Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon
- Thread starter galveston bay
- Start date
And Christie was such a moron to actually think that pointing out a problem was a personal attack on him.....
And refused to acknowledge that his torpedoes were broken and kept blaming the sub crews. Never My Fault.
Promoting the woefully unqualified and incompetent Almond to Corps command didn't help his image either.
(That he was considered the shining star of MacArthur's staff, after being shunted into a dead end job, speaks volumes)
Another reason for OTL, for keeping Hart in the Pacific. He had commanded Submarine command USN between the wars as well as commanding a 2 division squadron in Europe during WW I. In addition Hart, hart had twjce commanded the Naval Torpedo factory, and clashed with civilian staff over quality control.
If the torpedo and munition magazines at Marivales had been completed all torpedoes would have been safe, and the loss of S boat torpedos(which worked), would have allowed them more operational time i. Atea.
I have read differing views on him, but my own assessment is that MacArthur insisted that Almond do too many jobs at once and pushed him at Chosin which almost led to catastrophe.
Here is a helpful map showing the Japanese progress and American/Filipino collapse in the historical (OTL) 2nd Battle of Bataan (ITTL Good Friday Offensive)
https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/engineers_v1_1947/bataan_2nd_battle_1942.jpg
https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/engineers_v1_1947/bataan_2nd_battle_1942.jpg
Driftless
Donor
Comparing the two maps(historic-post #1206 and this universe-post #1183) shows a significant difference in position (to me anyway). Certainly the US & Philippines forces are in a really tough spot, but with some better position and less dire physical straights than historically. Are the allied forces in any condition to counterattack the apparent gap between the Japanese 4th & 16th Divisions, or is that beyond their reach at this point of the campaign?
time will tell, but artillery support would be minimal by the time this fight is over
a reminder, the PA Army Divisions have minimal artillery support (about a battalion of 12 75 mm guns each), and have about half to a quarter of the support weapons of the 2 Philippine Scout Divisions. Basically riflemen (and some equipped with shotguns and Tommy Guns) with a handful of machine guns per company. The 2 Philippine Scout Divisions have the standard heavy weapons of an American Infantry Division of 1941
Battle of Balanga Bagac Line (Day 3)
Night April 4 -5
II Corps is ordered to pull back as the scope of the Japanese offensive is now clear. The 11th Division abandons its positions on the southern slopes and summit of Mount Natib and retreats through the 21st Division which is ordered to prepare to fight a delaying action if pressed. The 11th is thus in reserve by mid-morning, with its troops eating a meal and getting some rest. The Japanese 16th Division is initially slow to discover the Allied move and thus does not begin moving to secure positions held by the 11th Division until daylight.
Meanwhile further east, the Japanese 4th and 38th Divisions and the 62nd Brigade dig in for the night and bring up ammunition and food for their troops and they are allowed to rest a bit. Surviving infiltrators pull back to Japanese positions so that mauled companies and battalions can reorganize and resupply. The American and Filipino troops meanwhile hurriedly bring up food and ammunition under darkness and absence of air attack and dig an emergency line. The 1st and 51st Divisions are both pulled out of the line and sent to rest and eat, while the front is taken over the the 12th and 23rd Divisions, plus the 101st Infantry Brigade and 6th Cavalry Brigade, supported by the anti-aircraft guns (deployed as a ground support weapons), tanks, half-tracks and Bren gun carriers to back them up. Artillery ammunition is down to just barely 2 units of fire remaining, and Wainwright authorizes King to shoot all of it except for a final reserve a few rounds per gun.
Day 3 (Easter Sunday, April 5)
At 0800 hours the Japanese open up with another heavy bombardment, this for two hours, concentrating their fire on the 101st Infantry Brigade and inflicting heavy losses on it. At 0945 hours the bombardment is widened across the entire front and at 1000 hours the 16th and 4th Divisions begin probing the positions opposite of them, while the 38th Division and 62nd Brigade launch a full scale assault supported by the engineers and tanks that remain as well as light artillery and anti-aircraft guns operating as direct ground support. Every light bomber that can fly is also in the air, as are the medium bombers which give Corregidor a day off in order to attack rear area positions at Pilar.
The most intense fighting of the day is the Japanese attack on the 6th Cavalry and 101st Infantry. The 6th Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS) and 112th Cavalry Regiment (Texas and Montana National Guard) has a thin line of 1,600 dismounted cavalry well supported by mortars, medium and heavy machine guns, 37 mm and 3 inch AAA guns, and the last 24 tanks of the 192nd Tank Battalion. The Japanese attack with 2,000 infantry of the 62nd Brigade, along with 1,000 surviving combat engineers, 40 tanks, and supported by 80 light artillery and anti-aircraft guns. They are attacking across dry rice paddies, a paved highway and the wreckage of trees and brush that had been ruined by the previous artillery and air strikes. American fire is withering, and in spite of three attempts, the Japanese make no forward progress in spite of very heavy casualties. Although at times the Japanese reach the main battle positions and fighting is hand to hand at times, in spite of the occasional local crisis, the line holds. This fight costs the Americans and Philippine Scouts 500 men and 10 tanks, but the Japanese lose over 800 men as well as 30 tanks and are too exhausted and to worn down to continue the fight. By night fall they have retreated to their start line and dug in for the night.
However while a major effort, this is not the principal attack. That falls on the 101st Infantry Brigade, whose 6 battalions are far less supplied with machine guns, have few mortars and while supported by anti-aircraft guns of the 3rd Coast Artillery and the remaining 22 tanks of the 194th Tank Battalion, the Japanese are attacking with 6 battalions of the 38th Infantry Division (4,200 infantry), another 1,000 engineers, 90 guns and 50 tanks. The terrain is mixed jungle and dry rice paddy, with most of the jungle having been blasted away. Both sides also pour their supporting artillery fire into this battle. The 2,500 infantry of the 101st fight desperately, and indeed beat back the first assault, but in hours of fighting are overrun. Heavy fire blasts apart most of the tanks on both sides, as well as infantry throwing bundles of dynamite, Molotov cocktails, and a few anti-tank rifles as well as tank versus tank fights in the smoke and dust of the battle
The Japanese overwhelm the 101st, although at a dreadful cost, but a desperate attack by the Filipino engineers of the engineer reserve, backed by the few remaining tanks, half tracks and Bren gun carriers manage to restore the line by the end of the day. However an attack just after dusk breaks the line again and this time only the the urgent dispatch of the Filipino 2nd Infantry Division (the least worn down of the 2 regiments of the 1st Infantry Division) manages to stabilize the line which is 2,000 yards back from its starting position. Although the infantry of the 101st are down to a few hundred spent survivors, their desperate efforts and that of the engineers later in the day prevented the Japanese from overrunning artillery positions and aid stations. Japanese losses amount to 3,800 men and 40 tanks, while Filipino and American losses are heavy too, at 2,200 men, 19 tanks, and 30 other tracked vehicles.
The 12th Division faces only a few probes and artillery fire over the day, but as 2 of its regiments are only lightly armed Philippine Army troops, General Weaver (acting I Corps commander) decides that an attack to relief pressure on the troops to his west would be ill advised. Instead he pulls the 57th Philippine Scouts out of the line and has the 2 Philippine Army regiments extend to cover the gap. This gives I Corps a reserve just as it commits the 1st Division at nightfall, but this move is not unobserved. A Japanese attack an hour after dusk overruns part of the 92nd Infantry (PA) but a counterattack by the 57th Philippine Scouts restores the line and in sharp fighting that lasts through most of the night manages to restore the line and link up with isolated survivors of 2 battalions of the 92nd by morning. This is the final gasp of the Japanese drive, one that costs them 800 casualties but Filipino casualties are high too, running to 700 men.
April 5 Stalemate
General Siechi orders a halt to further attacks as the situation becomes clear to him at dawn. In three days of hard fighting he has pushed the American and Filipinos back but has not broken them. It has cost him nearly 13,000 casualties, most of his tanks, his engineers are shattered remnants, and he has expended artillery ammunition that took nearly 2 months to stockpile. Both of his attack divisions are effectively gutted, while the 62nd Brigade is even worse shape. While he estimates he has inflicted heavy losses on the defenders, he is still looking at a continued siege.
For General King, the commander of Bataan, has his own problems. The fighting has cost him around 11,000 men, nearly all of his remaining tanks and other tracked vehicles are either knocked out or now so badly worn down as to be of little further utility, and his field and heavy artillery guns are now down to a few rounds each. These losses, along with the 13,000 men hospitalized and unfit for duty without many more weeks of recovery time (or longer) means that the Bataan force is now down to 95,000 men of which only around 60,000 are physically fit enough for duty after the wounded, sick and combat exhausted are taken into account. The Japanese have destroyed or wrecked beyond further combat effectiveness 14 infantry battalions, while 4 cavalry squadrons, 6 engineer battalions and and 6 other infantry battalions are reduced to strong companies in size. Of his divisions only 3 are reasonably intact, the rest have either lost whole formations or are so battered that their intact formations are shadows of themselves.
In the days ahead Wainwright and King are forced to make hard decisions.
II Corps is ordered to pull back as the scope of the Japanese offensive is now clear. The 11th Division abandons its positions on the southern slopes and summit of Mount Natib and retreats through the 21st Division which is ordered to prepare to fight a delaying action if pressed. The 11th is thus in reserve by mid-morning, with its troops eating a meal and getting some rest. The Japanese 16th Division is initially slow to discover the Allied move and thus does not begin moving to secure positions held by the 11th Division until daylight.
Meanwhile further east, the Japanese 4th and 38th Divisions and the 62nd Brigade dig in for the night and bring up ammunition and food for their troops and they are allowed to rest a bit. Surviving infiltrators pull back to Japanese positions so that mauled companies and battalions can reorganize and resupply. The American and Filipino troops meanwhile hurriedly bring up food and ammunition under darkness and absence of air attack and dig an emergency line. The 1st and 51st Divisions are both pulled out of the line and sent to rest and eat, while the front is taken over the the 12th and 23rd Divisions, plus the 101st Infantry Brigade and 6th Cavalry Brigade, supported by the anti-aircraft guns (deployed as a ground support weapons), tanks, half-tracks and Bren gun carriers to back them up. Artillery ammunition is down to just barely 2 units of fire remaining, and Wainwright authorizes King to shoot all of it except for a final reserve a few rounds per gun.
Day 3 (Easter Sunday, April 5)
At 0800 hours the Japanese open up with another heavy bombardment, this for two hours, concentrating their fire on the 101st Infantry Brigade and inflicting heavy losses on it. At 0945 hours the bombardment is widened across the entire front and at 1000 hours the 16th and 4th Divisions begin probing the positions opposite of them, while the 38th Division and 62nd Brigade launch a full scale assault supported by the engineers and tanks that remain as well as light artillery and anti-aircraft guns operating as direct ground support. Every light bomber that can fly is also in the air, as are the medium bombers which give Corregidor a day off in order to attack rear area positions at Pilar.
The most intense fighting of the day is the Japanese attack on the 6th Cavalry and 101st Infantry. The 6th Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS) and 112th Cavalry Regiment (Texas and Montana National Guard) has a thin line of 1,600 dismounted cavalry well supported by mortars, medium and heavy machine guns, 37 mm and 3 inch AAA guns, and the last 24 tanks of the 192nd Tank Battalion. The Japanese attack with 2,000 infantry of the 62nd Brigade, along with 1,000 surviving combat engineers, 40 tanks, and supported by 80 light artillery and anti-aircraft guns. They are attacking across dry rice paddies, a paved highway and the wreckage of trees and brush that had been ruined by the previous artillery and air strikes. American fire is withering, and in spite of three attempts, the Japanese make no forward progress in spite of very heavy casualties. Although at times the Japanese reach the main battle positions and fighting is hand to hand at times, in spite of the occasional local crisis, the line holds. This fight costs the Americans and Philippine Scouts 500 men and 10 tanks, but the Japanese lose over 800 men as well as 30 tanks and are too exhausted and to worn down to continue the fight. By night fall they have retreated to their start line and dug in for the night.
However while a major effort, this is not the principal attack. That falls on the 101st Infantry Brigade, whose 6 battalions are far less supplied with machine guns, have few mortars and while supported by anti-aircraft guns of the 3rd Coast Artillery and the remaining 22 tanks of the 194th Tank Battalion, the Japanese are attacking with 6 battalions of the 38th Infantry Division (4,200 infantry), another 1,000 engineers, 90 guns and 50 tanks. The terrain is mixed jungle and dry rice paddy, with most of the jungle having been blasted away. Both sides also pour their supporting artillery fire into this battle. The 2,500 infantry of the 101st fight desperately, and indeed beat back the first assault, but in hours of fighting are overrun. Heavy fire blasts apart most of the tanks on both sides, as well as infantry throwing bundles of dynamite, Molotov cocktails, and a few anti-tank rifles as well as tank versus tank fights in the smoke and dust of the battle
The Japanese overwhelm the 101st, although at a dreadful cost, but a desperate attack by the Filipino engineers of the engineer reserve, backed by the few remaining tanks, half tracks and Bren gun carriers manage to restore the line by the end of the day. However an attack just after dusk breaks the line again and this time only the the urgent dispatch of the Filipino 2nd Infantry Division (the least worn down of the 2 regiments of the 1st Infantry Division) manages to stabilize the line which is 2,000 yards back from its starting position. Although the infantry of the 101st are down to a few hundred spent survivors, their desperate efforts and that of the engineers later in the day prevented the Japanese from overrunning artillery positions and aid stations. Japanese losses amount to 3,800 men and 40 tanks, while Filipino and American losses are heavy too, at 2,200 men, 19 tanks, and 30 other tracked vehicles.
The 12th Division faces only a few probes and artillery fire over the day, but as 2 of its regiments are only lightly armed Philippine Army troops, General Weaver (acting I Corps commander) decides that an attack to relief pressure on the troops to his west would be ill advised. Instead he pulls the 57th Philippine Scouts out of the line and has the 2 Philippine Army regiments extend to cover the gap. This gives I Corps a reserve just as it commits the 1st Division at nightfall, but this move is not unobserved. A Japanese attack an hour after dusk overruns part of the 92nd Infantry (PA) but a counterattack by the 57th Philippine Scouts restores the line and in sharp fighting that lasts through most of the night manages to restore the line and link up with isolated survivors of 2 battalions of the 92nd by morning. This is the final gasp of the Japanese drive, one that costs them 800 casualties but Filipino casualties are high too, running to 700 men.
April 5 Stalemate
General Siechi orders a halt to further attacks as the situation becomes clear to him at dawn. In three days of hard fighting he has pushed the American and Filipinos back but has not broken them. It has cost him nearly 13,000 casualties, most of his tanks, his engineers are shattered remnants, and he has expended artillery ammunition that took nearly 2 months to stockpile. Both of his attack divisions are effectively gutted, while the 62nd Brigade is even worse shape. While he estimates he has inflicted heavy losses on the defenders, he is still looking at a continued siege.
For General King, the commander of Bataan, has his own problems. The fighting has cost him around 11,000 men, nearly all of his remaining tanks and other tracked vehicles are either knocked out or now so badly worn down as to be of little further utility, and his field and heavy artillery guns are now down to a few rounds each. These losses, along with the 13,000 men hospitalized and unfit for duty without many more weeks of recovery time (or longer) means that the Bataan force is now down to 95,000 men of which only around 60,000 are physically fit enough for duty after the wounded, sick and combat exhausted are taken into account. The Japanese have destroyed or wrecked beyond further combat effectiveness 14 infantry battalions, while 4 cavalry squadrons, 6 engineer battalions and and 6 other infantry battalions are reduced to strong companies in size. Of his divisions only 3 are reasonably intact, the rest have either lost whole formations or are so battered that their intact formations are shadows of themselves.
In the days ahead Wainwright and King are forced to make hard decisions.
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authors note: Unlike the Good Friday Offensive in OTL, which turned out to be the final offensive, the American and Filipino troops are sufficiently fit to fight and thus their morale is reasonably good. They hold. Barely, but they hold.
In a lot of ways this siege is mimicking what the Japanese faced at Port Arthur in 1905, and after two major assaults that failed to achieve a decisive results the Japanese are finally going to start treating it as such. The dogged and effective resistance by the American and Filipino troops here will also cause the Japanese Army at least to consider the Americans to be more dangerous foes and reduce some of the more obvious effects of "Victory Disease" that resulted in debacles such as the first two Japanese ground offensives at Guadalcanal in OTL.
In a lot of ways this siege is mimicking what the Japanese faced at Port Arthur in 1905, and after two major assaults that failed to achieve a decisive results the Japanese are finally going to start treating it as such. The dogged and effective resistance by the American and Filipino troops here will also cause the Japanese Army at least to consider the Americans to be more dangerous foes and reduce some of the more obvious effects of "Victory Disease" that resulted in debacles such as the first two Japanese ground offensives at Guadalcanal in OTL.
Well Bataan is eventually going to fall as attrition can be decisive
Guardian54
Banned
True. However, there's no reason they can't destroy twice as many Japanese troops as their own number.
From the California Military Museum (worth a visit if you are ever in Sacramento)
Company C / 194th Tank Battalion was California National Guard
http://www.militarymuseum.org/Bataan.html