Entente Victory against defensive stance in 1917/18?

[carlton_bach]

A question, purely out of curiosity, for those who understand things that go bang better than I do:

Assuming the war has gone much as it did IOTL until late 1917 (Russia knocked out, US entry, Ottoman Empire on the ropes), if the German high command decided to use the troops it brought in from the Eastern Front to strengthen its defenses instead of going for one last push, just how well could the Entente forces expect to do?

I know that this is an unlikely stance for political reasons, but I am interested purely in the military side of things. With the resources that were squandered in Operation Michael available to stop the advancing armies instead, how hard does the going get? Will there be anything like the 100 Days, or do things bog down again?

 

[CarribeanViking]

Michael, George, Georgette etc. happened because the German high command knew it didn't have that kind of time to spare; the American build up was going to more than make up for the collapse of Russia.

After Messines and Vimy, after the evolution of techniques represented by the beginning half of Cambrai, standing on the defensive was not going to work in the long term- unless the Allies completely bottled it, which with Lloyd George involved was admittedly a possibility, they would be ground down eventually, even the relatively fresh troops from the Eastern front.

Playing for time, on the defensive, their only mechanism of victory is that collapse of Allied will; and after the turnip winter, who looked like they had more time in hand? And, what happens when the Spanish flu starts to appear? The already weaker population likely suffers more.

It would be a longer and more unpleasant war, if that was possible, Plan 1919- massed armour the keystone- would probably have been used, it was after all the plan. The Hundred Days was the German army, worn down by attrition to the point where it was thin enough to bend, doing so almost to the point where it broke; under plan 1919, they might be pushed hard enough actually to do so.

 

[LordKalvert]

Germany was collapsing from within as the economy was reaching the point of total collapse, the field army had peaked in January 1917, there were no more men for the front and horses were getting scarce as well. The situation was even worse in Austria, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire


The allies had developed a fearsome army- complete control over the air, massive superiority in artillery and men, tanks and most important, motorized transport. Germany's defeat was certain

The resources used in the Spring offensives aren't that much but the failure was a crushing blow to morale- the Germans realized that they had lost any chance of victory. Going over to the defensive would only bring this about earlier. In OTL, it was Bulgaria that fell first, followed rapidly by the Ottomans, the Austrians and finally the Germans. A defensive minded Germany would only bring this about sooner

 

[Richter von Manthofen]

The OTL attack was probably the waking call for the German military - it showed that even under "best possible" conditions the war was unwinnable. Assuming the Germans stay on the defensive during (most of) 1918 the do not realize this and tryy to stem the tide - that could lead to a drawn out retreat battle - probably even a longer and more bloody war (mid 1919???) - especially if they bolster their allies preventing or delaying their collapse. (the germans would not waste resources but defensive needs less, so some troops and ammo can be sent to Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey - if Michael is cancelled)

 

[Ramontxo]

If coupled with a call to end the war on the Wilson famous 14 points, it would have put Britain and France in a very difficult political position. To refuse an armistice and defend another offensive in the wersten front would have been very difficult. And Germany with an intact army and in occupation of northen France and Belgiun offering an referendum in Alsace Lorena and backing out of occupied wersten Europe, could get an "Anschluss" with the german speacking parts of the former Austrian Empire (probably) the best possible outcome for them.

 

[HIM Dogson]

Germany will not win this way. They had one chance to take Paris, and to not take that chance would be foolhardy.

 

[Glenn239]

A question, purely out of curiosity, for those who understand things that go bang better than I do:

Assuming the war has gone much as it did IOTL until late 1917 (Russia knocked out, US entry, Ottoman Empire on the ropes), if the German high command decided to use the troops it brought in from the Eastern Front to strengthen its defenses instead of going for one last push, just how well could the Entente forces expect to do?

I know that this is an unlikely stance for political reasons, but I am interested purely in the military side of things. With the resources that were squandered in Operation Michael available to stop the advancing armies instead, how hard does the going get? Will there be anything like the 100 Days, or do things bog down again?

Can't do worse than the historical strategy. The question is whether it does something useful or just prolongs the war and increases the pain of the post-war settlement. Gut hunch is that the best bet was to accept the 14 Points early in 1918 call of the U-boat war and withdraw into Germany, then hope for some sort of terms.

 

[CarribeanViking]

There certainly are two ways to do worse; still be at war and under blockade when the spanish influenza begins to reach pandemic stage, and kill enough Americans in the field that they are no longer willing to offer the fourteen points as negotiating terms.

Oops...

 

[Matteo]

The 14 points of Wilson were not an offer of peace. They just were the principles that Wilson wanted to prevail to build a lastable peace and, did he think, a better world.

But the US were just one among the other allied great power. They had their say in the treaty. These says were around the same weight as Wilson's say.

And the compromise between them was the treaty of Versailles, not the 14 points.

There could not be a separate peace between Germany and the US on the 14 points' basis.

 

[CarribeanViking]

They were rapidly becoming the paymasters of the alliance; they had far more than an equal's say in the settlement as it was, and the Germans certainly began by believing, or politically pretending to believe, that Wilson's fourteen points were the basis of negotiations.

Versailles as it happened was the result of argument between the winners, with the Americans having a creditor's share of the result, rather more than an equal's; with the spirit of the fourteen points much in evidence, plus the odd insult like clause 231 that Britain and France managed to work in.

Annoy the Americans sufficient with actual dead and wounded, the spirit of the offer goes, 'until the pips squeak' makes a reappearance, a post-war conditions for Germany are that much harsher, I reckon.

 

[Magnum]

Middle Eastern Butterflies

If the Germans stay on the defensive, the British won't panic and pull out forces from Palestine - two complete divisions, another 24 infantry battalions from other divisions and nine dismounted yeomanry regiments, as well as all of the tanks. This means they don't have to wait for reinforcements to arrive, and then wait for those reinforcements to be re-organized and retrained.

This means Allenby can achieve his breakthrough of the over-stretched Ottoman positions in Palestine sometime in early-to-mid April when he would have completed his preparations, instead of having to delay until September for the above reasons.

Based on their OTL performance (which ITTL should actually be better, since the Ottomans would not get an extra 6 months to reinforce their troops), Allied troops should be able to anihilate most of their oppostion and reach Aleppo within 30 days (thus capturing Palestine and most of Syria).

 

[kung Zog]

plus the odd insult like clause 231 that Britain and France managed to work in.

Well, it was written by two American diplomats and was regarded as a fair compromise by most parties. The original American version ("Lansing's note") could (and probably would have) been regarded as a war guilt clause by Germany.

 

[Glenn239]

There certainly are two ways to do worse; still be at war and under blockade when the spanish influenza begins to reach pandemic stage, and kill enough Americans in the field that they are no longer willing to offer the fourteen points as negotiating terms.

Oops...

Any strategy that did not reinforce the tendency of the US to compel its allies to make a deal was going to be a losing proposition. There is no question but that by 1918 military was subordinate to diplomatic, and that the German high command did not or would not admit that. Michael and friends were the last throws at resolving the war with a military strategy. Gut hunch was the best bet was to accept the 14 points and withdraw into Germany during the 1st half of 1918.

 

[matzeskatze]

Question, how long could have Germany and the CP stood on the defensive? And how many casualities would the Entente have taken in that time.

The point I think would be, would the Americans, British and French soldiers in late 1917 / early 1918 be all that willing to pile the dead up if Germany is on the defensive and makes serious offers for a case fire and later negotiated peace treaty?

 

[Catspoke]

The minimum armistice terms I can visualize the Allies would accept at any point are below (even without German offensives, the Allies would just wait until 1919 and clean up in Turkey until then to close the ring, so Germany might as well roll the dice and attack):

Germany would have to:
Withdraw from France, Belgium and Alsace Lorraine.
Surrender all submarines
Surrender all bombers (i.e. all planes with more than one engine)
Surrender all Zeppelins
Surrender all artillery > 150mm
Surrender all tanks
Stop production of all lethal war materiel.
All German surface warships go to Baltic ports. Stop all construction and repair of warships.
Return all Allied POWs immediately.

Better than OTL, At least Germany could still do a credible defense with these terms and so perhaps could try and resist later if the final peace was unbearable. I only see the Allies accepting these until about September 15th 1918 (Bulgarian collapse) at which time they can ask for more. I only see the Germans accepting these after the end of July 1918 after which at least some people knew defeat was inevitable.

So I only see a range of about July 30th to September 10th where any sort more compromise armistice was possible. Then it would take a POD, perhaps something like:

OTL Austria told Germany it was done mid August and would need to sue for peace, in OTL Germany thought it could gain a defensive victory on the western front and achieve better terms, in this ATL Germany knows better (perhaps Ludendorf dies or is fired) and a request for peace is offered late August.

 

[ben0628]

I know that this really doesn't have to do with the original question, but after knocking out Russia, instead of using those extra troops on the Western Front, what would happen if Germany used them all in an offensive to knock out Italy or Greece, or reinforce the Ottomans?

 

[Glenn239]

I know that this really doesn't have to do with the original question, but after knocking out Russia, instead of using those extra troops on the Western Front, what would happen if Germany used them all in an offensive to knock out Italy or Greece, or reinforce the Ottomans?

Would help maintain the CP alliance into 1919 but doesn't solve the basic problem of 4 million Americans coming to France. An alternative might be just to let Austria and the Ottomans be defeated and concentrate all the resources for Germany.

 

[ben0628]

Using German troops from the former eastern front to win in Italy and the Balkans would theoretically allow the austrians and Bulgarians transfer hundreds of thousands of troops to the western front as well as the German troops. Knocking Italy and Greece out of the war would also be a huge blow to British and French morale and could allow the central powers to start a new front in southeastern France.

 

[Roland Traveler]

Using German troops from the former eastern front to win in Italy and the Balkans would theoretically allow the austrians and Bulgarians transfer hundreds of thousands of troops to the western front as well as the German troops. Knocking Italy and Greece out of the war would also be a huge blow to British and French morale and could allow the central powers to start a new front in southeastern France.

I've always thought that was the most logical choice for Germany. Maybe not politically expedient, but it would allow them to outflank the French. Italy was near breaking from Caporetto, 50 new divisions appearing on the front would probably make them sue for peace if they weren't broken from this attack.
Unfortunately this is about a defensive stance from Germany. Maybe spoiling attacks could draw out the war, but after America arrived in force, Germany was doomed without a deus ex machina. They'd probably have their best chance taking the Idi Amin guide to diplomacy and challenging the Allies to a boxing match.

 

[Mikestone8]

Would help maintain the CP alliance into 1919 but doesn't solve the basic problem of 4 million Americans coming to France. An alternative might be just to let Austria and the Ottomans be defeated and concentrate all the resources for Germany.

But if Austria collapses, then hundreds of miles of Germany's southern frontier are wide open to attack. How does she man this additional front?