Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon

Reader mode
galileo-034

galileo-034

That brings me to another one (or two):
  1. Which is reach of Corregidor guns on the map (relief into account)?
  2. Even if using these guns was a possibility, would the low ammunitions reserves keep their use for the battle of Corregidor itself?
 

galveston bay

galileo-034 said:
That brings me to another one (or two):
  1. Which is reach of Corregidor guns on the map (relief into account)?
  2. Even if using these guns was a possibility, would the low ammunitions reserves keep their use for the battle of Corregidor itself?
Click to expand...

There are very few high explosive rounds for the 12 inch mortars, so they are being held back. OTL, they were saved for counterbattery for artillery positions that were spotted, and used shortly after Bataan surrendered to try to slow the Japanese build up.
 
Battle of Balanga Bagac Line (Day 2)
  • Index

    • galveston bay

    April 4 (Holy Saturday) Day 2
    The Japanese continue their attack at first light with another heavy bombardment of two hours aimed at suspected Luzon Force artillery positions, while light artillery pounds the now isolated positions held b the 3rd Infantry Regiment (1st Inf Div) and 57th Philippine Scouts Regiment (51st Inf Div). General King has the 23rd Infantry move to cover the flank and rear of II Corps, moving the Corps artillery to support it, leaving the 11th and 21st Division to hold the line with little support. However the Japanese 16th Infantry Division continues to face II Corps and launches a few probes but little else.

    The main Japanese attack begins at 0900 hours once again, with the 38th Infantry Division driving through the gap with 3rd Infantry Regiment, supported by an engineer regiment, a tank regiment and 3 light artillery battalions. The Japanese run smack into the 12th Infantry Division which has launched its own counterattack to clear infiltrators from the 51st and 1st Infantry Division rear area, supported by motorized AAA guns of the 3rd Coast Artillery and the 20 remaining tanks of the 192nd Tank Battalion. This results in a meeting engagement and a head on clash, and both sides see their attacks stall as infantry go to ground under heavy fire from artillery, mortars and machine guns. As a result, very little ground changes hands that day and deadlock results.

    However, on the flanks of the penetration, strong combined arms forces of infantry, engineers, tanks, light anti-aircraft guns, and light artillery wipe out the remainder of the 57th Philippine Scouts and 3rd Philippine Infantry Regiment and only a handful of survivors of each manages to eventually make their way to friendly positions. General Lim gets King to authorize a pull back by the remainder of the 51st and 1st Infantry battalions holding the line, aided by strong support from the 23rd Infantry Division and 6th Cavalry Brigade. By midnight all 4 regiments have successfully pulled back.

    It is a costly day, with Japanese losing 3,500 men, 40 tanks and 35 guns, while the Luzon Force losses are 2 entire infantry regiments, 4,700 men, 20 tanks, and 25 guns. Heavy bombing attacks continue all day as well but fierce opposition from ground fire downs 12 Japanese light bombers, with another 8 lost to operational causes. King has also made what will be the his most important decision, releasing 90% of remaining artillery ammunition for use, convinced that if the Japanese are not stopped this time there will not be another battle. Meanwhile General Siechi is satisfied with the elimination of 2 entire American regiments but is frustrated by the deadlock that resulted when his best division ran head on into the American counterattack. He is also concerned about his supply situation as almost 75% of his artillery ammunition has been exhausted and a breakthrough does not appear imminent.

    The 4th Division and 62nd Brigade are both down to 50% of their infantry, with the engineers down to 30% of their starting strength and half of his tanks are knocked out or broken down. The 38th Division is in better shape, still at 80% of its infantry strength, but his intact division, the 16th, is not in position to attack as it is spread to thin holding the line in front of the American II Corps.

    good friday offensive day.jpg


    II Corps and the 16th Division are both on the defensive and have moved little. The situation in the I Corps area is fluid, for both sides, although the American fixed positions have been abandoned or overrun.

    At this point the only remaining uncommitted American reserve is the Engineer Brigade (PA) and the Marine 1st Provisional Battalion (which can field 2 machine gun companies in a pinch) The Japanese lack any significant reserves available for the battle.

     
    Last edited:
  • Index

    • RyderWest

    galveston bay said:
    They will eventually replace their losses but every tank and gun lost to the defenders of Bataan is gone for good.
    Click to expand...
    Yep. And the IJA cannot just go to the reserves and get a new tank or artillery piece, because they have no reserves.

    As long as the defenders of Bataan keep cutting and bleeding the Japanese dry, they can retreat in good order.
     

    galveston bay

    vl100butch said:
    Where are the Bren gun carriers? Even a scratch force counter attack could make things very unpleasant for the Japanese...
    Click to expand...

    those Bren Gun carriers are why the 3rd Coast Artillery is motorized .. .they are hauling 37 mm and 3 inch AAA guns as well as heavy machine guns, along with some half tracks
     

    galveston bay

    RyderWest said:
    Yep. And the IJA cannot just go to the reserves and get a new tank or artillery piece, because they have no reserves.

    As long as the defenders of Bataan keep cutting and bleeding the Japanese dry, they can retreat in good order.
    Click to expand...

    The Japanese are going to have to figure out a way to replace their tanks. As all of the tanks in Luzon are present at Bataan, they will have to take some from somewhere else, which means someplace else has fewer tanks. Japanese tank production dropped substantially during the war in OTL, so some discussions between the Army and Navy will be a bit heated in regards to resource allocation.
     

    vl100butch

    Thanks gb, guess I have to go back and re-read

    even organized in an improvised manner, the 1941 unit brings a lot of firepower that could be very useful at this point of the battle, Bren gun carriers rampaging in the Japanese rear could delay things for a couple of more months
     
    Last edited:

    sloreck

    If the Japanese don't do it now, they are in for a protracted siege for several more months. Submarine runs (including the Nautilus and Argonaut) will keep a trickle of supplies coming in, and wounded going out - priority to those who are either never going to return to the fight or those who would but with long recovery times - as well as any remaining personnel who can't be captured. I wonder if it would be worthwhile to try and get some folks out to beyond the perimeter to work with the Filipino stay behind forces. In theory the Japanese could continue artillery and air raid harassment occasional infantry attacks and eventually the Americans would run out of ammo, food, medical supplies. Then, of course, the harbor forts.

    The problem for the Japanese is with the personnel and equipment losses they have had, to do anything but a "siege" is really severely robbing Peter to pay Paul. Additionally, until Bataan and the forts are captured, Manila Bay is useless. The end is inevitable, but the "Battling Bastards of Bataan" have already made the japanese pay more than they can afford in time, personnel, and equipment. If they can ride out this attack...
     

    galveston bay

    Bob in Pittsburgh said:
    This is an excellent story line. Among other things it shows what might have happened if MacArthur had moved supplies to Bataan.
    Click to expand...

    Thanks for the kind words.

    That failure to move and organize supplies, more than any other issue, is what makes me the most angry about MacArthur. The aircraft caught on the ground at Clark Field is annoying, but probably had far less impact on the Fall of Luzon (although some increased losses on the Japanese would have some interesting butterflies)
     

    Barry Bull

    Donor
    galveston bay said:
    Thanks for the kind words.

    That failure to move and organize supplies, more than any other issue, is what makes me the most angry about MacArthur. The aircraft caught on the ground at Clark Field is annoying, but probably had far less impact on the Fall of Luzon (although some increased losses on the Japanese would have some interesting butterflies)
    Click to expand...

    That's probably caused by chronic underestimating what the Japanese force was capable of AND daring to do. It is by no means unique to MacArthur, the racist stereotype was prevalent among US forces before the war, but as a self-claimed 'expert' in Japanese matter who have been on the spot for a while, he should have and ought to have know better.
     

    sloreck

    The failure to move supplies to Bataan was part and parcel of his decision to try and defend Luzon starting at the beaches with forces that were inadequate in number, not well trained, and not well equipped. The plan to fall back to Bataan WITH a well supplied base and hold out on Bataan and the harbor forts was a well established plan, and frankly the best that could be done. By 1941 it was clear that the odds of the US being able to relieve to PI were dim indeed, and really this had been accepted since the immediate post WWI period. While the Japanese attack was stronger and "better" than expected from the "slant eyes" the reality is that even given the racist underestimating of Japanese capabilities planners had expected that geography, if nothing else, meant a relief of the PI in the face of Japanese attack was a longshot at best.

    MacArthur's ego convinced him of his expertise on the "Oriental Mind" (tm). The reality is that throughout the entire Philippine campaign he consistently underestimated the Japanese, even after the proof was right in front of him. In Korea, again his "expertise" allowed him to pooh-pooh the possibility of China entering the war. Furthermore he let himself be surrounded by sycophants, and as long as they kissed ass he ignored their numerous failings. Willoughby's complete incompetence as a senior intelligence officer is perhaps the most glaring case of this.

    I won't even bring up MacArthur's shabby actions against the Bonus Army in the 30's.

    On his behalf he was personally brave, and his decision at Inchon was brilliant. Whether or not that balances things out I leave to the gentle reader.
     

    Butchpfd

    galveston bay said:
    Thanks for the kind words.

    That failure to move and organize supplies, more than any other issue, is what makes me the most angry about MacArthur. The aircraft caught on the ground at Clark Field is annoying, but probably had far less impact on the Fall of Luzon (although some increased losses on the Japanese would have some interesting butterflies)
    Click to expand...

    Having aircraft to defend Cavite, would have allowed the Navy to finish moving torpedos and other submarine supplies to Miravales.
     

    galveston bay

    Butchpfd said:
    Having aircraft to defend Cavite, would have allowed the Navy to finish moving torpedos and other submarine supplies to Miravales.
    Click to expand...

    Sure, but again, would not have saved Luzon. It wasn't just the torpedoes that were a problem at the start of the war for the submarines of the Asiatic Fleet. Several commanders were relieved for lack of aggression (and worse), Lingayen Gulf was a very difficult for submarines to operate in.

    But I do agree any bit of damage they can do does add up ... just not early on.
     

    sloreck

    Part of the problems with submarines was the doctrine that supported attacks made on sonar readings, rather than direct periscope observation.
     
    Reader mode
    You must log in or register to reply here.
    Top
    Top