Yes but Germany are ahead of France even through they have had several major disaster over the 20th century (Versailles, Nazi rule, WWII, Communist rule in East Germany). I have a hard time seeing France doing so much better because it doesn’t suffer a WWI and WWII, that it make up for Germany not having all these disasters which hit it either.
Es Geloybte Aretz Continuation Thread
- Thread starter carlton_bach
- Start date
So on Austria-Hungary, it's a difficult scenario to play out because there are so many moving parts. I think a case study would be helpful in illustrating what I mean.
Let's look at the city of Bratislava/Pozsony/Pressburg
OTL according to the 1910 census the ethnic breakdown of the city was 42% German, 41% Hungarian and 15% Slovak. This census plausibly over counts Hungarians a bit and we have had a few fewer years of Magyarisation but I suspect the breakdown is broadly accurate immediately following this timeline's Russo-German war. So what happens to this principle city so close to Vienna? Three scenarios.
1) The Slovak population dramatically increases compared to the other two
Austria-Hungary comes out of the war economically distressed but as victors and thus industrialisation and urbanisation increase as the economy begins to grow post war. This involves populations that are rural in the surrounding area (in this city's case many Slovaks) move to the urban areas in search of work. Slovaks would move to the largest cities near them with Bratislava being the principle. As such overtime the city increasingly becomes associated with the concept of Slovakia in any independent state.
2) The Hungarian population dramatically increases compared to the other two
Austria-Hungary continues as it is in the OTL which as far as Hungary's minorities are concern means more Magyarisation. Pozsony is ruled from Budapest and German and Slovak are somewhat suppressed and in the city use of Hungarian is encouraged and matters for further personal development. The city might not be the primary destination for rural Hungarians to move to but its still important by the 1930's the city is firmly seen as linguistically and ethnically Hungarian.
3) The German population dramatically increases compared to the other two
Austria-Hungary is deeply intertwined in Mittleeuropa and as such German becomes the lingua-franca of the area and hugely important. The open trade routes dramatically improve the economy of Austria-Hungary post war. Vienna sees a huge boost and Pressburg should be thought of as a satellite settlement to Vienna being so close. Regardless of efforts from Hungary to suppress German, it is the key language for Mittleeuropa and is vital to learn. Slovaks who move to the city pick up German as their go too second language and integrate better. By the 1930's the city is mostly bilingual and many people are trilingual but nearly everyone speaks German. The economy is so interconnected with Vienna that any division of Austria-Hungary would see the city and its environs placed within the new German-Austria.
Some of these outcomes are more likely than others and all are plausible. This is a rather extreme example since the city is on the cusp of three language zones and clearly will see urbanisation and much change. But a similar pattern repeats in many other cities like Lviv/Lwow/Lemberg with its Ukranian/Polish/Yiddish divisions. And also in Hungary proper where many Swabian Germans exist and where their culture and language rights are almost certainly better protected than OTL. But we can easily create plausible scenarios where they move or stay or are assimilated. This is before we get to the mess in the Balkans with Croats/Serbs/Bosnians.
On the one hand this is a recipe for confusion. On the other hand it gives the author of the timeline, in this case @carlton_bach a relatively free hand to paint a plausible scenario as he sees fit. Do the Hungarians suppress their minorities, does German rise, do the minorities take hold of the cities, does the economy thrive or is the bureaucracy so sclerotic that the country gets left behind in the Mitteeuropa growth?
Let's look at the city of Bratislava/Pozsony/Pressburg
OTL according to the 1910 census the ethnic breakdown of the city was 42% German, 41% Hungarian and 15% Slovak. This census plausibly over counts Hungarians a bit and we have had a few fewer years of Magyarisation but I suspect the breakdown is broadly accurate immediately following this timeline's Russo-German war. So what happens to this principle city so close to Vienna? Three scenarios.
1) The Slovak population dramatically increases compared to the other two
Austria-Hungary comes out of the war economically distressed but as victors and thus industrialisation and urbanisation increase as the economy begins to grow post war. This involves populations that are rural in the surrounding area (in this city's case many Slovaks) move to the urban areas in search of work. Slovaks would move to the largest cities near them with Bratislava being the principle. As such overtime the city increasingly becomes associated with the concept of Slovakia in any independent state.
2) The Hungarian population dramatically increases compared to the other two
Austria-Hungary continues as it is in the OTL which as far as Hungary's minorities are concern means more Magyarisation. Pozsony is ruled from Budapest and German and Slovak are somewhat suppressed and in the city use of Hungarian is encouraged and matters for further personal development. The city might not be the primary destination for rural Hungarians to move to but its still important by the 1930's the city is firmly seen as linguistically and ethnically Hungarian.
3) The German population dramatically increases compared to the other two
Austria-Hungary is deeply intertwined in Mittleeuropa and as such German becomes the lingua-franca of the area and hugely important. The open trade routes dramatically improve the economy of Austria-Hungary post war. Vienna sees a huge boost and Pressburg should be thought of as a satellite settlement to Vienna being so close. Regardless of efforts from Hungary to suppress German, it is the key language for Mittleeuropa and is vital to learn. Slovaks who move to the city pick up German as their go too second language and integrate better. By the 1930's the city is mostly bilingual and many people are trilingual but nearly everyone speaks German. The economy is so interconnected with Vienna that any division of Austria-Hungary would see the city and its environs placed within the new German-Austria.
Some of these outcomes are more likely than others and all are plausible. This is a rather extreme example since the city is on the cusp of three language zones and clearly will see urbanisation and much change. But a similar pattern repeats in many other cities like Lviv/Lwow/Lemberg with its Ukranian/Polish/Yiddish divisions. And also in Hungary proper where many Swabian Germans exist and where their culture and language rights are almost certainly better protected than OTL. But we can easily create plausible scenarios where they move or stay or are assimilated. This is before we get to the mess in the Balkans with Croats/Serbs/Bosnians.
On the one hand this is a recipe for confusion. On the other hand it gives the author of the timeline, in this case @carlton_bach a relatively free hand to paint a plausible scenario as he sees fit. Do the Hungarians suppress their minorities, does German rise, do the minorities take hold of the cities, does the economy thrive or is the bureaucracy so sclerotic that the country gets left behind in the Mitteeuropa growth?
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The city is very close to the slovakian/hungarian divide in populace. So it would get a big number of hungarian immigrants as well (beside slovakian). Magyarization will likely continue not necesserily forced as well. What I mean if you want a carreer or simply work as a public servant you will have to speak hungarian. Speaking German would be important and mostly spoken by anyone a bit better educated but as long as the city remain part of Hungary it will be the most important language to know.
In regards of A-H the following are factors to be considered:
1. I dont remember any episodes in TTL about how Austria handled its nationalities. OTL the Austrian military handling czech and ruthenian people as traitors from the get go and in many cases without reason was a huge factor in eroding the loyalty of the people towards the monarchy. We know that there was aczech legion at the very least which should not help with czech-austrian relations.
2. Hungary: Change is inevitable. Hungary was pretty stable before the war - oppressive but stable. However there is no way that after the war you dont give voting rights to veterans at the very last. This will change hungarian politics drastically - before the war the national minorities despite being about half the populace (croatian pairlaiment was seperate) had barely any representation in the hungarian pairlaiment. The lower classes of hungarians too will get representations. OTL interwar the magnates managed to retain a complete control ower hungarian politics despite these - however they didnt have any national minorities to contend with so this is anyones guess.
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It is an article of faith among film lovers throughout the English-speaking world today that German productions are more intellectually stimulating and more artistically accomplished than those of any other nation. This reputation is not undeserved, but neither is it universally justified. The German film industry has an interesting and chequered history, and most of its products are as much designed to cater to mass taste as those of Hollywood and the Imperial Studios. That these are rarely seen in Britain today is owed more to the vagaries of distribution than any discernment in taste, but it has ensured that most German films that do show here are of the highbrow variety.
The beginnings of the German film industry as an industry – unlike that of Britain and France, but similar to the American studio system – were created by political accident. Film was still a new medium when the General Staff's department IIIb 4 – propaganda and censorship – approached a number of production firms about raising public morale. The resulting short clips – standard length at the time was between three and ten minutes – were not very dissimilar in theme from previous patriotic fare, but the cooperation of the military ensured far higher production values. Their popularity both at home and abroad convinced German producers that investing in scale could pay dividends at about the same time the first major investors were willing to put money into moving pictures. What had been a cottage industry of documentary and comedy footage turned into a highly competitive entertainment arm of the great press empires, and for a decade after 1907, no country could hope to match the lavish scale on which the Mutuum-bank financed DeFAG and the Ullstein-owned Aurora Film produced.
A second factor in the success of German filmmaking was the ability to competitively produce high-quality photographic materials. Especially AGFA with its innovative processes and large spare capacity after the war ensured that German studios had access to the best film priced in mark. Since many early productions were export successes, this was approved by the economy ministry and supported generously by the völkische propagandist groups who were keen on projecting Germany's might and status abroad.
German films of the time were known for their scale, growing in length as well as complexity and lavish production values. When the DeFAG produced Die Brücke am Bug in 1912, it was both the longest and most expensive film yet made, running to 47 minutes and involving over 2000 extras, most of them military. By 1918, most large-scale productions ran to either 30 or 60 minutes and it was not uncommon for a high-end production to involve mass scenes and elaborate scenery. The 1919 history film Tannenberg broke the record set in 1916 by the US production The Klansman for both length – 217 minutes – and scale – 34 actors and 5000 extras. Its elaborate, artistically lit and cut battle scenes retain the ability to inspire and horrify in equal measure to this day while D W Griffith's work has aged badly. Meanwhile, Aurora Film based in cosmopolitan Berlin desperately sought ways to compete with the funding and government support enjoyed by DeFAG and found it in cutting-edge novelty. Innovative technologies, artistic techniques and not least hot topics of the day were used in its often daring productions. Directors such as Murnau, Lang, Bevenser, Oswald, Sternberg and Pabst worked for the Ullstein brand, producing memorable successes of modern filmmaking. The legendary qualities of the production department behind Opium!, Vampyr, Mordkommission, Das Lied der Kosaken and Asphaltblumen have served to cover much less memorable output in later years.
The greatest single factor in putting German film studios on an equal footing with American ones, though, was imperial patronage. Wilhelm III was an avid and public cinemagoer, a fact that was not lost on the aspiring rich of Berlin. Private screenings at the Stadtpalais became the most sought-after events in the industry, where directors, financiers and actresses met a select few of the nobility who shared the all-highest appreciation of their art. The first prizes for films by the Prussian Academy of the Arts were given in 1911, years before any such recognition was accorded the medium anywhere else. In later years, the emperor's presence at events of the film world was often rumoured to reflect his love of young actresses and the drugs liberally consumed there, but his appreciation of the medium cannot be doubted. The string of affairs with popular starlets through the years of his failing marriage and declining health affirms the degree to which he felt comfortable among the modernist, newly wealthy and talent-driven world of filmmaking.
A watershed in German film production was reached in 1927 with the first introduction of simultaneous sound recording in the AGFAphono process. Sound films were enormously popular and successful at home, but they failed in export markets which had to date been an important revenue source for German studios. DeFAG's long reliance on silent films for export led to a loss of market share while Aurora was able to capitalise on the international marketability of musical productions and, in short order, developed the ability to 'dub' its product for foreign customers. At the same time German viewers, accustomed to sound films early and demanding in terms of technical quality, were reluctant to accept poorly translated foreign fare for a crucial time in the 1930s and early 1940s when American 'movies' became so dominant.
Colour film, developed successfully by both AGFA and Kodak at roughly the same time, remained uncommon for longer than it needed have been owing to the impact of the Balkan crisis and the second Russo-German War, but the technical expertise of the DeFAG's Munich studios and Aurora's Babelsberg was rivalled only by the very greatest of US and British Studios. It was here that the famous works of experimental film art and cinematographic technology that made them worldwide household names in the 1950s.
The beginnings of the German film industry as an industry – unlike that of Britain and France, but similar to the American studio system – were created by political accident. Film was still a new medium when the General Staff's department IIIb 4 – propaganda and censorship – approached a number of production firms about raising public morale. The resulting short clips – standard length at the time was between three and ten minutes – were not very dissimilar in theme from previous patriotic fare, but the cooperation of the military ensured far higher production values. Their popularity both at home and abroad convinced German producers that investing in scale could pay dividends at about the same time the first major investors were willing to put money into moving pictures. What had been a cottage industry of documentary and comedy footage turned into a highly competitive entertainment arm of the great press empires, and for a decade after 1907, no country could hope to match the lavish scale on which the Mutuum-bank financed DeFAG and the Ullstein-owned Aurora Film produced.
A second factor in the success of German filmmaking was the ability to competitively produce high-quality photographic materials. Especially AGFA with its innovative processes and large spare capacity after the war ensured that German studios had access to the best film priced in mark. Since many early productions were export successes, this was approved by the economy ministry and supported generously by the völkische propagandist groups who were keen on projecting Germany's might and status abroad.
German films of the time were known for their scale, growing in length as well as complexity and lavish production values. When the DeFAG produced Die Brücke am Bug in 1912, it was both the longest and most expensive film yet made, running to 47 minutes and involving over 2000 extras, most of them military. By 1918, most large-scale productions ran to either 30 or 60 minutes and it was not uncommon for a high-end production to involve mass scenes and elaborate scenery. The 1919 history film Tannenberg broke the record set in 1916 by the US production The Klansman for both length – 217 minutes – and scale – 34 actors and 5000 extras. Its elaborate, artistically lit and cut battle scenes retain the ability to inspire and horrify in equal measure to this day while D W Griffith's work has aged badly. Meanwhile, Aurora Film based in cosmopolitan Berlin desperately sought ways to compete with the funding and government support enjoyed by DeFAG and found it in cutting-edge novelty. Innovative technologies, artistic techniques and not least hot topics of the day were used in its often daring productions. Directors such as Murnau, Lang, Bevenser, Oswald, Sternberg and Pabst worked for the Ullstein brand, producing memorable successes of modern filmmaking. The legendary qualities of the production department behind Opium!, Vampyr, Mordkommission, Das Lied der Kosaken and Asphaltblumen have served to cover much less memorable output in later years.
The greatest single factor in putting German film studios on an equal footing with American ones, though, was imperial patronage. Wilhelm III was an avid and public cinemagoer, a fact that was not lost on the aspiring rich of Berlin. Private screenings at the Stadtpalais became the most sought-after events in the industry, where directors, financiers and actresses met a select few of the nobility who shared the all-highest appreciation of their art. The first prizes for films by the Prussian Academy of the Arts were given in 1911, years before any such recognition was accorded the medium anywhere else. In later years, the emperor's presence at events of the film world was often rumoured to reflect his love of young actresses and the drugs liberally consumed there, but his appreciation of the medium cannot be doubted. The string of affairs with popular starlets through the years of his failing marriage and declining health affirms the degree to which he felt comfortable among the modernist, newly wealthy and talent-driven world of filmmaking.
A watershed in German film production was reached in 1927 with the first introduction of simultaneous sound recording in the AGFAphono process. Sound films were enormously popular and successful at home, but they failed in export markets which had to date been an important revenue source for German studios. DeFAG's long reliance on silent films for export led to a loss of market share while Aurora was able to capitalise on the international marketability of musical productions and, in short order, developed the ability to 'dub' its product for foreign customers. At the same time German viewers, accustomed to sound films early and demanding in terms of technical quality, were reluctant to accept poorly translated foreign fare for a crucial time in the 1930s and early 1940s when American 'movies' became so dominant.
Colour film, developed successfully by both AGFA and Kodak at roughly the same time, remained uncommon for longer than it needed have been owing to the impact of the Balkan crisis and the second Russo-German War, but the technical expertise of the DeFAG's Munich studios and Aurora's Babelsberg was rivalled only by the very greatest of US and British Studios. It was here that the famous works of experimental film art and cinematographic technology that made them worldwide household names in the 1950s.
This is something of a digression but how does Fanny zu Reventlow feel about "The string of affairs with popular starlets"?
I am curious as to what drives the "intellectually stimulating" aspect of German film given the context in which it emerges, it doesn't necessarily strike me that a film tradition which emerges from war and propaganda cinema necessarily lends itself well to intellectual stimulation
I am curious as to what drives the "intellectually stimulating" aspect of German film given the context in which it emerges, it doesn't necessarily strike me that a film tradition which emerges from war and propaganda cinema necessarily lends itself well to intellectual stimulation
Maybe not but Germany has a strong philosophy tradition. It's likely that post war there will be a push back against war in some quarters leaning hard into the German philosophy tradition.
A German Lorca strikes me as totally plausible.
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Deleted member 90563
France sure seems to have missed the boat in terms of the movie industry... and even sadder, Germany picked up its title as 'home of the artsy highbrow movie'.
Whatever shall the French do?
They can make all the cool movies, which is almost impossible for Germans. Also comedies.
War damage is a temporary thing, structural factors are longer lasting. I'll have to look up some data, but IIRC France didn't take that long after the war to largely catch up to the pre-war growth trend, until the Great Depression screwed everyone's hopes over. Similarly, I don't see why the war in the ATL is permanently going to slow German economic growth. (It would be interesting to see what the 1900-1914 growth trend of France looks like extended to 1920: it's hard to compare to OTL Germany and hope to learn for the ATL, though, since as the loser it's economy received a great many insults. I may get back to this once I have better internet access (fast cable dead, working with crappy wi-fi)
It's the twentieth century. Everybody gets slapped around. But not as badly as IOTL.
Well, they do own most of Central Europe and the most advanced industrial base on the continent. What more do you want?
All of this will have an impact (and France is going to be the country of the 'entrepreneur', here meaning small businesses protected against external and internal competitors by strict rules). But it will take time. Right now, France is a wealthy country with profitable colonies, and one where the wealth is more equally divided than elsewhere. Germany is a country where much of the wealth is in the hands of nobles and industrialists, and where the state draws in enormous resources in taxes and reparations and uses them to pay foreign creditors, build up an outsize military, and plough it into public infrastructure. this is a big deal in the medium term: A lot of this infrastructure stock will make Germans better off, but it doesn't belong to them. They don't feel richer for having cooperative apartments, metalled roads, railways, canals, social insurance and an efficient administration the way the French will for having bicycles, cars, homes and bonds.
There is a world of difference between 1906 and 1913 in the German economy. ITTL, Germany has two wars to pay off. The underlying economic performance of Germany from the beginning is more dynamic, but it will take decades for that to be a decisive factor. I don't see Germany rivalling France in 'felt' wealth until after the 1928-34 crisis, and that is only a decade before the next big war. It's another twenty years of debt service after that. Then it's all smooth sailing.
got a question, how has international law different in this tl to our world, does the Geneva convention still hold, chemical weapons bans, etc?
Whats the situation with Sweden like? They didn't get the land they wanted but still got Aland islands and something else, but more importantly they got a massive reparations from Russia comparatively to there size. So is the nation having a good time, the Russian threat is gone, new neighbours to trade with better market access. With those reparations they are investing them into the nation as they have no damage, relatively low casualties, or nations to support. It seems only there naval is the main concern as that would be expensive but they can probably just by some of the German navies ships for cheap after there beating they took. Would Sweden encourage immigration from the Baltic as they can expand industry and offer better compared to these new nations created.
So whats the situation with nations names, in of the older parts character was thinking about them and they mentioned names such as Estland etc but now they all have there real life names?
Whats the situation with Sweden like? They didn't get the land they wanted but still got Aland islands and something else, but more importantly they got a massive reparations from Russia comparatively to there size. So is the nation having a good time, the Russian threat is gone, new neighbours to trade with better market access. With those reparations they are investing them into the nation as they have no damage, relatively low casualties, or nations to support. It seems only there naval is the main concern as that would be expensive but they can probably just by some of the German navies ships for cheap after there beating they took. Would Sweden encourage immigration from the Baltic as they can expand industry and offer better compared to these new nations created.
So whats the situation with nations names, in of the older parts character was thinking about them and they mentioned names such as Estland etc but now they all have there real life names?
France sure seems to have missed the boat in terms of the movie industry... and even sadder, Germany picked up its title as 'home of the artsy highbrow movie'.
Whatever shall the French do?
Make all the erotic movies, the scandalous stuff. ITTL, France is the only big moviemaking market without any form of blue laws (America has the Voluntary Code, the Empire has the BBFC/IBFC, Germany has the Selbstkontrolle der Filmwirtschaft and its pornography and blasphemy laws). They can make porn, gay love stories, adaptations of Emile Zola's most shocking works, and screen it all in regular theatres. And of course they do make auteur films. It's jst not the first thing that comes to mind when you hear 'French cinema'.
She's dead. Tragic traffic accident under the influence of cocaine in 1915, nobody seems to be able to reconstruct what actually happened. The emperor sent a large wreath to the funeral. He was unable to attend personally.
Germany has a large class of educated bourgeois who, now that the All-Highest likes films, officially also like films. Directors wrap 'Easter eggs' for them in their movies - quotes, refreences to art, science, current culture or classical literature. These get picked up by foreign audiences, too. They are a vehicle to make viewers feel smart and smug.
German pacifism is strong. Also, not strong enough to make much of a dent in the country's military tradition. but that is another story.
Deleted member 94708
This is an interesting parallel to some of the ways that Europeans, Japanese, and Chinese seem to view the world differently than Americans do...
I usually use a small pond big pond argument. North, Central and East Europeans and we East Asians are more content to be a small fish in a big pond, whilst Anglo-Saxons in Western Europe and North America prefer to be a big fish in a small pond.
And regarding the 'cooperative apartments, metalled roads, railways, canals, social insurance and an efficient administration' not being felt, depends on whether they have a basis of comparison. German newspapers could take the usual haughty observations of French Governments being like the London Bridge, going up and down and making a lot of noise in the process.
Interwar Poland – The Most Successful Disappointment
The story of interwar Poland can be told in two discrete narratives: as a resounding success, or a deep disappointment. The question is largely whether the author decides to approach it from the lofty plans made at Baden-Baden, or from a more clear-eyed look at the realities of the time. Compared to what the country was meant to become – the peaceful shared home of its different religious and ethnic group, prosperous and harmonious – the reality of a bickering, often violent community of mutual loathing mired in persistent poverty must seem anticlimactic. Many outside observers, especially Americans who had taken a close interest in the heroic tale of the Polish revolt, found themselves repelled by the spectacle. Poland, conventional wisdom had it, was beyond saving.
More recent histories have tried to do justice to the achievements of a country that faced the future under a crushing burden. At the end of the war, Poland was devastated by years of brutal fighting. Russian troops had systematically destroyed anything they could not carry off during the punitive occupation of 1906/07. Up to 80% of the population had been displaced at least once, and millions still lived in refugee camps. Property rights across the countryside needed to be settled, public administration was almost nonexistent except in the form of the ubiquitous army, and the government under a foreign and unloved king faced these challenges groaning under a debt burden of billions owed almost entirely to Germany. What other than lawlessness, conflict and abject subordination could be expected?
By those lights, the fact that Poland managed a functioning government headed by the twin stars of King Karol Stepan and Chancellor Field Marshal Pilsudski verged on a miracle. The two men, though very different in outlook, temperament and education, came to work together better than anyone had expected. When the first Sejm election returned a narrow plurality for the Congress party, the king decided to place his trust in Pilsudski and instructed him to form a government based on the wartime centre-left coalition that lasted through three terms, only ending with the 1925 victory of the clerical conservative Polish National Party. This period of relative stability allowed the country to build a stable public administration that was entrenched enough to deploy its own gravity when Dmovski's partisans sought to purge it of former Socialists and Jews. Though it would be unrealistic to expect absence of corruption in a country as wide, poor and ill-governed as Poland, the habit of obedience to rules generally prevailed and no 'spoils' system ever developed.
The effective administration of the country depended heavily on structures laid down during the war, often by violent, unscrupulous and highly competitive people. King Karol Stepan's ability to work with people like Dzerzhinski, head of the NSB, while integrating them into a government system that made use of their fiefdoms has been called his greatest historic achievement. It defanged both the Combat Organisation of the officially defunct Socialist Party and the extreme wing of the Catholic Nationalist movement by giving them a place at the table. None of this prevented violent clashes in the streets or epic rows in the Sejm, but it stopped the country from a descent into all-out civil war that was certainly a possibility in the years between 1908 and 1913.
The greatest disappointment to a watching world was the almost immediate breakdown of the envisioned interethnic harmony the Adenauer plan was meant to ensure. The Jewish community, under pressure from Polish nationalists and clerical agitators, embraced a strongly defensive stance as millions of Jewish refugees from Russia swelled its numbers. Great Rabbi Landauer, their unofficial spokesperson, stated in no uncertain terms that the military forces raised during the war would see their primary duty in securing and defending their coreligionists from any threat. Pogroms and attacks occurred with depressing regularity in areas where Jews lived in isolation, but rarely in the towns and cities where they were numerous enough to form militias and operate courts. The resulting alienation from the majority allowed the Jews of Poland to become resilient, prosperous and safe, but it would be a heavy burden on the country in decades to come.
The Ruthenian and Russian minorities, denied the opportunity to develop effective institutions, became the target of discrimination, violence and occasional bouts of ethnic cleansing. Numbers from the years of slapdash postwar administration are notoriously unreliable, but anything up to 700,000 people may have been expelled from the country in its first decade. Many families were forced to leave at a later date, individually, by threats of violence and sabotage from their Polish neighbours. Many, unwilling to face the prospect of settling in tyrannical and misgoverned Russia, moved into the cities that managed to keep the promise of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state somewhat better.
Economically, Poland fell short of the hopes many of its citizens had. Its natural resources remained in the hands of a small landowning class despite the best efforts of the Socialist politicians who had led the uprising and much of what the country exported was used to pay wartime debts. Currency controls and import limitations remained in force until the early 1920s. Manufacturing, though successful especially in the more urbanised west, always remained an annex to the industrial behemoth next door, dependent on German capital, expertise and customers. Any effort to support the country's army of half a million men on this economic base had to fall short of expectations. Despite cutting many social programmes and even direly needed infrastructure spending in favour of defense against the threat of Russian revenge, the Polish army struggled to match the modern equipment and high state of training its German allies demanded. During the Second war, the gap between its frontline divisions and the far less favoured reserve formations many of which lacked artillery, machine guns and motor transport would prove a major obstacle to operations.
The story of interwar Poland can be told in two discrete narratives: as a resounding success, or a deep disappointment. The question is largely whether the author decides to approach it from the lofty plans made at Baden-Baden, or from a more clear-eyed look at the realities of the time. Compared to what the country was meant to become – the peaceful shared home of its different religious and ethnic group, prosperous and harmonious – the reality of a bickering, often violent community of mutual loathing mired in persistent poverty must seem anticlimactic. Many outside observers, especially Americans who had taken a close interest in the heroic tale of the Polish revolt, found themselves repelled by the spectacle. Poland, conventional wisdom had it, was beyond saving.
More recent histories have tried to do justice to the achievements of a country that faced the future under a crushing burden. At the end of the war, Poland was devastated by years of brutal fighting. Russian troops had systematically destroyed anything they could not carry off during the punitive occupation of 1906/07. Up to 80% of the population had been displaced at least once, and millions still lived in refugee camps. Property rights across the countryside needed to be settled, public administration was almost nonexistent except in the form of the ubiquitous army, and the government under a foreign and unloved king faced these challenges groaning under a debt burden of billions owed almost entirely to Germany. What other than lawlessness, conflict and abject subordination could be expected?
By those lights, the fact that Poland managed a functioning government headed by the twin stars of King Karol Stepan and Chancellor Field Marshal Pilsudski verged on a miracle. The two men, though very different in outlook, temperament and education, came to work together better than anyone had expected. When the first Sejm election returned a narrow plurality for the Congress party, the king decided to place his trust in Pilsudski and instructed him to form a government based on the wartime centre-left coalition that lasted through three terms, only ending with the 1925 victory of the clerical conservative Polish National Party. This period of relative stability allowed the country to build a stable public administration that was entrenched enough to deploy its own gravity when Dmovski's partisans sought to purge it of former Socialists and Jews. Though it would be unrealistic to expect absence of corruption in a country as wide, poor and ill-governed as Poland, the habit of obedience to rules generally prevailed and no 'spoils' system ever developed.
The effective administration of the country depended heavily on structures laid down during the war, often by violent, unscrupulous and highly competitive people. King Karol Stepan's ability to work with people like Dzerzhinski, head of the NSB, while integrating them into a government system that made use of their fiefdoms has been called his greatest historic achievement. It defanged both the Combat Organisation of the officially defunct Socialist Party and the extreme wing of the Catholic Nationalist movement by giving them a place at the table. None of this prevented violent clashes in the streets or epic rows in the Sejm, but it stopped the country from a descent into all-out civil war that was certainly a possibility in the years between 1908 and 1913.
The greatest disappointment to a watching world was the almost immediate breakdown of the envisioned interethnic harmony the Adenauer plan was meant to ensure. The Jewish community, under pressure from Polish nationalists and clerical agitators, embraced a strongly defensive stance as millions of Jewish refugees from Russia swelled its numbers. Great Rabbi Landauer, their unofficial spokesperson, stated in no uncertain terms that the military forces raised during the war would see their primary duty in securing and defending their coreligionists from any threat. Pogroms and attacks occurred with depressing regularity in areas where Jews lived in isolation, but rarely in the towns and cities where they were numerous enough to form militias and operate courts. The resulting alienation from the majority allowed the Jews of Poland to become resilient, prosperous and safe, but it would be a heavy burden on the country in decades to come.
The Ruthenian and Russian minorities, denied the opportunity to develop effective institutions, became the target of discrimination, violence and occasional bouts of ethnic cleansing. Numbers from the years of slapdash postwar administration are notoriously unreliable, but anything up to 700,000 people may have been expelled from the country in its first decade. Many families were forced to leave at a later date, individually, by threats of violence and sabotage from their Polish neighbours. Many, unwilling to face the prospect of settling in tyrannical and misgoverned Russia, moved into the cities that managed to keep the promise of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state somewhat better.
Economically, Poland fell short of the hopes many of its citizens had. Its natural resources remained in the hands of a small landowning class despite the best efforts of the Socialist politicians who had led the uprising and much of what the country exported was used to pay wartime debts. Currency controls and import limitations remained in force until the early 1920s. Manufacturing, though successful especially in the more urbanised west, always remained an annex to the industrial behemoth next door, dependent on German capital, expertise and customers. Any effort to support the country's army of half a million men on this economic base had to fall short of expectations. Despite cutting many social programmes and even direly needed infrastructure spending in favour of defense against the threat of Russian revenge, the Polish army struggled to match the modern equipment and high state of training its German allies demanded. During the Second war, the gap between its frontline divisions and the far less favoured reserve formations many of which lacked artillery, machine guns and motor transport would prove a major obstacle to operations.
Which of newly created states is going to be the most successful?
Why are there even russians in poland aren't the four recognised groups are poles, jews, ruthenians and germans.
Why are there even russians in poland aren't the four recognised groups are poles, jews, ruthenians and germans.
Good question. Economically, I would say Finland. In political terms, ultimately Poland.
Poland was part of Russia for a century. People move. And the exact definition of who is a Ruthenian and who is a Russian (not to mention such fine distinctions as between Ukrainian and Byelorussian) is beset with difficulty. Since Russians are supposed to be expelled, you could find yourself defined as a Russian if your neighbour liked your farm.
Many US and British charities offered relief in the immediate aftermath, and loans were available (though expensive). But nobody provided anything like development aid. That's not really the style of the age.
yboxman
Banned
What does the demographic structure of Poland look like following the "population exchange" between rump Russia and "Duchy of Warsaw extended into White Russia" look like?
Unless the Jews end up a much larger proportion of Poland than I think, then they are likely to be facing some version of the communal economic boycotts they faced OTL in the late 1930s. And although being part of a Mitteleuropan economic sphere and having residual trade ties to rump Russia will make them less vulnerable to such boycotting, at the end of the day most Jews in Poland will depend on Polish customers and suppliers, not German, Lithuanians, etc.