Enver Pasha not war minister

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Deleted member 1487

What if Enver Pasha never became the Ottoman war minister?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/İsmail_Enver
He was responsible for some of the greatest disasters suffered by the Ottoman army and also contributing to the poor harvest of 1914, thanks to ordering all military age men to report to the army where they could not all be processed (according to wikipedia that is).
His biggest mistake in 1914 was the battle Sarikamish, which cost the Ottomans a major part of their army, many of whom were veteran soldiers, irreplaceable.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sarikamish

This is something I thought would be a better option (from the article): "Hasan İzzet Pasha was not in favor of an offensive action in the harsh winter conditions. He was planning to remain in defense. He wanted to pull the Russians to the Erzurum Fortress and launch a counter attack at the right time."
Even the Germans supported waiting until spring/summer, but Pasha pushed for it, ultimately destroying his 3rd army in the Caucasian mountains. Had he waited some of the logistical difficulties could have been rectified by new rail construction, ensuring a better situation for the 3rd army when the battle started. This disaster opened up the Eastern part of the empire to a Russian riposte, causing the campaign to be fought on Ottoman soil leading to massive destruction and civilian casualties in eastern Turkey.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caucasus_Campaign

Other failed schemes he let go through included the assaults on the Suez canal and the army of Islam operation, during which he tried to take the Turkic areas of the Caucasus, meanwhile neglecting the collapsing middle eastern fronts.

I am suggesting the Enver instead becomes a diplomat or liaison with the Germans, letting the Turkish general staff conduct operations. The Caucasian campaign holds up better, repelling the Russians in the winter, perhaps counter attacking at a viable point, inflicting a reserve loss on the Russians opening the Russian Caucasus up to attack, drawing forces off of other theaters and perhaps even keeping the Russians from operating in Persia.
This could also head off the Armenian revolt in the Ottoman areas if they feel the Russians weren't winning. Thoughts?
 
With Enver not in place, the Ottoman Empire most probably wouldn't join the Central Powers that early, so, no winter battle in the Caucasus anyway. They might enter the war in 1915, in conjunction with Bulagria.
 

yourworstnightmare

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Well, I guess things would be better for the Ottomans in the long run if they had been able to repel the Russians.

Still, I wouldn't really trust every word in that Wikipedia article.
 
If Enver weren't the War Minister, the Ottomans wouldn't have entered the war, which would have been better for everyone, I think.

As for his failures, Sarakamish was a pretty close battle - but Izzet Pasha was correct. He couldn't have known it, but the Russians had a lot of munitions problems in 1915, so if the Ottomans had waited, they'd have had the whole army mobilized and available at a good time. In addition, the army was undergoing a large reorganization that needed a few more months to complete.

No Sarakamish would likely have meant no Armenian revolt, which would, besides avoiding a huge human catastrophe, would have meant more forces available on the front, and less economic dislocation. Possibly also there would have been no Gallipoli campaign.

The Suez attack wasn't a failure - it was a strategic probe, was an impressive accomplishment, cost virtually no casualties, and forced the British to maintain large forces in Egypt throughout the war.

The Army of Islam adventure did take resources out of Palestine, but not too many, nor would it have made much difference given the massive size of the British forces - and the Army of Islam was wildly successful.

In general, Enver was not as bad as he is generally made out to be. He was young and inexperienced, and also had inflated perceptions of the empire's capabilities, but he improved as the war progressed, and it's not like everyone else didn't have grandiose ideas about what was possible in 1914.

Anyway, no Enver would be a huge plus for the Ottomans. He was too aggressive with Ottoman forces, dispersed them on too many fronts, and basically lacked an overall strategic vision. His thinking was that the war would be short and it was necessary to be in it on the winning side.
 

Deleted member 1487

Was there any chance to at least convince him not to launch Sarakamish before 1915? Had the Turks entered into the war and Enver was still war minister without launching a caucasian offensive, would the Russians attacked as Izzet suggested, opening themselves up a reverse Sarakamish? They did strike first and were defeated in a skirmish in November, before the Ottoman offensive.
 
Was there any chance to at least convince him not to launch Sarakamish before 1915? Had the Turks entered into the war and Enver was still war minister without launching a caucasian offensive, would the Russians attacked as Izzet suggested, opening themselves up a reverse Sarakamish? They did strike first and were defeated in a skirmish in November, before the Ottoman offensive.

I suppose so, although pretty much everyone was against it. Perhaps of Hafiz Hakki (chief of staff) had died earlier or been convinced it was a bad idea, he could have convinced Enver.
 

Deleted member 1487

I suppose so, although pretty much everyone was against it. Perhaps of Hafiz Hakki (chief of staff) had died earlier or been convinced it was a bad idea, he could have convinced Enver.

Assuming that the 3rd army waits until 1915 and for better weather while the Russians wreck themselves going after Erzurum (would the Armenians still revolt if there is an intact 3rd army while the Russians are attacking?), what does this mean for the Ottomans? I am assuming the'd wait for spring and coordinate with the Germans, so May would be the start time, but could they really penetrate deep into the Caucasus even with Russian munition problems? Historically I thought the Ottoman logistic problems continually handicapped their offensives, while decent Russian leadership and terrain made their defense/counteroffensives difficult to defeat.

I still see Galliopoli happening, because Serbia is still in the war, the Russians need their ports opened and the Ottoman pressure relieved, and Entente wants to influence the Balkan states to their side by a show of force.
 
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