Es Geloybte Aretz Continuation Thread

Discussion in 'Alternate History Discussion: Before 1900' started by carlton_bach, Aug 3, 2018.

  1. Jürgen Well-Known Member

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    No it’s not bad in this timeline, because Danes invested in factories, which they will still own when Russia are rebuilding. Here Germany will pay loan off to Denmark, which the Danes can use to make extra investments. It’s a microcosm of what’s happening all over north Europe, German and Russian money under the war are kickstarting industries and development of financial in the neighboring countries, who was willing to borrow them money.

    The Danish army are big for a country of its size, but use obsolete equipment (this will of course change), the navy are small, but fully up to date, Denmark was a major shipbuilding nation at the time, and had a major focus on the navy. But if German goes to war with Denmark, Denmark doesn’t have a chance
     
  2. Jürgen Well-Known Member

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    Denmark will be part of Mitteleuropa, it will just seek other partners, to make Berlin believe that they can’t just walk over Copenhagen, but in the end if Berlin ask Copenhagen to jump, the only thing Copenhagen will say will be “how high?”
     
  3. haider najib Well-Known Member

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    So denmark wants to be the first among equals of mittleleuropa little states?

    Which loan? Also wouldn't russia have heavily borrowed from denmark losing this by defulting meaning denmark has nothing. Those loans are worth more than the factories.
     
  4. Jürgen Well-Known Member

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    Denmark will care about making money


    Germany have loaned from Denmark to buy Danish goods, Denmark have invested in Russia it didn’t loan them money, that was the pattern we saw in WWI. Germany need what Denmark produced (food primarily), Russia needed Danish expertise not Danish products, so the Danes opened factories in Russia and build infrastructure. In OTL this was something of a failure as Germany lost the War and Danish property in Russia was confiscated with the Communist takeover. But here Russia can’t afford to get rid of Danish expertise, and they don’t nationalism all property.
     
  5. avernite Well-Known Member

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    Depending on what you call little, that seems overambitious. Sweden or the Netherlands (if part of Mitteleuropa proper) would be a size too big - though I guess before decolonization the Netherlands can still pretend to be a middle power rather than a little one.
     
  6. carlton_bach Member

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    The Schleswig issue will be a continuing irritant, just like Alsace-Lorraine and the Polish minorities along the border. But these things don't start wars. Just strongly worded letters and stupid populist legislation.

    Denmark is a small country with a very long and proud history. In the age of nationalism, joining the German Empire is out of the question. Afterwards, it is no longer an attraction. You get all the benefits of commercial integration, and Germany pretty much has to militarily guarantee Denmark against all comers anyway. It's the situation of Switzerland vis-a-vis NATO.

    This, pretty much. Belgium has the added bonus of close commercial integration with France (which is a MUCH richer country than Germany ITTL) and Britain (even more so). Denmark has only Britain, by sea. They need Germany, so they have to be useful, but they don't have to be a pushover because they are useful enough to know their worth.

    Russia was not allowed to default. It's in the terms of the Treaty of Baden-Baden. Not that it helped anywhere near as much as the German loans. Denmark was happy to invest in both belligerents.
     
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  7. carlton_bach Member

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    The Ausgleich of 1937

    No country in history, as English historian Frederick Taylor put it, ever gambled more recklessly than the Austro-Hungarian Empire when it put the renewal of its very existence to a decennial vote. This had not been the intention behind the Ausgleich, but this was ultimately what it was felt to represent: the opportunity for the separate bodies of the Empire to choose whether the continuation of their union was in their continued interest. What had been intended as a tool of adjusting a working agreement without constitutional changes became an emotionally highly charged political game as time progressed. Eventually, no political party could afford to retreat without losing face. Compromise, the lifeblood of Austria-Hungary, became toxic. The breakdown of civic structures that followed this downward arc of comity brought the Empire to its knees.

    The Ausgleichsverhandlung scheduled for 1907, still a largely technical exercise, though already observed keenly by the press, were rendered moot by the ongoing war, ultimately leading to almost no changes. The following institutional stasis that was supported by a widespread veneration of Emperor Franz Joseph, a saintly figure since his death at the height of a terrible but victorious war. The turmoil caused by economic dislocation, war, and rapid industrialisation might have been managed better by a more flexible system of government. The Austro-Hungarian civil service was exemplary in its even-handedness and skill, but it could do little to address the problems of the modern era. Frustration with this state of affairs was intense by the time the 1917 negotiations began.

    Hope attended the auspicious beginning of a new chapter in Austro-Hungarian history as a relatively young and still vigorous emperor laid out his agenda: Equal treatment to Slavs and Romanians, systematic reform of public administration, expanded social policies, and a greatly expanded role to the military in the running of government. Franz II Ferdinand's successes were limited despite his ability to cast Hungarian opponents of the Ausgleich as reactionary obstructionists. It was enough to leave the Hungarian elites deeply disaffected, but not enough to win the hearts of the still disadvantaged Slavic peoples. This was a greater problem than it need have been because relations between the nations of Cisleithania were still strained because of widespread collaboration by Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians. The popular press, especially papers with German nationalist leanings, continued to paint them as potential enemies within and made much of the supposed ingratitude of the Polish minority. As conservative politicians increasingly turned to ethnic nationalism as an antidote to Socialist mobilisation of the poor, these attitudes increasingly poisoned public discourse.

    The 1927 negotiations were mired in discord and difficulty from the beginning. Under the shadow of a growing economic crisis and led by an ageing, increasingly isolated and disillusioned emperor, they would nonetheless produce sufficient progress to create a false dawn of hope for many liberal commentators. Yet the prospect of victory for a reasonable compromise would be ground to dust between the increasing acrimony of nationalist agitation that accompanied the economic downturn of the late 1920s, the seething anger of a Hungarian ruling class marginalised in the new order, and the weakening of central authority under the pressure of dwindling revenues and fading memories of war.

    All of this makes it all the more tragic to consider that the actual compromise hammered out in 1937/38 could have been effective. Had the parties involved been willing or able to look past their bruised egos and allowed politics to take their course, there is every reason to believe the new incarnation of the Empire relying more strongly on elected provincial assemblies and less on the central governments of Vienna and Budapest would have shaken itself into shape. The escalation of political sabotage, grandstanding and violence that followed instead would destroy any hope for a peaceful resolution.
     
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  8. haider najib Well-Known Member

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    So Austria-Hungary will most likely collapse, or with violence Austria finally breaks the Hungarian back. Its a shame only if blessed Karl could have taken the throne he would have saved the empire.

    My bois the ottomans better not get fucked, they already being slapped around it would be elderly abuse at this point.
     
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  9. B_Munro Member

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    Kukexit?

    Hey, what happened to the "wank" part of this German-wank? Is it just delayed due to the need for Germany to, shall we say, de-Imperialize itself?
     
  10. avernite Well-Known Member

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    I'd think more 'Ausgleich? Raus, gleich!' or somesuch. German is a bit more important in this TL.
     
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  11. Jürgen Well-Known Member

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    A few thoughts about France staying richer than Germany, I don’t think it will be the case, it’s no accident that Scandinavia are as rich as they are, it have a lot to do with the economical model it follow, the high union membership and low corruption. Germany follow a somewhat similar model, but it was even more similar before the World Wars. The French model mixed with the low union membership and higher corruption means that France will grow slower in the long term, even with their empire to fuel their economy and the massive influx of capital from staying out of the war. In fact the empire may work against France as their informal post-colonial in OTL have given large French companies access to a large market with little competitions which have allowed French companies to stay less competitive than their German counterparts.
     
  12. De von Of Him Diamond

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    Might that be the Casus Belli for the second Great Eastern War? Hungary trying to break off with Russian help?
     
  13. Joriz Castillo Well-Known Member

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    @carlton_bach, can you please threadmark your posts so I can better catch up with all of them?
     
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  14. Superpacman_21/ Well-Known Member

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    Or you can look for all the posts made by @carlton_bach in this very thread using the search button ...
     
  15. Admiral Matt Member

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    Same name I picked for my Nazis without Hitler timeline, all those years ago. Validating. 8)
     
  16. Daztur Seoulite

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    Germany is still wanked compared to IOTL and by missing the Nazis the gap is only going to get bigger.
     
  17. B_Munro Member

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    Historical estimates of GDP per capita generally show Germany being richer than France (not accounting for distribution, of course) by 1913.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_...P_(PPP)_per_capita#Europe_1830–1938_(Bairoch)

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_regions_by_past_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita#1–1800_(Maddison_Project)

    Of course, the war will knock this back for a bit, but Germany must perform economically worse than OTL to stay behind France.
     
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  18. Tuna-Fish Well-Known Member

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    The main difference here is that France is doing much better than historically, because they didn't spend 4 years in a massive war that was fought mostly on their territory.
     
  19. Jürgen Well-Known Member

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    Germany in OTL was a smoking crater in 1945.
     
  20. NotBigBrother Donor

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    I think Tuna-Fish meant the WWI.