by American supplies via the Burma Road, consumed Japanese attention from the summer onwards. ‘We cannot contemplate any further transfers of air units from China,’ noted Tojo in August, ‘the enemy’s strength grows there.’ By the end of the year the American 'Flying Tigers' had been joined in China by a British fighter wing, nicknamed 'the Red Dragons'. Some Chinese and American officers opposed this, but London insisted, for propaganda and morale reasons. Meanwhile the Allies continued to build up their land-based air power in the Malaya-Sumatra region, so that by the time of the East Indies monsoon, in the autumn, the Allies had gained air superiority over the waters within two hundred miles of Singapore, and the Eastern Fleet could return there.
By the winter Allied decision-makers knew that the phase of Japanese strategic offensives had concluded. General Wavell, having returned to the theatre after extended leave, wrote to the War Council at Christmas 1942: ‘We have stopped the enemy, but no offensive possible by us for some months. Weather alone prevents it currently. If successes in Mediterranean permit transfer of aircraft and landing craft, we envisage taking offensive in April or more probably May.’
Allied commanders had difficult decisions to make this winter, and the challenges of alliance warfare raised their heads. Each of the three theatre commanders for the war against Japan, Nimitz, Macarthur and Wavell, had strong views, and moreover had political masters with strong views of their own. The French, Australian and Dutch had placed their forces under command of the theatre commanders, but retained their own views about their best employments, and retained the right to veto participation in operations in extremis. Finally, Wavell in particular suffered from a complex command structure beneath him. Admiral Cunningham gave steady cooperation, but the same could not be said for his Army and RAF subordinates. General Montgomery in particular made no secret of his belief that he ought to have the supreme command...
All could agree that the liberation of Timor would make a useful first step, relieving Canberra of any anxiety in that quarter, distracting and attriting the Japanese, and giving a base for further operations. US Marines and Australian troops made their landings in March and by the end of April secured most of the key points on the island, including its airfields, though Japanese resistance continued for months in the mountains. Small sea actions were numerous, in which the Allied forces gradually gained the upper hand, especially once USMC aircraft began operating from the island itself, and the Japanese suffered further heavy attrition in the air. ‘They are down to their second squad,’ said one USMC pilot, ‘we shoot them down six or seven to one.’
The main campaign though had to occur further west, making use of the facilities available at Singapore. ‘Borneo or Java - really that is the only question,’ said Admiral Esteva at the Darwin Conference. Many voices, not least the Dutch, argued for an invasion of Java, in order to restore easy sea and air communications with Australia, liberate the capital of the DEI, and free the population from a harsh military rule. ‘We understand Java,’ said Admiral Doorman, ‘we understand the fragility of its economy. We think our Allies under-rate the risk of famine there.’ Fears of famine were a constant undercurrent in Allied debates at this time. Timely shipments of food from Burma averted mass hunger in Bengal, while the Allies struggled to feed Sumatra…
With regard to Java, most Allied governments took the legalistic view that the feeding of the Javanese civil population was, under international law, the responsibility of the occupying power. ‘We can accept no responsibility for the Javanese civil population while Japan occupies the island,’ wrote Churchill, and the French and Americans concurred. Several decision-makers expressed the view that the Javanese had broadly welcomed the Japanese, and should now face the consequences. ‘They did everything they could to hinder our troops last year,’ noted one Australian general. ‘They made their bed…’
Taking the military view, most commanders preferred Borneo. ‘Java is just a political target,’ commented Wavell. ‘Borneo is the key.’ The Japanese, as noted, certainly regarded Borneo as more essential, as it contained the all-important oil. General Macarthur also preferred Borneo as a possible stepping stone to the Philippines, and the French saw it as heading in at least roughly the right direction towards Indochina. Against this, Dutch concerns over Java had little weight. This might have been the right military judgement, but was to have terrible consequences, and led to lasting post-war controversy.
