As Germany stands on the shoulders of von Clausewitz and Moltke the Elder does Germany have Principles of War ? Would you care or dare to enumerate them ?
Es Geloybte Aretz Continuation Thread
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That is a complicated question. These things are matters opf public political debate in Germany at that point, after all. I'll try briefly, though.
The German leadership is still wedded to the idea of decisive battle, but it analyses it on a different scale. War takes place between nations and economies, not between armies, and it follows that the battle involves all theatres of war and that all avenues of attack are legitimate. The idea is to remove the enemy's capacity to make war.
The big dispute about the matter is how to best do that. Some focus on the war at the level of the economy and mainly worry about the capacity to mobilise forces and manage production capacity in terms of quantity. Others mostly think in more narrrow battlefield terms and see technology as a game-changing force multiplier. These two groups do not actually disagree on the what, just on the how.
A much bigger debate, and an unresolved one, is the question of the justification for war. in a way, Germany was 'lucky' in having been attacked in both wars ITTL. But German politics is riven between a more left/liberal position of war as a legal measure that requires certain conditions to be legitimate, and a conservative/völkisch position of war as a means of policy that can be deployed as a government sees fit. There is nothing like the veneration of law of nations we have in many places IOTL, but a strong idea that something as consequential as war should not be embarked upon without a very good reason.
One thing that the German military establishment is largely in agreement on is a brutally pragmatic approach to the laws of war. It is not quite nulla ius in bello, but comes rather too close for comfort. The General staff considers the hague convention a set of rather sensible suggestions as long as they are mutually respercted, but they have absolutely no compunction about breaking them whenever the situation seems to call for it.
Another thing is that when it comes to war, there are no half measures. War is all or nothing - if you declare it, you fight for keeps. The only reason why Germany might be looking at a long drawn-out conflict anywhere is lack of available resources. It does not view colonial conflicts the way the British in India or the French in North Africa do. You can police an unruly area for many years, accepting that it changes very little, but once the army gets involved, there must be a conclusion. Much unnecessary suffering was caused by this belief.
Was that what you had in mind?
Man's Moments, Stefan Zweig, Petropolis, 23 February 1942 [post canon]
This country is beautiful: its landscape, language, nature, climate, her women supreme.
It is the union of the best of Europe and the New World; the Fortunate Islands Magellan sought for.
I could not be happier.
This country is beautiful: its landscape, language, nature, climate, her women supreme.
It is the union of the best of Europe and the New World; the Fortunate Islands Magellan sought for.
I could not be happier.
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Got a question does any idea of nordic unity/ pan-scandinavianism exist in this tl? As in post ww2 sweden wanted a nordic alliance but denmark chose nato instead. Does it not exist due to Sweden being closer to germany, and Denmark to the United Kingdom?
Also is Finland less attached to nordic idea popular view due to them being closer to germany. As in most people think Finland is a Scandinavian nation in RL, but here are they considered close to the baltic nations?
Also is Finland less attached to nordic idea popular view due to them being closer to germany. As in most people think Finland is a Scandinavian nation in RL, but here are they considered close to the baltic nations?
Complex issue, I will try a simple answer.
Nordic unity is popular of course. it speaks to everything this TL loves: Ethnic nationalism, great power politics, and a mysticism of history and race.
For entirely practical reasons, it will not get any serious traction. Sweden is deeply concerned abourt Russia and supremely unworried by Germany (which cannot credibly threaten it and depends on its exports). Denmark is in the exact opposite situation, unconcerned with Russia, but deeply suspicious of Germany. Norway, meanwhile, distrusts Sweden's intention and has no desire whatsoever to be dragged into a possible war with either Russia or Germany which it stands nothing to gain from and really can't afford. There is no way you can get the security needs of these three countries to align.
Finland is in a somewhat odd situation with regard to this. It is widely seen as 'another one of that bunch', basically a Scandinavian country with a funny population substrate (it 'helps' that the ruling class speak mostly Swedish at home and German with visitors). Its status as a recently liberated nation from under the Russian yoke allows many oddities to pass. However - that is very much an uninfoprmed outside view, much the same that allows modern Europeans to see Pakistan and Egypt as basically 'the same thing'. Finland itself does most emphatically NOT see itself as a Scandinavian country. It is not interested in being part of a union with Sweden thankyouVERYmuch, and it's not like they didn't offer. The psychological need to show they are not a Swedish client state (which they are) is as strong in Helsinki (don't say Helsingfors) as it is in Stockholm to show they are not a German client (which they are).
Estonia is a Finish client state. There is no question about that. Estonia embraces the idea of having a big brother.
kham_coc
Banned
I recently re-read the finished timeline, and i was reminded of Lieutenant-Colonel Brede - so what happened with him?
Now my question is less about him specifically, and more generally, what happened with the Ex-czarist officers.
Understandably Germany wouldn't be particularly interested in putting Ex-czarist officers in charge of Ex-czarist soldiers in their legions, but on the other hand, there would almost certainly be a distinct lack of officers in said legions, and afterwards in their local armies too.
And to be fair, now i'm wondering what happened with Lieutenant-Colonel Brede
Generally speaking, this is not an ideological war the way the second one would become. As a result, having served in the Czar's army is not a black mark against a man. Brede and anyone like him would be welcome in his native town. This is a world that believes on ties of blood, in the duties of a gentleman, and in honouring loyalty. They check all the boxes.I recently re-read the finished timeline, and i was reminded of Lieutenant-Colonel Brede - so what happened with him?
Now my question is less about him specifically, and more generally, what happened with the Ex-czarist officers.
Understandably Germany wouldn't be particularly interested in putting Ex-czarist officers in charge of Ex-czarist soldiers in their legions, but on the other hand, there would almost certainly be a distinct lack of officers in said legions, and afterwards in their local armies too.
And to be fair, now i'm wondering what happened with Lieutenant-Colonel Brede
Of course, they will never be near the levers of true power. Brede might join the new army and one day command a depot. He may become a policeman or civil servant and run a records office or a rural station house. He will not be holding high office or trusted with sensitive secrets. Those jobs go to those who fought on the winning side.
And to many men like him, there is a stark economic reality to face up to: The Czar's government honours its pension obligations, and to many of them, their military rank (and attendant patent of nobility) is the only capital they have in this world. But Moscow will not pay a kopek to someone who repudiates Russian citizenship, and that is the one thing they would unequivocally be asked to do if they wanted to settle in the new states. Many honourable men are left penniless and dependent on poorly paid civilian employment after returning to their ancestral homelands. Others are resigned to never seeing their childhood homes and families again in return for the security of a parsimonious military pension.
Brede did reasonably well for himself. He owned land, after all. After a year in a Swedish POW camp, he was released on parole and ended his life as a gentleman farmer, in reduced circumstances, but still a substantial member of his community.
Also, while pan-Scandinavianism and pan-Nordism didn't succeed in OTL neither did it fully fail, there was a lot of cooperation and transnational organization in the region. But these things were too significant extent caused by the rise of Hitler and the Great Depression. With the rise of Hitler SPD stopped being a factor in the Nordic countries, whose Social Democratic parties were closely connected to each other, instead the local SocDem began cooperating in the Nordic region with the Swedish party being the biggest, but not able to dominate the other parties, SPD will dominate the Nordic parties who will end up in orbit of Berlin. This factor is also strengthened by the fact that under OTL Cold War, there was not a foreign city dominating the Nordic intelligentsia, here Berlin will be the place Nordic people travel to make it big, they will likely join Balts and Poles in the pubs and cafes of Berlin. SocDem, Consevative and Social Liberal parties will orient themselves toward their German sister parties. The Danish minority in Schleswig will only strengthen this integration as they will serve as a bridgehead for Nordic literature and culture in Germany and German literature and culture in the Nordic countries [1].
[1] I don't think it's accidental that Nordic Noir have done rather well earlier in Germany than most places, I think the relative "large" Danish minority in Schleswig has made it easy to translate Scandinavian literature into German. Because of different cultural structures in Denmark, German more "highbrow" culture is less likely to make it the other way, while "lowbrow" German culture is seeing increasing popularity in Jutland and among the older population.
Has historiography been able to agree on an official start date for the Second Russo-German War ?
Not internationally. But everyone agrees that the 'shit really hit the fan' moment was when Russia started the offensive against Poland and Lithuania.
Can i ask a question so what is Germany's Bloc like? Can it be compared to the EU as does it have common policies, laws, and free movement. Does the German EU (i know the EU doesn't exist i've forgotten what the name of germany bloc is called so im just refering to it as Germanys eu for simplicity sake) have any institutions similar to the EU? If so are the utterly dominated by germany? As in are these organisations all based in Germany or do they spread all across the bloc some in Baltic, Poland and, Ukraine? Lastly is there a common defensive pact or military alliance? If so Does Germany have military bases in those nations? Do these bases have the same effect US bases have in europe. European governments greatly want their country to host a US military base, and the bases support the local economy greatly? Is this the case with Eastern european economies?
Okay more questions Does anyone willing want to share their thoughts on what Polands relations with other bloc members nations are like that aren't germany. Is Poland the UK to Germany USA? Do other nations consider them bossy? Also how do other nations now deal with there polish minorities, has poland been snooping around?
Okay more questions Does anyone willing want to share their thoughts on what Polands relations with other bloc members nations are like that aren't germany. Is Poland the UK to Germany USA? Do other nations consider them bossy? Also how do other nations now deal with there polish minorities, has poland been snooping around?
That's a tough one. Let me try to do it justice (it's been a long day, I will try to be brief):
It's not like the EU in that it has no unitary institutional identity. It's more like the Cold War 'Western bloc' of NATO, WTO, EEC, Bretton Woods and other overlapping organisational frameworks that not everyone is a member of all, but that in combination make a distinct identity. There is no free movement and no shared law, but there are treaties stipulating all kinds of things, and German industrial policy is de facto set for much of the continent through sheer force of gravity.
The institutions are spread out and often quite light in personnel and influence, but they are mainly dominated by Germany in much the same way Prussia dominates the shared institutions of the Reich. This is not a coincidence.
There is a common defensive pact as of 1953, but the various alliances Germany built up in the years after 1908 amounted to effectively the same thing. Germany promised to defend its allies against attack, and they promised to do the same for Germany, which in effect meant promising to go along with Germany's wars as and when they happened. Austria-Hungary would have been able to weasel out of it if it had wanted to. The Netherlands and Sweden might have. The rest are effectively vassals and must follow where Berlin leads.
Germany has military bases in some countries, but not the same way the USA has bases in NATO countries. They maintain relatively small skeleton contingents and facilities in various places, but not actual combat formations on the ground. There are a few exceptions to that rule. The naval port at Riga and several areodromes in southern Finland, eastern Poland, and Wolhynia represent serious 'boots on the ground'. The locals appreciate them the same way they do garrisons of their own armies, economically speaking, but these are not comparable to something like Ramstein or Lakenheath.
Poland is - interesting. Their neighbours do not appreciate them throwing their weight around. There are too many unresolved issues over who is the true heir to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Polish national myth is one of local dominance. But it is also in many ways a model to look to for nation-building, a system that works.
National minorotes are the itching powder in the gears of a smoothly running Mitteleuropa, always will be, and the Poles are no exception. but Warsaw is generally civilised about it, and the neighbouring countries generally treat their Poles well enough (on the understanding this state of affairs could end if they didn't, if nothing else). Think about diplomatic recriminations, ambassadors called in, loud press feuds and gransdstanding, though, not armed insurgencies, enforced exterritoriality or Sudetenland shenanigans. Berlin won't stand for that.
And in case you're wondering what I've been so busy with I can't spend any time here: This.
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Looks fabulous, might have to pick up a copy for myself!
After re-reading the timeline again recently, I've pondered how things would've turned out had the Ligue somehow been able to carry the 1906 election. If an electoral victory seemed likely, would Déroulède not proceed with his silly putsch and remained Prime Minister of France in time for the war between Germany and Russia? If so, would France have joined the war alongside Russia after taking time to properly modernize and conscript its forces as General de Pellieux suggested? An escalation from a Russo-German war to a general World War would be a whole different ballgame.
Pichon rebuffed Purishkevich with ease in 1907, but I wonder how such a conversation with Syveton would have gone.
After re-reading the timeline again recently, I've pondered how things would've turned out had the Ligue somehow been able to carry the 1906 election. If an electoral victory seemed likely, would Déroulède not proceed with his silly putsch and remained Prime Minister of France in time for the war between Germany and Russia? If so, would France have joined the war alongside Russia after taking time to properly modernize and conscript its forces as General de Pellieux suggested? An escalation from a Russo-German war to a general World War would be a whole different ballgame.
Pichon rebuffed Purishkevich with ease in 1907, but I wonder how such a conversation with Syveton would have gone.
At the moment, the narrative is stuck in the mid-40s - Second Russo-German War. But the broad story outline was working on is mapped to the 2010s. If I ever get to write it.
That is one of the most popular WIs in ATL's AH scene, and beloved on the French right. And it's not unrealistic, though very likely it would have triggered a British entry into the war and thus produced a global confrontation that would end in a bitter peace of exhaustion.
If Britain is on the German/Austrian side, wouldn't they just win outright?