Es Geloybte Aretz Continuation Thread

czechs and the poles wouldnt be too happy - to say the least - about the changes (looking at the plans for greater austria)
Hungarians i get opposing, but what do the Czechs and poles lose? They are not being germanised.

He was incredibly important - he was the impersonification of the Empire.
Was it because he has ruled for a long time or actions he has done. Did the various groups then have more loyalty to him over the actual state?
 
Hungarians i get opposing, but what do the Czechs and poles lose? They are not being germanised.
Looking at maps of the proposed federalizations all of them had the sudetenland divided from bohemia for example. The cezech OTOH wanted the 3 czech provinces united with their historical borders -including all of the sudetenlands - and if they were proponents of Czechslovakia than the addition of the Slovakian territories.

The poles regarded the whole of Galicia as rightfully theirs: it has been a part of Poland and Austria acquired it by the polish partition. Loosing a very big part of it to ukrainians including some polish majority cities and enclaves was not going to sit well with them.

Was it because he has ruled for a long time or actions he has done. Did the various groups then have more loyalty to him over the actual state?

Mostly because he has ruled for a very long time. But also that he had no qualms about nationalities. He wanted a working, governable empire most of all. If this ment a government in austria relying on slavs instad of german he was Ok with it - see Taafe's chancellorship. He was not a nationalist in any sense which in a vastly multinationalistic empire was a huge bonus.
 
Looking at maps of the proposed federalizations all of them had the sudetenland divided from bohemia for example.

Good point.

Mostly because he has ruled for a very long time. But also that he had no qualms about nationalities.

While I wouldn't want to overstate the actual affection Franz Josef commanded at that point, what he did also provide, in addition to surprisingly even-handed rule and favor, was political legitimacy.
 
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Looking at maps of the proposed federalizations all of them had the sudetenland divided from bohemia for example. The cezech OTOH wanted the 3 czech provinces united with their historical borders -including all of the sudetenlands - and if they were proponents of Czechslovakia than the addition of the Slovakian territories.

The poles regarded the whole of Galicia as rightfully theirs: it has been a part of Poland and Austria acquired it by the polish partition. Loosing a very big part of it to ukrainians including some polish majority cities and enclaves was not going to sit well with them.
so people are just being unreasonable then as why on earth would the czechs think government would allow them to rule german majority land.

Btw what was life like for the muslims in austria hungary the bosniaks. What was their place?
 
I might have missed if this was mentioned before, but what is the status of ethnic germans in the hungarian part of the empire? My ethnic german grandfather lived in Vojvodina near Sombor, and he told me about the attempted magyarization policies during world war 2. Would the hungarians attempt to magyarize germans, and if they did, to what extent? Or does being part of the austro-hungarian empire mean ethnic germans are considered above that?
 
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so people are just being unreasonable then as why on earth would the czechs think government would allow them to rule german majority land.

Btw what was life like for the muslims in austria hungary the bosniaks. What was their place?

Nationalism was usually unresonable. But we have to say for them they too had their reasons. The land of the Czech Crown were Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia. These were traditionally their lands and their borders havent changed (except for Silesia) for a millenia in any meaningful way. Tearing away the Sudetenlands was tantamount to sacrilege for a lot of czech nationalists. And they could make the argument that the germans moved in later - and wouldnt be completly wrong.

for muslims:
AFAIK with hindsight they regard it as a Golden Age. I think even than they were aware of this but im less sure about that.
My personal opinion is that they were incredibly lucky to end up in Austria instead of Serbia. Austria made an effort to help and to integrate them - an additional nationality that was no frineds with the serbs was something they could really use - and thus supported. The development of the bosniak nationality (I dont know how to put this) was a special project of theirs and was supported by Austria for this reasons wholeheatadly. In comparison if they ended up in Serbia I suspect that they would have been subjected to opression and even some ethnic cleansing - I say this based on the fate of all the muslim minorities that existed on the Balkans in territories that later ended up in Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece- All of them disappeared. I think the bosniaks were too numerous to completly wipe out or to forcefully remove to the ottoman empire but im also sure that they ending up in Austria at the time saved them from a much worse fate.
 
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These are the images i find googling franz Ferdinand federation plans. So it seems german enclaves are only autonomous. None in vojvodina, so what is the vojvodina a serb state? Also why no mention of bosnia?
 
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These are the images i find googling franz Ferdinand federation plans. So it seems german enclaves are only autonomous. None in vojvodina, so what is the vojvodina a serb state? Also why no mention of bosnia?
Because technically Bosnia was not a part of Austria-Hungary in 1906, as it was officially Ottoman territory Austria-Hungary had a treaty-given right to occupy and administrate (it was not officially annexed until 1908).
 
Because technically Bosnia was not a part of Austria-Hungary in 1906, as it was officially Ottoman territory Austria-Hungary had a treaty-given right to occupy and administrate (it was not officially annexed until 1908).
So thats 6 years of offical rule, were there not any ideas. This tl they still have it still so any ideas how austria would deal with it?
 
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Hungarians i get opposing, but what do the Czechs and poles lose? They are not being germanised.


Was it because he has ruled for a long time or actions he has done. Did the various groups then have more loyalty to him over the actual state?

Like others pointed out, nationalism is under no obligation to be reasonable. Eery nationality in this mix has a glorious history to resrrect and nobody is happy to settle for (shudder) compromise. And with generations of people certain that it was only the dead weight of the Völkerkerker stopping their emergence as mighty nations, the realisation that reform is not going to give them everythig they want is going to be painful. And that is before even strting to considerthe kind of leadership skils and personal likeableness issues Franz Ferdinand brings to the table.

Any reform of Austria-Hungary that is not unilaterally imposed will leave everyone unhappy.

so people are just being unreasonable then as why on earth would the czechs think government would allow them to rule german majority land.

Because it is hostorically Bohemian soil and to give up even a foot of it would be tantamount to betraying your blood kin, right?

THere is a psychopathology very specific to European politics between 1800 and 1950, and this is it.

Btw what was life like for the muslims in austria hungary the bosniaks. What was their place?

Obviously they were horrifically oppressed by an uncaring and brutal government that treated them like - everybody else, basically. THere was a fair amount of racism and bias and they frequently got the short end of the stick, but realistically, this is not a bad time to be a Bosniak, For one thing, the government is actually invested in not having your neighbours kill you. THere will be a Bosnian modernity.

I might have missed if this was mentioned before, but what is the status of ethnic germans in the hungarian part of the empire? My ethnic german grandfather lived in Vojvodina near Sombor, and he told me about the attempted magyarization policies during world war 2. Would the hungarians attempt to magyarize germans, and if they did, to what extent? Or does being part of the austro-hungarian empire mean ethnic germans are considered above that?

By the unspoken rules of Who is Whose Bitch, you can't Magyarise Germans the way you can Magyarize Romanians. It is known. But there is a multitude of unpleasantnesses that can meet you if you will not speak Hungarian around te time of the 1937 Ausgleich's failure, and being German does not exempt you from all of them.

So thats 6 years of offical rule, were there not any ideas. This tl they still have it still so any ideas how austria would deal with it?

Eventually, there will be a separate quasi-national entity in the context of the imperial state. But it will not be a happy one.
 
Did I mention I hate doing AH with AH?

I get it, it’s pretty hard to really project what way it would be going, and honestly while I think AH could have survived, I have no real idea how it would have survived. As example if the Austrian Empire had collapsed in 1848, the alt. me would have never had guessed that the Austrian Empire would have turned into Austria-Hungary. The Habsburg were really good at doing what people didn’t expect.
 
I get it, it’s pretty hard to really project what way it would be going, and honestly while I think AH could have survived, I have no real idea how it would have survived. As example if the Austrian Empire had collapsed in 1848, the alt. me would have never had guessed that the Austrian Empire would have turned into Austria-Hungary. The Habsburg were really good at doing what people didn’t expect.

Its pretty hard but for your example I wouldnt say impossible.
Look at it like this: 1848 brought forth the possibility of Austria being booted out of both Italy and Germany - though it was impossible at the time to say for sure but if you suppose this happens the austrian part of the equation makes already sense. The hungarians have remained in opposition end under opression after the revolution but it was also quit probable that at least the more reasonable part of their leadership will come around - if only Austria offers or is willing to accept a deal.
So if you just after the 1848 revolutions imagine a future where Austria has lost Italy and Germany (not sure but not impossible) you will have to ask what they will do? The defeats will have shown them that relying only on the german conservatives to rule their empire is not practical. Its probable that at some point they will try a more liberal approach. However as the germans in themselves are still too few they might try to widen their support a bit more. There are 2 candidates for this: the czech and the hungarian. Both are problematic - recent rebellions. For pro's the czech are richer and more industrialized why the hungarians are more numerous. But most importantly practical sonsiderations: The main nationalistic gripe of the czech were with the germans - and by main I mean nearly the only one. The hungarians on the other hand had problems with a lot of nationalities - but germans were only a small part of this and unlike Bohemia Hungary was never regarded as a german land by the germans. So it would be also much easier to come to an understanding with the hungarians than the czech without alienating the most important group - the germans. Than there is tradition: Hungary has been regarded as the second most important title for the austrian habsburgs ever since their acquired it and for most if its history enjoyed some level of autonomy under the habsburg domains. We might not think of this as much today but at time and especially for the Habsburgs it mattered.
Looking at all that its not at all improbable - though far from certain or even sure - that an Austria that looses Italy and Germany will come to an understanding with the hungarians.

As for the Empire's survival: its far from impossible. Its important that its people should continue to have their hopes for a better future be based on it. Like I said earlier: OTL before WWI most of its people hoped not for secession or independence but of the reform of the Empire in their way. Loosing this could be a death blow.
Howeve that hoped for reform has to come sometime - and it will be a disappointment for most as a necessity. The tricky part and the way Austria could have survived was if the disappointment is for everybody through the compromises made and is not so big a disappointment as to turn them against the Empire. To put it simply if people will say afterward: Its not what we hoped for but we can live with it and at least the (insert random austrian nationality) did not get all their wanted either - it was a success and the Empire will be fine. The problem is that FF as I see it was not a very diplomatic guy and not the man to work hard to get the most sensible compromises. Thus if he gets the throne my expectations of Austria's survival are drastically lowered.
 
Is there any reason besides its being very complicated?

Most everywhere has an internal complexity that outside observers ignore at ther peril, but Austri-Hungary is a universe in itself, a place where it can seem like every province has as much histpry and geography as a major Western European nation. And because so much of this nation is based on conscious political will - AH has no intertia - all of it potentially matters. THere is no way to do this lazily and remotely well.
 
Most everywhere has an internal complexity that outside observers ignore at ther peril, but Austri-Hungary is a universe in itself, a place where it can seem like every province has as much histpry and geography as a major Western European nation. And because so much of this nation is based on conscious political will - AH has no intertia - all of it potentially matters. THere is no way to do this lazily and remotely well.

Honestly I think that you should look at the economic policies of AH, I think that will fundamental be the factor which going to shape the empire. AH embraced before the policies which rather laissez faire, we will likely see that continue. We can expect few public investments in infrastructure, low taxes and very pro-business policies. The result will be strong boom and burst circles with high growth un good times, a very unequal society as result we will see high birth rates . At the same time the many different ethnic groups will result in dysfunctional political system like a worse version of the American system right now. The result will likely be that some kind of unifying factor will be needed. The group trying to unify the Left will be the Social Democrats, which will likely grow stronger as industrial area grow in importance and the impoverished rural people move to these regions creating a identity as Austrian Social Democrats, the right will early on push a Habsburgian identity, but without the prestige of Frank Joseph this will likely weaken, and I see fascism rise as the Right’s idea of imperial unity, a ideology where the state tries to enforce a common identity from top-down through schooling and military conscription. I could very well see the AH embrace one of these models.
 
The end of Germany's twenty-year flirtation with Integralist tyranny, much like its beginning, was marked not by a grand event marking historical sea change, but by a widespread sense of disorientation and loss. Too many historians today readily share the facile dismissal recorded by the movement's nominal leader and focus, Wilhelm III, as “my personal comic opera”. In reality, millions of Germans dedicated their lives to the cause of Kaiserheil and felt a devastating emptiness in their lives as the Conservative Revolution petered out in a series of corruption scandals and broken promises. Even Wilhelm himself, though famously cynic and no respect of protocol, spoke his famous words in 1946, not in 1930, when he was still happy to participate in the pomp and circumstance that his admiring populace laid on.


Even though it must have appeared difficult to believe even at the time, the tens of thousands of youths assembled in Berlin to shout “Heil dem Kaiser”, the paunchy, middle-aged petit-bourgeis squeezed into their fantasy uniforms, the white-clad girls performing gymnastics calculated to prepare them for healthy motherhood, and the thousands of elderly teachers reading out fervid orations to sleepy classes just before term's end in the summer heat were entirely serious. They believed what they were told by a carefully orchestrated array of media – newspapers and magazines, educational films, and the new radio. They genuinely saw themselves as part of a greater whole and wanted to serve the Volkskörper with every fibre of their being.


That is why the succession of chancellors as the Nationalpartei replaced the Nationale Volkspartei as the strongest party in the Reichstag in 1936, then was eclipsed by the Deutschnationale Partei in the snap election of 1938, then returned to brief pre-eminence in 1939 was such a galling disappointment. We understand the infighting behind the scenes that led to these machinations better today, but a movement that venerated leadership and depended on personal sacrifice to function was ill served by this spectacle. Though a right-wing majority coalition could still be devised in the 1940 and 1942 Reichstage, the end was inexorably drawing near, not because a powerful new movement was taking power – nothing electrified the German voting public – but because the voting pool dissipated. In more and more districts, as the various conservative parties called off their electoral pact, shares of 20-30% returned Zentrum and SPD candidates to office buoyed not by enthusiasm, but by the exhaustion of their opponents. Despite all efforts to rig the vote in rural constituencies, the conservative revolution was finished. As chancellor von Thaden resigned in disgrace in late 1942, the nation awoke to a collective hangover.


It could not have been timed more inauspiciously. The conservative parties had drawn the country's public into an obsessive preoccupation with internal dissent, national character and austerity that had excluded almost all outside events except as they pertained to domestic policy. Their foreign policy had largely consisted of a show of strength, the victory dividend of 1908 that allowed Germ,any to claim uncontested hegemony of its Eastern periphery. They had no actual plans to reinforce or make good such claims, never considering the need for anything but the power to assert them. Now disgraced in the public eye, their rhetorical tropes failed to convince even where they would have been appropriate.


While the representatives of the conservative political movement had been well known for bellicose speeches, the actual masterminds of the Great General Staff proved reluctant warriors. Von Seeckt was shaken by the experience of losing the basis of public support that the army had been building patiently since the tenure of Field Marshal von der Goltz. The resurgence of Russian power had long been viewed with majestic unconcern, but this had rapidly turned into dismayed panic as the Greco-Turkish War unfolded. Bureaucratic infighting had returned the commanding heights of a number of departments to 'Falkenhayner' officers who deplored the use of copious resources on paramilitary programmes and mass mobilisation. Their chorus that the military was unprepared, underequipped and technologically backward added to the indecision at the top. Emperor Wilhelm was in the habit of taking experts seriously, even when they brought bad news.


Meanwhile, the actual cabinet, the one entity that could have taken a determined stance in the face of Russian aggression, consisted of an uneasy alliance of Zentrum, SPD, national minority parties and liberals, all with two decades' worth of opposition under their belt and no government experience. Desperate to distance themselves from the noisy and muscular diplomacy of their predecessors and only too ready to embrace the narrative of misgovernment having left the army unready for war, they proved unwilling to escalate the confrontation to the last.


None of this translated into a deliberate policy of appeasement. Germany spent the years between 1942 and 1944 rearming, preparing for a conflict that was largely considered inevitable. However, the indecision at the highest levels of government, an increasingly reclusive and ailing emperor and a certain amount of blundering by inexperienced ministers encouraged the Russian leadership to take risks that made a climbdown increasingly impossible. There is a degree of truth in the charge of future historians that as the Russian bear had been needled into the first war, he had been baited into the second.
 
got a question saw on reddit something about a german princess family using the rifht to be forgotten due to her saying something about hating muslims or something. What are the censorship laws/ lese-majeste laws. Do they get used to stop coverage when royals do stupid or bad things.

Also in modern times does bavaria, Saxony still have their own embassies and armies?
 
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